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Abstract	  
In	   this	   thesis,	   I	  unpack	  the	  mutation	  of	  Mexican	  organized	  crime	  by	  providing	   insights	  of	  unprecedented	   depth	   into	   one	   of	   the	   field’s	   principal	   actors	   of	   the	   past	   decade,	   Los	  
Caballeros	  Templarios	  (The	  Knights	  Templar,	  LCT).	  My	  elaborations	  are	  based	  on	  firsthand	  qualitative	   data.	   During	   a	   year	   of	   fieldwork,	   I	   conducted	   ethnographic	   research	   in	   LCT’s	  core	   operational	   territory	   of	   Tierra	   Caliente,	  Michoacán,	   including	   interviews	  with	   LCT’s	  leaders	  and	   local	  civilians.	  Drawing	  on	  these	  data,	   I	  situate	  LCT	  as	  a	  phenomenon	  deeply	  engrained	  in	  the	  liquefaction	  and	  reshuffling	  of	  social	  order,	  governance,	  and	  sovereignty	  in	  Mexico	  and	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  ‘global	  south’.	  In	  this	  setting,	  the	  problem	  of	  survival	  is	  as	  eminent	   for	   non-­‐state	   armed	   actors	   as	   it	   is	   for	   state	   actors.	   Upon	   revisiting	   historical	  transformations	   of	   Michoacán	   organized	   crime,	   I	   analyze	   how	   LCT	   sought	   to	   secure	  permanence	   through	   a	   hybrid	   form	   of	   criminal	   agency	   that	   defies	   default	   approaches	   to	  organized	  crime.	  The	  group	  perceived	  a	  minimum	  degree	  of	  legitimacy	  as	  crucial	  to	  control	  over	  locally	  rooted	  resources	  and	  thus	  survival.	  I	  argue	  that	  this	  drove	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  project	  of	  alternative	  governance;	   in	  essence	  a	  ceremonially	  enacted	  narrative	  portraying	  LCT	  as	  a	  guardian	  of	  social	  order.	  By	  contrasting	  ‘official’	  claims	  with	  the	  lived	  experiences	  of	  civilians,	  I	  examine	  the	  latter’s	  performance	  and	  impact	  on	  local	  communities	  and	  lives.	  Furthermore,	   and	   as	   opposed	   to	   the	   predominant	   reduction	   of	   state-­‐organized	   crime-­‐interactions	  (in	  Mexico)	  to	  violent	  antagonism,	  LCT	  did	  not	  pursue	  its	  project	  of	  alternative	  governance	  against	  or	  without	  the	  state	  per	  se.	  Rather,	  I	  contend,	  higher-­‐level	  state	  actors	  and	   LCT	   converged	   in	   the	   production	   of	   a	   trans-­‐legal	   order.	   The	   state’s	   symbolic-­‐legal	  façade	   is	   here	   carried	   by	   actors	   standing	   on	   either	   side	   of	   the	   binary	   licit-­‐illicit-­‐divide,	  which	  acts	  as	  a	  veil	  for	  shared	  access	  to	  resources	  stereotypically	  exclusive	  to	  ‘the’	  state.	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Chapter	  1:	  Introduction	  	  	  
The	  process	  leading	  to	  the	  present	  thesis	  started	  some	  years	  before	  I	  officially	  commenced	  a	  PhD	  program	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Essex	  in	   late	  2010.	  A	  year	  spent	  at	  a	  Californian	  high	  school	   proved	   highly	   formative	   in	   this	   respect.	   Fresno,	   situated	   in	   the	   heart	   of	   the	  Californian	   agricultural	   mega-­‐industry	   and	   a	   classical	   migratory	   destination,	   offered	   a	  veritable	  chunk	  of	  Mexico	  north	  of	  the	  border	  and,	  personally,	  contacts	  south	  of	  it.	  Having	  fallen	  for	  Mexico	  whilst	  at	  Fresno	  and	  during	  a	  number	  of	  subsequent	  visits	  to	  the	  country,	  my	  incipient	  university	  career	  took	  a	  turn	  towards	  Latin	  American	  area	  studies.	  Following	  a	  semester’s	  worth	  of	  studies	  in	  Mexico	  City	  in	  2007,	  I	  was	  longing	  to	  escape	  from	  the	  city.	  The	   way	   to	   go	   in	   this	   respect	   had	   been	   established	   by	   my	   fellow	   chilangos1	  and	   the	  countless	  mezcal2-­‐drenched	  tales	  praising	  all	  the	  hidden	  treasures	  of	  the	  Pacific	  coastline	  and	  their	  otherworldly	  beauty.	  All	   the	  more	  convincing	  were	   the	  stories	  my	  Argentinean	  flatmate	   and	   I	   enjoyed	   one	   night	   for	   the	   narrator,	   in	   this	   case,	   had	   not	   only	   high-­‐proof	  liquor	  but	  also	  photographic	  evidence	  to	  back	  such	  tales	  up.	  	  	  A	   couple	   of	   weeks	   later,	   my	   girlfriend	   and	   I	   arrived	   in	   Maruata	   and	   what	   we	   found	  exceeded	   our	   expectations.	   Sitting	   on	   the	   largely	   virgin	   coast	   of	   the	   federated	   state	   of	  Michoacán,	   the	   small	   fishing	   village	  was	  breathtaking.	   From	   the	  hammocks	  hung	  on	  our	  rustic	   cabin’s	   porch,	   we	   gazed	   at	   a	   truly	   tropical	   paradise:	   to	   one	   side,	   a	   180-­‐degree	  panorama	  of	  the	  emerald	  green	  Pacific	  and	  the	  numerous	  small	  bays	  it	  had	  carved	  into	  the	  steep	   rocky	   coast,	   gradually	   giving	  way	   to	   fine	   sandy	  beaches;	   to	   the	   other,	   the	   village’s	  palm-­‐covered	   shacks,	   given	   a	   foggy,	   mysterious	   aura	   by	   the	   dispersed	   smoke	   columns	  emerging	  from	  open	  fires	  and	  set	  against	  a	  rapidly	  rising,	  lush	  mountainside.	  Maruata	  well	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Mexican	  Spanish	  for	  Mexico-­‐City	  dwellers.	  	  2	  An	  agave	  distillate	  similar	  to	  tequila.	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deserved	  its	  name,	  meaning	  ‘where	  there	  are	  precious	  things’	  in	  náhuatl3.	  Natural	  beauty	  was,	  however,	  not	  the	  only	  precious	  thing	  on	  offer.	  Nor	  was	  a	  roof	  over	  our	  heads	  the	  only	  service	   proffered	   by	   our	   landlord,	   a	   proud	   beer-­‐bellied	   man	   in	   his	   mid-­‐forties	   who	  introduced	  himself	  and	  was	  respectfully	  referred	  to	  by	  other	  locals	  as	  El	  Mecho4.	  With	  the	  price	  of	  the	  cabin	  negotiated	  and	  the	  obligatory	  introductory	  chitchat	  about	  preferences	  in	  football	   teams	   and	   the	   like	   finished,	  El	  Mecho	   undertook	   the	   strenuous	   five-­‐feet	   passage	  from	  hammock	  to	  cabin.	  He	  reemerged	  with	  a	  large	  black	  garbage	  sack,	  reached	  deep	  into	  it,	  pulled	  out	  two	  handfuls	  of	  mota5,	  grinned	  widely,	  and	  bluntly	  asked:	  ‘So,	  how	  much	  do	  you	  want?’	  	  	  Maruata’s	   illicit	   drugs	   portfolio,	   it	   turned	   out,	   further	   transcended	   export-­‐grade	   mota	  grown	   in	   conformity	   to	   US-­‐American	   demand	   (‘This	   is	   how	   the	   gringos6	  like	   it’)	   on	   El	  
Mecho’s	  plantation.	  Within	  the	  first	  few	  hours	  of	  exploring	  the	  community	  on	  foot,	  we	  were	  shown	  and	  offered	  opium,	  psilocybin	  (‘magic’)	  mushrooms,	  as	  well	  as	  cocaine.	  A	  few	  days	  into	   our	   stay,	   my	   reluctance	   to	   give	   in	   to	  my	   girlfriend’s	   apparent	   need	   for	   sunbathing	  received	  unexpected	  support.	  Having	  had	  the	  whole	  beach	  to	  ourselves	  for	  most	  of	  the	  day,	  company	  came	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  group	  of	  fifteen	  youngsters.	  The	  lavish	  tattoos	  across	  their	  faces	  and	  bare	  chests	  were	  a	  dead	  give-­‐away	  of	   their	  mara7	  affiliation.	  My	  greeting	   from	  afar	  was	  reciprocated	  yet	  a	  certain	  element	  of	  discomfort	   remained	  due	   to	   the	  awkward	  juxtapositioning	   of	   the	   intense	   display	   of	   violent	  masculinity	   to	  my	   right	   and	  my	  bikini-­‐covered	  Northern	  European	  girlfriend	  to	  my	  left.	  At	  night,	  we	  once	  again	  used	  our	  contact	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  The	  most	  widely	  spoken	  indigenous	  language	  in	  Mexico.	  	  4	  Due	   to	   security	   considerations	   and	  with	   the	   exception	   of	   leading	  members	   of	   Los	   Caballeros	  Templarios	  (LCT),	  pseudonyms	  are	  used	  throughout	  this	  thesis.	  	  5	  Mexican	  Spanish	  for	  Marihuana	  (colloquial).	  	  6	  Gringo	  designates	  US-­‐Americans	  (and,	  to	  a	  lesser	  degree,	  other	  foreigners	  who	  look	  alike)	  and	  can	  carry	  a	  pejorative	  meaning.	  	  7	  Widely	  feared	  Central/North-­‐American	  youth	  gangs.	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with	   local	   families	   serving	   fresh	   seafood	   in	   front	   of	   their	   shacks	   to	   inquire	   who	   these	  visitors	   were.	   Not	   originally	   from	   the	   community	   the	   youngsters	   would,	   we	   were	   told,	  sometimes	   come	   down	   to	   the	   beach.	   To	   take	   a	   break,	   our	   shrugging	   host	   hypothesized	  about	   the	   training	   imparted	   to	   them	  by	  a	  more	  organized	  group	  whose	  name	  he	  did	  not	  care	  to	  mention	  specifically.	  
	  
Basic	  themes,	  research	  questions,	  and	  aims	  	  	   	  
The	  seeming	  paradox	  of	  a	  phenomenon	  out	  in	  the	  open	  	  
In	   retrospect,	  my	   vacation-­‐turned-­‐field	   research-­‐trip	   provided	  my	   first	   contact	  with	   the	  local	   fall-­‐out	   of	   el	   narco,	   the	   (somewhat	   nebulous)	   synonym	   for	   contemporary	  Mexican	  organized	  crime.	  These	   few	  days	  had	  sufficed	   for	  me	   to	  naively	   stumble	  across	   traces	  of	  some	  of	  the	  very	  themes	  that	  would	  define	  the	  whole	  of	  my	  PhD	  project.	  Most	  importantly,	  my	   first	   close-­‐up	  encounter	  with	  Mexican	  organized	  crime	  had	   left	  me	  perplexed.	  As	   the	  sources	  –	  academic,	  journalistic,	  and	  official	  alike	  –	  I	  subsequently	  consulted	  offered	  little	  to	  satisfy	  my	  curiosity,	   it	  had	  provided	  the	  initial	  stimulation	  for	  the	  present	  study.	  As	  of	  the	   time	   of	  my	   visit	   to	  Maruata,	   Mexican	   organized	   crime	   had	   recently	   entered	   into	   its	  phase	   of	   hyper-­‐violence,	   thereby	   capturing	   the	   world’s	   attention	   and	   firing	   up	   its	  imagination.	  On	  the	  day	  he	  entered	  office,	  Felipe	  Calderón	  Hinojosa	  declared	  the	   ‘war	  on	  organized	   crime’	   –	   a	   mere	   relabeling	   of	   the	   ‘war	   on	   drugs’	   –	   his	   presidency’s	   defining	  policy.	  The	  full	  force	  of	  the	  state,	  including	  its	  armed	  forces,	  would	  be	  applied	  until	  ‘public	  spaces	   would	   once	   again	   be	   for	   our	   children	   and	   not	   territories	   for	   criminals	   [sic]’	  (Calderón,	   2006).	   Michoacán,	   his	   home	   state,	   became	   the	   first	   stage	   for	   a	   fight	   without	  ‘truce	  nor	  mercy	  for	  the	  enemies	  of	  Mexico’	  (Calderón,	  2007,	  cited	  in:	  Emol,	  2007).	  Indeed,	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the	   coastal	   road	   leading	   to	   Maruata	   was	   loaded	   with	   checkpoints	   manned	   by	   soldiers.	  When	   stopping	   and	   searching	   travelers	   such	   as	  myself,	   they	   brandished	   semi-­‐automatic	  assault	  rifles,	  visibly	  enacting	  the	  government’s	  bellicose	  commitment.	  However,	  inside	  the	  community	  and	  barely	  a	  stone’s	  throw	  from	  the	  closest	  checkpoint	  I	  encountered	  business	  as	   usual.	  El	  Mecho,	   for	   one,	   seemed	   confident	   enough	   to	   stock	   quantities	   of	  mota	   in	   his	  living	   room	   large	   enough	   to	   get	   him	   serious	   time	   in	   prison.	  Mareros8	  said	   to	   collaborate	  with	  criminal	  organizations,	  were	  hanging	  about	  on	  the	  beach,	  and	  despite	  the	  ostensible	  presence	  of	  drugs	  and	  narcotrafficking9	  in	   locals’	   lives	  (and	   livelihoods)	   the	  community’s	  
seemingly	  undisturbed	  tropical	  easiness	  contrasted	  with	  the	  outside	  world’s	  suggestion	  of	  a	  constant	  state	  of	  emergency.	  Against	  all	  odds,	  organized	  crime	  (or	  its	  traces)	  manifested	  itself	  overtly	  and	  almost	  banally,	   imposing	   itself	  onto	   the	  willing	  and	  unwilling	  observer	  alike	  without	  any	  hint	  of	  attempted	  concealment.	  	  	  On	  a	  larger	  and	  more	  spectacular	  scale,	  the	  seemingly	  paradoxical	  out-­‐in-­‐the-­‐openness	  of	  a	  phenomenon	  usually	   asserted	   to	   be	   condemned	   to	   clandestinity	   due	   to	   its	   illegal	   nature	  found	  a	  reflection	  in	  the	  local	  emblem	  of	  el	  narco:	  Los	  Caballeros	  Templarios	  (‘The	  Knights	  Templar’,	  LCT).10	  This	  group,	  counted	  amongst	  Mexico’s	  major	  criminal	  organizations	  (e.g.	  Beittel,	  2013),	  was	  not	  confining	   its	  activities	   to	   the	  sphere	  of	   the	   ‘underworld’.	  Much	   to	  the	   contrary:	   from	   its	   creation	   in	   2005	   onwards,	   it	   deliberately	   sought	   public	   attention,	  feeding	   communiqués	   to	   diverse	   media	   or	   releasing	   them	   directly	   to	   local	   civilian	  populations.	  In	  these,	  it	  did	  not	  only	  claim	  dominion	  over	  Michoacán	  as	  its	  designated	  core	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Members	  of	  mara	  gangs.	  	  9	  Reflecting	  common	  usage	  and	  unless	  specified	  otherwise,	  I	  use	  narcotrafficking	  generically	  to	  connote	  both	  drugs	  production	  and/or	  trafficking.	  	  	  10	  LCT	  first	  surfaced	  under	  the	  label	  La	  Familia	  Michoacana	  (‘The	  Michoacán	  Family’,	  LFM).	  The	  outcome	  of	  an	  internal	  scission	  in	  late	  2010,	  the	  faction	  that	  emerged	  victoriously	  relabeled	  into	  LCT.	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	   this	   thesis	   and	   unless	   indicated	   otherwise,	   I	   use	   both	   labels	   indifferently	   to	   refer	   to	   the	   faction	   in	  question.	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operational	  territory	  but	  advanced	  a	  narrative	  depicting	  it	  as	  much	  more	  than	  a	  criminal	  organization.	  Moreover,	  it	  claimed	  to	  have	  come	  into	  existence	  in	  the	  first	  place	  to	  ‘clean	  up	  society’	  as	  a	  guardian	  of	  social	  order,	  a	  bulwark	  necessary	  to	  fence	  off	  internal	  and	  external	  threats	   alike.	   Despite	   such	   exposure,	   Calderón’s	   proclaimed	   will	   to	   first	   take	   this	   very	  group	   out	   of	   the	   picture,	   and	   then	   eliminate	   territorial	   competition	   from	   hostile	   illicit	  actors,	  LCT	  appeared	  to	  have	  achieved	  the	  standing	  as	  el	  poder	  fáctico	  (the	  de	  facto	  power)	  by	  the	  time	  I	  returned	  to	  Michoacán	  in	  2011	  to	  conduct	  fieldwork.	  This	  was	  presented	  to	  me	  as	  fact	  by	  virtually	  anybody	  I	  interacted	  with,	  be	  they	  local	  civilians,	  journalists,	  actors	  in	   the	   private	   sector,	   civil	   society	   groups,	   the	   leaders	   of	   LCT	   themselves,	   and	   not	   least	  government	  functionaries.	  	  	  	  
	  
What	  it	  takes	  to	  stay	  afloat:	  Survival	  in	  the	  world	  of	  Mexican	  organized	  crime	  	  
This	  thesis	  departs	  from	  this	  seeming	  paradox:	  What	  accounts	  for	  LCT’s	  manifest	  degree	  of	  territorial	  dominion	  and,	  closely	  related,	  its	  seemingly	  favorable	  prospects	  for	  survival	  in	  spite	  of	  gravely	  adverse	  environmental	  circumstances?	  Under	  the	  volatile	  conditions	  that	  characterize	  contemporary	  Latin	  America	  and	  Mexico	  in	  particular,	  this	  question	  does	  not	  lend	  itself	  to	  an	  easy	  answer.	  Against	  the	  backdrop	  of	  the	  disintegration	  of	  the	  ‘traditional’	  nation-­‐state	  and	  its	  increasingly	  constrained	  capacity	  to	  govern	  and	  uphold	  its	  monopoly	  on	   legitimate	   coercion,	   societies	   across	   the	   ‘global	   south’	   have	   seen	   the	   emergence	   and	  increasing	  prominence	  of	   ‘multiple,	   localized,	  and	  relatively	  autonomous	  cores	  of	  power’	  (Davis,	  2010:6).	  Davis	   (ibid.)	  refers	   to	   the	  resulting	  state	  of	  affairs	  as	  one	  of	   ‘fragmented	  sovereignty’.	  Here,	  a	  true	  kaleidoscope	  of	  actors	  situated	  everywhere	  and	  anywhere	  on	  a	  blurry	   licit-­‐illicit-­‐continuum	   is	   involved	   in	   the	   reshuffled	  production	  of	   rule,	   governance,	  and	   authority.	   This	   encompasses	   actors	   as	   diverse	   as	   (ad-­‐hoc)	   neighborhood	   watches,	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more	   or	   less	   spontaneous	   expressions	   of	   informal	   justice	   (e.g.	   lynching),	   vigilantism,	  private	   security	   firms,	   state-­‐connected	   and/or	   state-­‐sponsored	   para-­‐militarism,	   youth	  gangs,	   and	   also	   criminal	   organizations	   such	   as	   LCT.	   In	   addition,	   the	   outcomes	   produced	  differ	  enormously	   in	   terms	  of	  spatial	  extension,	  organizational	  structuredness,	  as	  well	  as	  duration	  (see	  Arias/	  Goldstein,	  2010;	  see	  also	  Koonings/Kruijt,	  2004;	  Comaroff/Comaroff,	  2006	  and	  Clunan/Trinkunas,	  2010	  for	  well-­‐informed	  overviews).	  	  	  This	  constellation	  entails	  a	  severe	  problem	  of	  state	  control	  over	  territory,	  resources,	  and	  means	  of	  coercion.	  Much	  of	  the	  debate	  on	  the	  outlined	  developments	  has	  been	  centered	  on	  this	   finding,	  with	  emphasis	  placed	  on	   its	   threat	  potential	   for	   (democratic)	   state	   rule	  and	  how	   it	   should	   be	   countered	   from	   a	   policy	   perspective	   (see	   e.g.	   Duffield,	   2001;	  Williams,	  2010;	   Adams,	   2011;	   Kaldor,	   2012).	   Suggestions	   by	   (US)	   policy	   makers	   and	   associated	  academicians	   that	   the	   Mexican	   state	   has	   ‘failed’	   or	   is	   on	   the	   brink	   of	   failing	   forcefully	  second	  such	  assessments	  (see	  e.g.	  New	  York	  Times,	  2009).	  Though	  the	   latter	  assertion	   is	  certainly	  contentious	  and	  indeed	  of	   little	  help	  in	  analytical	  terms,	  anti-­‐statist	  (neoliberal)	  reforms	  advanced	  in	  great	  intensity	  from	  the	  1980s	  effectively	  entailed	  a	  significant	  loss	  in	  regulatory	  and	  governmental	  capacities	  (see	  Gledhill,	  1995).	  In	  parallel,	  Mexico’s	  one-­‐party	  system,	  kept	  afloat	  by	  a	  mixture	  of	  paternalist	  social	  policy,	  repression,	  and	  the	  mitigation	  of	   societal	   cleavages	   qua	   top-­‐down	   corporatism,	   underwent	   gradual	   dismantling	   (see	  Camp,	   1999).	   Both	   factors	   would	   cast	   their	   shadow	   on	   the	   development	   of	   Mexican	  organized	  crime	  and	  contemporary	  conflict	  dynamics.	  For	   the	   loss	   in	  regulatory	  capacity	  extended	   well	   into	   the	   realm	   of	   the	   illicit.	   For	   decades,	   as	   the	   default	   argument	   goes,	  Mexican	   organized	   crime	  was	   characterized	   by	   low	   levels	   of	   violence	   due	   to	   the	   state’s	  capacity	   to	   informally	   regulate	   criminal	   markets	   (above	   all	   narcotrafficking),	   mediate	  amongst	  participants,	  and	  establish	  the	   ‘rules	  of	   the	  game’.	  To	  cut	  a	   long	  story	  short,	   the	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dismantlement	   of	   Mexico’s	   one-­‐party	   system	   undermined	   the	   efficacy	   of	   this	   ‘state-­‐sponsored	   protection	   racket’	   (Snyder/	   Duran,	   2009;	   see	   also	   Astorga,	   1996	   and	   Flores	  Pérez,	  2009:137-­‐227),	  ultimately	  giving	  birth	  to	  the	  hyperviolence	  the	  country	  has	  become	  notorious	  for.11	  	  	  	  This	  constellation	  has	  proven	  paradoxical	  for	  Mexican	  organized	  criminal	  actors	  and,	  more	  widely	   speaking,	   for	   non-­‐state	   armed	   actors.	   It	   provides	   increased	   action	   space	   and	  opportunities.	   What	   I	   refer	   to	   as	   the	   ‘mutation	   of	   Mexican	   organized	   crime’	   –	   the	  phenomenon’s	  spill	  over	  into	  societal	  spheres	  other	  than	  illicit	  markets	  and	  a	  core	  theme	  explored	   throughout	   this	   thesis	   –	   supposes	   a	   prominent	   outcome	   in	   this	   context.	   It	  simultaneously	   translates,	   however,	   into	   a	   constellation	   in	   which	   the	   possibility	   of	  maintaining	   control	   over	   a	   given	   (social)	   space	   is	   severely	   limited.	   Under	   conditions	   of	  fragmented	  sovereignty,	  the	  forms	  of	  social	  order	  produced	  tend	  to	  be	  as	  short-­‐lived	  and	  unstable	   as	   the	   actors	   pursuing	   them.	   The	   result	   is	   fluctuation.	   In	   the	   cutthroat,	   quasi-­‐Darwinian	   world	   of	   Mexican	   organized	   crime,	   this	   existential	   uncertainty	   is	   further	  accentuated.	  For	  the	  individual	  actor,	  being	  embedded	  in	  such	  an	  environment	  translates	  into	   a	   challenge	   of	   survival	   arguably	   greater	   in	   its	  magnitude	   than	   ever.	   The	   prominent	  trend	   towards	   organizational	   fragmentation	  within	   the	   field	   of	  Mexican	  organized	   crime	  (see	   Astorga/Shirk,	   2010;	   Reuter,	   2009)	   underlines	   the	   matter.	   Three	   main	   sources	   of	  existential	  contention	  come	  into	  play	  here:	  (i)	  the	  existence	  of	  national	  states	  (domestic	  as	  well	   as	   international)	   that	   operate,	   at	   least	   hypothetically,	   as	   champions	   of	   legality,	   (ii)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Generally	  speaking,	  quantitative	  data	  relating	  to	  criminal	  activities	  have	  to	  be	  treated	  with	  utmost	  care	  and	  amount,	   in	  many	  ways,	   to	   little	  more	   than	   a	   ‘guessing	   game’	   (Thoumi,	   2005).	   This	   also	   holds	   true	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  casualties	  produced	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Mexico’s	  ‘war	  on	  drugs’	  where	  unreliable	  sources	  and	  the	   government’s	   intransparency	   undermine	   accuracy.	   Estimations	   speak	   of	   more	   than	   100.000	   ‘drug-­‐related’	   deaths	   between	   2006	   and	   2012	   (see	   Molzahn	   et	   al.,	   2012).	   These	   do	   not	   include	   thousands	   of	  ‘disappearances’	   unaccounted	   for	   (see	   e.g.	   Newsweek	   Noticias,	   2015).	   Just	   as	   unprecedented	   as	   the	  quantity	  of	  the	  violence	  is	  its	  quality,	  i.e.	  the	  brutality	  with	  which	  it	  is	  carried	  out	  and	  the	  communicational	  function	   that	   acts	   such	   as	   mutilations	   and	   decapitations	   and	   their	   public	   display	   fulfill	   (see	   e.g.	   Martin,	  2012).	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intense	  and	  violent	   field-­‐internal	   competition,	   and	   (iii)	   the	   emergence	  of	   organized	   (and	  armed)	  forms	  of	  civilian	  opposition.	  	  	  	  Rather	  than	  add	  to	  the	  concert	  of	  standard	  formulations	  that	  see	  the	  problem	  of	  control	  as	  an	   issue	   exclusively	   confronting	   ‘the'	   state	   construed	   as	   a	   monolithic	   entity	   and,	  conversely,	  non-­‐state	  armed	  actors	  as	  the	  only	  true	  driving	  force	  behind	  the	  dissolution	  of	  order,	   I	   turn	   the	   question	   on	   its	   head.	   I	   ask	   how	   the	   latter	   perceive	   such	   existential	  challenges	   and	   what	   action	   responses	   they	   develop	   to	   confront	   them.	   In	   particular,	   I	  constrain	   and	   explore	   the	   matter	   by	   providing	   insights	   into	   one	   particular	   project	   of	  organizational	   survival	   as	   pursued	   by	   one	   specific	   actor:	   LCT.	   This	   requires	   putting	  organized	   crime	   in	   its	  place.	  The	  question	  of	   the	   ‘local’	   arises	  here,	   as	   I	   lay	  out	  over	   the	  following	   pages,	   as	   the	   center	   stage	   for	   said	   project.	   It	   therefore	   necessarily	   also	  constitutes	   the	   basis	   of	   my	   own	   analysis.	   What	   concerns	   me,	   in	   essence,	   is	   the	  identification	   of	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   LCT	   sought	   to	   ‘work	   the	   local’	   so	   as	   to	   obtain	   and	  sustain	  access	   to	   resources	  enabling	   it	   to	   stay	  afloat.	  To	   introduce	  distance	   to	  externally	  imposed	  accounts,	   I	  deem	   it	  necessary	   to	  adopt	   the	  perspective	  of	  an	  empathic	  observer	  (see	  Blaikie,	  2009:51)	  and	  thus	  a	  stance	  that	  strives	  for	  an	  understanding	  in	  the	  Weberian	  sense	   of	   Verstehen	   (see	   O’Hear,	   1996).	   Empowered	   by	   a	   close-­‐up	   perspective	   gained	  through	   ethnographic	   fieldwork	   within	   the	   group’s	   core	   operational	   territory,	   I	   explore	  which	  resources	  LCT12	  perceived	  as	  vital	  and	  how	  these	  perceptions	  were	  translated	   into	  action.	   I	   here	   follow	   the	   broad	   understanding	   of	   organizational	   resources	   advanced	   by	  Yuchtman	   and	   Seashore	   as	   ‘generalized	  means	   or	   facilities	   that	   are	   potentially	   usable	   –	  however	   indirectly	   –	   in	   relationships	   between	   the	   organization	   and	   its	   environment’	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  As	  laid	  out	  in	  greater	  depth	  in	  Chapter	  4,	  even	  though	  LCT	  does	  qualify	  as	  an	  organization	  it	  should	  not	  be	  understood	   as	   a	   monolithic	   organizational	   entity.	   For	   the	   sake	   of	   depicting	   the	   group’s	   leaders’	   basic	  strategic	  orientations,	  I	  employ	  the	  label	  LCT	  to	  connote	  this	  highest	  copula.	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(1967:900).	  Phrased	  differently:	   resources	  are	  what	  enable	  actors	  –	  here,	   a	   set	  of	   actors	  and	   individuals	  aggregated	  under	  what	   is	  as	  much	  an	  organizational	  construct	  as	  a	   label	  empowering	   for	   those	   with	   access	   to	   it	   –	   to	   get	   things	   done.	   The	   characterization	   of	  resources	   as	   vital	   depends	   on	   whether	   denied	   access	   would	   entail	   the	   serious	  malfunctioning	  or	  even	  the	  breakdown	  of	  the	  organization.	  In	  the	  present	  case,	  then,	  what	  counts	   as	   vital	   primarily	   depends	   on	   the	   degree	   to	   which	   efforts	   –	   or	   investments	   –	  undertaken	  by	  LCT	  to	  obtain	  and	  sustain	  access	  to	  them	  speaks	  of	  their	  perceived	  value.13	  My	   main	   focus	   lies,	   in	   this	   vein,	   on	   the	   relational	   patterns	   between	   LCT	   and	   its	   local,	  immediate	   surroundings	   and	   its	   interactions	   with	   key	   actors	   present	   in	   it	   (civilian	  populations	   and	   state	   actors).	   With	   resources	   and	   their	   carriers	   situated,	   by	   and	   large,	  outside	  of	  the	  organization	  it	  is	  only	  by	  relating	  to	  the	  spheres	  in	  which	  they	  are	  embedded	  that	  they	  can	  be	  accessed.	  As	  a	  result	  a	  loop	  emerges:	  resources	  are	  needed	  both	  to	  act	  and	  relate	  to	  while	  acting	  and	  relating	  is	  necessary	  to	  access	  resources.	  	  	  	  	  
	  
LCT’s	  project	  of	  alternative	  governance	  as	  (perceived)	  condition	  to	  survival	  	  	  
The	  specific	  ways	  in	  which	  LCT	  sought	  to	  secure	  its	  permanence	  constituted,	  as	  I	  maintain,	  a	   immense	   shaping	   power	   on	   the	   group	   itself	   as	  well	   as	   its	   environments.	   The	   chain	   of	  argument	   I	  develop	   throughout	   the	   following	   chapters	   is	   anchored	   in	   the	   following:	  LCT	  strove	  for	  a	  duality	  of	  control14	  over	  vital	  resources.	  The	  projected	  outcome	  of	  this	  duality	  amounts	   to	   an	   ideal	   scenario	   in	   which	   available	   resources	   become	   mobilizable	   in	   the	  group’s	   interests	   while	   a	   mobilization	   to	   its	   detriment	   is	   prevented.	   LCT	   followed	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  There	   exists	   an	   obvious	   tension	   between	   objective	   –	  measurable	   in	   terms	   of	   independently	   observable	  outcomes	   –	   and	   subjective	   vitality.	   Though	   the	   congruence	   between	   the	   former	   and	   the	   latter	   is	   also	  addressed	  at	  a	  later	  point	  in	  this	  dissertation,	  what	  primarily	  concerns	  me	  is	  the	  latter.	  	  	  14	  It	  should	  be	  kept	  in	  mind	  a	  striving	  for	  control	  cannot	  be	  equated	  to	  outcome.	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comprehensive	  understanding	  of	  resources,	  comprising	  both	  material	  and	  immaterial,	  and	  by	   no	   means	   limited	   to	   immediately	   extractable	   economic	   resources	   but	   prominently	  encompassing	   symbolic	   and	   social	   capital.	   Its	   attempt	   to	   gain	   and	   sustain	   control	   over	  these	   sets	   of	   resources	   saw	   its	   engagement	  with	   those	   structures,	   processes,	   and	   actors	  carrying,	   possessing,	   and	   deciding	   their	   allocation	   and	  mobilization.	   The	   latter’s	   diffuse	  arrangement	   across	   societal	   spheres	   beyond	   that	   of	   illicit	   markets	   is	   a	   key	   factor	  accounting	   for	   the	   expansion	   of	   LCT’s	   action	   spheres.	   Here,	   it	   manifested	   a	   pattern	   of	  environmental	   intervention	  unprecedented	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  expansiveness	  and	  intensity.	  Claims	  of	   supremacy	  over	   the	   licit	   as	  well	   as	   the	   illicit	   economic,	   the	   social,	   but	   also	   the	  political-­‐institutional	   were	   followed	   by	   corresponding	   action.	   What	   truly	   distinguished	  LCT,	   however,	   was	   not	   that	   it	   intervened	   so	   broadly	   but	   how	   it	   intervened.	   Here,	   the	  reckoning	   by	   LCT’s	   leaders	   that	   a	   minimum	   degree	   of	   organizational	   legitimacy	   was	  paramount	   to	   survival	   as	  a	   sort	  of	  master	   resource	  exerted	  great	   influence.	   It	  ultimately	  acted,	  I	  argue,	  as	  the	  core	  mechanism	  underlying	  LCT’s	  construction	  as	  an	  organizational	  construct	  of	  unprecedented	  hybridity.	  As	  much	  a	  product	  as	  a	  producer	  of	  the	  conditions,	  the	   latter’s	  analysis	  offers	  exceptional	   insights	   into	   the	  dialectic	  of	  order	  and	  disorder	   in	  the	   ‘global	   south’	   (see	   Comaroff/Comaroff,	   2006:5ff.)	   and	   the	   role	   of	   non-­‐state	   armed	  actors.	  	  	  	  My	  aim	  is	  not	  to	  provide	  another	  recital	  of	  the	  socio-­‐economic	  and	  political	  conditions	  that	  provide	   a	   ‘fertile	   ground’	   for	   the	   emergence	   of	   organized	   crime	   as	   such.	   This	   has	   been	  addressed	   exhaustively,	   amongst	   others	   by	   Passas	   (2002)	   and,	   with	   a	   focus	   on	   Latin	  America,	   by	   Thoumi	   (2003).	   Factors	   such	   as	   socio-­‐economic	   as	   well	   as	   cultural	  stigmatization	   and	  marginalization	   still	   find	   their	  place	  within	   this	  work.	  Not	   least	   since	  they	  surface	  prominently	  in	  informants’	  accounts.	  Rather	  than	  as	  structural	  conditions	  out	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of	   which	   (organized)	   crime	   is	   frequently	   portrayed	   as	   emerging	   quasi-­‐automatically,	  though,	  I	  primarily	  treat	  them	  as	  items	  reflected	  and	  related	  to	  by	  LCT	  in	  the	  construction	  of	   its	  project	  of	  alternative	  governance	  and	   thus	  of	  a	   form	  of	  agency	  sui	  generis	  within	  a	  broader	   population	   of	   criminal	   organizations.	   This	   outcome	   supposes,	   in	   many	   ways,	   a	  deviation	   from	   behavioral	   and	   organizational	   patterns	   predominantly	   associated	   with	  organized	  crime	   in	  Mexico	  and	  beyond.	  This	  deviation,	   then,	  must	  additionally	  shape	  my	  own	   approach	   as	   it	   pushes	   it	  well	   beyond	  paradigmatic	   bounds.	   The	   latter	   prove	   overly	  hermetic	   in	   terms	   of	   deciphering	   the	   eclectic	   shape	   the	   phenomenon	   attained	   in	   Tierra	  Caliente15,	  LCT’s	  core	  operational	  territory	  and	  cradle.	  Key	  assumptions	  built	   into	  default	  scholarly	   sensemaking	  on	  organized	   crime	   stand	   in	  direct	   contradiction	   to	   the	   empirical	  realities	  I	  encountered	  and	  subsequently	  analyze.	  Against	  this	  background,	  in	  the	  following	  paragraphs	  I	  set	  out	  a	  brief	  review	  of	  the	  main	  building	  blocks	  of	  the	  ‘paradigm’.	  I	  highlight	  how	  the	   latter	   lack	   in	  explanatory	  potential	   (to	  approach	   the	  present	  case),	  pairing	  each	  with	  a	  synthesized	  preview	  of	  my	  own	  findings.	  	  
	  
Basic	  methodological	  remarks	  	  	  
The	  role	  of	  concepts	  –	  an	  eclectic	  approach	  to	  a	  hybrid	  phenomenon	  	  	  
Two	  things	  should	  be	  made	  clear	  from	  the	  outset.	  My	  critique	  is	  not	  geared	  at	  replacing	  the	  concept	   of	   organized	   crime	  by	   advancing	   a	   competing,	   all-­‐encompassing	   catchphrase	   as,	  for	  instance,	  Block	  and	  Chambliss	  (1981)	  attempted	  by	  advancing	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘organizing	  crime’.	   My	   limitation	   to	   one	   specific	   setting	   and	   case	   prohibits	   such	   an	   undertaking.	   I	  furthermore	  find	  that	  it	  is	  precisely	  the	  concept’s	  overly	  rigid	  nature,	  reproduced	  qua	  self-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Though	   primarily	   designating	   its	   stretch	   falling	   into	   the	   boundaries	   of	  Michoacán,	   Tierra	   Caliente	   (‘Hot	  Land’)	   can	   also	   indicate	   areas	   situated	   in	   two	   further	   federated	   states,	   both	   bordering	   on	   Michoacán.	  Throughout	  this	  thesis,	  I	  use	  the	  designation	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  former.	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referential	   debate	   that	   sustains	   the	   distance	   from	   empirical	   realities.	   Its	   monolithic	  orientation,	   underlined	   below,	   is	   moreover	   diametrically	   opposed	   to	   the	   spirit	   of	   this	  thesis:	  shedding	  light	  on	  the	  locally	  contingent	  manifestation	  of	  a	  phenomenon	  that	  bears	  resemblance	  to	  organized	  crime	  in	  sensu	  (re)stricto	  and	  is	  yet	  significantly	  more	  complex.	  What	   I	   find	   is	   a	   fundamentally	   hybrid	   phenomenon	   that	   necessitates	   an	   eclectic	   and	  adaptable	  conceptual	  response.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  my	  findings	  do	  not	  speak	  to	  existing	  bodies	  of	  thought,	  both	  on	  what	  is	  treated	  as	  organized	  crime	  in	  sensu	  (re)stricto	  as	  well	  as	  the	   involvement	  of	  criminal	  organizations	  as	  non-­‐state	  armed	  actors	   in	  the	  reshuffling	  of	  social	   order	   in	   contemporary	  Mexico	   and	   the	   Global	   South	  more	   generally	   speaking.	   An	  element	   of	   ‘theoretical	   generalization’	   (Mitchell,	   1983)	   is,	   in	   this	   sense	   possible	   (see	  Chapter	  3).	  Yet,	  so	  as	  to	  avoid	  falling	  into	  the	  dogmatic	  trap	  of	  replacing	  one	  rigidity	  with	  another	  I	   follow	  Zaitch’s	  example	  (2002)	  and	  consider	  concepts	  first	  and	  foremost	  fitting	  tools	   that	   serve	   the	   sole	  purpose	  of	  helping	   shed	   light	  on	   concrete,	   real-­‐life	  phenomena.	  This	  appears	  all	  the	  more	  pertinent	  since	  my	  study	  is	  one	  into	  a	  severely	  under-­‐researched	  field	   and	   thus	   fundamentally	   exploratory	   in	   orientation.	   Against	   this	   backdrop,	   these	  elements	  primarily	  surface	  as	  aids	  to	  address	  the	  blanks	  left	  by	  existing	  approaches.	  	  
	  
Organized	  crime:	  a	  phenomenon	  out	  of	  sight	  and	  reach?	  
The	   scholarly	   study	   of	   organized	   crime	   has	   been	   overshadowed	   by	   a	   fundamental	   and	  arguably	   foundational	   methodological	   dilemma.	   Any	   subject	   to	   be	   approached	   in	   a	  scholarly	   way,	   qua	   definition,	   presupposes	   a	   minimum	   degree	   of	   proximity	   by	   the	  researcher	   –	   foremost	   at	   a	   stage	   of	   inquiry	   where	   basic	   traits	   remain	   unexplored.	   Yet,	  proximity	  to	  organized	  crime	  and	  its	  protagonists	  has	  been	  declared	  unfeasible	  to	  achieve	  by	  many.	  Certain	  methods	  are	  consequently	  excluded	  from	  conceivable	  research	  designs	  a	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priori.	  This	  specifically	  concerns	  ethnographic	  and	  other	  methods	  requiring	  physical	  field	  presence	  designed	  to	  explore	  hidden	  or	  sub-­‐explored	  populations	  (see	  Rawlinson,	  2008).	  Two	  main	   obstacles	   seem	   to	   stand	   in	   the	  way.	   Organized	   criminal	   actors	   are	   said	   to	   be	  anything	   but	   interested	   in	   disclosing	   their	   identities	   or	   in	   unveiling	   information	  concerning	   their	   existence	   and	   activities.	   Clandestinity	   emerges	   as	   a	   supposedly	   iron	  behavioral	  trait	  necessary	  for	  the	  avoidance	  of	  legal	  consequences.	  Hence,	  anyone	  trying	  to	  break	   this	   veil	   of	   silence	   and	   clandestinity	   is	   said	   to	   incur	   the	   risk	   of	   violent	   defensive	  reactions.	  Taken	  together,	  both	  obstacles	  underpin	  the	  widespread	  perception	  that	  close-­‐up	   research	   on	   organized	   crime	   constitutes	   a	   ‘mission	   impossible’,	   as	   Rawlinson	   (ibid.)	  critically	  remarked.	  	  	  	  This	   perception	   comes	   at	   the	   cost	   of	   a	   divorced	   relationship	   between	   concept	   and	  empirical	   reality:	   ‘rarely	   is	   there	   somebody	   with	   firsthand	   information’	   (Finckenauer,	  2005:63).	  Most	  accounts	  rely	  on	  little	  more	  than	  secondary	  data	  highly	  susceptible	  to	  bias.	  Official	   documents	   such	   as	   wiretaps	   occupy	   an	   important	   role	   in	   this	   context,	   enabling	  entire	   (successful)	   academic	   careers.	   They	   are,	   especially	   if	   the	   only	   source,	   considered	  highly	   problematic.	   Their	   gathering,	   systematization,	   and	   also	   release	   often	   follows	  institutional	  perspectives	  and	  interests,	  making	  their	  academic	  value	  questionable	  (see	  e.g.	  Chambliss,	   1975;	   Bovenkerk	   et	   al.,	   2003).16	  Moreover,	   the	   principal	   scarcity	   in	   firsthand	  data	  acts	  as	  an	   insulating	  membrane	   that	   serve	   to	   sustain	  manifold	  distortions,	   fallacies,	  and	   even	  outright	  myths	   that	   have	  been	  built	   into	   (scholarly)	   sensemaking	  of	   organized	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  A	   notable	   exception	   in	   this	   context	   comes	   in	   form	   of	   ‘leaked’	   documents,	   something	   which	   has	   gained	  prominence	   as	   of	   late	   in	   the	   context	   of	   official	   documents	   released	   by	   platforms	   such	   as	   Wikileaks.	  Furthermore,	   in	  Mexico	   (investigative)	   journalists	  have	   long	  been	  embedded	   in	  a	  veritable	   informational	  economy	   through	   which	   (fragments	   of)	   official	   documents	   are	   channeled	   into	   the	   public	   sphere.	   An	   in-­‐depth	  exploration	  of	  the	  forms	  of	  exchange	  here	  involved	  would	  certainly	  be	  in	  order,	  but	  goes	  beyond	  the	  scope	   of	   this	   thesis.	   Here,	   it	   shall	   suffice	   to	   say	   that,	   through	   contacts	   with	   journalists,	   I	   too	   obtained	  classified	  documents	  during	  fieldwork	  (see	  below).	  While	  these	  do	  inform	  my	  analysis	  I	  do	  not	  rely	  on	  them	  solely.	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crime	  (see	  e.g.	  Woodiwiss,	  2001;	  Paoli,	  2002,	  2003;	  Finckenauer,	  2005).	  As	  Paoli	  (2002:72)	  states,	  sustaining	  these	  misconceptions	  is	  possible	  ‘only	  by	  sacrificing	  empirical	  evidence’.	  While	  I	  concur,	  it	  also	  seems	  that	  less	  data,	  on	  one	  hand,	  and	  the	  convenient	  acceptance	  of	  the	  overly	  strong	  reliance	  on	  official	  data,	  on	  the	  other,	  renders	  such	  ignorance	  far	  easier.17	  Given	   examples	   to	   the	   contrary,	   the	   notion	   of	   ‘mission	   impossible’	   seems	   overly	  generalizing.	  To	  name	  but	  a	   few,	  Chambliss	   (1988),	  Hobbs	   (1988),	  Bourgois	   (2002),	   and	  Zaitch	   (2002)	   all	   conducted	   in-­‐depth	   fieldwork	   on	   organized	   crime	   (or	   phenomena	  associated	  to	  it)	  and,	   like	  others	  having	  conducted	   ‘dangerous	  fieldwork’,	   ‘lived	  to	  tell	  us’	  (Jacobs,	   2006:	  158).	   Similarly,	   in	  Latin	  America,	   (ethnographic)	   research	  of	   this	   sort	  has	  become	  more	  frequent	  in	  recent	  years	  (see	  e.g.	  Rodgers,	  2006;	  Arias,	  2009;	  Denyer	  Willis,	  2015).	  However,	  by	  no	  means	  does	  such	  research	  represent	  a	  walk	  in	  the	  park	  as	  risks	  are	  real	   and	   cannot	   be	   ignored:	   the	  more	   so,	   arguably,	   in	   contemporary	  Mexico.	   There	   are,	  after	  all,	  reasons	  the	  country	  has	  become	  one	  of	  the	  riskiest	  places	  for	  (critical)	  journalists	  worldwide	  (e.g.	  Reporters	  Without	  Boundaries,	  2013).	  	  	  Correspondingly	   scarce	   or	   even	   altogether	   inexistent	   were	   (and	   still	   are)	   works	   on	  organized	   crime	   in	  Michoacán	   and	   specifically	   on	   LCT	   that	   could	   provide	   firsthand	   data	  and,	   not	   least,	   orientation	   in	   the	   shape	   of	   guiding	   insights	   for	   somebody	   such	   as	  myself	  seeking	  to	  study	  on-­‐the-­‐ground	  realities.	  The	  bulk	  of	  the	  works	  that	  touch	  upon	  the	  matter	  were	   (and	   remain)	   overshadowed	   by	   the	   same	   dilemma	   confronting	   scholarly	  sensemaking	   on	   organized	   crime	   in	   general.	   They	   are	   exclusively	   based	   on	   secondary,	  mostly	  journalistic	  data	  (Grayson,	  2010/2011,	  the	  most	  cited	  work	  on	  LFM,	  confirms	  this	  pattern;	  see	  also	  Kostelnik/Skarbek,	  2013).	  The	  literally	  less	  than	  a	  handful	  of	  works	  based	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  A	  thorough	  examination,	  inspired	  by	  Kuhn’s	  seminal	  if	  somewhat	  simplistic	  work	  on	  academic	  knowledge	  production	  (1962),	  of	   the	  paradigmatic	  defense	  mechanisms	  at	  play	  here	  would	  certainly	  be	   in	  order	  but	  goes	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  thesis.	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on	  primary	  data	  and	  providing	  a	  closer	  exploration	  is,	  for	  the	  most	  part,	  outdated.	  None	  of	  these	   draws	   on	   data	   gathered	   directly	   from	   members	   of	   LCT.	   Moreover,	   most	   of	   these	  works	   (Malkin,	   2001;	  McDonald,	   2005)	   represent,	   as	   the	   authors	   themselves	   stress,	   by-­‐products	  of	  studies	  with	  different	  core	  interests.	  Although	  they	  therefore	  necessarily	  lack	  in	   depth,	   they	   do	   address	   aspects	   of	   great	   relevance	   for	   organized	   crime-­‐civilian	  populations-­‐interactions	   and	   corresponding	   repercussions	   for	   local	   communities.	  Hence,	  they	  offer	  welcome	  points	  of	  reflection	  for	  my	  own	  analysis,	  one	  of	  the	  core	  contributions	  of	  which	  consists	  in	  addressing	  these	  matters	  in	  greater	  depth.	  	  	  	  	  
	  
Methodological	  overview	  
Reflecting	   the	   constraints	   that	   go	   hand	   in	   hand	   with	   research	   on	   organized	   crime,	   the	  methodological	  part	  of	  this	  thesis	  (Chapter	  3)	  oscillates	  between	  possibility	  and	  constraint.	  Security	  considerations	  and	  the	  attempt	  to	  mitigate	  potential	  risks	  as	  best	  possible	  formed	  an	   integral	   component	   of	   all	   stages	   of	   my	   research	   project.	   LCT	   appeared,	   even	   when	  measured	  by	  Mexican	  standards,	  exceptionally	  violent.	  The	  assertion	  of	  this	  trait	  as	  well	  as	  the	  suggestion	  that	  my	  intention	  to	  set	  foot	  in	  its	  core	  operational	  territory	  amounted	  to	  an	  eminent	  death	  wish	  on	  my	  part	  supposed	  a	  constant	  backdrop	   to	  my	  research.	   I	   initially	  reacted	  to	  security	  concerns	  (and	  corresponding	  institutional	  pressures)	  by	  elaborating	  a	  conservative	  research	  design.	   I	  omitted	  the	  necessity	   to	  either	  enter	  Tierra	  Caliente	  or	   to	  come	  into	  immediate	  contact	  with	  active	  members	  of	  the	  organization.	  The	  way	  in	  which	  I	  nevertheless	  sought	  to	  obtain	  data	  sufficient	  to	  construct	  a	  well-­‐informed	  account	  was	  by	  conducting	   semi-­‐structured	   interviews	   with	   informants	   that	   were	   equipped	   with	   a	  ‘privileged	  perspective’	  on	  life	  within	  Tierra	  Caliente	  and	  that	  could	  be	  accessed	  outside	  of	  the	  region.	  While	  ‘circling	  around	  the	  hot	  stuff’	  for	  various	  months	  led	  to	  the	  generation	  of	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valuable	  information,	  I	  never	  categorically	  renounced	  the	  possibility	  to	  ‘go	  deeper’.	  As	  the	  fruit	  of	  a	  months-­‐long	  snowballing	  process	  through	  diverse	  social	  networks,	  a	  trustworthy	  contact	  willing	  to	  pave	  my	  way	  into	  Tierra	  Caliente	  emerged.	  	  	  This	  contact	  would	  become	  my	  principal	  gatekeeper	  and	  enable	  the	  most	  intense	  phase	  of	  my	   fieldwork,	   both	   in	   terms	   of	   personal	   (not	   always	   positive)	   excitement	   and	   the	   data	  obtained.	   Most	   importantly,	   I	   was	   able	   to	   participate	   in	   everyday	   interactions	   amongst	  local	   civilians	   and	   could	   allow	   my	   methodology	   to	   morph	   into	   a	   true	   ethnographic	  approach.	   My	   presence	   in	   the	   field	   was	  met	   with	   a	   surprising	   willingness	   to	   share.	   My	  persona,	   deliberately	   constructed	   as	   a	   naïve	   outsider	  willing	   to	   listen	   and	   learn,	   invited	  reflection	   from	   local	   civilians	  –	  and	  moreover	  by	  LCT	   itself.	  Once	  my	  permanence	   in	   the	  field	  had	  been	  successfully	  negotiated,	  I	  was	  able	  to	  interview	  the	  two	  top	  leaders	  of	  LCT	  alongside	   further	   members	   of	   the	   organization.	   This	   readiness	   to	   tolerate	   my	   presence	  contradicts	   organized	   crime’s	   supposedly	   iron	   law	   of	   silence.	   However,	   it	   also	   invites	  questions	   as	   to	   the	   agenda	   behind	   and	   the	   credibility	   of	   the	   accounts	   provided.	   The	  triangulation	  of	  accounts	  provided	  to	  me	  by	  LCT	  and	  civilians,	  respectively,	  their	  internal	  deviations	  as	  well	  as	  information	  contained	  in	  further	  sources	  (academic,	  media,	  and	  state	  documents)	  occupies,	  in	  this	  sense,	  an	  important	  role	  in	  my	  attempt	  to	  mitigate	  biases	  and	  construe	  an	  informed	  account.	  	  	  	  Furthermore,	  and	  despite	  unexpected	  depth,	  my	  access	  and	  freedom	  of	  movement	  whilst	  remaining	   in	   Tierra	   Caliente	   was	   far	   from	   unrestrained.	   For	   one,	   I	   tried	   to	   develop	  strategies	  to	  mitigate	  risks	  –	  both	  for	  those	  I	  engaged	  with	  and	  myself	  –	  as	  best	  possible.	  In	  a	  severely	  understudied	  and	  volatile	  environment	  in	  which	  uncertainty	  is	  the	  norm,	  such	  an	   attempt	   is	   necessarily	   fraught	  with	   limitations.	   Conducting	   research	   in	   such	   a	   setting	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presupposes	  renouncing,	  to	  a	  certain	  degree,	  the	  illusion	  of	  control.	  Many	  times,	  windows	  to	  gather	  data	  opened	  as	  quickly	  as	  they	  were	  expected	  to	  close	  again.	  Snap	  decisions	  on	  the	   basis	   of	   partial	   information	   characterized	   my	   fieldwork	   and	   gave	   Simpson’s	  observation	  that	   ‘you	  don't	  do	   fieldwork,	  but	   fieldwork	  does	  you’	   (2006)	  a	  distinct	   taste.	  The	  role	  of	  my	  gatekeeper	  was	  equally	  enabling	  and	  simultaneously	  constraining.	  My	  entry	  into,	  (safe)	  permanence	  in,	  and	  movements	  within	  Tierra	  Caliente	  as	  well	  as	  access	  to	  key	  informants	  depended	  on	  his	  ability	   to	  vouch	   for	  my	   integrity	  and	   to	  make	   introductions.	  Yet,	   with	   such	   prominence	   of	   a	   gatekeeper	   also	   come	   limitations	   in	   the	   perspectives	  captured.	  	  As	  of	  the	  time	  of	  fieldwork,	  I	  was	  –	  to	  my	  knowledge	  –	  the	  only	  researcher	  who	  had	  ever	  stepped	  foot	  into	  this	  particular	  field	  with	  the	  agenda	  to	  study	  Tierra	  Caliente	  under	  LCT’s	  rule.	   Reflecting	   the	   region’s	   construction	   by	   the	   outside	  world	   as	   an	   impenetrable	   black	  hole	   and,	   for	   that	   matter,	   a	   deathtrap	   for	   researchers,	   it	   had	   remained	   severely	  understudied.	   My	   study	   is	   thus	   necessarily	   exploratory	   in	   nature	   and	   much	   of	   what	   I	  identify	   over	   the	   following	   chapters	   are	   themes	   that	   open	   up	   possibilities	   for	   future	  research.	  In	  the	  same	  vein,	  though	  exclusive	  and	  providing	  important	  windows	  into	  local	  realities,	  my	  data	   is	   far	   from	  all-­‐encompassing.	   It	   neither	   covers	   the	   entire	   geographical	  range	   of	   LCT’s	   territory	   nor	   the	   perspectives	   and	   experiences	   of	   all	   layers	   of	   the	  organization	  or	  those	  it	  interacted	  with.	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Paradigmatic	  depictions	  of	  organized	  crime	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  Los	  Caballeros	  Templarios	  
The	  search	  for	  a	  unitary	  definition	  and	  identity	  	  
For	   decades,	   the	   scholarly	   debate	   on	   organized	   crime	   has	   revolved	   around	   the	   quixotic	  attempt	  of	  producing	  a	  definition	  capable	  of	  capturing	  ‘the	  activities	  of	  criminal	  groups	  and	  networks	   all	   around	   the	   planet’	   (Siegel/Nelen	   2008:1).	   According	   to	   von	   Lampe,	   a	   US-­‐based	  scholar	  who	  has	  attempted	  to	  keep	  track,	  a	  staggering	  number	  of	  180	  definitions	  has	  been	   generated	   to	   date	   (the	   list	   is	   available	   under:	   www.organized-­‐crime.de).	   Indeed,	  there	  seem	  to	  be	  so	  many	  ‘different	  notions	  of	  organised	  crime’	  that	  have	  ‘little	  or	  nothing	  in	  common’	  that	  one	  might	  be	  compelled	  to	  ask	  why	  they	  are	  still	   ‘somehow	  investigated	  under	   the	   same	   tag’	   (van	   Dijck,	   2007:	   79).	   Yet,	   most	   remain	   within	   the	   same	   basic	  parameters,	   delineated	   as	   (transnational)	   organized	   crime	   became	   a	   matter	   of	   major	  international	  political	  preoccupation	  during	   the	  1980s	  and	  especially	   the	  1990s	   (see	  e.g.	  Paoli,	  2002;	  Paoli/Fijnaut,	  2004;	  van	  Duyne/Nelemans,	  2012).	  A	  series	  of	  UN	  Congresses	  on	   the	   Prevention	   of	   Crime	   and	   the	   Treatment	   of	   Offenders	   served	   as	   a	   vehicle	   for	   the	  internationalization	  of	   the	   term,	   its	   construction	   as	   a	   formidable	   threat,	   and	   the	   (widely	  successful)	   call	   on	   national	   legislators	   to	   take	   corresponding	   action.	   ‘Little	  more	   than	   a	  category	  of	   administrative	   convenience	   for	   law	  enforcement	   agents’	   (Paoli,	   2011)	   rather	  than	  one	  built	  on	  sound	  empirical	  foundation,	  the	  wording	  cemented	  in	  the	  2000	  Palermo	  Convention	  obeyed	   the	   logic	   of	   accommodating	   all	   ‘politically	   relevant	   perceptions’	   (van	  Duyne/Nelemans,	  2012:43).	  ‘For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  Convention’,	  Article	  2	  reads,	  	  
‘(a)	  ‘’Organized	  criminal	  group’’	  shall	  mean	  a	  structured	  group	  of	  three	  or	  more	  persons,	  existing	  for	  a	  period	  of	  time	  and	  acting	  in	  concert	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  committing	  one	  or	  more	  serious	  crimes	  or	  offences	  established	  in	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accordance	  with	  this	  Convention,	  in	  order	  to	  obtain,	  directly	  or	  indirectly,	  a	  financial	  or	  other	  material	  benefit;	  	  (b)“Serious	  crime”	  shall	  mean	  conduct	  constituting	  an	  offence	  punish-­‐	  able	  by	  a	  maximum	  deprivation	  of	  liberty	  of	  at	  least	  four	  years	  or	  a	  more	  serious	  penalty;	  	  (c)	   “Structured	  group”	   shall	  mean	  a	   group	   that	   is	  not	   randomly	   formed	  for	   the	   immediate	   commission	   of	   an	   offence	   and	   that	   does	   not	   need	   to	  have	  formally	  defined	  roles	  for	  its	  members,	  continuity	  of	  its	  membership	  or	  a	  developed	  structure…’	  	  Standard	   definitions	   moreover	   add	   an	   element	   of	   violence	   and	   coercion	   as	   well	   as	   an	  element	  of	  ‘infiltration’	  of	  the	  ‘legal’	  economy	  and	  state	  bodies	  to	  the	  formula.	  The	  bulk	  of	  the	  definitions	  produced	  by	   scholars	   stay	   close	   to	   these	  basic	  points	   and	   the	  debate	  has	  been	  structured	  along	  three	  main	  corresponding	  lines:	  (1)	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  it	  is	  the	  set	  of	  activities	  (serious	  crimes)	  a	  group	  is	  involved	  in	  or	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  group	  itself	  that	  ‘makes’	  organized	  crime;	  (2)	  what	  degree	  and	  type	  of	  organizational	  structuredness	   is	  to	  be	  assumed;	  and	  (3)	  what	  degree	  of	  organizational	  permanence	  exists.	  	  	  Traditional	  imagery,	  propagated	  from	  the	  1950s	  in	  the	  USA,	  equated	  organized	  crime	  to	  a	  (singular)	   centralized,	   hierarchical	   organization.	   Summarized	   as	   the	   ‘alien	   conspiracy	  theory’,	   Italian-­‐Americans	   (La	  Cosa	  Nostra)	  were	   said	   to	   be	   ‘polluting	   the	   economic	   and	  social	  life	  of	  the	  country’	  (Paoli,	  2002:54;	  for	  the	  original	  formulations	  see	  Cressey,	  1969).	  While	   the	   latter	   imagery	   never	   lost	   its	   popular	   allure	   altogether,	   from	   the	   1960s	   the	  scholarly	   debate	   shifted	   towards	   the	   depiction	   of	   organized	   crime	   as	   the	   mere	  continuation	   of	   rational	   profit	   maximization	   by	   illicit	   means.	   This	   ‘Illicit	   Enterprise	  Paradigm’	  (Paoli,	  2002)	  has	  remained	  dominant	  to	  date,	  although	  associated	  images	  have	  somewhat	   gravitated	   away	   from	   lasting,	   large-­‐scale	   organizations	   to	   loosely	   coupled	  networks	  (see	  e.g.	  Thoumi,	  2003;	  Levi,	  2007;	  von	  Lampe,	  2009).	  Proponents	  of	  the	   latter	  nuance	   such	   as	   Reuter	   (1983)	   postulate	   that	   the	   pressures	   of	   illegality	   and	   the	   need	   to	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evade	  law	  enforcement	  produce	  ‘disorganized’	  crime.	  Here,	  participating	  units	  are	  seen	  as	  relatively	   small	   and	   less	   permanent,	   cooperating	   to	   capitalize	   on	   specific	   criminal	  opportunities	   (see	   also	   Blok,	   2008;	   for	   overviews	   of	   past	   and	   contemporary	   strains	   of	  conceptualizing,	   see	   Paoli	   2002,	   Paoli/Fijnaut	   2004,	  Dorn/Levi	   2005,	   Finckenauer	   2005,	  von	  Lampe	  2009).	  
In	   spite	  of	   (or	  perhaps	  precisely	  due	   to)	   such	  efforts,	  what	   ‘we	  are	  now	   left	  with	   [is]	   an	  ambiguous	   and	   conflated	   concept’	   (Paoli/Fijnaut,	   2004:	   22).	   As	   van	   Duyne	   (1996:53)	  contends:	  	  
'’’Organized	  crime'’	   is	   in	  many	  ways	  a	  strange	  concept:	   it	   is	   found	   in	  widely	  diverse	   contexts,	   being	   used	   as	   if	   it	   denotes	   a	   clear	   and	   well-­‐defined	  phenomenon.	   Nothing	   is	   further	   from	   the	   truth.	   The	   concept	   of	   organized	  crime	   has	   constantly	   been	   redefined	   and	   contains	   all	   sorts	   of	   implicit	  ideologies	   and	   myths,	   ranging	   from	   the	   'Mr	   Big'	   to	   the	   'alien	   conspiracy	  theory'.	   Reviewing	   the	   literature	   on	   'organized	   crime'	   one	   gets	   increasing	  doubts	  as	  to	  the	  scientific	  usefulness	  of	  the	  concept.	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	   it	   is	  difficult	   to	   relate	   the	   popular	   concepts	   and	   theories	   of	   'organized	   crime'	   to	  the	  existing	  empirical	  evidence.’	  	  Notwithstanding,	   the	   concept	   has	   become	   a	   ‘political	   best-­‐seller’	   (van	   Duyne/Nelemans,	  2012:43).	  Given	  the	  quantity	  of	  works	  produced,	  it	  is	  an	  academic	  one	  as	  well.	  Even	  so,	  the	  concept	  seems	  to	  capture	  everything	  –	  and	  nothing	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  This	  observation	  also	  holds	  true	  when	  considering	  the	  case	  of	  LCT.	  LCT	  had	  been	  involved	  in	  serious	  crimes	  such	  as	   drugs	   trafficking,	   kidnapping,	   extortion,	   and	   homicide.	   The	  Mexican	   (e.g.	   PGR	   SIEDO,	  2009)	   and	   the	   US	   governments	   (e.g.	   DEA,	   2013)	   as	   well	   as	   LCT	   itself,	   in	   interviews	   I	  conducted	  with	   its	   leaders,	   left	  no	  doubt	   in	   this	   regard.	  The	  group	  comprised	  more	   than	  three	  members	  and	  existed,	  in	  differing	  shapes,	  at	  least	  since	  2005.	  It	  was	  involved	  in	  the	  generation	   and	   laundering	   of	   illicit	   economic	   proceedings.	   Its	   operations	   went	   across	  national	   borders	   and	   stretched,	   for	   instance,	   into	   the	   USA	   and	   Guatemala.	   It	   was	  characterized	   by	   a	   structured	   organizational	   body	   with	   an	   internal	   hierarchy	   and	   a	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division	  of	  labor.	  It	  even	  had	  an	  explicit	  behavioral	  and	  disciplinary	  code	  (obtained	  in	  copy	  during	   fieldwork	   and	   discussed	   in	   Chapter	   4).	   Recruits	   received	   training	   as	   well	   as	  indoctrination	   and	   lower-­‐ranking	  members	   a	  monthly	   salary.	   It	   had	   corrupted,	   coerced,	  and	   applied	   overt	   violence	   against	   public	   officials	   and	   institutions	   and	   intervened	   in	  judicial	  as	  well	  as	  electoral	  processes	  (see	  Chapter	  6).	  	  	  Hence,	  on	  all	  counts,	  LCT	  complies	  with	  even	  the	  strictest	  definitions	  of	  organized	  crime.	  And	   yet,	   sticking	   to	   these	   aspects	   only	   captures	   a	   fragment	   of	   what	   LCT	   represents.	  Granted,	   a	   focus	   such	   as	   the	   one	   I	   choose	   might	   appear	   out	   of	   paradigmatic	   scope.	  However,	   even	   for	   those	   with	   an	   interest	   in	   organized	   crime	   in	   sensu	   (re)stricto,	   this	  hermeticism	  proves	  problematic.	  To	  illustrate:	  LCT	  clearly	  showed	  a	  capacity	  to	  ‘organize	  crime’.	  Yet,	  the	  sustention	  of	  this	  capacity	  and,	  for	  that	  matter,	  its	  participation	  in	  spheres	  of	   paradigmatic	   relevance	   such	   as	   transnational	   markets	   for	   illicit	   drugs	   fundamentally	  depended	  on	  the	  capacity	  to	  simultaneously	  organize	  other	  and	  largely	  ignored	  processes.	  This	   concerns,	   crucially	   and	   as	   stated	   above,	   its	   performance	   on	   the	   local	   level	   as	   an	  important	   stage	   for	   organizational	   survival.	   In	   this	   sense,	   though	   neither	   its	   core	  contribution	  nor	   interest,	  my	  research	  goes	   full	   circle.	  Sticking	   to	   the	  narrow	  confines	  of	  the	  paradigm,	  then,	  does	  not	  only	  entail	  socially	  and	  culturally	  impoverished	  accounts	  (see	  Siegel/Nelen,	  2008)	  but	  also	  the	  risk	  of	  poorly	  capturing	  the	  subject	  in	  itself.	  	  
	  The	   quantity	   of	   definitions	   and	   approaches	   to	   organized	   crime	   seems	   to	   suggest	  divergence	  and	  dissonance.	  Nevertheless,	  much	  of	  the	  debate	  remains	  within	  consensual,	  largely	  unquestioned	  confines.	  These	  (tacitly)	  accepted	  building	  blocks,	  contrasted	  below	  to	   my	   own	   findings,	   have	   partly	   been	   critically	   addressed	   by	   a	   number	   of	   the	  abovementioned	   authors	   (e.g.	   Paoli,	   2002;	   Finckenauer,	   2005;	   van	   Duyne/Nelemans,	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2012).	   For	   illustrative	   purposes,	   I	   here	   mainly	   draw	   on	   Paoli’s	   elaborations	   on	   the	  ‘paradoxes	   of	   organized	   crime’	   (2002),	   a	   particularly	   concise	   and	   exhaustive	   exercise	   in	  this	   vein.	   For	   the	  most	  part,	   I	   support	  her	  observations,	  particularly	  with	   regards	   to	   the	  economic-­‐rationalist	  reductionism	  inherent	  in	  the	  ‘Illicit	  Enterprise	  Paradigm’.	  However,	  at	  the	  same	  time	  she	  too	  succumbs	  to	  what	  I	  refer	  to	  as	  certain	  binaries	  summarized	  below	  as	  the	   illusion	   of	   the	   licit-­‐illicit-­‐divide	   in	   that	   the	   separation	   between	   the	   stereotypical	  spheres	  of	  ‘underworld’	  and	  ‘upperworld’	  appears	  overly	  rigid	  (see	  Geffray,	  2001	  and	  the	  volume	  edited	  by	  van	  Duyne	  et	  al.,	  2002	  for	  some	  critical	  reflections).	  	  
	  
Criminal	  organizations	  as	  rational	  profit-­‐maximizing	  machines	  	  
That	  organized	  crime	  is	  all	  about	  business	  has	  become	  largely	  taken	  for	  granted.	  Gill,	   for	  instance,	   states	   that	   ‘it’	   ‘may	   be	   defined	   as	   the	   ongoing	   activities	   of	   those	   collectively	  engaged	   in	   production,	   supply	   and	   financing	   for	   illegal	   markets	   in	   goods	   and	   services’	  (2006:280).	   Block	   and	   Chambliss,	   two	   authors	   generally	   known	   for	   their	   critical	  perspective,	  argue	  that:	  ‘organized	  crime	  [should]	  be	  defined	  as	  (or	  perhaps	  better	  limited	  to)	  those	  illegal	  activities	  involving	  the	  management	  and	  coordination	  of	  racketeering	  and	  vice’	   (1981:	   13).	   The	   ‘Illicit	   Enterprise	   Paradigm’,	   then,	   boils	   down	   the	   relevant	   subject-­‐matter	  to	  that	  chain	  of	  working	  steps	  immediately	  associated	  with	  the	  generation	  of	  illicit	  proceedings	   (and	   their	   processing,	   e.g.	   Levi,	   2007:	   597).	   The	   identity	   and	  motivation	   of	  organized	   criminal	   groups	   is	   presumed,	   consequently,	   to	   consist	   in	   one	   sole	   goal:	   the	  generation	   of	   material	   benefits.	   Their	   permanence	   (or	   survival)	   then	   depends	   on	   their	  success	  in	  gaining	  access	  to	  one	  ultimately	  relevant	  resource	  (economic	  capital)	  within	  the	  sole	   relevant	   sphere	   of	   illicit,	   clandestine	   markets.	   The	   core	   focus	   here	   becomes	   the	  manner	   in	   which	   the	   question	   of	   how	   a	   task	   is	   translated	   into	   action	   is	   approached.	   A	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simplistic	   formula	   is	   mainly	   applied:	   participants	   make	   rational	   choices,	   have	   the	  information	   and	   capacity	   to	   do	   so,	   and	   design	   organizational	   strategies,	   structures,	   and	  forms	   accordingly.	  With	   rational	   actor	  models	   successfully	   proliferated	   from	   the	   field	   of	  neo-­‐classical	   economics	   to	   account	   for	   all	   facets	   of	   human	   behavior,	   making	   sense	   of	  organized	  crime	  has	  not	  been	  the	  exception.	  The	  ‘view	  that	  organized	  crime	  [is]	  rationally	  oriented	   towards	   the	   maximization	   of	   profits	   through	   illegal	   business	   activities’	   (Paoli,	  2012:54)	  or	  ‘modern	  management	  techniques’	  (UN	  Secretary-­‐General,	  1991)	  has,	  in	  other	  words,	  become	  dominant.	  	  
My	  contention	  is	  not	  that	  economic	  activity	  should	  be	  neglected	  as	  a	  component	  of	  such	  a	  thing	   as	   organized	   crime.	   Yet,	   the	   above	   outlined	   reductionism	   of	   organized	   criminal	  groups	  to	  rationally	  designed	  one-­‐goal-­‐machines	   is	  problematic	   for	  a	  number	  of	  reasons.	  To	  begin	  with,	   the	  belief	   that	   there	  can	   exist	  such	  a	   thing	  as	  a	  social	  construct	  rationally	  designed	   to	   pursue	   one	   goal	   only	   has	   been	   revealed	   to	   be	   an	   illusion	   by	   organizational	  scholars.18	  Diverse	   goals	   and	   sub-­‐goals,	   differing	   in	   accordance	   to	  members’	   interests	   as	  well	  as	  over	  time,	  necessarily	  collide	  with	  one	  another.	  The	  behavior	  of	  organizations	  and	  the	   corresponding	   allocation	   of	   resources	   appear	   far	   less	   streamlined.	   Even	   in	   legal	  business	   organizations,	   the	   very	   goal	   of	   seeking	   profit	   is	   ultimately	   overshadowed	   by	  securing	   survival	   (see	  Meyer/Rowan,	   1977;	  DiMaggio/Powell,	   1983;	  DiMaggio,	   1997	   for	  basic	  formulations).	  Criminal	  organizations	  are,	  in	  this	  respect,	  no	  different.	  As	  Paoli	  notes,	  ends	  pursued	  by	   the	   latter	   are	  many	   times	   ‘so	  different	   and	  often	   in	   open	   contradiction	  with	   one	   another	   that	   it	   is	   very	   difficult	   to	   select	   a	   single,	   typifying	   one’,	   making	   it	  impossible	  ‘to	  single	  out	  an	  encompassing	  function	  or	  goal’	  (2002:72).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  It	   must	   suffice	   at	   this	   point	   to	   underline	   that	   the	   mere	   possibility	   to	   design	   organizations	   as	   rational	  systems	  has	  been	  convincingly	  debunked	  by	  authors	  such	  as	  March	   (1978)	  and	  Simon	  (1972,	  1992).	  See	  Scott	  (2004)	  for	  an	  overview.	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Legitimacy	  as	  an	  organizational	  goal	  	  
LCT,	  too,	  escapes	  the	  sense	  of	  reductionism	  outlined	  above.	  Its	  designation	  as	  a	  mere	  drug	  trafficking	   organization,	   transnational	   criminal	   organization,	   or	   ‘drug	   cartel’	   falls	   short.	  The	  generation	  and	  extraction	  of	  economic	  capital	  remains	  a	  goal	   informing	   its	  actions	  –	  but	  not	  the	  only	  one.	  As	  I	  maintain,	  the	  striving	  for	  legitimacy	  surfaces	  as	  an	  organizational	  goal	   in	   its	  own	  right.	   In	   interviews	  I	  conducted	  with	  LCT’s	   leaders,	   time	  and	  again	   it	  was	  stressed	   that	   a	   minimum	   degree	   of	   organizational	   legitimacy	   was	   paramount	   to	   its	  survival.	  Phrased	  in	  pragmatic	  terms	  by	  Servando	  Gómez	  Martínez,	  second	  in	  command	  at	  the	  time	  I	  interviewed	  him:	  ‘if	  I	  treated	  them	  [local	  civilians]	  badly,	  they	  would	  put	  a	  bullet	  in	  me.’	   Such	   claims	   apart,	   I	   argue	   that	   the	   pursuit	   of	   legitimacy,	   even	   if	   not	   ‘genuinely’	  motivated,	  produced	  palpable	  effects.	  Organized	  crime	  scholarship,	  much	  like	  the	  general	  public,	  has	  treated	  the	  association	  of	   legitimacy	  with	  organized	  crime	  as	  counterintuitive	  and	  even	  nonsensical,	  largely	  rendering	  it	  a	  non-­‐subject.	  This	  adds	  to	  the	  reductionist	  take	  on	  criminal	  organization-­‐environment-­‐interactions.	   If	   ‘the	  setting	  of	  goals	   is	  essentially	  a	  problem	  of	  defining	  a	  desired	  relationship	  between	  an	  organization	  and	  its	  environment’	  (Thompson/McEwan,	   1985:23),	   the	   imagery	   of	   criminal	   organizations	   as	   one-­‐goal-­‐machines	  with	  little	  more	  than	  a	  predatory	  economic-­‐extractive	  agenda	  leaves	  little	  space	  for	   complexity.	   The	   emergence	   of	   legitimacy	   as	   a	   prominent	   organizational	   goal	  complicates	   things	   –	   from	   LCT’s	   and	   an	   analytical	   perspective	   alike.	   This	   is	   because	   its	  pursuit	   introduces	   a	   specific	   and	   different	   set	   of	   challenges,	   tasks,	   and	   corresponding	  action	  responses	  –	  different	  requirements,	   that	   is,	  of	  how	  to	  translate	  challenge	  into	  task	  and	   task	   into	   practice.	   Factoring	   in	   the	   profound	   impact	   this	   produced	   is	   crucial	   to	  understanding	   LCT’s	   conduct	   at	   the	   local	   level,	   its	   interactions	   with	   local	   civilian	  populations,	  the	  resulting	  repercussions	  for	  the	  latter	  as	  well	  as	  for	  LCT,	  and	  not	  least	  the	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shape	   of	   state-­‐organized	   crime-­‐interactions	   in	   the	   present	   case.	   Demonstrating	   how	   it	  shaped	  on-­‐the-­‐ground-­‐realities	  consequently	  emerges	  as	  a	  core	  interest	  and	  contribution	  of	  this	  thesis.	  	  	  Given	   the	   absence	   of	   analytical	   tools	   provided	   by	   organized	   crime	   scholarship,	   I	   turn	   to	  insights	   developed	  within	   organizational	   sociology	   and	   thus	   a	   body	   of	   thought	   that	   has	  long	   recognized	   the	   importance	   of	   legitimacy	   in	   shaping	   organizations.	   In	   the	  corresponding	   literature,	   legitimacy	   is	   essentially	   depicted	   as	   a	   function	   of	   an	  organization’s	   alignment	   to	   norms,	   values,	   and	   expectations	   prevalent	   in	   a	   given	  environment.	  Whether	  those	  social	  audiences	  –	  here	  civilian	  populations	  –	  that	  evaluate	  its	  conformity	   and	   ultimately	   suppose	   the	   sources	   of	   legitimacy	   provide	   support	   or,	   at	   the	  very	  least,	  grant	  tolerance,	  depends	  on	  whether	  the	  organization	  is	  perceived	  to	  perform	  to	  their	   (material)	   benefit	   and	   on	   whether	   its	   existence	   seems	   cognitively	   appropriate	   –	  makes	  sense	  –	  within	  the	  particular	  cultural	  setting.	  When	  this	   form	  of	   ‘cultural	  support’	  (see	  Meyer/Rowan,	  1977;	  Meyer/Scott,	   1983)	   is	   granted,	   it	   serves	   as	   a	   ‘sine	  qua	  non	  for	  easy	  access	  to	  resources...	  and	  long	  term	  survival’	  (Brown,	  1998:	  35)	  –	  a	  master	  resource.	  The	   contrary,	   however,	   can	   be	   existentially	   threatening	   as	   it	   triggers	   ‘comments	   and	  attacks’	   (Pfeffer/Salancik,	   1978;	   see	   also	   Deephouse/Suchman,	   2008).	   The	   rightful	  existence	  of	  the	  organization	  is	  put	  in	  question	  and	  proactive	  action	  against	  it	  can	  follow.	  This	   invites	   reflections	   on	   the	   abovementioned	   duality	   of	   control	   over	   vital	   resources.	  From	   LCT’s	   perspective,	   the	   principal	   challenge	   then	   consists	   in	   influencing	   social	  audiences’	  perceptions	  so	  as	  to	  prevent	  the	  organization’s	  right	  to	  exist	  being	  questioned	  to	   a	   degree	   entailing	   hostile	  mobilization.	   LCT’s	   project	   of	   alternative	   governance	   reads,	  against	  this	  backdrop,	  as	  a	  ceremonially-­‐practically	  backed	  narrative	  suggesting	  alignment	  and	   even	   symbiosis	   with	   the	   local,	   as	   an	   attempt	   to	   relate	   to	   the	   local	   so	   as	   to	   confer	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legitimacy	  to	  the	  organization	  in	  locally	  contingent	  ways.	  While	  there	  are	  strategic	  ways	  to	  ‘manage’	   legitimacy,	   for	   instance	   by	   becoming	   ‘identified	   with	   symbols,	   values,	   or	  institutions	  which	  have	  a	  strong	  base	  of	  social	  legitimacy’	  (Dowling/Pfeffer,	  1975:127),	  it	  represents	  anything	  but	  a	  ‘free	  lunch’	  and	  requires	  investment,	  sacrifice,	  and	  adaption	  (see	  Suchman,	   1995).	   How	   the	   striving	   for	   legitimacy	   materialized	   into	   a	   specific	   pattern	   of	  action	   towards	   the	   local	   underpins	   the	   analysis	   in	   Chapter	   5	   of	   LCT’s	   discourse	   and	  practices	  of	  governance	  as	  well	  as	  their	  perception	  by	  civilian	  populations.	  Apart	  from	  an	  overview	   of	   the	   latter,	   below	   I	   provide	   brief	   overviews	   of	   the	   further	   chapters	   that	  constitute	  the	  empirically	  based	  core	  structure	  of	  this	  thesis	  as	  well	  as	  of	  its	  conclusion.	  	  
	  
Overview	  of	  core	  empirical	  chapters	  	  
Chapter	  4:	  An	  on-­‐the-­‐ground	  history	  of	  Michoacán	  organized	  crime	  	  	  
In	   Chapter	   4,	   I	   portray	   the	   historical	   trajectory	   of	  Michoacán	   organized	   crime.	   Though	   I	  add	   new	   details	   and	   nuances,	   I	   do	   not	   make	   any	   claim	   to	   rewrite	   –	   or	   rather,	   as	   a	  comprehensive	  account	  has	  yet	  to	  be	  produced,	  write	  –	  the	  history	  of	  Michoacán	  organized	  crime.	  Doing	  so	  would	  go	  well	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  present	  thesis.	  What	  I	  offer	  is	  an	  on-­‐the-­‐ground	   reconstruction	  of	   the	  phenomenon’s	   career	  as	   reflected	  and	  evaluated	   in	   the	  voices	  and	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  experiences	  of	  those	  equipped	  with	  a	  privileged	  perspective:	  former	   narcotraffickers	   and	   local	   civilians.	   Drawing	   on	   conversations	   and	   interviews	  conducted	  with	  members	  of	  both	  groups,	  I	  trace	  the	  career	  of	  Michoacán	  organized	  crime	  in	   broad	   strokes	   in	   particular	   identifying	   four	   distinct	   phases	   of	   the	   phenomenon’s	  mutation.	   This	   introduces	   the	   historical-­‐structural	   backdrop	   to	   LCT’s	   rise	   and	   thus	  elements	  without	  which	  the	  group’s	  agency	  sui	  generis	  within	  the	  local	  cannot	  be	  properly	  deciphered.	  To	  do	   so,	   I	   outline	   ‘grand	   changes’	  within	   the	   field	  of	   criminal	   organizing	   in	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Latin	  America	  and	  Mexico	  in	  particular.	  Inseparably	  interlinked	  are	  macrostructural	  socio-­‐economic	   and	   political	   transformations,	   which	   I	   discuss	   correspondingly.	   Of	   particular	  importance	   is	   the	   changing	   role	   of	   the	   state	   in	   assuming	   (and,	   later,	   rejecting)	  representation	   of	   social	   order	   and	   progress.	   These	   macrostructural	   features	   are	   clearly	  reflected	   in	   the	   experiences	   captured	   and	   supposed	   driving	   forces	   behind	   the	  mutation.	  Central	   to	   these	   elaborations	   is	   the	   question	   of	   how	   locals	   evaluate	   the	   place	   that	  Michoacán	   organized	   crime,	   in	   its	   respective	   shapes,	   occupied	   within	   local	   society	   and	  what	   impact	   is	  exercised	  on	   locals’	   lives.	   In	  particular,	   four	   items	  derived	  from	  collective	  experience	  guide	  these	  evaluations:	  the	  role	  of	  violence;	  the	  moral	  status	  of	  activities	  and	  participants;	   the	   field’s	   structure	   and	   conditions	   of	   participation;	   and	   the	  distribution	  of	  proceeds.	   Apart	   from	   structuring	   representations	   of	   the	   past,	   these	   items	   are	   of	   great	  importance.	  They	  resurface	  as	  the	  basis	  upon	  which	  local	  civilians	  evaluate	  LCT’s	  narrative	  and	  performance.	  As	  such,	  these	  evaluations	  serve	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  the	  subsequent	  analysis	  of	   LCT’s	   project	   of	   governance	   and	   its	   effectiveness	   in	   fostering	   legitimacy	   and	  organizational	  survival.	  	  	  The	  four	  phases	  are	  as	  follows:	  	  1) The	   emergence	   of	   Michoacán	   organized	   crime	   from	   the	   1950s	   in	   the	   shape	   of	  narcotrafficking	  in	  sensu	  stricto	  as	  a	  diffusely	  arranged	  and	  loosely	  coupled	  field	  of	  economic	   activity,	   largely	   positively	   reflected	   upon	   as	   a	   generalized	   means	   of	  economic	   empowerment	   with	   the	   possibility	   for	   widespread	   participation.	   This	  phase	   surfaces	   as	   something	   akin	   to	   the	   ‘golden	   times’	   of	   Michoacán	  narcotrafficking	  in	  locals’	  accounts.	  	  2) The	  1980s	  as	  a	  phase	  of	  grand	  transformations	  in	  the	  political	  and	  socio-­‐economic	  fields	  and	   consequently	   in	   the	   field	  of	  Michoacán	  organized	   crime.	  While	   the	   first	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phase’s	   features	   are	   still	   eminent,	   first	   indications	   of	   a	   greater	   degree	   of	  concentration,	   centralization,	   and	   organization	   become	   apparent	   as	   well	   as	   a	  gradual	  increase	  in	  violence.	  	  	  3) The	   third	   phase,	   which	   sets	   in	   around	   the	   turn	   of	   the	   millennium,	   sees	   the	  transformation	   of	   the	   second	   phase’s	   features	   into	   exclusive	   and	   highly	   stratified	  forms	   of	   participation	   in	   narcotrafficking.	   This	   translates	   into	   accentuated	  expressions	   of	   violent	   competition	   amongst	   participants	   and	   undermines	   locals’	  access	   to	   narcotrafficking	   as	   a	   means	   of	   economic	   empowerment.	   Moreover,	   an	  incipient	   el	   narco’s	   spillover	   into	   societal	   spheres	   other	   than	   criminal	   markets	  becomes	  apparent.	  4) The	  fourth	  phase,	   from	  2005,	  coincides	  with	  the	  rise	  of	  LFM	  as	  LCT’s	  predecessor	  organization.	  Here,	  the	  mutation	  culminates	  in	  that	  it	  experiences	  the	  galvanization	  of	   organized	   crime	   and	   alternative	   governance	   into	   a	   fundamentally	   eclectic	  phenomenon	  that	  is	  firmly	  rooted	  in	  the	  past	  phases’	  transformations.	  Materialized	  in	  the	  contemporary	  setting	  of	  Tierra	  Caliente,	  these	  provide	  more	  than	  just	  a	  fertile	  context	  to	  LCT’s	  insertion	  into	  the	  local	  as	  a	  force	  of	  alternative	  governance.	  For,	  in	  the	  latter	  construct,	  they	  surface	  as	  building	  blocks	  that	  LCT	  explicitly	  relates	  to	  and	  leverages	  upon.	  In	  Chapter	  5,	  I	  analyze	  this	  phase	  in	  depth.	  	  	  A	  fifth	  phase	  –	  which	  unfolded	  as	  a	  result	  of	  LCT’s	  demise	  and	  disintegration	  over	  the	  past	  couple	  of	  years	  and	  which	  set	  in	  after	  I	  left	  the	  field	  –	  is	  here	  deliberately	  not	  included.	  Yet,	  the	  current	  situation	  in	  Tierra	  Caliente	  –	  characterized	  by	  the	  emergence	  of	  yet	  another	  set	  of	   non-­‐state	   armed	   actors	   (so-­‐called	   self-­‐defense	   groups)	   and	   what	   I	   call	   a	   third-­‐order	  territorial	   fragmentation	   –	   has	   everything	   to	   do	  with	   LCT’s	   previous	   dominion	   over	   the	  local.	  My	  work	  provides,	  in	  this	  sense,	  important	  insights	  to	  decipher	  this	  constellation	  as	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well	  as	   the	  more	   fundamental	  question	  of	  what	  drives	   the	  oscillation	  between	  order	  and	  disorder	  in	  Mexico	  and	  the	  ‘global	  south’.	  Hence,	  I	  include	  a	  discussion	  of	  these	  matters	  in	  Chapter	  7,	  the	  conclusion	  to	  this	  thesis.	  	  	  	  
	  
Chapter	  5:	  LCT’s	  project	  of	  alternative	  governance	  as	  enacted	  narrative	  	  	  
Whereas	  Chapter	  4	  describes	  the	  historical	  backdrop	  to	  LCT’s	  rise,	  Chapter	  5	  is	  dedicated	  to	   the	   analysis	   of	   the	  peak	  of	   its	   territorial	   dominion	   and	   lifespan.	  This	  phase	  moreover	  coincided	  with	  the	  period	  during	  which	  I	  gathered	  data	  in	  situ.	  As	  noted	  above,	  the	  striving	  for	  legitimacy	  as	  a	  goal	  worth	  pursuing	  is	  here	  scrutinized	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  palpable	  effects	  on	   the	  group’s	   conduct	   towards	   the	   local	   as	  well	   as	   the	   resulting	   repercussions	  both	   for	  local	  communities	  and	  LCT	  itself.	  In	  particular,	  I	  draw	  on	  data	  gathered	  from	  within	  LCT	  as	  well	   as	   local	   civilian	   populations	   to	   provide	   an	   in-­‐depth	   description	   of	   LCT’s	   project	   of	  alternative	  governance.	  Rather	  than	  ascribing	  to	  LCT,	  as	  is	  frequently	  done,	  the	  identity	  of	  a	  monolithic	  entity	  capable	  of,	  as	  well	  as	  characterized	  by,	  perfectly	  coordinated	  action,	  I	  approach	   it	   as	   a	   contradictorily	   enacted	   narrative.	   The	   latter,	   I	   argue,	   best	   captures	   the	  essence	  of	  the	  project	  of	  alternative	  governance	  as	  an	  attempt	  to	  construe	  legitimacy	  and	  thereby	   organizational	   survival.	   First,	   I	   provide	   an	   overview	   of	   key	   concepts	   in	   the	  contemporary	  landscape	  of	  social	  order	  and	  sovereignty	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  relation	  between	  alternative	  governance	  and	  the	  question	  of	  legitimacy.	  This	  serves	  to	  situate	  LCT’s	  agency	  within	  a	  broader	  context	  and	  thus	  a	  wider	  population	  of	  non-­‐state	  actors	   involved	  in	  the	  provision	   of	   governance.	   These	   structural	   conditions	   –	   including	   the	   dysfunctionality	   of	  state	   rule	  and	  socio-­‐economic	  marginalization	  –	   suppose	   important	  explanatory	   features	  in	  this	  context.	  LCT	  showed	  a	  clear	  capacity	  to	  ‘read’	  and	  capitalize	  on	  their	  manifestation	  on	   the	   local	   level.	   This	  was	   therefore	   a	  key	   asset	   for	   the	   group	  as	  well	   as	   a	  main	  driver	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towards	  its	  constitution	  as	  an	  organizational	  construct	  of	  unparalleled	  hybridity,	  rendering	  what	  I	  refer	  to	  as	  environmental	  reflexiveness	  a	  central	  feature	  of	  my	  analysis.	  	  	  	  In	   particular,	   I	   argue	   that	   locals’	   negative	   reflections	   on	   the	   contemporary	   turn	   of	  Michoacán	   organized	   crime	   towards	   its	   highly	   coagulated,	   exclusive,	   stratified,	   and	  hyperviolent	  shape	  (see	  Chapter	  4)	  entailed	  as	  much	  of	  a	  necessity	  as	  an	  opportunity	  for	  LCT	  to	  create	  distinction	  and	  thereby	  foster	  legitimacy.	  This	  concerned,	  first	  and	  foremost,	  distinction	  from	  itself.	  LCT’s	  self-­‐narrative	  –	  one	  out	  of	  two	  pillars	  carrying	  its	  governance	  and	   widely	   diffused	   amongst	   local	   populations	   but	   also	   via	   diverse	   media	   channels	   –	  speaks	  loudly	  in	  this	  respect.	  LCT	  portrayed	  itself	  as	  a	  benevolent	  guardian	  of	  the	  local,	  as	  the	  only	  actor	  willing	  and	  capable	  to	  confront	  threats	  to	  local	  society	  as	  embodied	  by	  state	  and	   non-­‐state	   enemy	   others.	   The	   latter,	   construed	   as	   forces	   blamed	   for	   disorder	   and	  destruction,	  serve	  as	  elements	  of	  distinction.	  They	  underpin	  LCT’s	  claim	  to	  belong	  to	   the	  category	   of	   revolutionarily	   inspired	   social	  movements	  with	   the	   goal	   of	   bringing	   about	   a	  just	  and	  orderly	  society	  rather	  than	  that	  of	  criminal	  organizations.	  As	  much	  as	  the	  group’s	  existence	  reflects	  this,	  they	  are	  geared	  towards	  neutralizing	  their	  permeation	  of	  the	  local	  so	  that	  it	  appears	  as	  a	  necessity.	  As	  shared	  threats,	  they	  moreover	  provide	  the	  basis	  for	  the	  suggestion	   of	   a	   natural	   communion	   of	   the	   group	   and	   local	   society.	   The	   latter	   discursive	  strain	  of	  distinction	  is	  amended	  by	  an	  absolute	  one	  in	  which	  positively	  connoted	  elements	  that	  promise	  to	  confer	  legitimacy	  are	  borrowed	  from	  a	  wider	  array	  of	  ideological	  currents	  and	   eclectically	   arranged	   alongside	   symbolic	   carriers	   that	   suggest	   a	   shared	   history	   and	  cultural	   identity.	   As	   a	   result	   a	   proclaimed	   project	   of	   (narco-­‐)social	   engineering	   is	  established.	   Its	  existence	   turns,	  as	   I	  argue,	  binary	  depictions	  of	   the	  relationship	  between	  the	  licit	  and	  the	  illicit,	  the	  legal	  and	  the	  criminal,	  the	  moral	  and	  the	  immoral	  on	  their	  head	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insofar	   as	   LCT	   claimed	   nothing	   less	   than	   more	   perfect	   ownership	   of	   very	   same	   ideas,	  norms,	  and	  values	  stereotypically	  championed	  by	  the	  (Mexican)	  state.	  	  	  On	   analyzing	   the	   group’s	   official	   narrative	  with	   the	   help	   of	   documents	   obtained	  directly	  from	   LCT	   (see	   Chapter	   3)	   –	   publicly	   non-­‐available	   and,	   in	   offering	   the	   densest	  crystallization	  of	  the	  narrative,	  of	  great	  value	  –	  I	  contrast	  it	  with	  more	  pragmatic	  accounts	  as	  voiced	  by	  members	  of	  LCT	  in	  interviews.	  Unveiling	  contradictions	  and,	  again,	  the	  plural	  configuration	   of	   the	   organizational	   construct	   of	   LCT,	   this	   provides	   rich	   insights	   into	   the	  interstices	  between	  front-­‐	  and	  backstage,	  as	  Goffman	  (1959)	  would	  have	  it.	  I	  then	  move	  on	  to	  discuss	  how	  both	  discursive	  levels	  resurface	  in	  form	  of	  that	  set	  of	  palpable	  practices	  that	  characterized	   LCT’s	   insertion	   into	   local	   communities.	   I	   here	   focus	   on	   patterns	   of	   social	  control,	   which	   includes	   the	   implementation	   of	   a	   quasi-­‐judicial	   system,	   as	   well	   as,	   more	  generally	   speaking,	   encounters	   with	   LCT	   as	   a	   fixture	   of	   everyday	   life	   within	   local	  communities.	  The	  accounts	  provided	  to	  me	  by	  civilian	  informants	  allow	  me	  to	  interrogate	  the	  tensions	  between	  discursive	  claims	  and	  on-­‐the-­‐ground	  realities.	  These	  moreover	  serve	  to	   examine	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   LCT’s	   self-­‐narrative	   as	   locals	   evaluate	   the	   group’s	  performance	   and,	   more	   fundamentally,	   the	   degree	   to	   which	   it	   appears	   (or	   not)	   as	  legitimate	  to	  them.	  	  	  	  
Chapter	  6:	  State-­‐organized	  crime-­‐interactions	  	  
Any	  attempt	   to	  approach	   the	   ‘pluralization	  of	   regulatory	  authority’	   (Roitman,	  2005)	  as	  a	  dynamic	   characteristic	   for	   contemporary	   Latin	   America	   needs	   to	   bring	   in	   the	   state.	   For,	  despite	  its	  weakening	  and	  an	  eminent	  loss	  in	  governmental	  and	  regulatory	  capacity,	  by	  no	  means	  does	  it	  simply	  vanish	  and	  leave	  such	  a	  thing	  as	  a	  perfect	  vacuum	  (see	  Davis	  2009,	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2010).	  This,	  in	  turn,	  implies	  that	  to	  non-­‐state	  armed	  actors	  such	  as	  LCT,	  the	  state	  remains	  a	  factor	  to	  be	  reckoned	  with.	  In	  Chapter	  6,	  I	  incorporate	  the	  matter	  into	  my	  own	  analysis	  by	  providing	   a	   depiction	   of	   the	   ways	   state-­‐organized	   crime-­‐interactions	   played	   out	   in	   the	  present	  case.	  It	  forms	  a	  central	  feature	  of	  my	  exploration	  of	  the	  above	  formulated	  question	  of	  how,	  under	  utmost	  adverse	  environmental	  circumstance,	  LCT	  sought	  (and	  succeeded,	  up	  to	  a	  certain	  point)	  to	  secure	  its	  own	  survival.	  My	  findings	  in	  this	  arena	  contradict	  dominant	  accounts	  of	  state-­‐organized	  crime-­‐interactions	  and,	  more	  widely	  speaking,	  of	  the	  way	  the	  licit	  relates	  to	  the	  illicit.	  Non-­‐state	  armed	  actors	  are,	  in	  this	  vein,	  asserted	  to	  thrive	  under	  conditions	   of	   (violently	   induced)	   state	   absence	   and	   to	   produce	   ‘ungoverned	   spaces’	   or	  even	   ‘failed	   states’.	   Similarly,	   paradigmatic	   accounts	   on	   organized	   crime	   depict	   the	  fundamental	   relationship	   between	   upper-­‐	   and	   underworld	   thus:	   By	   definition,	   as	   Paoli	  (2002:	  64,	  65)	  phrases	   it,	  organized	  criminal	  groups	  must	  operate	   ‘against	   the	  state’	  and	  moreover	   ‘without	   the	  state’.	  Law	  and	   ‘the’	   state	  are	  here	  asserted	   to	  constitute	  a	  quasi-­‐natural,	   ever-­‐looming	   existential	   threat	   to	   those	   standing	   outside	   of	   it.	   The	   boundary	  between	   the	   licit	   and	   the	   illicit	   appears	   as	   largely	   taken	   for	   granted,	   punctured	   only	   as	  ‘criminal	   energy’	   is	   channeled	   towards	   the	   neutralization	   of	   ‘the	   law’	   qua	   infiltration,	  corruption,	  perversion.	  	  	  This	   binary	   imagery	   of	   the	   ‘licit-­‐illicit-­‐divide’,	   as	   I	   refer	   to	   it,	   surfaces	   in	   especially	   clear	  ways	  in	  the	  debate	  on	  Mexico’s	  ‘war	  on	  drugs’.	  Here,	  two	  monolithic	  blocks	  –	  the	  modern	  nation	  state	  as	  the	  stereotypical	  champion	  of	  law,	  legality,	  and	  (moral)	  order	  and	  nihilistic	  forces	  of	  illegality	  and	  disorder	  –	  are	  seen	  to	  confront	  each	  other	  in	  existential	  antagonism.	  Prima	  facie,	  the	  existence	  of	  projects	  of	  alternative	  governance	  such	  as	  the	  one	  in	  question	  here	  supports	  such	  assessment.	  The	  more	  so	  since	  it	  invokes	  contention	  with	  ‘the’	  state	  in	  its	   very	   core	   arenas	   of	   action.	   Three	   themes	   thus	   sustain	   the	   imagery	   of	   the	   licit-­‐illicit-­‐
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divide	  as	  the	  iron	  dividing	  line	  between	  upper-­‐	  and	  underworld:	  exclusivity,	  supplantation,	  and	  monolithic	  antagonism.	  All	   three	  prove,	   I	  maintain,	   fallacious	  and	   rooted	   in	  one	  and	  the	   same	   basic	   normative	   distortion:	   the	   failure	   to	   distinguish	   between	   ‘the	   law’	   in	   its	  idealized	  projection	  and	  its	  empirical	  manifestation	  (see	  Heyman/Smart,	  1999:11).	  	  
To	   approach	   realities	   in	   Tierra	   Caliente	   as	   well	   as	   elsewhere	   in	   the	   ‘global	   south’,	   the	  recognition	   of	   the	   law	   as	   an	   ‘indeterminate	   system	   of	   meanings	   manipulated	   in	   actual	  social	  practice’	  (ibid.)	  is	  essential.	  It	  acquires	  the	  quality	  as	  a	  resource	  moldable	  by	  actors	  situated	  on	  both	  extremes	  of	  the	  licit-­‐illicit-­‐divide.	  This	  trait	  surfaces,	  in	  great	  clarity,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  LCT	  and	  in	  what	  I	  term	  its	  ‘differential	  positioning’	  towards	  the	  Mexican	  state	  and	  its	  fragments.	  As	  I	  maintain	  in	  Chapter	  6,	  law	  and	  legality	  appear	  less	  as	  a	  given	  existential	  threat	   to	   be	   evaded	   and	   neutralized	   than	   as	   a	   rich	   playing	   field.	   Specifically,	   LCT	  recognized	   the	   plural	   and	   contradictory	   composition	   of	   ‘the’	   state.	   Leveraging	   on	   the	  interstices	  between	  ‘ideal’	  and	  ‘empirical’	  law	  enabled	  LCT	  to	  access	  the	  state	  as	  a	  rich	  pool	  of	  resources,	  as	  crucial	  to	  its	  performance	  and	  survival	  as	  those	  derived	  from	  interactions	  with	  local	  civilian	  populations	  (see	  Chapter	  5).	  It	  did	  so	  on	  three	  distinct	  levels:	  	  
1) The	   gap	   between	   state	   actors’	   legal	  mandate	   and	   their	  de	   facto	   behavior	   allowed	  LCT	   to	   engage	   with	   them	   in	   differential	   ways	   transcending	   the	   licit-­‐illicit	   divide.	  This	   enabled	   LCT,	   for	   instance,	   to	   (successfully)	   seek	   an	   accommodation	   with	  higher-­‐level	   state	   actors	   such	   as	   the	   military	   and	   the	   two	   presidential	  administrations	  while	  transforming	  municipal	  state	  structures	  into	  external,	  yet	  de	  
facto	  organizational	  assets.	  	  	  	  	  	  2) The	   same	   gap	   allowed	   LCT	   to	   justify	   its	   existence	   and	   generate	   legitimacy	   by	  criticizing	   the	   inefficiency	   and	   corruption	   of	   state	   actors	   and	   functionaries,	  presenting	  itself	  as	  a	  better	  solution	  for	  social	  order.	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3) The	   same	   ideas,	   norms,	   and	   values	   embodied	   in	   the	   Mexican	   legal	   code	   and	  especially	  its	  progressive	  constitution,	  served	  LCT	  as	  a	  pool	  from	  which	  to	  borrow	  building	  blocks	  informing	  its	  discursive	  self-­‐legitimation.	  	  	  A	   seeming	   paradox	   arises	   out	   of	   this	   constellation:	   so	   as	   to	   be	   able	   to	   continue	  manipulating	  and	  populating	   the	   interstices	  between	   ideal	   and	  empirical	   law,	  LCT	  had	  a	  vested	   interest	   in	   the	   reproduction	   of	   the	   project	   of	   the	   Mexican	   nation	   state	   (in	   its	  empirically	   deformed	   shape),	   in	   fostering	   the	   balance	   between	   its	   legitimacy	   and	   its	  illegitimacy.	   In	   this	  sense,	   the	  state,	  despite	   its	  erosion,	  remains	   the	  only	   thing	  close	   to	  a	  superstructure	   providing	   a	   degree	   of	   predictability	   under	   liquefaction	   and	   uncertainty.	  LCT’s	   interest	   correspondingly	   lay	   far	   from	   a	   will	   to	   overthrow	   and	   to	   replace	   state	   or	  system	  altogether.	  Rather,	   its	  positioning	   towards	   relevant	   (i.e.	  higher-­‐level)	   state	  actors	  speaks	  of	  an	  (effectively	  reciprocated)	  offer	  to	  engage	  in	  the	  coproduction	  of	  a	  trans-­‐legal	  order,	   based	   on	   the	   partition	   or	   sharing	   of	   the	   fruits	   of	   sovereignty	   according	   to	   each	  party’s	   needs.	   The	   licit-­‐illicit-­‐divide	   reemerges	   as	   a	   highly	   functional	   myth	   allowing	   for	  mutual	   accommodation.	   The	   ceremonial	   reproduction	   of	   the	   state’s	   symbolic,	   legally	  committed	   façade	   and	   thus	   the	   very	   basis	   for	   its	   existence	   occupied	   a	   place	   of	   central	  functionality	   in	   this	   context.	   LCT	   actively	   invested	   in	   producing	   signals	   required	   to	   this	  end.	  Amongst	  other	  things,	  it	  would,	  as	  its	  leaders	  told	  me,	  ‘give’	  the	  state	  ‘a	  meth	  lab	  every	  once	   in	   a	  while’,	   allowing	   the	   state	   to	   ‘impersonate	   itself’	   (Comaroff/Comaroff,	   2006:16)	  and	   to	   simulate	   its	   capacity	   and	   will	   to	   advance	   the	   rule	   of	   law.	   As	   I	   explain	   further,	  municipal	   elections	   were	   effectively	   co-­‐organized	   by	   both	   sides,	   thereby	   sustaining	   the	  illusion	  of	  an	  electoral	  democracy	  to	  the	  benefit	  of	  one	  and	  producing	  organizational	  assets	  for	  the	  other.	  All	  the	  while	  LCT’s	  project	  of	  governance	  largely	  proceeded	  under	  conditions	  of	   non-­‐interference	   and	   spatial	   coexistence	   with	   higher-­‐level	   state	   actors.	   In	   a	   nutshell,	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LCT	   did	   not	   primarily	   pursue	   its	   project	   of	   alternative	   governance	   and	   thus	   its	  organizational	  survival	  despite,	  or	  even	   in	  direct	  antagonism	  to,	   the	  state	  per	  se	  but	  was	  able	  to	  do	  so	  due	  to	  a	  skillful	  insertion	  into	  the	  extant	  landscape	  of	  sovereignties.	  	  Before	   I	   set	   out	   to	   analyze	   LCT’s	   rise	   as	  well	   as	   the	   shape	   and	   effects	   of	   its	   attempt	   to	  guarantee	   its	   organizational	   survival,	   in	   the	   following	   chapter	   I	   discuss	   key	   themes	   and	  concepts	   that	   are	   being	   prominently	   discussed	   in	   the	   contemporary	   literature	   on	   the	  reshuffling	   of	   social	   order	   in	   the	   Global	   South	   and	   the	   role	   of	   non-­‐state	   armed	   actors	  herein.	  These	  are	  therefore	  also	  of	  great	  importance	  for	  the	  interpretation	  of	  my	  own	  data	  in	  in	  Chapters	  4	  to	  6,	  which	  are	  furthermore	  preceded	  by	  a	  discussion	  of	  my	  methodology	  in	  Chapter	  3.	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Chapter	  2:	  Literature	  Review	  	  	  
This	   thesis’	  goal	   to	  decipher	   the	  mutation	  of	  Mexican	  organized	  crime	  and	   its	  Michoacán	  variant	  in	  particular	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  ‘naive’	  encounters	  with	  it.	  Encounters,	  as	  I	  have	  pointed	  out	  in	  the	  introduction,	  with	  a	  phenomenon	  that	  manifested	  itself	  out	  in	  the	  open	  and	   thus	   where,	   common	   as	   well	   as	   default	   academic	   sensemaking	   indicate,	   it	   was	   not	  supposed	  to	  be	  found.	  How	  could	  a	  violent	  non-­‐state	  actor	  such	  as	  LCT	  publicly	  claim	  and	  effectively	  exercise	  a	  significant	  degree	  of	  control	  over	  an	  important	  chunk	  of	  the	  Mexican	  territory?	  The	  more	   so	   since	   this	  was	   happening	   in	   a	   country	   that	   had,	   just	   a	   few	  years	  before,	  been	  widely	  lauded	  as	  a	  model	  democratizer	  that	  had	  non-­‐violently	  and	  gradually	  transitioned	   from	  authoritarian	  rule	   to	  democracy	   like	  no	  other	  political	   system	   in	  Latin	  America	  before	  it	  (see	  Chapter	  4	  for	  details).	  This	  observation,	  bewildering	  to	  most	  outside	  analyzers	  and	  hotly	  discussed	  both	  within	  and	  outside	  of	  scholarly	  circles,	  raises	  important	  questions.	   These	   concern,	   most	   obviously,	   the	   role	   and	   standing	   of	   the	   state.	   More	  specifically,	   the	   interactions	  and	   relations	  between	  non-­‐state	  armed	  actors	  and	   the	   state	  are	   of	   the	   greatest	   importance	   for	   deciphering	   the	   mechanisms	   and	   driving	   forces	  underlying	   the	  reshuffling	  of	  social	  order	   in	   in	  Latin	  America	  and	   the	  Global	  South	  more	  generally.	  The	  same	  is	  therefore	  true	  for	  this	  thesis.	  Hence,	  to	  lay	  the	  groundwork	  for	  the	  discussion	   and	   themes	   I	   develop	   over	   the	   following	   chapters,	  what	   I	   provide	   below	   is	   a	  succinct	  reflection	  of	  the	  main	  items	  and	  strains	  of	  the	  debate.	  I	  do	  so	  by	  centering	  on	  the	  concepts	   and	   strains	   of	   reasoning	   that	   are	   of	   the	   greatest	   relevance	   for	   reflecting	   and	  interpreting	   my	   own	   data	   and	   the	   findings	   derived	   from	   it.	   I	   first	   discuss	   ‘traditional’	  understandings	  of	  state,	  state	  formation,	  and	  sovereignty	  and	  examine	  ways	  in	  which	  these	  have	   been	   drawn	   upon	   to	   account	   for	   transformation	   in	   order	   creation	   (in	   the	   Global	  South)	   and	   interaction	   between	   state	   and	   non-­‐state	   elements.	   I	   then	   contrast	   these	   by	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introducing	   more	   recent,	   critical	   conceptualizations	   that	   provide	   analytical	   tools	   more	  fitting	  for	  significantly	  changed	  sociopolitical	  conditions	  such	  as	  those	  the	  case	  of	  LCT	  has	  been	  embedded	  in.	  	  
	  
Default	  imagery	  of	  state	  and	  state	  making	  
The	   narrative	   of	   Mexico’s	   ascendance	   to	   a	   poster	   country	   of	   democratic	   and	   economic	  development	  was	  drowned	  for	  good	  as	  the	  country’s	   ‘narcoviolence’	  hit	  new	  highs	   in	  the	  aftermath	   of	   the	   militarization	   of	   anti-­‐organized	   crime	   measures	   under	   President	  Calderón.	  To	  doomsayers	  of	  different	  backgrounds,	  this	  and	  the	  admitted	  loss	  of	  control	  by	  the	  Mexican	  state	  over	  parts	  of	   its	  territory	  in	  Michoacán	  and	  elsewhere	  harbingered	  the	  partial	  or	  utter	  failure	  of	  the	  Mexican	  state.	  As	  irreconcilable	  and	  distant	  they	  seem,	  both	  assertions	  –	  that	  of	  the	  triumph	  of	  democratic	  progress	  and	  process	  and	  that	  of	  Mexico’s	  drug-­‐propelled	  decay	  into	  a	  state	  of	  anarchy	  –	  are	  base	  on	  the	  same	  traditional	  imagery	  of	  state	   and	   state	   formation.	  Both,	   that	   is,	   are	   rooted	   in	   a	  metaphysical	   genealogy	  of	   social	  order	  that	  postulates	  a	  linear	  development	  of	  human	  society.	  Simply	  put,	  an	  initial,	  socially	  atomistic	   state	   of	   anarchy	   is	   seen	   as	   the	   point	   of	   departure.	   Fundamental	   insecurity	   or	  even	  a	  war	  of	  all	  against	  all	   is	  here	  perpetual	  but	  ultimately	  overcome	  as	   individuals	  see	  the	   reason	   for	   and	   agree	   upon	   a	   ‘social	   contract’	   which	   gives	   society	   coherence	   and	   its	  members	  security	  through	  norms	  of	  reciprocity	  (Hampton,	  1986	  provides	  a	  good	  overview	  of	  this	  genealogy	  of	  societal	  order	  based	  on	  in	  social	  contract	  theories,	  most	  famously	  by	  Hobbes	  and	  Locke).	  From	  this	  point	  of	   inception	  starts	  a	  civilizational	  process	   that	  gives	  birth	   to	   states,	   crucial	   for	   securing	   civilizational	   advancement	   and	   social	   order	   through	  their	  capacity	  to	  bind	  and	  dominate	  sources	  of	  violence	  that	  would	  otherwise	  be	  disorderly	  arranged,	   thus	   harboring	   a	   high	   potential	   for	   or	   inevitably	   leading	   to	   disintegration	   and	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chaos.	  Especially	   in	  Hobbes’	  account,	  man	  does	  not	  appear	  as	  a	   ‘social	  animal’	  by	  nature	  and	  is	  only	  tamed	  through	  the	  state.	  	  	  The	   term	   ‘state’	   itself	   is	  deeply	   rooted	   in	  Western	   thought	  and	  dates	  back	   to	   the	  Middle	  Ages.	  It	  first	  connotes	  an	  embodiment	  of	  a	  particular	  ruler	  and	  of	  a	  particular	  form	  of	  rule	  herewith	  coupled.	  This	  starts	  to	  change	  in	  the	  Renaissance	  where	  it	  begins	  to	  be	  construed	  as	  a	  particular	  form	  of	  government	  the	  ruler	  has	  a	  certain	  responsibility	  to	  reproduce.	  This	  thought	  of	  abstraction	  and	  transcendence	  culminates	  with	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  modern	  nation-­‐state:	   ‘[A]ccording	   to	   the	   modern	   concept,	   the	   state	   is	   an	   entity	   with	   a	   life	   on	   its	   own,	  distinct	  from	  both	  governors	  and	  governed.	  And	  because	  of	  this	  abstraction,	  it	  can	  demand	  allegiance	   from	  both	   sides'	   (Asad,	  2004:281).	  Not	  only	   that,	   but	   it	   is	   furthermore	  vested	  with	  the	  legitimate	  right	  to	  do	  so.	  For	  it	  is,	  from	  this	  perspective,	  only	  through	  the	  state’s	  historical	   success	   in	   monopolizing	   both	   taxation	   and	   violence	   that	   late	   feudal	   societies’	  fragmentation	  and	  conflictivity	  is	  overcome	  and	  a	  higher	  civilizational	  state	  obtained.	  This	  is	   not	   to	   say	   that	   violence	  within	   society	   is	   eradicated	   altogether.	   But,	   as	  Weber	   (1919)	  famously	  argued,	  the	  state’s	  monopolization	  of	   it	  as	  well	  as	   its	  use	  for	  the	  public	  and	  not	  the	  private	   good	  according	   to	   a	   rational,	   independent,	   and	   legally	  bound	  and	   committed	  bureaucracy	  makes	   it	   ‘civilized	   violence’	   (or	   simply	   ‘force’).	  Hereby,	   the	   existence	   of	   the	  state	  as	  such	  becomes	  legitimate	  (good	  examples	  of	  critical	  overviews	  of	  default	  accounts	  of	  state	  formation	  come	  from	  Asad,	  2004,	  who	  draws	  on	  Skinner’s	  work	  of	  1978	  to	  trace	  the	   trajectory	   of	   the	   term	   in	   Western	   thought;	   Davis,	   2009:225ff.;	   Pansters,	   2012:19).	  Weber’s	   formulation	   is	   still	   predominant	   and	   the	   gold	   standard	   tacitly	   accepted	   and	  reproduced	  by	  most	  social	  scientists.	  In	  this	  vein,	  the	  modern	  nation-­‐state	  is	  understood	  as	  a	   ‘human	   community	   that	   successfully	   claims	   the	   monopoly	   of	   the	   legitimate	   use	   of	  physical	  force	  within	  a	  given	  territory’	  (Weber,	  1919).	  Expressed	  differently	  in	  summary	  of	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the	  above	  outlined	  imagery,	  the	  state	  appears	  as	  a	  political-­‐institutional	  body	  that	  acts	  in	  unity,	   rationally,	   and	   legally	   and	   which	   furthermore	   is	   the	   only	   actor	   within	   a	   given	  territory	   that	   holds	   the	   means	   of	   violence	   and	   decides	   over	   their	   activation	   vis-­‐a-­‐vis	   a	  given	  subject	  population	  by	  which	  its	  right	  to	  do	  so	  is	  recognized	  as	  legitimate.	  The	  latter	  also	   holds	   the	   inseparably	   entangled	   definition	   of	   ‘sovereignty’,	   which	   is	   of	   utmost	  importance	   for	  the	  case	  and	  setting	  I	  analyze	   in	  this	   thesis	  and	  to	  which	  I	  dedicate	  more	  attention	  below.	  Suffice	  it	  to	  say	  in	  the	  meantime,	  that	  sovereignty	  is	  ‘taken	  as	  the	  absolute	  authority	   a	   state	   holds	   over	   a	   territory	   and	   people’	   and	   ‘treated	   as	   an	   already	   settled	  question’.	   Particularly	   so	   within	   political	   science	   and	   international	   relations	   and	   thus	  scholarship	  with	  great	  influence	  over	  sensemaking	  on	  non-­‐state	  armed	  actors,	  as	  Cynthia	  Weber,	  herself	  a	  member	  of	   that	  discipline,	   laments	  (1995:1).	  The	   ‘evolution	  of	   “political	  man’’’,	  as	  Arias	  and	  Goldstein	  critically	  remark	  (2010:13),	  is	  moreover	  widely	  accepted	  as	  culminating	   in	  Western-­‐style	  democracy,	  which	   theoretically	  pairs	   a	   functioning	   state	   as	  laid	  put	  above	  with	  a	  wide	  regime	  of	  individual	  rights	  and	  protections	  against	  state	  abuse.	  ‘It’	   –	   the	   Western	   democratic	   state,	   that	   is	   –	   embodies	   the	   desirable	   product	   of	   said	  evolutionary	   process	   and,	   as	   such,	   the	   marker	   of	   good	   vs.	   evil,	   civilized	   vs.	  uncivilized/barbarian,	   rational	   vs.	   irrational/erratic,	   force	   vs.	   violence,	   order	   vs.	  disorder/anarchy,	  and	  law	  vs.	  arbitrariness	  and	  abuse.	  	  
	  
The	  loss	  of	  state	  centrality?	  
Increasingly	   so	   after	   the	   end	   of	   the	   Cold	   War	   and	   the	   formulation	   of	   world	   order	   as	  multipolar	  rather	  than	  bipolar,	  the	  above	  outlined	  traditional	  narrative	  of	  state	  making	  and	  of	   state	   itself	   has	   become	   questioned.	   While	   angles	   towards	   the	   reexamination	   of	   the	  matter	   have	   been	   informed	   by	   diverse	   interests,	   sets	   of	   presumptions,	   and	   disciplinary	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perspectives,	   most	   of	   these	   have	   centered	   on	   the	   observation	   that	   the	   ‘trinity’	   of	   the	  modern	   nation-­‐state	   –	   the	   monopoly	   of	   violence,	   sovereignty,	   and	   legitimacy	   –	   has	  undergone	   profound	   transformations.	   The	   weakening	   of	   the	   nation-­‐state’s	   capacity	   to	  govern	  and	  to	  effectively	  control	  populations	  and	  territories	  has	  surfaced	  as	  one	  the	  most	  prominent	  themes	  in	  this	  context.	  The	  default	  argument	  has	  it	  that	  forces	  previously	  held	  at	   bay	   through	   the	  partition	   of	   the	  world	   among	   the	   ‘super-­‐powers’;	   the	  USSR	   and	  USA.	  Each	  had	  an	  interest,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  resources,	  in	  fostering	  state	  survival	  in	  their	  respective	  areas	   of	   influence.	   All	   in	   all,	   this	   leveled	   out	   the	   respective	   opponent’s	   attempts	   to	   the	  contrary	  and	  gave	  stability	  to	  existing	  nation-­‐states.	  This	  often	  took	  the	  form	  of	  providing	  resources	  and	  expertise	  such	  as	  military	  aid	  and	  training,	  not	  least	  so	  in	  Latin	  America	  (see	  Gill,	   2004	   for	   an	   in-­‐depth	   account	   of	   US-­‐American	   counterinsurgency	   programs	   in	   the	  region).	   This	   either	   allowed	   sitting	   regimes	   to	   quell	   opposition	   groups	   or,	   vice	   versa,	  opposition	   groups	   to	   overthrow	   sitting	   regimes,	   concentrating,	   in	   any	   case,	   power	   and	  force	   at	   the	   state	   level.	   While	   this	   also	   ensued	   support	   for	   non-­‐state	   actors	   (a	   prime	  example	   would	   be	   US	   support	   for	   the	   so-­‐called	   mujahidin	   in	   Pakistan	   and	   Afghanistan	  against	   a	   state	   supported	   and	   installed	   by	   the	   USSR	   upon	   its	   invasion	   of	   the	   country	   in	  1979),	  this	  is	  nevertheless	  seen	  as	  having	  kept	  conflicts	  under	  relative	  control	  as,	  with	  only	  two	   blocks	   involved,	   things	   remained	   relatively	   clear-­‐cut.	   As,	   however,	   a	   multipolar	  structure	   arises	   and	   the	   pressure	   to	   provide	   resources	   evaporates,	   regimes	   and	   states	  hitherto	  kept	  alive	  quasi-­‐artificially	  began	  to	  reveal	  their	  true	  weakness	  and	  crumble.	  	  	  This	   line	   of	   argumentation	   has	   been	  most	   vocally	   advanced	   by	   scholars	  with	   an	   explicit	  concern	   for	   matters	   of	   ‘national	   security’	   (see	   Davis,	   2009:221ff.	   for	   an	   excellent	  overview).	   States	   situated	   in	   the	  Global	   South	   are	   portrayed	   as	  most	   adversely	   affected.	  	  Their	  ‘decay’,	  ‘malfunctioning’,	  or	  even	  ‘failure’	  –	  formulations	  vary	  –	  is	  said	  to	  present	  the	  
	  	   41	  
greatest	  threat	  potential	  for	  Western	  states	  and	  thus	  a	  new	  set	  of	  security	  challenges.	  Non-­‐state	  armed	  actors	  such	  as	  terrorist	  and	  insurgent	  groups	  are	  here	  often	  asserted	  to	  thrive	  under	   conditions	   of	   ‘weak’	   or	   altogether	   ‘absent’	   states,	   a	   condition	   only	   further	  accentuated	  as	  non-­‐state	  armed	  actors	  such	  as	  the	  aforementioned	  are	  seen	  to	  inherently	  strive	  to	  confront,	  undermine,	  and	  ultimately	  overthrow	  the	  state.	  This,	  it	  has	  been	  argued,	  leads	   to	   the	   production	   of	   ‘ungoverned’	   and	   thus	   ‘dangerous	   spaces’	   where	   ‘dragons’	  (Williams,	   2010)	   wreak	   havoc	   and	   tear	   apart	   societal	   arrangements	   and	   stability.	   As	  opposed	   to	   previously	   dominant	   ways	   of	   war-­‐making,	   conflict	   migrates	   from	   the	  international	  to	  the	  sub-­‐national	  sphere	  where	  unleashed	  non-­‐state	  entities	  confront	  each	  other	  as	  well	  as	   the	  state,	  entailing	  a	  serious	  destabilizing	  potential	  both	   for	  domestic	  as	  well	  as	   foreign	  states	  as	   ‘ungoverned	  spaces’	  are	  seen	  as	   safe	  havens	   for	   threats	   such	  as	  international	  drug	  trafficking	  and	  terrorism.	  The	  body	  of	  literature	  outlined	  here	  shows	  a	  significant	  overlap	  with	  default	  sensemaking	  on	  organized	  crime,	  the	  main	  building	  blocks	  of	  which	  I	  have	  discussed	  in	  the	  introduction	  to	  this	  thesis.	  Firmly	  built	  into	  this	  literature	  is	  a	  threat	  perception	  and	  positioning	  to	  law,	  state,	  and	  order	  that	  mirrors	  the	  assessment	  that	  non-­‐state	  armed	  actors	  strive	  to	  confront,	  push	  back,	  and	  replace	  established	  forms	  of	  order.	  Both	  are	  built,	  that	  is,	  on	  the	  same	  totalities,	  notably	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  Western	  nation-­‐state	   as	   the	   natural	   and	   only	   true	   guardian	   and	   ‘owner’	   of	   civilizational	   progress	  and	  thus	  morality,	  legality,	  rationality,	  and	  ‘good’	  social	  order	  more	  generally.	  	  	  	  	  Recent	  works	  that	  seek	  to	  decipher	  questions	  of	  societal	  ordering	  from	  the	  bottom	  up	  qua	  ethnography	   and	   other	   suitable	   methods,	   many	   of	   which	   have	   been	   elaborated	   by	  anthropologists,	  have	  also	  treated	  the	  role	  of	  the	  state	  as	  well	  as	  of	  non-­‐state	  armed	  actors	  prominently.	  While	  the	  recognition	  that	  the	  state	  is	  undergoing	  transformations	  and	  that	  it	  might	  be	  in	  decay	  (see	  e.g.	  Davis,	  2010)	  is	  widespread,	  these	  works	  paint	  a	  more	  complex	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picture	  of	  the	  forces	  driving	  these	  transformations.	  Crucially,	  this	  concerns	  the	  role	  of	  non-­‐state	  armed	  actors	  such	  as	  LCT,	  which	  are	  not	  reduced	  to	  entities	  with	  an	  easily	  delineated	  legal	   and	   moral	   identity,	   agenda,	   motivation,	   and	   relation	   to	   the	   state.	   Too-­‐virulent-­‐to-­‐control	  forces	  and	  flows	  of	  globalization	  –	  including	  but	  not	  limited	  to	  organized	  crime	  as	  a	  phenomenon	   propelled	   not	   least	   through	   technological	   advances	   and	   the	   associated	  impossibility	   to	  make	   national	   borders	   ‘airtight’	   (see	   Nordstrom,	   2000;	   Berdal/Serrano,	  2002)	  –	  are	  factored	  in.	  Yet,	  the	  erosion	  of	  governmental	  capacity	  is	  portrayed	  as	  driven,	  not	   least,	   from	  within	   the	   state.	   That	   is,	   while	   indubitably	   an	   effect	   of	   a	   ‘pressure	   from	  above’	   (see	  Trouillot,	  2001:125)	   insofar	  as	   they	  have	  been	  significantly	  diffused	   through	  actors	   and	   processes	   situated	   at	   the	   supranational	   level,	   neoliberal	   reforms	   were	  ultimately	  still	   legislated	  and	  implemented	  by	  state	   functionaries	  (see	  Clunan/Trinkunas,	  2010:22ff.).	  The	  ‘weak	  state’,	  as	  Sousa	  (2006:43)	  notes,	  is	  not	  least	  produced	  from	  within.	  Following	   the	   neo-­‐classical	   belief	   that	   private	   solutions	   to	   problems	   of	   governance	  (specifically	  within	  and	  over	  markets)	  are	  superior	  to	  those	  the	  state	  is	  capable	  of	  offering,	  this	  ensues	  the	  significant	  reduction	  of	  activity	  by,	  or	  retreat	  of,	  the	  state	  from	  previously	  assumed	   regulatory	   functions	   (see	   Gledhill,	   1995;	   Meyer,	   2000).	   The	   latter	   include	   the	  provision	  of	  social	  security	  and	  health	  care,	  the	  regulation	  of	  economic	  activities,	  and	  not	  least	   the	  provision	  of	  security,	  which	   is	  also	   increasingly	  either	   left	   for	  self-­‐regulation	  or	  outsourced	  to	  private	  actors.	  The	  privatization	  of	  policing	  as	  well	  as	  of	  armed	  forces	  have	  been	   discussed	   as	   prime	   examples	   in	   this	   context	   (see	   Forst/Manning,	   1999;	   Mandel,	  2001;	  Sklansky,	  2006).	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On	  the	  liquefaction	  of	  social	  order	  and	  the	  privatization	  of	  violence	  	  
This	   privatization	   and	   outsourcing	   of	   the	   state’s	   force	   is	   inscribed	   in	   an	   overarching	  dynamic	   of	   the	   privatization	   of	   violence,	   which	   has	   become	   a	   dominant	   feature	   of	  contemporary	  Latin	  America	  (see	  Caldeira,	  2000	  and	  Huggins,	  2000).	  The	  term	  implies	  a	  trend	  towards	  the	  disintegration	  of	  the	  monopoly	  of	  violence	  by	  the	  state	  and	  is	  based	  on	  the	   observation	   that	   private	   actors	   situated	   on	   the	   sub-­‐national	   level	   have	   increasingly	  come	   to	   bundle	   means	   of	   coercion.	   The	   ‘pressure	   from	   above’,	   Sousa	   (2006:44)	  extrapolates	   from	  his	  discussion	  of	   the	  resurgence	  of	   ‘traditional’	  authorities	   in	  Africa,	   is	  complemented	   from	   below.	   In	   Latin	   America,	   Kruijt	   and	   Koonings	   (2004)	   find	   a	   ‘new	  violence’	  (see	  also	  Pereira/Davis,	  2000;	  Kurtenbach,	  2003),	  which	  they	  deem	  an	  effect	  of	  its	   dispersion	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   the	   formal	   democratization	   of	   the	   region’s	   political	  regimes	  over	  the	  latter	  quarter	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century	  (the	  volume	  edited	  by	  Mainwaring	  and	  Scully,	  1995,	  provides	  an	  overview).	  Violence	  that,	  it	  is	  argued,	  was	  previously	  bound	  to	   the	   state	   and	   used	   to	   secure	   or	   challenge	   given	   regimes	   (in	   a	   Cold-­‐War	   climate)	   is	  subsequently	  refracted	  away	  from	  it.	  It	  resurfaces,	  to	  a	  large	  degree,	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  non-­‐state	   actors	   who	   employ	   it	   in	   the	   pursuit	   of	   diverse	   private	   interests,	   including	   private	  security	  solutions	  (more	  on	  the	  matter	  below).	  If,	  as	  the	  authors	  contend,	  this	  new	  violence	  is	  not	  geared	  at	   ‘at	  conquering	  state	  power’	   (Kruijt	  and	  Koonings,	  2004:8)	  anymore,	   this	  would	   effectively	   imply	   its	   de-­‐politicization.	   Yet,	   as	   I	   discuss	   below,	   this	   notion	   can	   be	  questioned	   insofar	   as	   it	   seems	   to	   equate	   state	   power	   to	   formal	   control	   over	   state	  institutions	  and	  to	  take	  for	  granted	  that	  such	  a	  thing	  can	  be	  clearly	  delineated	  and	  tied	  to	  formal	   political	   institutions	   in	   the	   first	   place.	   Searching	   for	   state	   power	   in	   and	   around	  formal	   institutions	  of	   government	   alone	   is,	   however,	   problematic,	   as	   I	   further	  discuss	   in	  reference	  to	  Trouillot’s	  work,	  insofar	  as	  it	  does	  not	  only	  manifest	  itself	  in	  such	  ‘empirically	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obvious’	   (2001:126)	   ways.	   Apart	   from	   these	   changes	   in	   the	   region’s	   prevalent	   type	   of	  political	  regime,	  the	  ‘neoliberal	  turn’	  is,	  here	  too,	  identified	  as	  a	  driver	  of	  the	  privatization	  of	   violence	  beyond	   the	  mentioned	   aspect	   of	   the	  direct	   outsourcing	   from	   state	   to	  private	  sphere	   alone.	   Specifically,	   as	   amongst	   others	   Stanford	   (1994),	   Gledhill	   (1995),	   Snyder	  (1999),	   Harvey	   (2005),	   as	   well	   as	   Arias	   and	   Goldstein	   (2010:14ff.)	   have	   discussed,	  neoliberal	   reforms	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   having	   accentuated	   the	   region’s	   deeply	   rooted	   social	  inequality,	   poverty	   levels,	   as	   well	   as	   indices	   in	   violence,	   which	   most	   adversely	   affects	  already	  vulnerable	  populations.	  	  	  The	  state’s	  reduced	  capacity	  and/or	  unwillingness	  to	  govern	  and	  to	  provide	  security	  forms,	  alongside	   the	   propagation	   of	   individual	   responsibility	   and	   self-­‐help	   as	   the	   ideological	  
Unterbau	  of	  neoliberal	  globalization	  is,	  according	  to	  Zygmunt	  Bauman,	  part	  and	  parcel	  of	  the	  past	  decades’	   great	   structural	   changes.	  Bauman’s	  highly	   influential	   concept	  of	   ‘liquid	  modernity’	   (2000,	   see	   also	   2006	   and	   2007)	   opposes,	   as	   he	   argues,	   the	   overly	   crude	  portrayal	   of	   Western	   societies’	   transition	   from	   modernity	   to	   postmodernity.	   The	   latter	  departs	  from	  the	  notion	  that	  modernity	  was	  essentially	  stable,	  based	  on	  and	  interwoven	  by	  ordering	   institutions	  such	  as	   the	   family,	   the	  profession,	   the	  nation-­‐state	  and	  nationalism,	  all	  of	  which	  underpinned	  and	  made	  for	  relatively	  fixed	  identities	  and	  forms	  of	  community	  and	   belonging.	   These	   ‘old’	   institutions	   of	   ‘rationalizing‘	   that	   act	   as	   containers	   and	  stabilizers	  undergo	  erosion	  as,	  not	   least	   induced	  by	   technological	   changes,	   social	   change	  picks	  up	   speed	  during	   the	   twentieth	   century’s	   last	  decades	  and	  a	   trend	   towards	   societal	  atomization	  ensues.	  To	  Bauman,	  such	  a	  neat	  transition	  from	  one	  societal	  state	  to	  another	  proves	   overly	   simplistic	   insofar	   as	   the	   duality	   and	   tension	   between	   constraint	   and	  conservation	   on	   one	   hand	   and	   change	   on	   the	   other	   was	   already	   well	   present	   during	  modernity,	  only	   that	   the	  above	  mentioned	   institutions	  kept	   the	  processes	  of	   change	  at	   a	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relatively	   low	   speed.	   Hence,	   to	   Bauman,	   social	   change	   and	   the	   pervasiveness	   of	   social	  change	  as	  such	  are	  nothing	  new	  necessarily.	  The	  essential	  elements	  that	  make	  what	  comes	  after	   ‘classic’	  modernity	  are	  already	  well	  present	  (and	  do	  not	  simply	  vanish	   later	  either).	  But	  as	  of	   yet	   they	  have	  not	  entered	  a	   comparable	   state	  of	   acceleration	  and	   flux.	  He	   thus	  deems	  it	  more	  pertinent	  to	  speak	  of	  a	  transition	  from	  solid	  to	  liquid	  modernity	  rather	  than	  to	  distinguish	  between	  modernity	  and	  post-­‐modernity	  as	  altogether	  discrete	  epochs.	  	  
	  	  
Non-­‐state	  armed	  actors	  and	  the	  structural	  underpinnings	  of	  alternative	  governance	  	  
Bauman’s	   account	   of	   liquefaction	   captures	   and	   helps	   to	   understand	   core	   processes	   that	  come	  into	  play	  in	  the	  reshuffling	  of	  Latin	  America’s	  and	  Mexico’s	  security	  and	  governance	  landscapes.	  It	  also	  surfaces	  as	  a	  key	  theme	  in	  my	  exploration	  of	  LCT	  as	  a	  group	  that,	  as	  I	  lay	  out	   in	   the	   core	   empirical	   chapters	   of	   this	   thesis,	   emerges	   out	   of	   a	   regional	   tradition	   of	  narcotrafficking	   but	   mutates	   into	   a	   far	   more	   complex	   phenomenon	   and	   organizational	  form	  insofar	  as	  it	  ventured	  into	  a	  sphere	  of	  governance.	  A	  true	  kaleidoscope	  of	  non-­‐state	  (armed)	  actors	  that	  has,	  across	  the	  region	  and	  the	  Global	  South	  more	  generally	  speaking,	  come	   to	   assume	   designated	   core	   functions	   of	   the	   nation-­‐state	   such	   as	   the	   provision	   of	  security	  and	  welfare.	  LCT	  resembles,	   in	  this	  aspect,	  non-­‐state	  entities	  as	  diverse	  as	   lynch	  mobs,	   vigilantes,	   private	   security	   firms,	   paramilitaries,	   youth	   gangs,	   as	  well	   as	   ‘classical’	  criminal	   organizations,	  whose	   involvement	   in	  different	   shapes	   and	  degrees	  has	   received	  increasing	   attention	   by	   recent	   scholarship	   (amongst	   other	   by	   Reno,	   1995,	   2000;	  Koonings/Kruijt,	  2004;	  Comaroff/Comaroff,	  2006;	  Litzinger,	  2006;	  Arias/Goldstein,	  2010;	  Baylouny,	  2010;	  Clunan/Trinkunas,	  2010).	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This	  ‘pluralization	  of	  regulatory	  authority’	  (Roitman,	  2005)	  cannot	  simply	  be	  accounted	  for	  by	  asserting	  that	  violent	  actors	  force	  themselves	  onto	  a	  given	  civilian	  population.	  The	  role	  of	  violence	  is	  beyond	  any	  doubt	  great	  in	  settings	  with	  high	  non-­‐state	  armed	  actor	  presence.	  This	  is	  indubitably	  the	  case	  in	  sites	  like	  Tierra	  Caliente,	  characterized	  by	  a	  criminal	  actor	  population	   that	   by	   any	   standard	   qualifies	   as	   extremely	   violent.	   Yet,	   while	   important,	  violence	   alone	   can	   neither	   account	   for	   the	   emergence	   of	   non-­‐state	   actor-­‐carried	  governance	   nor	   can	   it	   exhaustively	   describe	   their	   interactions	   with	   given	   civilian	  populations.	   As	   I	   show	   in	   reference	   to	   LCT	   in	   Chapters	   5	   and	   6,	   respectively,	   just	   as	  important	   for	   its	   production	   and	   formulation	   is	   uncertainty.	   The	   latter	   is,	   according	   to	  Bauman,	   one	   of	   liquid	   modernity’s	   central	   features	   and	   effects.	   The	   liquefaction	   of	   the	  state-­‐centered	  model	  of	  social	  ordering	  and	  the	  rapidness	  with	  which	  other	  building	  blocks	  of	  identity	  (see	  above)	  undermine	  ontological	  security	  leave	  individuals	  longing	  for	  some	  sort	   of	   orientation.	   Bauman	   sees	   the	   past	   decades’	   strengthening	   of	   religious	  fundamentalism	  and	  nationalism	  as	  clear	  examples	  in	  this	  context.	  	  	  In	   Latin	   America,	   the	   world’s	   most	   violent	   region,	   this	   uncertainty	   is	   arguably	   further	  accentuated.	  It	  underpins	  what	  Koonings	  and	  Kruijt	  (1999)	  have	  called	   'societies	  of	   fear'.	  Disorder	  and	   insecurity	   is	  here	  perceived	  by	  many	   to	  be	  a,	   if	  not	   the,	  defining	   feature	  of	  everyday	   life.	   As	   the	   state	   is	   widely	   blamed	   and	   perceived	   to	   be	   unwilling,	   incapable,	  and/or	  corrupt,	  citizens	  seek	  alternative	  solutions	  for	  social	  order.	  Comaroff	  and	  Comaroff	  (2006:19ff.),	  writing	   on	   (dis-­‐)	   order	   in	   the	   post-­‐colony,	   argue	   that	   it	   should	   come	   as	   no	  surprise	  that	  the	  demand	  for	  order	  –	  and	  the	  variety	  as	  well	  creativity	  of	   forms	  in	  which	  people	  try	  to	  satisfy	  it	  –	  is	  greatest	  precisely	  where	  it	  is	  perceived	  to	  be	  most	  absent.	  They	  go	  so	   far	  as	   to	  diagnose	  a	   ‘fetish’	   for	   law	  and	  order	   in	  many	  parts	  of	   the	  Global	  South.	  A	  similar	   argument	   has	   been	   advanced	   by	   Goldstein,	   who	   has	   conducted	   extensive	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ethnographic	   work	   on	   lynchings	   as	   a	   form	   of	   alternative	   justice	   and	   vigilantism	   more	  generally	  in	  Bolivia	  (e.g.	  2003,	  2005;	  on	  lynchings	  see	  also	  Godoy,	  2005;	  on	  vigilantism	  see	  also	   Huggins,	   1991;	   Hurrell,	   1998;	   Ungar,	   2007).	   Interpreting	   lynchings	   as	   ‘a	   form	   of	  political	   expressions	   for	   people	  without	   access	   to	   formal	   political	   venues’	   (2003:23),	   he	  opposes	   the	   common	   dismissal	   of	   lynchings	   and	   other	   forms	   of	   vigilantism	   as	   primitive	  and	   essentially	   pre-­‐modern	   expressions	   of	   hatred	   and	   revenge.	   On	   the	   contrary,	   it	   is	   a	  means	  via	  which	   ‘the	  powerless	  attempt	   to	  communicate’	   (2003:23),	  making	   lynchings	  a	  call	  on	  the	  state	  to	  fulfill	   its	  obligations	  rather	  than	  the	  attempt	  to	  carve	  out	  autonomous	  space	  from	  and	  against	  it.	  They	  thus	  appear	  as	  an	  attempt	  to	  pursue	  and	  are	  indeed	  often	  justified	  qua	  reference	   to	   the	  very	  same	  values	   the	  state	   ideally	  embodies	  but	   fails	   to,	   in	  reality,	  advance.	  They	  suppose	  not	  only	  ‘simultaneous	  embrace	  and	  rejection	  of	  the	  official	  order’	  (Goldstein,	  2003:25)	  but	  moreover	  embody,	  as	  Goldstein	  contends,	  a	  consequential	  instantiation	   of	   neoliberalism’	   self-­‐help	   and	   responsibility	   ethos.	   This	   supposes	   and	  interesting	  parallel	  to	  my	  elaboration	  on	  LCT	  insofar	  as,	  as	  I	  demonstrate	  in	  Chapters	  5	  and	  6,	   LCT	   claimed	   appropriation	   and	   more	   perfect	   representation	   of	   values	   and	   ideas	  stereotypically	  associated	  with	  the	  state.	  Here,	  too,	  it	  becomes	  apparent	  that	  in	  sites	  where	  they	  seem	  to	  be	  altogether	  absent,	  these	  elements	  are	  often	  recycled	  and	  reemployed	  in	  a	  seemingly	  paradoxical	  fashion.	  	  	  The	   disjuncture	   between	   expectations	   of	   progress,	   justice,	   and	   state	   performance	   as	  formally	   defined	   and	   everyday	   realities	   that	   significantly	   depart	   from	   the	   latter	   plays	   a	  crucial	  role	  in	  the	  privatization	  of	  violence.	  The	  same	  is	  true	  for	  the	  emergence	  of	  diverse	  forms	  of	  alternative	  governance,	  which	  has	  seen	  the	  involvement	  of	  criminal	  organizations	  involved	  in	  drug	  trafficking.	  As	  Davis	  (2009)	  shows	  by	  referring	  to	  Mexico	  and	  particularly	  the	   so-­‐called	   Zetas	   –	   commonly	   assumed	   to	   be	   the	   bloodiest	   amongst	   the	   country’s	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criminal	  organizations	   (Ríos/Dudley,	  2013)	  and	  one	  of	  LCT’s	  predecessors	   (Chapter	  4)	  –	  criminal	  actors	  not	  traditionally	  counted	  amongst	  non-­‐state	  armed	  actors	  are	  involved	  in	  the	   constitution	   of	   ‘new	   imagined	   communities’.	   She	   implies,	   by	   this	   term,	   imagined	  communities	   other	   than	   those	   of	   nation-­‐states	   and	   construed	   to	   foster	   ‘loyalty	   and	  allegiance’	  by	  populations	  who	  have	  grown	  estranged	  from	  the	  state.	  My	  own	  elaborations	  on	   the	   case	   of	   LCT,	   particularly	   those	   I	   present	   in	   Chapter	   5,	   add	   both	   new	   data	   and	  complexity	   to	   this	   observation	   insofar	   as	   I	   unpack	   LCT’s	   own	   attempt	   to	   form	   such	   a	  community,	  revealing	  the	  underlying	  strategic	  motivations,	  discursive	  techniques	  applied,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  impact	  of	  this	  attempt	  both	  on	  civilian	  populations	  and	  LCT	  itself.	  More	  than	  just	  drugs	  or	  other	  goods,	  I	  argue,	  LCT	  peddles	  ontological	  security.	  The	  latter	  is	  one	  of	  the	  main	  features	  that	  distinguishes	  LCT	  from	  ‘normal’	  organized	  crime	  groups	  and	  renders	  it	  unique.	  	  	  	  	  While	   criminal	   organizations’	   involvement	   in	   the	   provision	   of	   security	   and	   even	  ontological	  security	  might	  seem	  a	  paradox	  from	  a	  perspective	  that	  sticks	  to	  the	  assumption	  of	   the	   state’s	   moral	   integrity,	   a	   deeply	   engrained	   division	   and	   mistrust	   between	  populations	  and	  state	  actors	  is	  common	  in	  Latin	  America	  and	  frequently	  based	  on	  a	  history	  of	   human	   rights	   abuses.	   This,	   in	   combination	   with	   the	   fact	   that	   local	   (criminal)	   power	  holders	  can	  simply	  be	  ‘closer’	  than	  agents	  of	  the	  state	  that	  often	  have	  little	  to	  no	  personal	  connection	   to	   the	   community	   entails	   that	   ‘low-­‐income	   populations	   often	   [feel]	   more	  protected	  by	  the	  ‘real’	  criminals	  than	  by	  the	  police…’	  (Leeds,	  2007:24/27-­‐30).	  This	  schism,	  in	  turn,	  can	  be	  leveraged	  by	  criminal	  actors	  to	  foster	  their	  own	  legitimacy	  and	  survival.	  It	  also	  underpins,	  alongside	  other	  factors	  such	  as	  the	  modified	  role	  and	  presence	  of	  the	  state,	  the	   hybridization	   of	   Mexican	   organized	   crime	   into	   a	   phenomenon	   characterized	   by	   the	  galvanization	  of	  ‘classical’	  organized	  criminal	  actors,	  traditionally	  taken	  to	  be	  motivated	  by	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profit,	   and	   ‘classical’	  non-­‐state	  armed	  actors,	   assumed	   to	  be	  driven	  by	  a	  political	   agenda	  (see	  Davis,	  2009:221-­‐225;	   for	  an	  overview	  of	  the	   ‘greed	  vs.	  grievance	  debate’	  see	  Berdal,	  2005).	  	  	  In	   the	   case	   of	   LCT,	   the	   striving	   for	   organizational	   legitimacy	   surfaced	   as	   a	   core	   building	  block	   of	   the	   group’s	   survival	   strategy.	   Key	   in	   this	   context	   is	   that	   legitimacy	   needs	   to	   be	  conceptually	  decoupled	  from	  a	  Weberian	  reading	  that	  postulates	  it	  as	  a	  something	  only	  the	  state	   can	   truly	   own	   and	   delegate	   (I	   discuss	   the	  matter	   of	   legitimacy	   in	   greater	   depth	   in	  Chapter	   4).	  On-­‐the-­‐ground	   realities	   such	   as	   the	   ones	   found	   in	  Tierra	   Caliente	   prove	   this	  understanding	  overly	  static	  as	  non-­‐state	  armed	  actors	  effectively	  strive	  for	  and	  are	  granted	  by	  a	  degree	  of	  legitimacy	  by	  the	  true	  sources	  of	  legitimacy,	  specific	  social	  communities.	  In	  the	   case	   of	   LCT,	   it	   also	   constituted	   a	   central	   force	   in	   shaping	   its	   behavior	   towards	   and	  interactions	   with	   local	   civilian	   populations.	   Drawing	   on	   his	   work	   on	   Rio	   de	   Janeiro’s	  networks	   of	   traffickers,	   politicians,	   and	   civic	   leaders,	   Arias	   (2006,	   2009)	   assigns	   similar	  importance	  to	  legitimacy	  as	  a	  necessity	  for	  criminal	  organizational	  survival	  and	  shows	  how	  and	  why,	  in	  this	  particular	  case,	  traffickers	  invest	  in	  it.	  Although	  the	  drug	  trafficking	  gangs	  he	  studies	  show	  an	  arguably	  less	  ambitious	  and	  systematic	  approach	  to	  the	  matter	  when	  compared	   to	   LCT,	   the	   logic	   largely	   remains	   the	   same.	   Traffickers	   invest	   in	   their	   social	  legitimacy	  by	  making	  material	   investments	  in	  the	  community,	  coopting	  and/or	  staying	  in	  the	  good	  books	  with	  local	  civic	  leaders,	  providing	  vigilante	  security	  (against	  certain	  types	  of	   crime),	   and	  by	   taking	  up	   a	  mediating	   function	   in	   certain	   conflicts.	   Positively	   reflected	  upon	   by	   local	   residents	   (2006:315),	   this	   provides	   them	   with	   protection	   against	   certain	  state	  actors	  (non-­‐collaboration	  by	  locals	  is	  here,	  just	  as	  in	  Tierra	  Caliente,	  the	  name	  of	  the	  game).	   As	   Arias	   argues,	   the	   thus	   garnered	   social	   capital	   serves,	   in	   turn,	   as	   a	   type	   of	  currency	  in	  accessing	  needed	  resources	  held	  by	  the	  state	  and	  to	  negotiate	  with	  members	  of	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‘respectable	  society’.	  As	   traffickers	  need	  to	  maintain	  a	   low	  profile	  and	  moreover	   lack	  the	  necessary	  social	  skills,	  the	  ability	  to	  do	  so	  and	  the	  sustention	  of	  said	  networks	  depend	  on	  the	  mediation	  of	  local	  civic	  leaders.	  	  	  
	  
On	  state	  failure	  	  
The	   above	   outlined	   transformations	   have	   triggered	   a	   wide	   debate	   on	   the	   presence	   and	  future	   of	   the	  nation-­‐state	   as	  well	   as	   on	  how	   social	   scientists	   should	   conceptualize	   them.	  The	  Weberian	  notion	  of	  state	  and	  the	  underlying	  narrative	  of	  (Western)	  state	  formation	  as	  a	   linear	   civilizing	   process	   remains,	   in	   spite	   of	   an	   increasing	   array	   of	   arguments	   that	  undermine	   its	   central	   assumptions	   (see	   below),	   dominant.	   Joas	   and	   Knöbl	   argue	   that	   ‘a	  substantial	  number	  of	  social	  scientists	  are	  still	  caught	  up	  in	  the	  peaceful	  utopian	  mood	  of	  the	  European	  Enlightenment	  and	  continue	  to	  dream	  the	  dream	  of	  non-­‐violent	  modernity’	  (2013:2).	  These	  assumptions	  resonate	  prominently	  in	  the	  assertion	  that	  the	  nation-­‐state	  is	  being	   threatened	   and	   pro-­‐actively	   pushed	   back	   by	   forces	   situated	   outside	   of	   it.	   In	   this	  context,	  voices	  declaring	  contemporary	  Mexico	  a	  poster	  country	  for	  state	  failure	  have	  not	  been	  scarce	  (see	  my	  discussion	  of	  some	  of	  these	  voices	  in	  Chapter	  6).	  The	  fear	  that	  a	  stable	  and	   long-­‐standing	   international	   system	   of	   nation-­‐states	   is	   being	   eroded	   by	   hostile	   non-­‐state	  armed	  actors	  digging	  away	  at	  it	  from	  below	  shines	  through	  prominently.	  Such	  a	  trend	  is,	   of	   course,	   easy	   to	   detect	   if	   one	   sticks	   to	   a	   classical	   understanding	   of	   the	   state.	  Considered	   from	   this	   angle,	   states	   –	   particularly	   in	   the	   Global	   South	   –	   neither	   exercise	  effective	  control	  over	  their	  own	  territory	  nor	  are	  able	  to	  enforce	  and	  sustain	  the	  monopoly	  of	   coercion.	   Their	   malperformance	   in	   these	   arenas	   and	   the	   resulting	   incapacity	   to	  guarantee	   citizens’	   basic	   rights	   suggests	   moreover	   that	   its	   legitimacy	   is	   at	   risk,	   already	  severely	   undermined,	   or	   already	   damaged	   beyond	   repair.	   Hence,	   the	   three	  main	   pillars	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that	  make	  states	   ‘states’	   in	  a	  Weberian	  sense	  seem	  seriously	  challenged	  at	  the	  very	  least.	  The	  assertion	  of	  state	  failure	  –	  partial,	  as	  Kruijt	  and	  Koonings	  (2004)	  indicate	  by	  speaking	  of	  ‘governance	  voids’,	  or	  more	  absolutely,	  as	  amongst	  others	  such	  as	  Zartman	  (1999)	  and	  more	   recently	  Grayson	   (2011)	  have	   suggested	  –	   is	   just	   a	   stone’s	   throw	  away	   from	   these	  observations.	   In	   Latin	   America,	   it	   is	   the	   generally	   high	   levels	   in	   violence	   that	   are	   often	  focused	  on	  in	  this	  context.	  In	  the	  Mexican	  case	  in	  particular,	  it	  is	  chiefly	  the	  concentration	  of	  violence	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  criminal	  organizations	  and	  that	  these	  are	  seen	  as	  employing	  it	  against	  the	  state	  –	  ‘head-­‐on’,	  as	  Knight	  (2012:134)	  phrases	  it	  –	  that	  is	  cited	  to	  support	  this	  claim.	  	  Equivalent	  to	  that	  on	  state	  failure	  runs	  the	  debate	  on	  the	  supposed	  failure	  of	  democracy	  in	  Latin	  America.	  As	  Arias	  and	  Goldstein	  (2010:	  2)	  lay	  out	  in	  some	  detail	  in	  the	  introduction	  to	   their	   volume	   on	   ‘violent	   democracies’,	   the	   persistently	   high	   levels	   of	   violence	   in	   the	  region	  have	  been	   taken	  as	   a	   ‘measure	  of	  democratic	   failure’,	   i.e.	   a	   sign	   that	   its	   countries	  have	   not	   yet	   reached	   the	   highest	   stage	   of	   (political)	   evolution.	   ‘[A]	   whole	   range	   of	  adjectives	   –	   including	   imperfect,	   illiberal,	   incomplete,	   delegative,	   and	   disjunctive	   ’,	   they	  write	   ‘have	   been	   proposed	   to	   characterize	   the	   differences	   between	   democracy	   in	   Latin	  America	  and	   the	   supposedly	  more	   ideal	   forms	  extant	   in	  Western	  Europe	  and	   the	  United	  States’	  (2010:3).	  Both	  discussions	  have	  been	  accused	  of	  uncritically	  reproducing	  the	  very	  totalities	   the	   above-­‐discussed	   Weber-­‐derived	   logic	   of	   state	   formation	   as	   a	   process	   of	  civilizational	   advancement	  with	   a	   conceivable	   and	   attainable	   endpoint	   as	   embodied	   and	  largely	  achieved	  by	  Western	  nation-­‐states	  (see	  Arias/Goldstein,	  2010:x).	  In	  particular,	  they	  have	   been	   criticized	   for	   being	   ethnocentric,	   i.e.	   the	   Western	   schemes	   of	   thought	   and	  analysis	   in	   ignorance	   of	   other	   cultures’	   and	   settings’	   specificities	   (critiques	   have	   been	  produced	   amongst	   others	  by	  Gledhill,	   2000;	  Hönke/Müller,	   2012;	  Morton,	   2012),	   and	   to	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suffer	  from	  a	  ‘state-­‐centered	  bias’	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  state	  rule	  is	  taken	  to	  be	  ‘the	  natural	  and	  right	   form	   of	   political	   organization	   that	   delineates	   and	   produces	   world	   order’	  (Clunan/Trinkunas,	   2010:20).	   Anything	   that	   departs	   from	   these	   ideals	   is,	   by	   that	  definition,	  incomplete.	  	  	  
	  
Complicating	  binaries	  	  	  
This	  binary	  approach,	   as	   amongst	  others	  Arias	   and	  Goldstein	   forcefully	   argue,	   is	   of	   little	  help	  as	  it	  fails	  to	  penetrate	  the	  institutional	  and	  formal	  surface	  under	  which	  dramatically	  different	   social	   realities	   and	  practices	  are	  hidden.	  That	   is,	   as	   the	  mentioned	  authors	  and	  Hönke	  and	  Müller	   (2012)	   similarly	   contend,	   these	  deviations	   from	  what	  ought	   to	  be	   are	  not	   to	  be	  seen	  as	  something	  exotic	   that	   runs	  counter	   to	   that	  which	  cannot	  be	  reconciled	  with	  Western	   ideals.	   These	   simply	  never	  materialize,	   leaving	   the	   task	  of	   investigating	   in	  which	   other	   and	   local-­‐specific	  ways	   they	   are	   instantiated	   and	   enacted	   instead	   (see	   also	  Moore	   1978).	   Needed,	   from	   this	   perspective,	   are	   approaches	   that	   overcome	   this	   binary	  simplicity	   by	   recognizing	   and	   conceptually	   factoring	   in	   that	   ideal	   and	   empirical	   realities	  simply	   do	   not	   overlap	   (see	   Smart,	   1999).	   This	   appears	   all	   the	  more	   pressing	   to	   reduce	  distortions	  in	  the	  portrayal	  of	  state-­‐non-­‐state	  and	  state-­‐criminal	  relations.	  Already	  pointed	  out	   as	   central	   to	   the	   present	   study	   and	   reflected	   upon	   in-­‐depth	   in	   Chapter	   6,	   these	   are	  frequently	   portrayed	   as	   structured	   along	   an	   iron	   licit-­‐illicit-­‐divide.	   One	   side	   –	   the	   good,	  morally	  whole,	   legal	  –	   is	   seen	  as	  principally	  embodied	  by	   the	   state.	  The	  other	  –	   the	  evil,	  amoral,	   illegal	  –	  is	  seen	  as	  populated	  by	  forces	  of	  criminality	  with	  an	  agenda	  of	  state	  and	  societal	   dissolution.	   Both	   confront	   each	   other	   in	   a	   striving	   for	  mutual	   annihilation.	   This	  imagery	   stands	   in	   line	   with	   the	   portrayal	   of	   state	   formation	   as	   an	   evolutionary-­‐civilizational	   process	   in	  which	   ‘order’	   comes	   to	   be	  monopolized	   by	   the	   state	   and	  during	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which	   the	  uncivilized	   is	   reduced	   throughout	  society	  and,	  crucially,	  pushed	  outside	  of	   the	  state,	  which	  comes	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  marker	   in	  this	  sense.	  This	  view,	  as	  I	  argue	  in	  Chapter	  6,	  clearly	   surfaces	   in	   the	   rhetoric	   surrounding	   (and	   arguably	   fostering)	   the	   ‘war	   on	  drugs’,	  which	  is	  construed	  on	  precisely	  these	  assumptions	  (see	  here	  Morton,	  2012,	  who	  discusses	  the	  ethnocentric	  bias	  inherent	  in	  this	  rhetoric).	  	  	  	  	  Heyman	  and	  Smart	  (1999)	  argue	  that	  this	  binary	  imagery	  is	  simplistic	  and	  call	  for	   ‘open-­‐minded,	   empirical	   studies	   of	   state-­‐illegality	   relations	   [that]	   enable	   us	   to	   transcend	   the	  stultifying	  assumption	  that	  states	  always	  uphold	  the	  law’	  (1999:1).	  The	  essays	  contained	  in	  Heyman’s	  volume	  on	   ‘states	  and	   illegal	  practices’	   (1999)	  reflect	   this	  spirit	  as	   they	  revisit	  extant	  conceptions	  and	  conceptualizations	  of	  the	  state’s	  relation	  to	  illegality	  and	  crime	  and	  question	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  state	  as	  a	  natural	  champion	  of	  legality	  and	  civilization.	  A	  collection	  of	  essays	  with	  a	  similar	  tone	  comes	  from	  Briquet	  and	  Favarel-­‐Garrigues	  (2010).	  Both	  find	  a	  more	   complex	   relationship,	   characterized	   not	   least	   by	   states’	   frequent	   and	   consistent	  involvement	  with	  actors	   labeled	   ‘criminal’.	  Schneider	  and	  Schneider	  (1999),	   for	   instance,	  address	   the	   normality	   of	   deep	   and	   persistent	   ties	   between	   Italian	   (organized)	   criminal	  groups	   and	   the	   country’s	   political	   elite	   and	   find	   ‘a	  weaving	   together	   of	   illegal	   and	   legal	  within	  states	  and	  societies	  that	  is	  usually	  obscured	  by	  the	  reification	  of	  the	  ‘law’’	  and	  that	  only	   becomes	   visible	   in	   ‘historical	  moment[s]	   of	   transparency’	   (1999).	   Similarly,	   Gallant	  (1999)	  examines	   the	  historical	  relationship	  between	  the	  state	  and	  criminals,	   finding	  that	  both	  are	  by	  no	  means	  opposites	  but	  often	  intrinsically	  interwoven	  and	  that	  definitions	  of	  the	  boundary	  between	  the	  two	  are	  highly	  arbitrary	  and	  frequently	  change	  as	  rapidly	  as	  the	  labels	  applied	  to	  particular	  actors.	  Pirates,	  for	  instance,	  were	  initially	  tolerated	  and	  indeed	  sponsored	  and	  employed	  by	  some	  states	  (e.g.	  England)	  to	  further	  their	  interest	  and	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  others	  (e.g	  Spain).	  Other	  ‘military	  entrepreneurs’	  would	  occupy	  double	  roles,	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oscillating	  between	  directly	  and	  officially	  serving	  in	  the	  name	  of	  the	  state	  and	  pursuing	  a	  ‘primitive’	  accumulative	  agenda	  formally	  defined	  as	  illegal.	  	  
	  
Critical	  accounts	  of	  state	  formation	  
A	   similar	   and	  widely	   cited	   challenge	   to	   the	   portrayal	   of	   the	  modern	   nation	   state	   as	   the	  embodied	  antithesis	  to	  violence	  and	  illegality	  has	  been	  formulated	  by	  Charles	  Tilly	  (1985).	  He,	  too,	  de-­‐romanticizes	  the	  default	  narrative	  of	  state	  formation.	  In	  particular,	  he	  compares	  it	   to	  an	  essentially	  unintended	  by-­‐product	  of	  war	  making	  amongst	  a	  wider	  population	  of	  violent	  entrepreneurs.	  States,	  in	  their	  early	  phase,	  appear	  by	  no	  means	  as	  the	  well	  meaning	  and	  enlightened	  entities	  they	  were	  later	  made	  out	  to	  be.	  Rather,	  he	  sees	  them	  as	  ‘coercive	  and	   self-­‐seeking	   entrepreneurs’	   who,	   so	   as	   to	   gain	   the	   upper	   hand	   in	   competition	   over	  power	  and	  territorial	  supremacy,	  needed	  to	  outperform	  militarily.	  This,	   in	  turn,	  required	  the	  extraction	  of	  resources	  (read:	  taxation)	  of	  given	  populations.	  To	  Tilly,	  early	  states	  are	  thus	   no	   different	   than	   organized	   crime-­‐type	   protection	   rackets,	   which	   also	   sell	   trade	  protection	  for	  tax	  (see	  also	  Gambetta,	  1993).	  Successfully	  sustaining	  this	  scheme,	  however,	  requires	   a	   certain	   degree	   of	   acceptance	   from	   a	   given	   population,	   which	   presupposes	  convincing	   it	   of	   the	   existence	  of	   benefits:	   ‘Apologists	   for	  particular	   governments	   and	   for	  government	   in	   general	   commonly	   argue,	   precisely,	   that	   they	   offer	   protection	   from	   local	  and	   external	   violence.	   They	   claim	   that	   the	   prices	   they	   charge	   barely	   cover	   the	   costs	   of	  protection’	  (1985:171).	  The	  modern	  nation-­‐state’s	  legitimacy	  does,	  from	  this	  perspective,	  not	  appear	  as	  constituted	  ex-­‐ante	  for	  being	  traceable	  to	  a	  social	  contract	  whose	  necessity	  and	  materialization	  through	  the	  state	  is	  equally	  state	  shared	  by	  governed	  and	  governors.	  Rather,	  it	  supposes	  an	  ex-­‐post	  construct	  to	  justify	  and	  thus	  stabilize,	  towards	  the	  inside	  as	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well	   as	   the	   outside,	   regimes	  whose	   roots	   of	   resource	   extraction	   are	  more	   unveiled	   and	  which	  could	  be	  constituted	  in	  the	  first	  place	  through	  violent	  performance.	  	  Tilly	  complicates	  the	  narrative	  of	  state	  formation	  by	  revisiting	  the	  relation	  between	  states,	  violence,	  and	  violent	  actors.	  While	  this	  argument	  alone	  might	  be	  interpreted	  as	  leaving	  the	  door	  open	  for	  the	  assumption	  of	  a	  later	  ‘purification’	  of	  the	  state	  to	  closer	  resemble	  its	  self-­‐designated	   civilizational	   role,	   other	   authors	   such	   as	   Anthony	   Giddens	   (1985)	   have	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  state’s	  relationship	  with	  illegality	  and	  violence	  has	  not	  become	  less	  complex	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  advancement	  of	  modernity.	  Worth	  considering	  in	  this	  context	  is	  Stanley	   Cohen’s	   take	   on	   the	   commission	   of	   state	   crimes	   by	   Western	   states	   (2001;	   see	  Chambliss	  et	  al.,	  2014,	   for	  a	  good	  overview	  of	  current	  debates	  about	  state	  crime).	  Cohen	  draws	  on	  Sykes	  and	  Matza’s	  (1957)	  work	  on	  how	  individuals	  justify	  their	  deviant	  and/or	  criminal	  behavior	  or	  deny	  it	  as	  well	  as	  the	  harm	  stemming	  from	  it	  altogether.	  States	  too,	  he	  contends,	   employ	   ‘techniques	   of	   neutralization’	   to	   deny	   their	   crimes,	   to	   play	   down	   their	  occurrence	   or	   the	   harm	   they	   cause,	   or	   to	   redefine	   them	   as	   measures	   necessary	   under	  exceptional	  circumstances	  (consider	  here	  Huggins’	  discussion	  of	  the	  justification	  of	  torture	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  war	  on	  terror	  and	  Kramer’s	  examination	  of	  the	  bombing	  of	  civilians	  from	  the	  latter	  half	  of	  the	  20th	  century,	  both	  included	  in	  Chambliss	  et	  al.,	  2014).	  	  
	  
The	  convergence	  of	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  and	  legal	  and	  illegal	  in	  the	  making	  of	  (dis)order	  	  
The	  realization	  that	  the	  imagery	  of	  illegal	  (violent)	  practices	  and	  the	  modern	  nation-­‐state	  as	   natural	   opposites	   falls	   short	   helps	   to	   resolve	   the	   seeming	   paradox	   of	   the	   parallel	  existence	  of	   democracies	   and	  persistently	  high	   levels	   of	   violence	   in	  Latin	  America.	  Arias	  and	  Goldstein	  (2010)	  make	  an	  important	  contribution	  in	  conceptually	  reconciling	  both	  by	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arguing	  that	  violence	  per	  se	  is	  not	  a	  sign	  for	  democracy’s	  failure	  but	  part	  and	  parcel	  of	  its	  empirical,	  far-­‐from-­‐ideal	  instantiation.	  What	  is	  more:	  the	  type	  of	  violence	  experienced	  and	  the	   way	   it	   is	   deployed	   is	   perhaps	   the	   core	   mechanism	   ‘keeping	   in	   place	   the	   very	  institutions	  and	  policies	  that	  neoliberal	  democracies	  have	  fashioned	  over	  the	  past	  several	  decades,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  an	   instrument	   for	  coping	  with	   the	  myriad	  problems	   that	  neoliberal	  democracies	   have	   generated’	   (Arias/Goldstein,	   2010:5).	   Correspondingly,	   they	   call	   for	   ‘a	  conception	  of	  politics	  that	  looks	  to	  the	  complex	  ways	  in	  which	  order	  (and/or	  disorder)	  is	  created	   through	   the	   interactions	   of	  multiple	   violent	   actors,	   both	  within	   and	  without	   the	  state’	  (2010:10).	  Here,	  the	  interaction	  and	  indeed	  cooperation	  between	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  armed	   actors	   is	   not	   the	   exception	   but	   the	   stuff	   of	   everyday	   life.	   The	   modalities	   and	  mechanism	  of	  order	  creation	  here	  appear,	  of	  course,	  far	  from	  their	  Weberian	  ideal,	  already	  as	  state	  actors	  effectively	  share	  and	  thus	  punctuate	  the	  monopoly	  of	  force.	  Latin	  America’s	  contemporary	  states,	  that	  is,	  do	  not	  exist	  in	  spite	  of	  illicit	  armed	  actors	  but	  because	  of	  the	  ways	  they	  engage	  with	  them	  (2010:9).	  	  	  Alan	   Knight	   has	   argued	   that	   such	   encounters	   and	   the	   normality	   of	   their	   occurrence	   are	  often	   underestimated	   or	   ignored	   altogether	   due	   to	   the	   overly	   rigid	   focus	   of	  many	   social	  scientists	   on	   the	   formal:	   ‘focusing	   on	   the	   high	   politics	   of	   the	   nation-­‐state…	   and	   formal	  politics,	  they	  have	  tended	  to	  overlook	  the	  hot,	  dense,	  and	  often	  dirty	  undergrowth	  of	  local	  politics’	   (Knight,	  1997:108).	  The	   ‘dirty	  undergrowth	  of	   local	  politics’	   forms	  part	  of	   those	  sites	   and	   zones	   in	   which	   legal	   and	   illegal	   as	   well	   as	   state	   and	   non-­‐state	   intersect	   and	  interact	   in	   ways	   which	   transcend	   their	   ascribed	   opposition.	   Under	   terms	   such	   as	   ‘gray	  zones’	   (Auyero,	   2007)	   and	   ‘shadow	   states’	   (Gledhill,	   1995/	   1999)	   and	   usually	   veiled	  through	  the	  myth	  of	  the	  state	  as	  ‘the	  very	  embodiment	  of	  reified	  legality’	  (Heyman/Smart,	  1999:11),	   they	   have	   received	   increasing	   scholarly	   attention	   as	   spaces	   crucial	   for	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contemporary	   dynamics	   of	   state	   formation	   (in	   the	   Global	   South).	   The	   existence	   of	   non-­‐state	   armed	   actors	  might	   contradict	   the	  myth	   of	   the	   state	   as	   a	   champion	   of	   legality	   and	  civilization,	  yet,	  in	  actual	  social	  practice,	  forms	  of	  order	  are	  rarely	  if	  ever	  configured	  along	  such	   clear	   lines	   and	   frequently	   see	   a	   convergence	   of	   state	   and	   non-­‐state	   elements.	   The	  state’s	   role	   is	   here	  more	   complex	   than	   commonly	   assumed.	   This	   begins	  with	   its	   role	   in	  defining	   certain	   activities	   as	   illegal	   through	   legislation,	   thereby	   constituting	   spheres	   and	  actors	  that	  subsequently	  can	  come	  to	  be	  defined	  as	  major	  threats	  (a	  good	  synthesis	  of	  this	  fundamental	   relation	   between	   states	   and	   illegality	   is	   provided	   by	   Heyman	   and	   Smart,	  1999).	  The	   international	  market	   for	   illegal	  drugs	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  prime	  example	   in	   this	  context	   as	  well	   as	   for	   the	   consequences	   this	   has	   entailed,	   not	   least	   so	   in	   Latin	   America	  (Mena	  and	  Hobbs,	  2010	  discuss	  the	  effects	  of	  prohibitionist	  legislation	  on	  human	  rights	  in	  Brazil).	  	  	  Apart	  from	  this	  more	  abstract	  role	  of	   introducing,	  embodying,	  and	  enforcing	  the	  dividing	  line	  between	  legal	  and	  illegal,	  the	  state	  is	  well	  present	  in	  the	  shape	  of	  those	  real-­‐life	  actors	  acting	   in	   its	   name	   and	   enacting	   it	   in	   everyday	   life.	   The	   realization	   that	   states	   are	   by	   no	  means	  naturally	   ‘bound	  by	  law’	  (Spinoza,	  1951	  [1883]:	  311,	  cited	  in:	  Rodgers,	  2006:326)	  appears	  crucial	  for	  studying	  social	  (dis-­‐)order	  in	  Mexico	  and	  beyond.	  This	  thus	  also	  holds	  true	   for	   the	   relationship	   between	   organized	   crime	   and	   the	   state	   as	   one	   subset	   of	   these	  interactions.	   In	   Mexico,	   for	   one,	   organized	   crime	   attains	   its	   current	   shape	   due	   to	   what	  Knight	   has	   called	   an	  historically	   ‘incestuous	   relationship’	   (2012:120).	   Snyder	   and	  Duran	  (2009)	   introduce	   the	   term	   ‘state-­‐sponsored	   protection	   racket’	   to	   highlight	   that	   drug	  trafficking	   grew	   under	   the	   auspices	   of	   a	   state	   providing	   protection	   to	   traffickers	   in	  exchange	  for	  kick-­‐backs	  and	  a	  basic	  respect	  for	  the	   ‘rules	  of	  the	  game’,	   including	  keeping	  levels	  of	  violence	  low	  (see	  also	  Astorga,	  1996;	  Flores	  Pérez,	  2009:137-­‐227;	  Watt/Zepeda,	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2012).	  Similarly,	  Davis	  finds	  that	  Mexican	  drug	  trafficking	  could,	  and	  still	  can,	  only	  thrive	  through	  the	  ‘tacit	  support	  of	  the	  police	  and	  the	  military,	  who	  often	  prioritize	  the	  protection	  of	  their	  own	  institutional	  sovereignty	  and/or	  involvement	  in	  these	  black	  market	  activities,	  rather	  than	  the	  protection	  of	  citizens’	  (2010:37).	  Arias’	  above-­‐cited	  study	  is	  another	  good	  example	   of	   the	   more	   complex	   role	   of	   the	   state	   as	   he	   shows	   how	   order	   in	   urban	   areas	  stereotypically	  portrayed	  to	  be	   ‘out	  of	  state	  control’	  and	  characterized	  by	  the	   ‘absence	  of	  the	  state’	  is	  in	  fact	  constituted	  through	  the	  interwovenness	  of	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors.	  	  Interactions	   defying	   simplistic	   notions	   of	   legal	   and	   illegal,	   of	   state	   and	   non-­‐state,	   and	   of	  state	  formation	  are	  neither	  a	  recent	  development	  nor	  one	  limited	  to	  Latin	  America	  or	  the	  Global	   South.19	  Reno	   (1995,	   2000)	   traces	   such	   structures	   back	   to	   colonial	   rule	   in	   Sierra	  Leone	   and	   underlines	   their	   high	   degree	   of	   durability	   and	   institutionalization.	   Similarly,	  Gingeras	  (2011)	  shows	  how	  the	  Turkish	  state	  obtained	  its	  current	  form	  and	  could	  expand	  its	  dominion	  within	  its	  own	  territory	  with	  the	  help	  of	  heroin	  traffickers	  and	  other	  criminal	  groups.	  These	  provided,	  alongside	  things	  such	  as	  financial	  means,	  paramilitary	  force	  used	  to	   quell	   ‘insurgent’	   groups	   and	   even	   troops	   for	  war,	   including	  World	  War	   I	   and,	   in	   this	  context,	  the	  Armenian	  genocide.	  To	  him,	  this	  murky	  intersection	  between	  state	  agents	  and	  (officially	   designated)	   criminals,	   between	   state	   security	   interests	   and	   drug	   trafficking,	  supposes	   the	   very	   basis	   of	   the	  much-­‐cited	   Turkish	   ‘deep	   state’.	  My	   observations	   on	   the	  case	  of	  LCT,	  too,	  speak	  of	  such	  complexity.	  To	  provide	  a	  glimpse	  of	  my	  findings,	  the	  state	  is	  neither	   absent	   nor	   does	   such	   a	   thing	   as	   war-­‐like	   confrontation	   between	   state	   and	   LCT	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  While	  exploring	  this	  matter	  in	  depth	  would	  go	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  review	  of	  literature,	  it	  should	  be	  kept	  in	  
mind	  that	  the	  existence	  of	  informal	  and	  hidden	  spheres	  of	  power	  are	  by	  no	  means	  limited	  to	  the	  Global	  South.	  
Gledhill	  (1999:205),	  for	   instance,	  points	  out	  that	  ‘[e]ven	  the	  most	  robust	   liberal-­‐democratic	  states	  have	  always	  
invited	   questions	   about	   the	   backstage	   power	   of	   corporate	   capital	   and	   the	   extent	   of	   political	   control	   over	  
national	  security	  services.	  It	  was,	  after	  all,	  Eisenhower	  who	  coined	  the	  phrase	  “the	  military-­‐industrial	  complex.’	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become	   apparent.	   Such	   a	   scenario	   was,	   as	   LCT’s	   leaders	   reckoned	   themselves,	   neither	  feasible	   nor	   desirable	   for	   fostering	   its	   survival.	   Tellingly,	   they	   perceived	   the	   state	   as	   a	  plurally	  configured	  construct	  the	  many	  fragments	  of	  which	  neither	  acted	  in	  harmony	  nor	  naturally	  in	  defense	  of	  the	  law.	  This,	  in	  turn,	  allowed	  LCT	  to	  engage	  particular	  state	  actors	  in	  interactions	  well	  beyond	  those	  of	  an	  all-­‐out	  confrontation.	  	  
	  	  
On	  parallel	  states	  
The	  above-­‐discussed	  complexities	  of	  state-­‐non-­‐state-­‐interactions	  are	  of	  great	   importance	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  critical	  reflection	  of	  another	  popular	  hypothesis	  voiced	  in	  reference	  to	  the	  increasing	  prominence	  of	  non-­‐state	  armed	  actors.	  Namely,	  that	  these	  actors	  have	  come	  to	  control20	  chunks	  of	  territory	  and	  populations	  and	  the	  challenge	  to	  the	  state’s	  monopoly	  of	  force,	   sovereignty,	   and	   legitimacy;	   this	   is	   said	   to	   suppose	  what	   has	   been	   equated	   to	   the	  existence	  of	  ‘parallel	  states’.	  Williams	  (2010),	  for	  instance,	  cites	  the	  Mexican	  case	  as	  well	  as	  the	  wider	  post-­‐Cold-­‐War	  environment	   (see	  above)	   to	   contend	   that	   state	   sovereignty	  has	  been	  undermined	  and	  splintered	  to	  such	  a	  degree	  that	  a	  return	  to	  medieval	  times	  can	  be	  detected.	  The	  more	  so	  if	  they	  are	  seen	  to	  compete	  with	  the	  state	  in	  its	  very	  core	  arenas	  of	  governance	   such	   as	   the	   provision	   of	   ‘justice’,	   social	   welfare,	   and	   security	   (see	  Clunan/Trinkunas,	  2010:19)	  and	   thus	   seem	   to	   threaten	   to	   replace	   it.	  Milhaupt	  and	  West	  (2000),	  for	  instance,	  survey	  different	  organized	  crime	  groups	  and	  find	  that	  their	  provision	  of	   ‘property	  rights	  enforcement	  and	  protection	  services’	  places	  them	  in	  competition	  with	  the	   state.	   Kruijt	   and	   Koonings	   (1999:11)	   argue,	   in	   a	   similar	   vein,	   that	   non-­‐state	   armed	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  In	   light	   of	   the	   impossibility	   for	   such	   a	   thing	   as	   total	   control	   of	   any	   governing	   body	   over	   a	   territory	   to	   ever	  
materialize	  (see	  Cynthia	  Weber’s	  critique	  above	  and	  my	  discussion	  of	  sovereignty	  below),	  I	  deem	  it	  crucial	  not	  to	  
use	  the	  term	  ‘control‘	  in	  an	  absolute	  but	  only	  in	  a	  relative	  sense.	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actors	  such	  as	  drug	  trafficking	  groups	  have	  ‘managed	  to	  mount	  parallel	  systems	  of	  violence	  and	   enforced	   order.’	   Davis	   (2010:36-­‐37)	   observes	   that	   in	  Mexico	   ‘well-­‐organized	   cadres	  involved	   in	   illicit	   activities	   often	   take	   on	   the	   equivalent	   role	   of	   miniature	   states	   by	  monopolizing	  the	  means	  of	  violence	  and	  providing	  protection	  in	  exchange	  for	  loyalty	  and	  territorial	  dominion’.	  Sousa	  (2006)	  situates	  a	  similar	  development	  within	  a	  wider	  trend	  of	  the	  post-­‐colonial	  state’s	  transformation	  into	  what	  he	  terms	  the	  ‘heterogeneous	  state’.	  The	  latter	  comes	  about	  as	  an	  effect	  of	  the	  above-­‐discussed	  pressures	  on	  the	  traditional	  nation-­‐state	  ‘from	  below’	  and	  ‘from	  above’.	  These	  forces	  undermine	  the	  state’s	  coherency	  and	  lead	  to	  ‘the	  uncontrolled	  coexistence	  of	  starkly	  different	  political	  cultures	  and	  regulatory	  logics	  in	   different	   sectors	   (e.g.,	   in	   economic	   policies	   and	   family	   or	   religious	   policies)	   or	   levels	  (local,	   regional,	   and	   national)	   of	   state	   action’	   (2006:44).	   In	   ‘extreme	   cases’,	   under	   such	  circumstances	   ‘microstates’	   can	   develop	   within	   the	   state	   itself	   (ibid.).	   Particular	   state	  segments,	   that	   is,	   obtain	   a	   degree	   of	   autonomy	   that	   allows	   them	   to	   decouple	   their	   own	  logic	  of	  operation	  from	  that	  of	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  state.	  	  	  Though	   at	   times	   subtly	   and	   perhaps	   tacitly,	   the	   very	   notion	   of	   the	   existence	   of	   ‘parallel	  states’	   incorporates	   the	   assumption	   that	   non-­‐state	   armed	   actor-­‐‘controlled’	   spaces	   exist	  somehow	  independently	  from	  the	  state	  or	  have	  been	  carved	  out	  and	  are	  being	  sustained	  in	  opposition	   to	   and	   in	   spite	   of	   the	   state.	   The	   notion	   of	   control	   here	   advanced	   is	   similarly	  totalistic	   as	   the	   one	  underlying	   traditional	   understandings	   of	   sovereignty	   (see	   above	   for	  Cynthia	  Weber’s	  critique).	  The	  more	  so	   if	   they	  come	  to	  replicate	  those	  characteristic	  and	  functions	   that	   make	   states	   ‘states’,	   their	   very	   existence	   seems	   to	   stand	   in	   mutual	  exclusivity	  to	  the	  state	  qua	  definition.	  And	  indeed,	  as	  pointed	  out	  above,	  there	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  non-­‐state	  armed	  actors	  have	  not	  only	  come	  to	  take	  up	  functions	  of	  governance	  but	  to	  moreover	  claim	  the	  legitimate	  right	  to	  do	  so.	  One	  clear	  example	  her	  is	  LCT.	  As	  I	  explain	  in	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detail	   in	   Chapter	   5,	   the	   group’s	   behavior	   within	   the	   local	   setting	   took	   the	   shape	   of	   a	  veritable	   project	   of	   alternative	   governance.	   Though	   never	   free	   of	   contradictions,	   it	  provided	  material	   benefits	   and	   ‘justice’	   to	   local	   civilian	   populations.	   However,	   the	   term	  ‘alternative’,	   just	   as	   the	   term	   ‘parallel’,	   needs	   to	   treated	   with	   care	   (also	   in	   Chapter	   5,	   I	  discuss	   the	  matter	   in	   greater	   depth).	   As	   Davis	   has	   pointed	   out,	   non-­‐state	   armed	   actors	  cannot	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  operating	  in	  a	  state-­‐less	  ‘vacuum’	  (2009:229).	  Even	  if	  the	  state	  is	  seen	  as	  weakened	  or	  decaying,	   it	  does	  not	   just	  disappear	  without	  trace	  and	  still	  occupies	  some	  role.	  It	  follows	  that	  non-­‐state	  armed	  actors	  must	  inevitably	  arrange	  themselves	  with	  states	   (and	   other	   non-­‐state	   actors)	   in	   some	   form.	   Leaving	   clear	   that	   these	   relations	  transcend	   violent	   conflict,	   she	   calls	   for	   the	   deciphering	   of	   the	   ‘diplomatic’	   relations	  amongst	   this	   multitude	   of	   actors	   and	   underlines	   that	   these	   remain	   understudied	   (my	  exploration	  of	  LCT-­‐state-­‐relations	  in	  Chapter	  6	  takes	  up	  this	  question).	  This	  still	  leaves,	  of	  course,	  the	  door	  open	  for	  the	  notion	  of	  parallel	  states.	  Yet,	  to	  merit	  this	  classification,	  these	  sub-­‐state	  entities	  would	  have	   to	   fulfill	   the	   theoretical	   criterion	  of,	   as	   it	  were,	  being	   state	  without	  the	  (sitting)	  state	  and	  to	  come	  to	  replicate	  the	  latter’s	  functions.	  Yet,	  the	  empirical	  evidence,	  especially	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  criminal	  organizations,	  suggests	  otherwise.	  In	  Latin	  America,	  where	   the	   vast	  majority	   of	   Guerrilla	   groups	   has	   disappeared,	   there	   are	   indeed	  only	  a	  handful	  of	  examples	  left	  for	  non-­‐state	  armed	  actors	  whose	  political	  agenda	  includes	  the	   overthrow	  of	   sitting	   states.	  Of	   these,	   only	  Colombia’s	   FARC	  have	   arguably	   reached	   a	  corresponding	   level	   of	   territorial	   control,	   and	   even	   in	   this	   case	   the	   line	   between	   the	  criminal	  and	  political	  aims	  is	  blurred	  (see	  Eccarius-­‐Kelly,	  2012).	  	  	  More	   fundamentally,	   the	   notion	   of	   ‘the	   state’	   as	   a	   coherent	   entity	   capable	   of	   concerted	  action	  and,	  for	  that	  matter,	  willing	  to	  pursue	  a	  coherent	  and	  legally	  committed	  agenda	  has	  been	   criticized	   as	   simplistic.	   Alan	   Smart	   underlines,	   in	   this	   context,	   that	   ‘[s]tates	   are	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internally	  complex	  and	  composed	  of	  many	  agents’.	  This	  makes	  it	  ‘inappropriate	  to	  refer	  to	  states	  doing	  or	  intending	  things’	  (1999:104).	  Das	  (2004)	  goes	  a	  step	  further	  and	  calls	  the	  Weberian-­‐based	  narrative	  of	  state	  ‘metaphysical’.	  To	  her,	  the	  inherent	  idea	  of	  ‘the’	  state	  as	  a	  somehow	  coherent	  body	  that	  has	  a	  life	  and	  identity	  of	  its	  own	  and	  that	  is	  thus	  capable	  of	  doing	  and	  causing	  things	  amounts	  to	  ‘magic’,	  a	  term	  she	  borrows	  from	  Taussig	  (1997;	  see	  also	   Coronil,	   1997).	   Adding	   the	   fact	   that,	   as	   already	   mentioned,	   states’	   commitment	   to	  legality	   cannot	   be	   taken	   for	   granted,	   this	   embeds	   non-­‐state	   armed	   actors	   and	   criminal	  actors	  such	  as	  LCT	  in	  structures	  that	  are	  principally	  pliable	  to	  their	   interest.	  Briquet	  and	  Favarel-­‐Garrigues,	  summarizing	  the	  case	  studies	  on	  state-­‐illegal-­‐dealings	  gathered	  in	  their	  edited	  volume,	  contend	  that	   it	   is	  precisely	   for	   this	  reason	  that	  criminal	  actors	   tend	  to	  be	  ‘satisfied	  with	  the	  existing	  rules	  of	  the	  political	  and	  economic	  game…	  [as]	  their	  familiarity	  with	   ‘‘the	  system’’	  allows	  them	  to	  detect	  opportunities	   that	  enable	   them	  to	  develop	  their	  activities’	   (2010:4).	  To	  many	  criminal	  actors,	   there	   is	  simply	  no	   incentive	  or	  necessity	   to	  take	   over	   the	   state’s	   functions	   or	   to	   substantially	   change	   the	   state’s	   empirical	   (and	   not	  ideal)	  functioning.	  Against	  this	  backdrop,	  it	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  confronting	  the	  state	  ‘head-­‐on’	   (see	  above)	   is	   counterproductive,	   as	  amongst	  others	  Lessing	   (2012)	  has	  argued.	  The	  Brazilian	   and	   Mexican	   drug	   trafficking	   groups	   he	   has	   examined	   refrain	   from	   an	   overly	  violent	  approach	  to	  the	  state	  as	  this	  could	  warrant	  the	  state’s	  attention,	  activate	  it	  against	  them,	  and	  thus	  question	  their	  survival.	  It	  can	  moreover	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  non-­‐state	  armed	  actors	  never	  achieve	  (or	  want	  to	  do	  so	  in	  the	  first	  place)	  an	  organizational	  capacity	  and	  volume	  that	  would	  allow	  them	  to	  perform	  as	  a	  (counter-­‐)state	  bureaucracy.	  Nor	   do	   they	   come	   anywhere	   close	   to	   an	   armed	   capacity	   that	   could	   seriously	   challenge	  sitting	   (Latin	   American)	   states	   in	   the	   arena	   of	   force.	   The	   Mexican	   state,	   for	   one,	   has	  repeatedly	  demonstrated	   that	   it	   is	   still	   in	   the	  position	   to	  effectively	  mobilize	   its	   coercive	  potential	   against	   specific	   non-­‐state	   armed	   actors.	   LCT’s	   eventual	   disintegration,	   which	   I	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discuss	  in	  greater	  depth	  in	  the	  conclusion	  to	  this	  thesis,	  provides	  a	  prime	  example	  for	  the	  continued	  centrality	  of	  the	  state	  in	  this	  sense.	  	  	  	  A	   third	   argument	   that	   has	   been	   brought	   forward	   in	   contradiction	   of	   the	   existence	   of	  parallel	   states	   is	   based	   on	   the	   observation	   that	   such	   a	   polarization	   of	   forces	   in	   clearly	  delineated,	   opposing	   blocks	   does	   not	   correspond	   to	   on-­‐the-­‐ground	   realities.	   Such	   an	  assertion	   of	   paralellity	   –	   similarly	   applied	   to	   economies,	   for	   instance	   by	   Shortland	   and	  Varese	  (2015)	  –	  falls	  short	  insofar	  as	  it	  departs	  from	  an	  ideal	  never	  materialized.	  What	  can	  instead	  be	  observed	  is	  interwovenness,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  resources	  pertaining	  to	  the	  state	  (including	  the	  symbolic	  power	  rooted	  in	  its	  myth	  or	  ‘magic’)	  are	  accessed	  and	  mobilized	  by	  networks	  integrated	  both	  by	  nominally	  legal	  as	  well	  as	  illegal	  actors.	  The	  normality	  of	  ‘gray	  zones’,	  mentioned	  above,	  here	  adds	  empirical	  fodder	  insofar	  as	  they	  are	  effectively	  formed	  around	   the	   shared	   use	   of	   these	   resources.	   Arias,	   drawing	   on	   data	   from	   the	  abovementioned	   study	   on	   Brazil,	   argues	   on	   these	   grounds	   that	   ‘[r]ather	   than	   creating	  ‘‘parallel	   states’’	   outside	   of	   political	   control…	   these	   networks	   link	   trafficker	   dominated	  favelas	   into	   Rio’s	   broader	   political	   and	   social	   system’	   (2006:293)	   and	   that	   ‘more	   than	  filling	   in	   space	   left	   by	   the	   government,	   illegal	   networks	   appropriate	   existing	   state	   and	  societal	   resources	   and	   power	   and	   use	   them	   to	   establish	   protected	   spaces	   in	   which	  traffickers	   can	   engage	   in	   illegal	   activities.	   More	   than	   parallel	   ‘states’	   or	   ‘polities’	   drug	  trafficking	   in	  Rio	   represents	   an	   expression	  of	   transformed	   state	   and	   social	   power	   at	   the	  local	   level’	   (2006:322).	   The	   qualifier	   ‘alternative’	   in	   governance	   is	   then	  more	   accurately	  used	  to	  indicate	  a	  departure	  from	  said	  ideal	  but	  not	  necessarily	  an	  absence	  of	  the	  state	  or	  forms	  of	  governance	  construed	  in	  opposition	  to	  or	  as	  an	  alternative	  per	  se	  to	  the	  state.	  Any	  form	   of	   governance	   ever	   materialized	   and	   recorded	   in	   the	   Global	   South	   and,	   for	   that	  matter,	  Mexico	  has	  arguably	  been	  characterized	  through	  the	  intermingling	  of	  what	  ought	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to	  be	  and	  what	  ought	  not	  to	  be,	  of	  nominally	  criminal	  and	  nominally	  legal	  (state)	  elements.	  There	   would,	   from	   this	   perspective,	   be	   nothing	   but	   ‘alternatives’	   or,	   as	   Comaroff	   and	  Comaroff	  (2006)	  would	  have	  it,	  ‘counterfeits’.	  	  
	  
The	  historical	  normality	  of	  alternative	  governance	  	  
Historical	   analyses	   make	   a	   crucial	   contribution	   in	   placing	   the	   involvement	   of	   non-­‐state	  elements	  in	  governance	  as	  well	  as	  their	  relation	  to	  the	  state	  and	  vice	  versa	  in	  perspective.	  As	   stated	   above,	   a	   principal	   agreement	   exists	   that	   the	   ‘traditional’	   nation-­‐state	   has	  undergone	   some	  degree	   of	   erosion	   and	   that	   non-­‐state	   armed	   actors’	   involvement	   in	   the	  creation	  of	  social	  (dis-­‐)order	  has	  been	  accentuated	  as	  a	  result	  and	  manifestation	  of	  a	  wider	  trend	  of.	  Yet,	  not	  all’s	  new	  under	  the	  sun.	  Bauman,	  for	  instance,	  finds	  that	  the	  assertion	  of	  post-­‐Cold-­‐War	   anarchy	   and	   decay	   might	   have	   been	   exaggerated	   and	   owe,	   to	   no	   small	  degree,	  to	  the	  fact	  that,	  ‘by	  dividing	  the	  world,	  power	  politics	  conjured	  up	  the	  apparition	  of	  
totality’	   (correspondence	  between	  Bauman	  and	  Dennis	  Smith,	  cited	   in:	  Smith,	  1999:205).	  The	  history	  of	  post-­‐colonial	  states	  reveals,	  in	  this	  context,	  a	  great	  continuity	  in	  ‘alternative	  governance’	   in	  the	  sense	  of	  a	  principal	  and	  lasting	  interwovenness	  of	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors	   in	   the	  production	  of	  governance	  and	  social	  order.	  Hansen	  and	  Steputat	   (2006),	   in	  revisiting	  existing	  arguments	  on	  sovereignty,	  show	  that	  ‘the	  reach	  and	  efficacy	  of	  colonial	  states	  was	  uneven	  and	  often	  severely	   limited’	   from	  the	  beginning	  on,	  a	  constellation	  that	  was	  never	  altogether	  and	  in	  some	  cases	  not	  at	  all	  overcome	  (pp.	  304ff.).	  This	  gave	  ‘rise	  to	  a	  complex	   range	   of	   informal	   sovereignties’	   (2006:305),	   amongst	   others	   exercised	   by	   non-­‐state	  (private)	  actors	  such	  as	  pirates	  and	  slave	  traders	  and	  connected	  to	  formal	  institutions	  in	  manifold	  ways.	   ‘Legal	  pluralism’	  here	  appears	  as	  a	  fixture	  of	  (colonial)	  state	  formation	  (see	  here	  Sousa’s	  overview,	  2004).	  So	  does	  ‘private	  indirect	  rule’	  (Mbembé,	  2001:67ff.),	  a	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term	   which	   underlines	   that	   states	   frequently	   outsource	   governmental	   functions	   and	  privileges,	   including	   territorial	   and	   populational	   control,	   and/or	   govern	   through	   private	  actors.	  One	   example	   is	   the	   licensing	  of	   pirates	  by	   the	  British	  Empire,	   a	  more	   recent	   one	  would	   be	   the	   entangledness	   of	   the	   Colombian	   state	   and	   paramilitary	   groups,	   of	   which	  Grajales	   (2011)	   provides	   an	   excellent	   study.	   Private	   and	   public	   interest	   here	   become	  blurred	  beyond	  recognition.	  The	  co-­‐existence	  and	   interwovenness	  of	   state	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors	   has	   been	   similarly	   palpable	   in	   Latin	   American	   states	   where	   ‘contested	   state	  formation’	   (Davis,	   2010:43)	   has	   been	   the	   norm.	   Especially	   so	   in	   the	   region’s	   freshly	  independent	   republics	   of	   the	   nineteenth	   century,	   central	   governments	   struggled	   to	   and	  never	   fully	   achieved	   control	   over	   marginal	   (geographical)	   areas	   of	   their	   own	   territory.	  This,	   in	   turn,	   resulted	   in	   the	   persistence	   of	   strong	   regionalisms,	   with	   local	   strongmen	  enjoying	   great	   discretion	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	   central	   state	   and	   thus	   great	   power	   of	   local	  populations:	   ‘The	   tentative	   rule	   and	   local	   despotisms	   of	   these	   forces	   often	   structure	   the	  lives	   of	   ordinary	   people	  more	   profoundly	   and	   effectively	   than	   does	   the	   distant	   and	   far-­‐from-­‐panoptic	  gaze	  of	  the	  state’	  (Hansen/Steputat,	  2006:305;	  for	  overviews	  see	  Pansters,	  2012:22-­‐23,	  Arias/Goldstein,	  2010:13ff.,	  Davis,	  2010:38-­‐43).	  	  
	  
Expanding	  the	  conceptual	  boundaries	  of	  state	  
It	  is	  against	  this	  backdrop	  that	  Trouillot	  calls	  for	  ‘a	  sober	  awareness	  that	  the	  national	  state	  was	   never	   as	   closed	   and	   as	   unavoidable	   a	   container—economically,	   politically,	   or	  culturally—as	  politicians	  and	  academics	  have	  claimed	  since	  the	  19th	  century’	  (2001:130).	  He	   thus	   also	   opposes	   simplistic	   approaches	   to	   the	   state	   that	   seek	   to	   pin	   it	   down	   to	   one	  clear	   shape	   and	   identity.	   While	   he	   refuses	   to	   engage	   in	   the	   production	   of	   yet	   another	  exercise	  to	  define	  what	  ‘it’	  is,	  he	  does	  reject	  its	  reduction	  qua	  a	  political	  science-­‐type	  focus	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on	   the	   normative	   and	   those	   formal	   institutions	   that	   make	   ‘government’	   as	   well	   as	   the	  reduction	   of	   state	   to	   a	   mere	   discursive	   construct-­‐come-­‐organization	   to	   elicit	   legitimacy	  from	   subject	   populations	   as	   for	   instance	   Abrams	   (1988:76,	   cited	   in	   Trouillot	   2001:127)	  would	   have	   it.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   he	   does	   not	   go	   to	   such	   extremes	   as	   other	   authors	   like	  Radcliff-­‐Brown,	  who	   categorically	   deny	   the	   existence	   of	   ‘state’	   altogether	   and	   calls	   ‘it’	   ‘a	  fiction	  of	  the	  philosophers’	  (1995	  [1940]:xxiii,	  cited	  in	  Trouillot,	  2001:126),	  granting	  that	  only	  ‘an	  organization,	  i.e.	  a	  collection	  of	  individual	  human	  beings	  connected	  by	  a	  complex	  system	   of	   relations’	   exists	   while	   ‘such	   thing	   as	   the	   power	   of	   the	   State’	   does	   not.	   The	  understanding	  of	  ‘state’	  he	  proposes	  instead	  is	  an	  ‘enlarged’	  one	  that	  approaches	  the	  state	  as	  an	   ‘open	   field	  with	  multiple	  boundaries	  and	  no	   institutional	   fixity…	  [that]	  needs	   to	  be	  conceptualized	  at	  more	  than	  one	  level’	  and	  that	  is	  best	  grasped	  ‘not	  an	  apparatus	  but	  a	  set	  of	   processes.	   It	   is	   not	   necessarily	   bound	   by	   any	   institution,	   nor	   can	   any	   institution	   fully	  encapsulate	   it.	   At	   that	   level,	   its	  materiality	   resides	  much	   less	   in	   institutions	   than	   in	   the	  reworking	   of	   processes	   and	   relations	   of	   power	   so	   as	   to	   create	   new	   spaces	   for	   the	  deployment	  of	  power’	  (2001:127).	   ‘State	  processes	  and	  practices’,	  he	  specifies,	  ultimately	  become	   ‘recognizable	   through	   their	   effects’,	   which	   boil	   down	   to	   a	   number	   of	   specific	  techniques	  of	  populational	  ordering	  and	  control	  (2001:126).	  Methodologically,	  this	  means	  venturing	  behind	   institutional	  and	  normative	  surfaces	  as	   the	   ‘empirically	  obvious’	   (ibid.)	  and	   ethnographically	   exploring	   those	   sites	   in	   which	   state	   effects	   and	   those	   actors	   from	  whom	  these	  effects	  emanate	  can	  be	  detected	  and	  analyzed.	  	  
Theoretically,	   and	   following	   Foucault’s	   (1991)	   similar	   delineation	   in	   his	   much	   quoted	  governmentality	   lecture,	   this	   severs	   the	   unity	   between	   state	   and	   government.	  ‘Government…	  can	  be	  clearly	  distinguished	  from	  sovereignty’,	  as	  Foucault	  (1991:	  94)	  puts	  it.	   However,	   whilst	   critiquing	   the	   ‘excessive	   value’	   (1991:	   103)	   attributed	   to	   the	   state,	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Foucault’s	   vision	   is	   closer	   to	   Trouillot’s	   than	   Radcliff-­‐Brown’s.	   For	   all	   its	   ‘mythicized	  abstraction’	   (ibid.),	   the	   state	   (in	   the	   form	   of	   sovereignty)	   is	   neither	   effaced	   nor	   entirely	  fictionalized.	  Rather,	  elements	  of	  it	  are	  deemed	  to	  exist	  only	  insofar	  that	  they	  are	  permitted	  by	  governmental	  manifestations	  of	  power:	  	  ‘[T]he	  state,	  no	  more	  probably	  today	  than	  at	  any	  other	  time	  in	  its	  history,	  does	   not	   have	   this	   unity,	   this	   individuality…	   this	   rigorous	   functionality,	  nor…	  this	  importance…	  Maybe	  what	  is	  really	  important	  for	  our	  modernity	  -­‐	  that	   is,	   for	  our	  present	  –	   is	  not	  so	  much	  the	  éstatisation	  of	  society,	  as	   the	  ‘governmentalization’	  of	  the	  state’	  (Ibid.	  emphasis	  in	  original).	  
 
 Power	  or,	  more	  precisely,	  governmental	  power,	  becomes	  emergent	  and	  transported	  via	  a	  diverse	   range	   of	   apparatuses,	   technologies	   and	   other	   mechanisms.	   The	   range	   hereof	   is	  later	  articulated	  by	  Foucault	  in	  his	  concept	  of	  ‘dispositif’,	  “a	   thoroughly	   heterogeneous	   ensemble	   consisting	   of	   discourses,	  institutions,	  architectural	  forms,	  regulatory	  decisions,	  laws,	  administrative	  measures,	   scientific	   statements,	   philosophical,	   moral	   and	   philanthropic	  propositions.	   .	   .	  What	  I	  am	  trying	  to	  identify	  in	  this	  apparatus	  is	  precisely	  the	  nature	  of	   the	  connection	   that	  can	  exist	  between	   these	  heterogeneous	  elements.	  (Foucault	  1980,	  194).	  	  	  	  Also	  important	  here	  is	  to	  acknowledge	  how	  power	  does	  not	  only	  ‘seep’	  below	  the	  state	  but	  may	   simultaneously	   operate	   above	   it	   (Collier	   2009),	   as	   expressed	   during	   his	   later	  theoretical	   development	   of	   ‘biopolitical’	   power	   that	   functions	   at	   more	   aggregated	  populational	  scales	  of	  governance	  (Foucault	  2008).	  	  
Following	   both	   Foucault	   and	   Trouillot’s	   readings,	   then,	   offers	   acknowledgement	   of	   the	  separation	  of	  state	  and	  government.	  From	  this	  follows,	  too,	  Trouillot’s	  argument	  that,	  in	  a	  liquefying	  context	  of	  social	  order	  and	  rule	  (see	  above),	  governmental	  capacity	  might	  have	  been	   reduced.	   The	   same	  does,	   however,	   not	   hold	   for	   state	   power,	  which	   can	   be	   seen	   as	  dispersed	   ‘into	   the	   murkier	   reaches	   of	   the	   private	   sector’,	   as	   Comaroff	   and	   Comaroff	  similarly	  observe	   (2006:16).	  Apart	   from	   the	   task	  of	   spotting	   state	   effects	   in	  practices	  by	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actors	   other	   than	   state	   actors,	   this	   calls	   for	   identifying	   how	   and	   by	   whom	   means	   and	  mechanisms	  of	  power,	   social	   control,	  and	  governance	  are	  being	  redeployed	  and	  how	  the	  thus	  enabled	  practices	  might	  or	  might	  not	  differ	   from	   those	  previously	  employed	  by	   the	  state.	   I	  develop	  my	  contributions	  on	  LCT’s	  practices	  of	  governance	   towards	   local	   civilian	  populations	   (Chapter	  5)	   and	  LCT’s	   relating	   to	   government	   and	   state	   (Chapter	  6)	   against	  this	  backdrop.	  	  	  	  	  	  
As	  state	  effects	  are	  by	  no	  means	  bound	  to	  state	  as	  a	  set	  of	  institutions	  of	  government,	  this	  shifts	  the	  analysis	  to	  unexpected	  sites,	  which	  under	  current	  conditions	  appear	  all	  the	  more	  important	  for	  the	  exploration	  of	  what	  state	  is	  and	  how	  it	   is	  made.	  In	  this	  vein,	  Trouillot’s	  work	   stands	   in	   close	   proximity	   to	  Das	   and	  Poole’s	   volume	  of	   2004,	   the	   contributions	   to	  which	   explore	   ‘the	   margins	   of	   the	   state’.	   Das	   and	   Poole	   (2004b)	   are	   critical	   of	   the	  interpretation	   that	   the	   seeming	   ‘disorder’	   and	   sense	   of	   being	   in	   the	  margins	   is	   simply	   a	  result	  of	  an	  incompleteness	  of	  the	  state	  which	  is	  anything	  but	  necessary	  and	  which	  can	  be	  overcome	   through	   the	   achievement	   of	   a	   higher	   stage	   of	   political	   evolution.	   They	   break	  open	   the	   traditional	   reading	   of	   the	   state	   as	   the	   embodiment	   of,	   and	   vehicle	   towards,	  progress	  departing	  from	  a	  point	  of	  ‘invention’	  of	  law	  and	  order.	  The	  process	  of	  making	  and	  remaking	  of	  law,	  order,	  and	  state	  is,	  they	  argue,	  constant	  and	  knows	  no	  static	  end	  product.	  A	  constitutional	  and	   latent	  characteristic	  of	   the	  state,	   it	  moreover	  meanders	   through	   the	  entire	  state	  body	  and	  is	  by	  no	  means	  confined	  to	  what	  is	  commonly	  perceived	  to	  lie	  outside	  of	   it,	   not	   only	   in	   geographical	   but	   also	   behavioral-­‐civilizational	   terms.	   The	   state	   as	   the	  antithesis	   to	   the	   uncivilized	   and	   from	   which	   the	   uncivilized	   and	   irrational	   has	   been	  expulsed	   and	   ‘a	   centralized	   administrative	   and	   political	   community	   whose	   density	  decreases	   as	   one	  moves	   toward	   its	   territorial	   margins’	   (Poole,	   2004:49)	   does	   not	   hold.	  Margins	  can	  effectively	  overlap	  with	  ‘borderlands’	  and	  other	  areas	  where	  state	  rule	  is	  seen	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as	   not	   (yet)	   fully	   implemented	   and	   its	   reach	   as	   limited.	   Yet,	   they	   go	   well	   beyond	   the	  territorial	   dimension	   to	   define	   and	   approach	   margins	   from	   three	   different	   viewpoints	  (ibid.,	  2004b:9,	  see	  also	  Asad,	  2004:279),	  which	  all	  resemble	  Trouillot’s	  state	  effects.	  The	  first	  examines	  the	  ‘specific	  technologies	  of	  power’	  developed	  and	  applied	  by	  modern	  states	  to	  control	  and	  ‘pacify’,	  if	  not	  integrate,	  populations	  seen	  as	  ‘insufficiently	  socialized	  into	  the	  law’.	  The	  second	  focuses	  on	  the	  state’s	  ‘writing	  practices’	  as	  the	  production	  of	  documents,	  categories,	  and	  data	  that	  is	  to	  render	  the	  state	  itself	  and	  above	  all	  populations	  ‘legible’	  (and	  controllable).	  It	  ends	  up,	  however,	  producing	  a	  simultaneous	  ‘illegibility’,	  for	  instance	  as	  its	  practices	  and	  documents	  become	  distorted	  and	  falsified	  in	  social	  practice	  and	  interactions,	  creating	   uncertainty	   amongst	   subjects	   as	   to	   what	   the	   state	   is	   and	   does.	   The	   third	   is	  concerned	   with	   bio-­‐politics	   and	   the	   (de)construction	   of	   life,	   chiefly	   through	   linguistic	  categorization	  (reflections	  here	  of	  Giorgio	  Agamben’s	  work,	  see	  below).	  In	  all	  these	  spaces,	  the	   state	   is	   present,	   utilized,	   and	   felt,	   but	   remains	   incomplete	   and	   is	   indeed	   enacted	   or	  employed	   in	  ways	  which	  do	  not	   live	  up	   to	   its	  own	  standards	   (rationality,	   legality	   (in	   the	  use	   of	   violence))	   and	   thus	   contradicts	   what	   it	   ought	   to	   be.	   And	   yet,	   as	   the	   exception	  becomes	   the	   rule,	   it	   is	   precisely	   through	   these	   contradictory	  practices	   that	   continuously	  make	  and	  remake	  state,	  law,	  and	  order	  on	  an	  everyday	  basis.	  The	  margins	  and	  what	  goes	  in	   them	   are	   no	   anomaly	   or	   simply	   an	   exotic,	   pre-­‐modern	   occurrence	   but	   ‘a	   necessary	  entailment	  of	  the	  state,	  much	  as	  the	  exception	  is	  a	  necessary	  component	  of	  the	  rule’	  (Das	  and	  Poole,	  2004b:	  4).	  	  	  The	  real-­‐life	  practices	   found	  in	  these	  sites	  transcend,	   frequently	  and	  in	  many	  ways,	  what	  the	   state	   ideally	   ought	   to	   be.	   The	   blurring	   of	   private	   and	   public	   interests	   and	   the	  mobilization	  of	  state	  resources	  for	  or	  against	  such	  interests,	  the	  at	  best	  muddled	  boundary	  between	  what	  is	  legal	  and	  what	  is	  not	  –	  this	  is	  the	  stuff	  that	  makes	  and	  sustains	  the	  state	  in	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the	  everyday.	  Consider	  the	  example	  of	  Peru’s	  gamonales	   (discussed	  by	  Das,	  2004).	  These	  local	  strongmen	  are	  often	  important	  private	   landowners	  who	  simultaneously	  occupy	  and	  effectively	  are	   the	  local	  state	  bureaucracy.	  Routinely	  abusing	  their	  power	  to	  further	  their	  own	  interests	  while	  enforcing	  the	  law	  at	  other	  times,	  the	  gamonales	  stand	  both	  inside	  the	  law	  and	  state	  body	  as	  well	  as	  outside	  of	  it.	  This	  does	  nothing	  less	  than	  to	  keep	  in	  place	  a	  de	  
facto	   state	  which	  otherwise	  might	  not	   exist.	  All	   of	   the	  above	   is	   also	   true	   for	   the	  cacique,	  Mexico’s	   version	   of	   the	   gamonal	   and	   key	   for	   representing	   and	   making	   the	   state	   in	   the	  provinces.	   In	   exchange	   for	   loyalty	   to	   (higher-­‐ups	   in)	   the	   central	   government,	   wide-­‐reaching	  discretion	  over	   given	  populations	  was	   granted.	  The	   simultaneous	   sustention	  of	  the	   state	   and	   the	   routine	   transgression	   of	   its	   rules	   has	   also	   underpinned	   institution	  building	  in	  Mexico	  in	  that	  ‘officeholding	  [was]	  a	  lucrative	  business	  whose	  gains	  were	  seen	  as	   supporting	   national	   revolutionary	   projects	   as	  much	   as	   personal	   pocketbooks’	   (Davis,	  2010b:45).	  This	   is	  moreover	   reminiscent	  of	  Arias	  and	  Goldstein’s	  argument	   surrounding	  the	  functionality	  of	  violence	  in	  sustaining	  institutions	  and	  democracy	  in	  Latin	  America	  (see	  above).	  This,	  just	  as	  the	  murkiness	  of	  the	  boundaries	  of	  what	  is	  state	  and	  what	  is	  not,	  is	  of	  great	  importance	  for	  the	  interpretation	  of	  my	  own	  case	  and	  context	  and	  serves	  as	  a	  point	  of	  departure	  for	  one	  of	  my	  core	  contributions.	  Here	  too,	  as	  I	  show	  in	  Chapter	  6	  and	  further	  discuss	   in	   the	   conclusion	   to	   this	   thesis,	   the	   state	   is	   not	   only	   kept	   in	   place	   through	  seemingly	   paradoxical	   arrangements	   and	   interactions	   between	   state	   actors	   and	   the	  criminal	  organization	  in	  question,	  giving	  rise	  to	  a	  constellation	  in	  which	  the	  latter	  does	  not	  only	  exercise	  state	  effects	  and	  moreover	  proactively	  invests	  in	  the	  sustention	  of	  the	  state.	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Questioning	  sovereignty	  	  
The	  above	  outlined	  critical	  reexamination	  of	  what	  the	  state	  is	  (or	  perhaps	  rather:	  of	  what	  it	  has	  never	  been)	  as	  well	  as	  the	  widely	  shared	  observation	  that	  power	  has	  somewhat	  drifted	  away	   from	  state	  or	  at	   least	  governmental	   institutions	   towards	   the	  sub-­‐national	  and	  non-­‐state	  sphere	  has	  gone	  hand	  in	  hand	  with	  a	  debate	  on	  sovereignty.	  Judging	  from	  the	  above-­‐discussed	  works,	  the	  state	  has	  never	  been	  the	  monolithic,	  unified	  organizational	  apparatus	  it	   was	   made	   out	   to	   be	   and	   never	   exercised	   the	   degree	   of	   territorial	   control	   it	   would	  suppose,	   the	  Weberian	  notion	  of	  sovereignty	  has	  come	  to	  be	  questioned.	  This	  has	  all	  but	  done	   away	   with	   the	   predominance	   of	   traditional	   approaches	   (in	   most	   social	   scientific	  discourse),	  yet	  research	  conducted	   to	  no	  small	  degree	   in	   the	  Global	  South	  has	  stirred	  up	  debate.	  Hönke	  and	  Müller	  capture	  the	  essence	  of	  new	  approaches	  to	  sovereignty	  and	  state	  more	   generally	   by	   calling	   for	   a	  move	   ‘beyond	   the	   static	   analytics	   of	   ‘bounded	  units’	   and	  fixed	   territorial	   spaces’	   (2012:386).	   Doing	   so,	   and	   not	   squeezing	   the	   emergence	   and	  proliferation	   of	   non-­‐state	   armed	   actors	   into	   traditional	   shapes	   is	   highly	   relevant	   for	   the	  case	  of	  LCT,	  as	  well,	  since	  the	  complexity	  of	  interactions	  between	  both	  ‘camps’	  as	  well	  as	  of	  the	  way	  sovereignty	  is	  at	  times	  contended	  over,	  at	  times	  effectively	  split	  and	  shared,	  and	  at	  other	   times	   conjointly	   enacted	   and	   exercised	   is	   far	   greater.	   Reflecting	   similar	   scenarios,	  Rodgers	  (2006:289)	  draws	  on	  Latham’s	  detachment	  of	  the	  ownership	  of	  sovereignty	  from	  the	   state	   (2000)	   to	   find	   ‘social	   sovereignty’	   resting	  with	  Central	  American	  gangs	   (2000).	  Davis,	  whose	  work	  on	  Mexican	  organized	  crime	  and	  state	   formation	   I	  have	  already	  cited	  several	  times	  over	  the	  past	  pages,	  speaks	  of	  ‘fragmented	  sovereignty’	  and	  Arias	  (2006:296)	  of	   ‘localised	  sovereignty’.	  Van	  Dun	  refers	  to	  the	  way	  Peruvian	  cocaine	  traffickers	  attempt	  to	  gain	  legitimacy	  from	  and	  social	  control	  over	  locals	  as	  ‘narco-­‐sovereignty’.	  In	  one	  way	  or	  another,	   all	   these	   works	   and	   terms	   reflect	   that	   the	   above-­‐discussed	   pluralization	   of	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violence	   breaks	   open	   the	   notion	   of	   state	   sovereignty	   and	   underline	   its	   impertinence	   by	  pointing	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   actors	   apart	   from	   the	   state	   exercise	   social	   control	   and	   violence	  over	  particular	  populations	  and	  pockets	  of	  territory.	  	  	  Hansen	   and	   Steputat,	   too,	   refer	   to	   this	   context	   (in	   the	   Global	   South)	   to	   argue	   that	  sovereignty	  in	  a	  Weberian	  sense	  is	  an	  impertinent	  tool	  to	  capture	  social	  realities,	  especially	  in	  the	  Global	  South.	  State	  sovereignty,	  they	  argue,	  in	  a	  traditional	  sense	  cannot	  be	  achieved	  and	  represents	   little	  more	   than	   ‘an	  ontological	  ground	  of	  power	  and	  order,	   expressed	   in	  law	   or	   in	   enduring	   ideas	   of	   legitimate	   rule’	   that	   should	   be	   replaced	   with	   ‘a	   view	   of	  sovereignty	   as	   a	   tentative	   and	   always	   emergent	   form	   of	   authority	   grounded	   in	   violence	  that	   is	   performed	   and	   designed	   to	   generate	   loyalty,	   fear,	   and	   legitimacy	   from	   the	  neighborhood	   to	   the	   summit	  of	   the	   state’	   (2006:296/297).	   State	   sovereignty	  à	   la	  Weber,	  that	   is,	   is	   unattainable	   as	   it	   is	   always	   contended	   and	   manifests	   more	   as	   ideology	   than	  observation.	  What	  makes	  sense	   from	  an	  empirical	  point	  of	  view,	   in	  contrast,	   is	   to	  depart	  from	  and	  describe	   ‘de	   facto	   sovereignty’,	  which	  boils	   down	   to	   ‘the	   ability	   to	   kill,	   punish,	  and	   discipline	   with	   impunity’	   (2006:296).	   The	   latter	   approach	   draws,	   as	   does	   Mbembé	  (2001,	  2003;	  Das	  and	  Poole,	  2004,	  and	  Comaroff	  and	  Comaroff,	  2006,	  advance	  very	  similar	  notions),	  on	  Giorgio	  Agamben.	  Though	  Agamben	  himself	   is	   inconsistent	   in	   regard	   to	   this	  matter	  (for	  a	  critique	  see	  Fiskesjö,	  2012),	  Fitzpatrick	  (2001)	  shows	  that	  Agamben’s	  (1998)	  work	   is	   crucial	   for	   the	   understanding	   of	   political	   constructs	   and	  mechanisms	   that	   strip	  individuals	  of	   their	   rights	  and	   reduce	   them	   to	   ‘bare	   life’,	  which	  does	  not	  deserve	   to	   live’	  (2001:80)	   and	   which,	   ‘killable’,	   be	   done	   away	   with	   without	   consequences.	   As	   Das	   and	  Poole	  remark	  (2004:13),	  Agamben’s	  work	  furthermore	  helps	  to	  comprehend	  the	  frequency	  with	   which	   states	   can	   resort	   to	   ‘states	   of	   emergency’	   in	   which	   the	   boundaries	   and	  categories	  of	  the	  killable,	  as	  becomes	  blatantly	  clear	  in	  war,	  are	  shifted.	  Qua	  definition,	  as	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the	  sovereign	  they	  stand	  above	  the	  law	  and	  can	  thus	  do	  so.	  This,	  they	  argue,	  is	  however	  not	  limited	   to	   what	   could	   be	   differentiated	   as	   true	   and	   spectacular	   states	   of	   exception	   of	  exception.	  For	  the	  exceptional,	  including	  the	  state’s	  standing	  both	  within	  and	  outside	  of	  the	  law,	   is	   the	   stuff	   of	   the	   everyday.	   This	   line	   of	   argumentation,	   as	   well	   as	   Hansen	   and	  Steputat’s	   call	   to	   transcend	   officially	   stipulated	   and	   metaphysically	   underpinned	  parameters	   to	   search	   for	   and	   analyze	   sovereignty	   ‘wherever	   it	   is	   found	   and	   practiced’	  (2006:296),	  is	  of	  great	  importance	  for	  my	  own	  study.	  For	  what	  I	  analyze	  and	  present	  data	  on	  is	  just	  such	  a	  construct	  that	  seeks	  to	  render	  certain	  individuals	  killable	  within	  and	  in	  the	  name	  of	  a	  ‘new	  imagined	  community’	  (Davis)	  and	  that	  constitutes	  a	  non-­‐state	  actor-­‐carried	  form	  of	  sovereignty	   (that	  nevertheless	  does	  not	  exist	   independently	   from	  other	   forms	  of	  sovereignty,	  neither	  spatially	  not	  temporally,	  see	  above).	  	  
	  
LCT	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  ‘classical’	  organized	  criminal	  groups	  	  
As	   argued	   above,	   the	   parameters	   established	   by	   standard	   accounts	   of	   organized	   crime	  prove	  far	  too	  rigid	  to	  capture	  LCT.	  This	  is	  certainly	  so	  as	  concerns	  organized	  crime	  in	  sensu	  
strictu	   (see	  Chapter	  1).	  While	  some	  parallels	  exist	  between	  the	  structural	  composition	  of	  LCT	   and	  depictions	   of	   other	   organized	   crime	   groups,	   a	   number	   of	   important	   differences	  remain,	  not	   least	   in	   the	   sense	   that	  LCT	   is	   far	   less	   streamlined	   in	   terms	  of	  organizational	  activities	  and	  goals.	  Nevertheless,	  some	  of	  its	  characteristics	  may	  invite	  its	  definition	  as	  a	  mafia-­‐type	   organized	   criminal	   group.	   Like	   the	   Sicilian	   Mafia	   (see	   Gambetta,	   1993),	   the	  Russian	  Mafia	  (see	  Varese,	  1994/1997;	  Volkov,	  2002),	  and	  the	  Japanese	  Yakuza	  (see	  Hill,	  2006;	   Kaplan/Dubro,	   2012),	   LCT	   is	   engaged	   in	   the	   ‘business	   of	   private	   protection’	  (Gambetta)	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  extortionist	  but	  de	  facto	  regulation	  and	  ordering	  of	  segments	  of	   both	   licit	   and	   illicit	   markets	   (see	   Chapters	   4	   and	   5).	   Here,	   too,	   it	   is	   the	   state’s	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dysfunctional	  presence,	  as	  I	  find	  (see	  Chapter	  5),	  or,	  in	  Gambetta’s	  account,	  its	  absence	  that	  provides	   the	   backdrop	   against	   which	   ‘violent	   entrepreneurs’	   can	   provide	   alternative	  mechanisms	  for	  dispute	  settlement	  and	  contract	  enforcement.	  	  	  However,	  apart	  from	  this	  principal	  overlap	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  engagement	  in	  the	  provision	  of	  some	  degree	  of	  governance,	  there	  are	  significant	  differences	  that	  set	  LCT	  apart.	  This	  chiefly	  concerns	  the	  role	  of	  clandestinity	  and	  its	  effects.	  As	  noted	  in	  Chapter	  1,	  and	  in	  contrast	  to	  representations	  of	  mafia	  groups	  and	  other	   ‘societies’	  or	   ‘brotherhoods’	  (Paoli,	  2003)	  that	  are	  seen	   to	  principally	  operate	   in	   the	   ‘underground’	   (ibid.),	  LCT	  operates,	   in	  many	  ways,	  out	   in	   the	  open.	  The	  need	   for	  secrecy	   is	   comparatively	   low	   in	  Tierra	  Caliente	   (and	  other	  parts	  of	  Mexico	  and	  the	  Global	  South).	  This	  is	  already	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  state	  and	  organized	  crime	  has	  historically	  not	  been	  an	  antagonistic	  one	  per	  se	  (see	   chapters	   4	   and	   6	   and	   above).	   This	   out-­‐in-­‐the-­‐openness	   has	   been	   enhanced	   by	   the	  relative	  weakening	  of	  the	  state	   in	  the	  region.	  Moreover,	   it	  has	  enabled	  LCT	  to	  take	  up	  an	  active	   role	   of	   governance	   in	   spheres	   far	   beyond	   that	   of	   economic	   markets	   alone.	   As	  discussed	  and	  developed	  in	  Chapter	  5,	   the	  functions	  of	  governance	  claimed	  and	  assumed	  by	   LCT	   represent	   far	   greater	   incursions	   into	   areas	   of	   social	   life	   than	   those	   of	   ‘classical’	  mafia-­‐type	  organized	  criminal	  groups.	  	  	  Furthermore,	   this	   more	   evolved	   nature	   of	   LCT’s	   political	   character	   becomes	   revealed	  through	   its	  communications	  with	   local	  society	  and	  the	  general	  public.	  The	  group	  has	  not	  only	   been	   untypically	   proactive	   in	   seeking	   attention	   through	   communiqués	   but	   has	  additionally	  advanced	  a	  discourse	  unparalleled	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  eclectic	  arrangement	  of	  diverse	   ideological	  positions	  and	   the	  extent	  of	  political	  ambitions	  conveyed	  (see	  Chapter	  4).	   LCT	   has	   claimed	   to	   be	   a	   revolutionary	   force	   fighting	   for	   the	   good	   of	   society,	   which	  
	  	   75	  
amounts	  to	  nothing	  less	  than	  the	  fabrication	  of	   ‘new	  imagined	  communities’	  observed	  by	  Davis	   (see	   above	   and	   Chapter	   5).	   This	   far	   transcends	   ‘classical’	   ‘criminal	   mores’	   (see	  Humphrey,	   1999)	   in	   two	   important	   ways.	   Here,	   the	   values	   and	   ideas	   that	   the	   state	  stereotypically	   represents	   are	   not	   opposed	   and	   rejected	   but	   appropriated	   and	   recycled.	  Additionally,	   LCT’s	   discursive	   production	   of	   itself	   targets	   audiences	   beyond	   its	   own	  organizational	   confines.	   In	   light	   of	   the	   criteria	   examined	   above	   and	   especially	   the	  organization’s	  role	   in	  the	  production	  and	  reshuffling	  of	  governance,	  LCT	  resembles	  other	  non-­‐state	   armed	   actors	   engaged	   today	   in	   the	   remaking	   of	   (dis)order	   in	   Latin	   America	  much	  more	  closely	  than	  ‘classical’	  criminal	  organizations	  (see	  Koonings/Kruijt,	  2004:8	  for	  a	   typology	   of	   Latin	   American	   non-­‐state	   armed	   actors	   that	   incorporates	   criminal	  organizations	  like	  LCT).	  Best	  situated	  and	  analyzed	  as	  part	  of	  that	  actor	  population,	  this	  is	  also	  the	  reason	  for	  the	  recruitment	  of	  the	  wider	  strains	  of	  literature	  and	  debate	  discussed	  above	  to	  inform	  my	  analysis	  throughout	  this	  thesis.	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Chapter	  3:	  Methodology:	  Close-­‐proximity	  fieldwork	  on	  (Michoacán)	  organized	  crime	  
between	  possibility	  and	  constraint	  
The	  field	  from	  afar	  
Outside	  representations	  of	  Tierra	  Caliente	  
As	   already	   indicated	   in	   the	   introduction	   to	   this	   thesis,	   the	   terrain	   I	   sought	   to	   study	  supposed	  a	  fundamentally	  under-­‐researched	  terrain.	  Specifically,	  this	  was	  the	  case	  in	  three	  distinct	  ways.	  First,	   close-­‐up,	  ethnographic	  enquiries	   into	  Mexican	  organized	  crime	  were	  and	   still	   are	   largely	   absent.	   The	   few	  examples	   to	   the	   contrary	   (Malkin,	   2001;	  McDonald,	  2005)	  represent,	  as	  the	  authors	  themselves	  tellingly	  stress,	  by-­‐products	  of	  anthropological	  studies	  with	  different	  core	  interests,	  thus	  lacking	  the	  depth	  a	  study	  with	  a	  corresponding	  focus	   on	   the	   phenomenon	   as	   such	   would	   be	   able	   to	   provide.	   Maldonado	   (2010,	   2012)	  elegantly	   situates	   the	   emergence	   of	   Michoacán	   narcotrafficking	   in	   wider	   socioeconomic	  and	  political	  processes,	  but	  largely	  holds	  back	  on	  ethnographic	  material.	  Second,	  they	  are	  outdated	  (see	  the	  publication	  dates)	  and	  thus	  of	   limited	  value	  for	  deriving	  insights	  into	  a	  rapidly	  changing	  and	  fundamentally	  dynamic	  field.	  One	  exception	  here	  is	  Campbell’s	  more	  recent	  work	  on	  the	  Ciudad	  Juárez-­‐El	  Paso	  metropolitan	  area,	  published	  in	  2009.	  Yet,	  and	  leading	   to	   the	   third	   aspect,	  while	   it	   provides	   important	   insights	   and	   guidance,	   dynamics	  along	  the	  border	  cannot	  be	  taken	  as	  representative	  for	  other	  regions	  and	  actors.	  As	  of	  the	  time	  when	  I	  was	  attempting	  to	  get	  close	  to	  Tierra	  Caliente	  and	  LCT	  as	  its	  dominant	  (illicit)	  actor,	   access	   to	   the	   region	   was,	   as	   mentioned,	   widely	   considered	   impossible.	   Guiding	  knowledge	  as	  to	  which	  on-­‐the-­‐ground	  realities	  to	  expect	  and	  as	  for	  the	  inner	  workings	  of	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LCT,	  was	  thus	  severely	  limited	  at	  best.21	  This	  concerns,	  moreover,	  journalistic	  sources	  that,	  while	  staggering	  in	  terms	  of	  quantity,	  by	  and	  large	  lack	  in	  qualitative	  density.	  	  	  	  In	   a	   sense,	   then,	   what	   I	   sought	   to	   study	   were	   two	   (interwoven)	   hidden	   populations:	  terracalentana	  civilian	  populations,	  on	  one	  side,	  and	  LCT	  as	  an	  organization	  but	  moreover	  as	   a	   hidden	   population	   arisen	   from	   the	   general	   hidden	   population	   on	   the	   other.	   As	  pioneered	  by	  representatives	  of	  the	  Chicago	  School	  and	  put	  to	  proof	  through	  their	  studies	  of	   deviance	   and	   crime	   as	   part	   of	   the	   urban	   environment	   (Bulmer,	   1986	   provides	   a	  comprehensive	  overview),	  methods	  such	  as	  ethnography	  that	  presuppose	  the	  researcher’s	  immediate	  proximity	  to	  the	  subject	  prove	  not	  only	  suitable	  but	  outright	  necessary	  to	  grasp	  hidden	  populations’	  ‘subjective	  meanings,	  perspectives,	  understandings,	  and	  salient	  issues’	  (Blumer,	   1969,	   as	   summarized	   by	   Adler,	   1990:44).	   However,	   and	   as	   laid	   out	   in	   the	  introduction	  to	  this	  thesis,	  my	  stated	  intention	  to	  try	  to	  gain	  a	  certain	  physical	  proximity	  to	  an	   active	   criminal	   organization	   so	   as	   to	   alleviate	   this	   scarcity	   in	   firsthand	  data	  was	  met	  with	  reactions	  oscillating	  between	  bewilderment	  and	  amusement.	  	  	  Upon	  arrival	  in	  Mexico-­‐City	  in	  August	  2011,	  I	  began	  to	  establish	  communications	  with	  an	  array	  of	  individuals	  that	  seemed	  to	  offer	  a	  potential	  of	  further	  contacts	  or	  at	  least	  advice.	  Emblematic	  for	  a	  range	  of	  similar	  reactions,	  the	  response	  by	  a	  local	  representative	  of	  the	  academic	  institution	  of	  which	  I	  had	  become	  a	  PhD	  fellow	  to	  an	  email	  of	  mine	  in	  which	  I	  had	  expressed	   the	   idea	   of	   entering	   Tierra	   Caliente:	   ‘You	   must	   be	   suicidal.’	   Telling,	   too,	   the	  comment	   by	   a	   renowned,	  Mexico-­‐City	   based	   scholar	   on	  Mexican	   drug	   trafficking	  whose	  seminars	  I	  had	  participated	  in:	  ‘Well,	  of	  course	  you	  can	  get	  in.	  The	  only	  problem	  is	  making	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Arguably,	  though,	  and	  in	  spite	  of	  all	  constraints	  this	  entails,	  this	  simultaneously	  facilitates	  treating	  such	  a	  setting	   as	   ‘anthropologically	   strange’	   (see	   here	   Schutz,	   1964	   and	   his	   ideal	   image	   of	   the	   ethnographer	   as	  ‘stranger’).	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it	  out	  in	  one	  piece	  again.’	  Another	  contact,	  already	  in	  Michoacán’s	  state	  capital	  of	  Morelia,	  felt	   similarly	   compelled	   to	   underline	   the	   disadvantages	   of	  my	  Northern-­‐European	   looks,	  rendering	   me	   an	   obvious	   outsider	   anywhere	   in	   Mexico,	   but	   the	   more	   so	   in	   Templar	  territory:	   ‘How	   scary,	   with	   that	   carita	   [diminutive	   for	   face]	   of	   yours	   in	   Tierra	   Caliente.’	  Strongly	   represented,	   thus,	   were	   the	   notion	   of	   close-­‐proximity	   research	   on	   organized	  crime	  as	  ‘mission	  impossible’	  (Rawlinson,	  2008)	  and	  its	  categorical	  exclusion	  of	  precisely	  those	  methods	  most	  suitable	  for	  shedding	  light	  on	  ‘hidden	  populations’.	  	  
	  
A	  conservative	  research	  design	  as	  a	  response	  to	  representations	  of	  impossibility	  
Prior	  to	  my	  excursion	  to	  Mexico,	  this	  had	  already	  been	  the	  case.	  My	  initial	  research	  design	  was	  correspondingly	  ‘conservative’,	  but	  formulated	  open-­‐endedly.	  This	  was	  to	  reconcile	  an	  expectation	   of	   control	   with	   a	   degree	   of	   flexibility	   needed	   to	   explore	   the	   unknown.	  Reflected	   here	  were	   (institutional)	   security	   concerns	   –	  members	   of	  my	   home	  university	  nervously	   inquired	   whether	   it	   would	   in	   fact	   be	   necessary	   at	   all	   to	   leave	   my	   host	  university's	   campus	   in	   Mexico	   City	   –	   but	   also	   served	   to	   keep	   expectations	   low	   in	   case	  deeper	  access	  would	  have	  effectively	  been	  blocked.	  Indeed,	  I	  spent	  the	  better	  half	  of	  a	  total	  of	   twelve	   months	   of	   fieldwork	   outside	   of	   Tierra	   Caliente.	   As	   envisioned	   in	   my	   original	  research	   design	   –	   getting	   close	   enough	   yet	   remaining	   sufficiently	   distant	   –	   I	   established	  contacts	  with	  informants	  not	  directly	  involved	  in	  any	  sort	  of	  illegal	  activities	  and	  that	  could	  be	  met	  outside	  of	  the	  region,	  for	  instance	  in	  Michoacán’s	  state	  capital	  of	  Morelia	  or	  other	  urban	  areas.	  These	  contacts	  had,	   for	   instance,	  entered	  the	  region	  just	  before	   ‘it	  got	  really	  bad’,	  as	  some	  would	  phrase	  it,	  or	  would	  still	  undertake	  sporadic	  entries	  due	  to	  their	  role	  as	  government	  functionaries	  in	  charge	  of	  overseeing	  local	  development	  projects.	  Hence,	  they	  could	  provide	  some	  privileged	  insights	  into	  criminal	  organization-­‐community-­‐interactions	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in	  Tierra	  Caliente,	  albeit	  from	  a	  certain	  distance.	  	  	  In	   retrospect,	   this	   phase	   proved	   valuable	   in	   two	   major	   ways.	   First,	   it	   allowed	   for	   my	  acclimatization	  to,	  as	  well	  as	  my	  sensitization	  towards,	  participants	  in	  a	  setting	  that,	  here	  too,	   was	   infused	   with	   fear	   and	   paranoia,	   two	   sides	   of	   the	   same	   coin.	   State-­‐level	  functionaries	   I	   sat	   down	   with	   in	   Morelia,	   for	   instance,	   made	   sure	   we	   met	   after-­‐hours.	  Though	   nobody	   else	   was	   present	   in	   the	   office,	   the	   name	   of	   ellos	   (‘them’,	   i.e.	   LCT)	   was	  preferably	  avoided	  altogether.	  If	  it	  did	  slip	  out,	  voices	  lowered	  to	  near-­‐unintelligibility	  and	  telling	  looks	  over	  the	  shoulder	  followed.	  The	  density	  of	  the	  atmosphere	  I	  encountered	  was	  not	  only	  something	  I	  had	  to	  try	  to	  get	  used	  to	  myself	  –	  its	  transference	  to	  me	  was	  certainly	  impacting	  –	  but	  which	   I	   also	  had	   to	   learn	   to	   factor	   into	  my	  attempts	   to	  gain	   informants’	  trust	   and	   their	   openness,	   for	   instance	   through	   the	   choice	   of	   a	   corresponding	   language	  during	   conversations	  and	   interviews.	   Second,	   and	  even	   though	  coming	  nowhere	   close	   to	  the	  richness	  of	  the	  data	  I	  would	  ultimately	  obtain	  in	  situ,	  the	  information	  I	  gathered	  during	  this	   phase	   in	   the	   form	   of	   about	   twenty	   semi-­‐structured	   interviews	   as	   well	   as	   a	   large	  number	  of	  informal	  chats	  proved	  valuable.	  Not	  least,	  they	  increased	  my	  comprehension	  of	  on-­‐the-­‐ground	  realities	  in	  Tierra	  Caliente.	  The	  fact	  that	  I	  had	  additionally	  obtained	  copies	  of	   extensive	   judicial	  documents	   specifically	   addressing	  LCT	   (PGR	  SIEDO,	  2009)	  added	   to	  the	  feeling	  that	  I	  had	  already	  built	  a	  basis	  sufficient	  for	  a	  PhD	  thesis.	  Nevertheless,	  so	  as	  to	  produce	   a	   more	   significant	   contribution	   to	   the	   understanding	   of	   the	   field	   of	   study	   and	  specifically	   on-­‐the-­‐ground	   realities	   in	   Tierra	   Caliente,	   getting	   closer	   and	   being	   able	   to	  apply	  a	  richer	  methodology	  remained	  the	  ideal	  scenario.	  For,	  especially	  under	  conditions	  of	  fragmentation	  of	  social	  order	  and	  the	  cropping	  up	  of	  seemingly	  ever-­‐fluctuating	  as	  well	  as	   spatially	   limited	   (organizational)	   responses,	   the	   local	   constitutes	   the	   ultimate	   ground	  where	  ‘things	  are	  happening’	  and	  thus	  ‘the	  place	  to	  be’	  for	  those	  seeking	  to	  shed	  light	  into	  a	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field	  of	  research	  that	  is	  fundamentally	  under-­‐explored.	  	  	  	  	  	  
Gaining	  geographical	  access:	  Frustrated	  attempts	  and	  a	  way	  in	  	  	  
Even	  though	  I	  never	  categorically	  abandoned	  the	  possibility	  of	   ‘going	  deeper’,	  an	  array	  of	  potential	   leads	   into	  Tierra	  Caliente	  stopped	  short	  of	  getting	  me	  where	   I	  wanted	  to	  go.	   In	  some	   instances,	   I	   could	   not	   trust	   these	   contacts	   or	   their	  motivations,	   and	   doubted	   their	  capacity	  to	  protect	  me.	  In	  other	  instances,	  it	  seemed	  that	  this	  lack	  of	  trust	  worked	  the	  other	  way	   around	   with	   contacts	   apparently	   deeming	   it	   too	   risky	   to	   be	   exposed	   by	   being	  associated	   with	   an	   outsider	   such	   as	   myself.	   One	   example	   was	   my	   attempt	   to	   access	  contacts	   via	   a	   local	   research	   institution	   situated	   outside	   of	   Tierra	   Caliente	   but	   still	   well	  within	   LCT’s	   area	   of	   influence,	   whose	   official	   representatives	   swiftly	   put	   an	   end	   to	   our	  conversation	   once	   I	   had	   voiced	   my	   intent.	   Then	   again,	   worsening	   security	   conditions	  undermined	  another	  promising	  ‘incursion’	  into	  Tierra	  Caliente	  with	  a	  couple	  of	  journalists	  as	  in	  the	  days	  prior	  to	  the	  date	  of	  entry	  twenty-­‐one	  dead	  bodies	  appeared	  in	  Morelia	  and	  bringing	   along	   a	  güero	   (‘whitey’)	   suddenly	   seemed	   like	   a	   bad	   idea.	   The	   actual	   access	   to	  Tierra	  Caliente	  with	   the	  help	  of	   the	  person	  who	  would	   later	  become	  my	  gatekeeper	  was	  ultimately	   the	   result	   of	   a	   chance	   encounter	   that	   opened	  up	   a	  whole	   new	   social	   network	  that	   I	   could	   relate	   to	   for	   ‘snowballing’	   purposes	   (see	   Faugier/Sargeant,	   1997	   for	   the	  pertinence	  of	  snowballing	  to	  access	  hidden	  populations	  such	  as	  those	  labeled	  criminal;	  see	  also	  Atkinson/Flint,	  2001).	  Back	  in	  Mexico-­‐City	  to	  catch	  some	  breath	  and	  spending	  a	  day	  in	  the	   National	   Autonomous	   University’s	   library,	   I	   ran	   into	   a	   former	   fellow	   student	   with	  whom	  I	  had	  shared	  a	  class	  as	  an	  exchange	  student	  in	  2007.	  Over	  lunch,	  it	  turned	  out	  that	  through	  his	  own	  research	  he	  had	  a	  contact	  to	  a	  social	  activist	  in	  Michoacán.	  The	  latter,	  after	  two	   meetings,	   introduced	   me	   to	   the	   leaders	   of	   an	   umbrella	   organization	   for	   social	   and	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peasant	  organizations	  active	  throughout	  the	  state.	  Apart	  from	  a	  place	  to	  sleep,	  they	  offered	  further	   contacts;	   it	   might,	   they	   stressed,	   be	   worth	   having	   a	   conversation	   with	   one	   in	  particular.	  After	  about	   two	  weeks	  of	   failed	  attempts	   to	  put	  me	   in	   touch	  –	   I	   later	   learned	  that	  this	  was	  due	  to	  personal	  differences	  between	  the	  two	  parties	  –	  I	  received	  a	  call.	  Diego,	  a	   pseudonym	   for	   this	   contact	   and	   my	   gatekeeper-­‐to-­‐be,	   signaled	   interest	   in	   my	   study,	  welcomed	  its	  objectives,	  and	  said	  he	  is	  happy	  to	  show	  me	  ‘the	  side	  of	  Tierra	  Caliente	  you	  won't	  see	   in	  the	  media.’	  He	  moreover	  offered	  to	  have	  a	   family	  member	  come	  pick	  me	  up	  early	   the	   next	   day	   and	   take	   me	   to	   Apatzingán,	   Tierra	   Caliente’s	   main	   city	   and	   LCT’s	  stronghold.	  Apart	  from	  a	  couple	  of	  people	  vouching	  for	  him	  and	  Diego	  himself	  assuring	  me	  that	   I	   have	   nothing	   to	   worry	   about,	   I	   had	   next	   to	   no	   information	   on	  which	   to	   base	  my	  decision	  as	  to	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  go.	  I	  briefly	  discussed	  the	  matter	  with	  a	  trusted	  academic	  via	  Skype.	  He	  told	  me	  not	  to	  risk	  anything.	  The	  next	  day	  I	  travelled	  to	  Apatzingán.	  	  	  	  
	  
Inside	  Tierra	  Caliente	  
Flexibility,	  uncertainty,	  and	  the	  illusion	  of	  control	  
As	  the	  term	  ‘research	  design’	  –	  an	  inevitable	  step	  to	  legitimize	  research	  projects	  towards	  institutions	   and	   funding	   bodies	   and	   moreover	   firmly	   built	   into	   the	   education	   of	   PhD	  students	   as	   the	   next	   generation	   of	   scholars	   –	   already	   invokes,	   social	   science	   research	  frequently	  carries	  the	  image	  of	  a	  linear,	  positivist-­‐scientistic	  process.	  Implied	  herein	  is	  that	  social	   realities	   and,	   for	   that	   matter,	   researchers’	   immersion	   into	   them	   as	   well	   as	   their	  interactions	   with	   real-­‐life	   actors	   are,	   to	   a	   good	   degree,	   foreseeable	   and	   controllable.	  Research	  in	  the	  real	  world	  is,	  however,	  far	  messier.	  Indeed,	  flexibility	  needs	  to	  be	  treated	  as	   a	   fundamental	   principle	   in	   order	   for	   qualitative	   and	   specifically	   ethnographic	   field	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research	   methods	   to	   unfold	   their	   true	   (exploratory)	   potential.	   As	   an	   open-­‐ended	  interactive	   process,	   ‘the	   project,	   and	   the	   methodology,	   are	   continually	   defined	   and	  redefined	   by	   the	   researcher’	   (Burgess,	   1990:25).	   The	   acceptance	   that	   ‘you	   don't	   do	  fieldwork,	   but	   fieldwork	   does	   you’	   (Simpson,	   2006)	   surfaces,	   in	   regard	   to	   the	   field	   in	  question	  here,	  as	  a	  requirement	  to	  step	  foot	  into	  it	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  Indeed,	  as	  Goldsmith	  (2003:111)	  states	   in	  reference	  to	  his	   fieldwork	  on	  violent	  Colombian	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors,	  ‘adaptability	  is	  a	  necessary	  response	  to	  the	  uncertainty	  surrounding	  many	  aspects	  of	   the	   field	   [in	   volatile	   settings].’	   This	   presupposes,	   to	   a	   certain	   extent,	   renouncing	   the	  illusion	  of	  (complete)	  control	  (see	  here	  Jacob’s	  ‘case	  for	  dangerous	  fieldwork’,	  2006).	  The	  need	  for	  snap	  decisions	  based	  on	   incomplete	   information,	  or	  simply	   ‘gut	   feeling’,	  such	  as	  the	  one	  referred	  to	  above	  reflects	  the	  matter	  as	  much	  as	  it	  underlines	  an	  inherent	  trade-­‐off	  between	  control	  and	  flexibility.	  	  	  As	  I	  travelled	  into	  Tierra	  Caliente	  the	  first	  time,	  what	  travelled	  with	  me	  was	  a	  whole	  set	  of	  preconceptions	  and	  stereotypes	  formed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  outsider	  knowledge	  available	  to	  me	  and,	  for	  that	  matter,	  the	  representation	  of	  Tierra	  Caliente	  as	  something	  akin	  to	  a	  black	  hole	  (more	  on	  the	  historical	  construction	  of	  Tierra	  Caliente	  as	  a	  zone	  of	  danger	  in	  Chapter	  4).	  Entering	  Apatzingán’s	  dusty	  streets	  and	  crossing	  its	  center	  to	  make	  it	  to	  Diego’s	  house,	  I	  spotted	   what	   I	   deemed	   to	   be	   obvious	   signs	   of	   the	   presence	   of	   ellos:	   large,	   powerful	  
camionetas	  (pick-­‐up	  trucks)	  of	  recent	  make,	  modelo	  del	  año,	  as	  Mexican	  media	  would	  have	  it.	   Inadvertently,	   I	  slid	   into	  a	   lower	  position	  in	  my	  seat.	  At	  this	  point,	   I	  envisioned	  a	  brief	  stay	  during	  which	   I	   intended	   to	   expose	  myself	   as	   little	   as	  possible	   and	   to	   conduct	   semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  with	  informants	  in	  a	  surgical	  manner	  so	  as	  to	  minimize	  risks.	  I	  was	  pursuing	   something	   akin	   to	   a	   ‘get-­‐in-­‐grab-­‐data-­‐get-­‐out’	   strategy.	  Within	   hours,	   my	   plan	  went	  up	   in	  smoke	  and	  dissolved,	  as	   it	  were,	   in	  a	  haze	  of	  scotch.	  Having	  warmly	  received	  
	  	   83	  
me,	  Diego	  asked	  me	  to	  tag	  along	  to	  a	  baptism	  party	  that	  was	  taking	  place	  that	  night.	  About	  two-­‐hundred	  people	  attended	  and,	  a	  rare	  view	  as	   the	  only	  obvious	  non-­‐local,	   the	   idea	   to	  maintain	  a	  ‘low	  profile’	  quickly	  proved	  ridiculous.	  	  I	  attracted,	  not	  least,	  the	  attention	  of	  an	  impersonator	   of	   a	   popular	   gay	  Mexican	   folk	   singer	  who	   invited	   on	   stage	   to	   give	  me	   an	  ‘official’	   welcome,	   which	   included	   comical	   flirtation.	   I	   had	   gone	   from	   perceived	  impossibility	   to	   immersion	   into	  my	  first	   ‘natural’	   local	  setting	   in	   little	  more	  than	  twenty-­‐four	  hours.	  Rather	  than	  gradually	  crossing	  this	  geographical	  and	  ontological	  border,	  I	  was	  thrown	   over	   it.	   In	   plain	   expectation	   of	   signs	   of	   emergency	   and	   crisis,	   portrayed	   as	   the	  region’s	   constant	   state	   by	   the	   outside	  world,	   the	  normality,	   openness,	   and	  banality	  with	  which	  the	  everyday	  unfolded	  before	  my	  eyes	  left	  me	  perplexed.	  Not	  least	  so	  since	  an	  array	  of	   individuals	   had	   been	   introduced	   to	   me	   countering	   my	   expectation	   of	   el	   narco	   as	  something	   principally	   clandestine	   as	   they	   had	   no	   problem	   in	   chatting	   about	   their	   past	  involvement	  in	  trafficking	  operations.	  In	  conjunction	  with	  mind-­‐numbing	  temperatures	  of	  above	   forty	   degrees	   Celsius,	   my	   clinging	   on	   to	   the	   desire	   of	   control	   amidst	   principal	  uncertainty	  coated	  me	  in	  a	  fog.	  A	  fog	  which	  lingered	  on	  throughout	  and	  beyond	  my	  time	  in	  the	  region	  making	  appear	  unreal;	  which	  entailed	   frustration,	  at	   times,	   for	  countering	  my	  striving	  for	  ad-­‐hoc	  sensemaking	  so	  as	  to	  regain	  ontological	  security;	  and	  which,	  in	  spite	  of	  everything,	   allowed	   me	   to	   function	   and	   perform	   as	   needed,	   for	   instance	   during	   later	  interactions	  with	  LCT’s	  leaders.	  	  	  In	   retrospect,	   I	   deem	   the	   effects	   of	   being	   emerged	   in	   uncertainty	   as	   the	   quintessential,	  albeit	   challenging	   practice	   of	   experiencing	   the	   setting	   itself.	   A	   theme	   I	   return	   to	   in	  following	  chapters,	  uncertainty	   forms	  part	  and	  parcel	  of	   a	   landscape	  of	   social	  order	   that	  presents	  itself,	  in	  Tierra	  Caliente	  and	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  ‘global	  south’	  alike,	  fundamentally	  liquefied.	   In	   local	   civilians’	   statements,	   uncertainty	   surfaces	   as	   part	   and	   parcel	   of	   the	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everyday	  experience	  characterized	  by	  the	  presence	  of	  armed	  actors	  –	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  alike	  –	  whose	  violent	  potential	  can	  be	  mobilized	  in	  unexpected	  and	  often	  arbitrary	  ways.	  The	  latter	  instability	  and	  flux	  also	  becomes	  the	  basis	  for	  LCT’s	  insertion	  into	  the	  local	  as	  a	  master	   over	   the	   twilight	   zone	   between	   certainty	   and	   uncertainty	   (see	   Chapter	   5).	   Its	  proclaimed	   supremacy	   over	   the	   local	   also	   provides,	   in	   this	   vein,	   the	   backdrop	   to	   the	  process	  through	  which	  I	  negotiate	  my	  right	  to	  stay	  with	  ellos	  and	  which	  I	  describe	  in	  the	  following	  in	  some	  depth.	  	  	  
	  
Negotiating	  permanence	  in	  the	  field	  with	  Los	  Caballeros	  Templarios	  	  
Having	   spent	   barely	   three	   days	   in	   Apatzingán,	   I	   was	   inserted	   in	   the	   same	   logic	   of	  negotiating	  my	   permanence	   in	   the	   region	   that	   had	   previously	   been	   described	   to	   me	   as	  indispensable	   by	   state	   functionaries	   I	   had	   sat	   down	  with	   (see	   above).	   They	   had	   left	   no	  doubt	   that	   they	   considered	   accessing	   the	   region	  without	   obtaining	   prior	   approval	   by	   el	  
poder	   fáctico	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   an	   ‘informational	   package’	   detailing	   number	   of	   individuals	  traveling,	   vehicles	   used,	   routes	   traveled,	   as	   well	   as	   regarding	   the	   reasons	   for	   entry	  imprudent	   at	   the	   very	   least.	   An	   informational	   system,	   fed	   by	   a	   countless	   number	   of	  diffusely	  arranged	  sources,	  allowed	  LCT	  to	   jealously	  monitor	  movements	   into	  this	   land	  it	  claimed	  dominion	  over.	  It	  worked,	  in	  my	  case	  too.	  Though	  it	  is	  fair	  to	  say	  that	  detecting	  the	  only	  obvious	  outsider	  for	  miles	  constitutes	  a	  limited	  challenge.	  The	  day	  after	  the	  baptism	  party,	  I	  was	  already	  known	  as	  ‘doctor	  alemán’	  (German	  doctor)	  in	  the	  street	  I	  am	  staying	  in	  and	   neighbors	   came	   to	   enquire	   about	   the	   possibility	   of	   receiving	   medical	   assistance.	   A	  misconception	  I	  had	  to	  clarify	  to	  their	  evident	  disappointment.	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Tito	  was	  well-­‐dressed.	  His	  dark	  black	  hair	  perfectly	   trimmed,	  no	   single	  hair	   escaped	   the	  proud	  order	  on	  his	  head.	  He	  was	  polite	  and	  seemed	  educated.	  In	  a	  low	  voice,	  he	  requested	  permission	   to	   take	   the	   stairs	   leading	   up	   to	   the	   second-­‐floor	   balcony	   from	  whose	   shade	  Diego	   and	   I	  were	   sipping	  my	   fieldwork’s	   drug	   of	   ‘choice’	   –	  Nescafé	   –	   and	   observing	   the	  vehicles	  sporadically	  whirling	  up	  dust	  on	  the	  unpaved	  street	   in	  front	  of	  my	  new	  home	  in	  Apatzingán.	  Until	   I	   left	   the	   field	  –	  and	  effectively	   far	  beyond	   this	  point	  –	  my	  accentuated	  attention	   to	   signs	   of	   potential	   danger	   persisted.	   Having	   barely	   been	   catapulted	   into	   the	  region,	  my	  hyper-­‐awareness	  was	  at	  an	  extreme.	  Every	  time	  a	  menacing	  growl	  announced	  the	   approach	   of	   camionetas	   and	   SUVs,	  my	   adrenaline	   level	   peaked.	   A	   casualty	   of	   an	   ill-­‐timed	  stomach	  weakness,	  I	  spent	  my	  first	  full	  day	  in	  the	  region	  home	  alone.	  My	  plan	  was	  not	  to	  be	  seen	  and	  invite	  unwanted	  attention.	  The	  entry	  door	  did	  not	  lock.	  Yet,	  the	  oven-­‐like	   temperatures	   that	  underlined	  why	   the	   region’s	  name	   is	  well	  deserved	  drove	  me	  out	  onto	  the	  balcony.	  I	  still	  tried	  to	  lay	  low,	  literally	  so	  on	  one	  of	  couches	  placed	  outside.	  Lush	  potted	  plants	  provided	  cover.	  I	  had	  dozed	  off	  as	  a	  luxury	  SUV	  abruptly	  pulled	  up	  in	  front	  of	  the	  house.	  A	  man	  of	  about	  thirty-­‐five	  years	  of	  age	  stepped	  out.	  He	  was	  buff;	  his	  tight,	  black	  shirt	   excessively	   underlining	   his	   muscularity.	   Over	   it,	   a	   golden	   chain	   was	   visible.	   He	  sported	   a	   ‘crew	   cut’	   and	   a	   thinly	   trimmed	   mustache.	   This	   model	   sicario22	  –	   a	   correct	  perception,	  I	  was	  later	  told	  –	  stared	  up	  at	  the	  balcony.	  ‘Okay,	  now	  I’m	  fucked’,	  I	  thought	  to	  myself.	  He	  hesitated	   for	   a	  moment,	   then	   shouted	  up:	   ‘No	  está	  Diego	   [Isn’t	  Diego	  home]?’	  Having	   obviously	   been	   spotted,	   I	   got	   up,	   greeted	   him,	   and	   responded	   that	   Diego	   was	  expected	  back	  later	  that	  afternoon.	  ‘Alright	  then.	  I	  was	  going	  to	  get	  him	  for	  la	  lotería.’	  As	  it	  turned	  out,	  sicarios,	  too,	  spend	  their	  Sundays	  playing	  board	  games.	  I	  wished	  him	  good	  luck	  and	  he	  drove	  off.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Sicario	   is	   the	   standard	   term	   used	   to	   designate	   Mexican	   criminal	   organizations’	   ‘foot	   soldiers’,	   their	  enforcers	  and	  ‘hit	  men’.	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In	   contrast,	   nothing	   visibly	   identified	   Tito	   as	  miembro	   de,	   as	   locals	   generically	   refer	   to	  membership	   in	   el	   crimen	   organizado	   and	   its	   contemporary	   local	   synonym,	   LCT.	   His	  appearance	  and	  the	  run-­‐down	  taxi	  he	  abandoned	  in	  front	  of	  the	  house	  did	  not	  suggest	  any	  obvious	  connection.	  It	  is	  only	  when	  he,	  almost	  shyly,	  introduced	  himself	  and	  stated	  that	  el	  
jefe	  (‘the	  boss’,	  here:	  Servando	  Gómez	  Martínez,	  then	  LCT’s	  second-­‐in-­‐command)	  sent	  him	  in	  order	  for	  the	  two	  of	  us	  to	  have	  a	  plática	  (‘chat’)	  that	  I	  began	  to	  distinguish	  him	  from	  the	  regular	  flow	  of	  people	  frequenting	  Diego’s	  home.	  Tito	  is	  a	  different	  cut	  of	  Templar23.	  He	  is	  what	  I	  call	  an	  emissary	  and	  thus	  one	  of	  the	  unthreatening,	  plain-­‐clothed	  individuals	  whose	  inconspicuousness	  destines	   them	   for	   specific	   tasks.	  Tito,	  hardly	  older	   than	   twenty	  years,	  uses	  his	  cover	  as	  a	  taxi	  driver	  to	  run	  errands	  for	  the	  group	  –	  ‘well,	  really	  whatever	  los	  jefes	  need.’	   In	   this	  case,	  he	  had	  come	  to	  gather	   intelligence.	  My	  sudden	  appearance,	  he	  stated,	  raised	  the	  question	  of	  what	  I	  might	  be	  up	  to.	  The	  following	  chat	  took	  the	  form	  of	  mutual	  assertions.	  To	  counter	  suspicions	  that	  I	  might	  be	  an	  oreja	  (‘ear’,	  or	  government	  informant),	  I	  stressed	  my	  outsider’s	  naivety,	  my	  status	  as	  a	  student,	  and	  my	  willingness	  to	  look	  behind	  the	   façade	   of	   government	   and	   media	   representations.	   In	   turn,	   he	   underlined	   LCT’s	  benevolence	  and	  grandeur.	  A	  few	  hours	  later	  he	  returned,	  happy	  to	  announce	  that	  ‘el	  jefe	  lo	  
ve	  bien’	  –	  i.e.	  that	  my	  presence	  would	  be	  tolerated	  for	  the	  time	  being	  –	  and	  that	  he	  might	  be	  able	   to	   receive	  me	   some	   time	   soon.	  He	  did,	   however,	   ask	   for	  details	  with	   regards	   to	  my	  stated	  university	  affiliation.	  Before	  allowing	  any	  sort	  of	  physical	  proximity	  to	  higher-­‐level	  members,	  it	  appears,	  LCT	  wanted	  to	  run	  a	  background	  check.	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  What	  weight	  the	  label	  LCT	  carries	  in	  spite	  of	  Tito’s	  boyishly	  polite	  aura	  becomes	  clear	  before	  our	  second	  encounter	   later	   the	   same	   day.	   I	   am	   seated	   in	   the	   backroom	   of	   the	   office	   building	   occupied	   by	   the	  organization	  headed	  by	  Diego	  and	  conduct	  an	  interview	  with	  two	  informants	  as	  Diego	  comes	  in	  and	  states	  that	  Tito	  just	  called	  and	  would	  soon	  be	  arriving.	  Without	  further	  due,	  my	  informants	  get	  up	  and	  clear	  the	  room	  within	  seconds.	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A	  week	  later,	  Diego	  and	  I	  were	  told	  to	  abandon	  our	  car	  at	  a	  second	  security	  checkpoint.	  We	  were	   now	   penetrating	   even	   deeper	   into	   LCT’s	   core	   operational	   territory	   aboard	   a	  
camioneta,	  driven	  by	  Alejandro,	  a	  twenty-­‐one-­‐year-­‐old	  sicario	  who	  kept	  his	  AR-­‐15	  in	  reach	  right	   next	   to	   the	   driver’s	   seat.	   We	   formed	   a	   three-­‐vehicle	   convoy,	   manned	   by	   a	   small	  brigade	  of	   heavily	   armed	  LCT	  enforcers.	  Gómez	   arrived	  only	   after	  his	  personal	   guards	   –	  elite	  sicarios,	  young	  and	  well-­‐trained	  members	  armed	  with	  grenade	  launchers	  mounted	  on	  semi-­‐automatic	  rifles	  –	  had	  set	  up	  a	  security	  parameter.	  The	  meeting	  point	  was	  a	  cemetery	  in	   the	   middle-­‐of-­‐nowhere,	   indistinguishable	   from	   the	   desert-­‐like,	   near-­‐monochrome	  surroundings	   if	   it	  was	  not	   for	   the	  gaily-­‐colored	  crosses	   indicating	  the	  existence	  of	  thirty-­‐odd	  graves.	  It	  was	  at	  this	  stage	  that	  Gómez	  provided	  me	  with	  an	  introduction	  to	  prevailing	  
terracalentana	   notions	   of	   justice:	   ‘I	   have	   killed	   loads	   of	   people	   but	   only	   those	   who	  deserved	  it…	  people	  that	  lie,	  that	  pretend	  to	  be	  something	  they	  are	  not,	  that	  do	  not	  tell	  the	  truth.’	  The	  ground	  rules	  thus	  set	  –	  it	  was	  the	  only	  time	  I	  received	  something	  which	  could	  be	  read	  as	  a	  threat,	  expressed	  through	  words	  and	  location	  –	  and	  having	  once	  again	  explained	  the	  reasons	  for	  my	  presence	  and	  interest,	  Gómez	  turned	  to	  rapport.	  Diego	  would	  later	  tell	  me,	  himself	   relieved,	   that	   ‘it	   seemed	   like	  he	   took	  a	   liking’	   to	  me.	  The	   latter	  was	  perhaps	  also	  a	   result	  of	   some	  rather	  out-­‐of-­‐place	   statements	  of	  mine	   such	  as	  my	  response	   to	   the	  bluntly	   formulated	  question:	   ‘So,	  what	  do	  you	  want	   to	  know	  from	  me?’	  Born	  out	  of	  pure	  nervousness,	   I	   stated	   that	   ‘I	   obviously	   came	   to	   talk	   about	   football’	   provoking	   laughter	  amongst	  those	  Caballeros	  present.	  Upon	  saying	  goodbye,	  and	  adding	  to	  the	  surreal	  feeling	  that	   accompanies	   such	   encounters,	   I	   received	   a	   brotherly	   hug	   from	   this	   man	   whose	  portrait	  greets	  travelers	  entering	  Michoacán	  from	  most-­‐wanted	  billboards.	  He	  had	  already	  boarded	  his	  camioneta	  as	  he	  rolled	  down	  the	  window	  and	  shouted	  over	  something	  like:	  ‘I’ll	  talk	  about	  it	  with	  my	  jefe.	  We’ll	  get	  you	  an	  interview.	  Almost	  certainly.’	  For	  the	  time	  being,	  I	  seemed	  to	  have	  gained	  the	  right	  of	  permanence	  by	  those	  claiming,	  time	  and	  again	  during	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my	  fieldwork,	  to	  be	  ‘the	  government’	  and	  ‘the	  law’.	  Due	  to	  the	  latter’s	  protection	  –	  and	  its	  capacity	  to	  provide	  it	  –	  I	  should	  have,	  as	  is	  moreover	  left	  clear,	  felt	  at	  ease.	  As	  a	  necessary	  condition	   of	   my	   prolonged	   presence	   in	   the	   region,	   I	   had	   thus	   entered	   –	   albeit	   on	   a	  dramatically	   different	   level	   –	   the	   same	   protection	   racket	   extended	   to	   local	   society	   as	   a	  whole.	  
	  
Discussion	  of	  data	  and	  methodological	  adaptions	  	  
LCT	  as	  a	  source	  	  
Being	   able	   to	   gain	   and	   maintain	   access	   to	   Tierra	   Caliente	   opened	   up	   unexpected	  possibilities	   for	   gathering	   data	   more	   diverse	   and	   above	   all	   richer	   than	   I	   had	   deemed	  possible	   beforehand.	   To	   ‘consider	   the	   conditions	   of	   [the	   field]	   of	   study…	   to	   conduct	  effective	  research	  in	  a	  particular	  social	  setting’,	  as	  Burgess	  (1990:25)	  bluntly	  puts	  it,	  only	  truly	  became	  possible	  once	  I	  had	  already	  entered	  it.	  For	  one,	  I	  had	  gained	  unprecedented	  access	  to	  active	  members	  of	  one	  of	  Mexico’s	  principal	  criminal	  organizations,	  including	  its	  leaders.	   These	   interactions	   can	   be	   classified	   as	   open-­‐ended	   interviews,	   ‘friendly	  conversations’	   (Spradley,	  1979:56-­‐58)	  during	  which	  I	   introduced	  and	  alluded	  to	   items	  of	  interest	  while	  taking	  care	  not	  to	  overstep	  or	  disrespect	  my	  conversational	  partners	  in	  any	  way.	  During	  these,	  I	  was	  being	  interviewed	  as	  much	  as	  I	  was	  doing	  the	  interviewing.	  The	  questions	  I	  was	  being	  asked	  were,	  in	  this	  vein,	  as	  unveiling	  as	  the	  responses	  given	  to	  me.	  I	  engaged	   in	   a	   total	   of	   seven	   such	   prolonged	   conversations	   (one	   to	   two	   hours	   each)	  with	  active	   members	   of	   LCT:	   two	   with	   the	   group’s	   second-­‐in-­‐command,	   Servando	   Gómez	  Martínez;	  one	  with	  the	  group’s	  founder	  and	  leader,	  Nazario	  Moreno	  González;	  two	  with	  an	  individual	  known	  as	  El	  Inge	  (short	  for	  ‘El	  Ingeniero’,	  or	  ‘The	  Engineer’),	  situated	  just	  below	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the	   highest	   level	   of	   command	   and	   acting	   as	   a	   connecting	   element	   between	   Gómez	   and	  Moreno;	   and	   two	  with	  Tito	   (mentioned	  above).	  At	   least	   as	   rich	   and	  perhaps	   even	   richer	  than	   the	   conversations	   as	   such	   was	   the	   lead-­‐up	   to	   them,	   which	   allowed	   for	   periods	   of	  participant	  observation	  amongst	  members	  of	  the	  group	  and	  within	  areas	  of	  LCT’s	  territory	  to	   be	   considered	   ‘high	   security	   and	   dominance’,	   not	   least	   leading	   to	   interesting	   insights	  into	  the	  interplay	  between	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors	  (more	  on	  the	  compartmentalization	  of	  the	  local	  through	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors	  in	  Chapters	  4,	  5,	  and	  6).	  Furthermore,	  in	  the	  context	   of	   direct	   interactions	   with	   the	   group,	   I	   obtained	   –	   was	   handed,	   to	   be	   exact	   –	  publicly	   non-­‐available	   propaganda	   material	   authored	   by	   the	   group.	   These	   documents	  were,	  as	  mentioned	  before,	  of	  outstanding	  value	  for	  deciphering	  the	  group’s	  discourse	  (see	  Chapter	  5).	  	  	  	  	  Data	   obtained	   directly	   from	  members	   of	   LCT	  were,	   beyond	   any	   doubt,	   of	   great	   value	   as	  they	   offered	   exclusive	   insights	   into	   the	   workings	   of	   an	   illicit	   actor	   hitherto	   not	   studied	  from	  close-­‐up.	  Yet,	   these	  data	  and	  above	  all	   the	  conditions	  under	  which	   I	  obtained	   them	  raised	   important	   questions	   in	   terms	   of	   credibility.	   Why	   would	   an	   actor	   ideal-­‐typically	  adhering,	  as	  far	  as	  default	  scholarly	  sensemaking	  on	  organized	  crime	  goes,	  to	  an	  iron	  law	  of	  clandestinity	  tolerate	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  nosy	  outsider	  and	  agree	  to	  talk	  to	  me?	  Clues	  as	  to	  the	   resolution	   of	   the	   latter	   paradox	   were,	   once	   again,	   provided	   directly	   in	   the	   form	   of	  statements	  and	  comments	  made	  by	  LCT	  towards	  me.	  I	  believe	  that	  I	  successfully	  conveyed	  an	  image	  of	  an	  unthreatening	  and	  fundamentally	  naïve	  stranger	  with	  a	  genuine	  interest	  in	  looking	   behind	   the	   façade	   of,	   as	   stated	   above,	   one-­‐sided	   media	   as	   well	   as	   government	  representations	   (more	   on	   these	   binary	   representations	   in	   Chapter	   5).	   Openness	   in	  ‘impression	   management’,	   advocated	   by	   Sluka	   (1990)	   as	   a	   golden	   rule	   for	   research	   in	  ‘violent	  social	  contexts’,	  was	  conducive	  to	  mining	  data.	  Of	  greater	  importance,	  though,	  was	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its	   ethical	   component.	   Playing	  with	   ‘open	  an	  open	  deck’	  was	   an	  absolutely	   indispensible	  component	  of	  guaranteeing	  my	  own	  physical	  integrity,	  let	  alone	  that	  of	  those	  who	  vouched	  for	  me	  and	  with	  whom	  I	  became	  visibly	  associated	  during	  fieldwork.	  As	  was	  expressed	  not	  least	   in	   the	   warning	   by	   Gómez	   cited	   above,	   covert	   or	   ‘undercover’	   research,	   though	  employed	   by	   researchers	   on	   (organized)	   crime	   and	   deviance	   (e.g.	   Adler,	   1985;	   Scheper-­‐Hughes,	  2004),	  did	  here	  not	  present	  itself	  as	  a	  feasible	  option.	  Being	  straightforward	  about	  my	   objectives	   and	   my	   persona	   communicated	   in	   the	   above	   described	   fashion	   seems	  moreover	  to	  have	  invited	  LCT’s	  perception	  that	  I	  could	  serve	  to	  further	  the	  group’s	  goals.	  Journalists,	   for	   instance,	  had	  previously	  been	  employed	  as	  proxies	   to	   lend	   support	   to	   its	  self-­‐legitimizing	  discourse	  as	  a	  benevolent	  guardian	  of	  the	   local	  through	  the	   introduction	  of	  seemingly	  objective	  third-­‐party	  voices.	  One	  example	  here	  is	  a	  ‘reportage’	  diffused	  in	  the	  form	  of	  booklets,	   in	  which	  a	   local	   journalist	  describes	  how	  his	  doubts	   on	   the	  veracity	  of	  LCT’s	  claims	  are	  dissolved	  thanks	  to	  convincing	  personal	  encounters	  with	  members	  of	  the	  group.	  Similarly,	  Gómez	  –	   informant	  as	  well	  as	  gatekeeper	  with	  a	  rather	  clear	   interest	   in	  steering	  me	  in	  a	  certain	  direction	  (on	  this	  issue,	  see	  Hammersley/Atkinson,	  2007:51-­‐53)	  –	  repeatedly	   asked	   me	   ‘what	   I	   had	   found	   so	   far’	   and	   ‘how	   things	   appeared	   to	   me.’	   He	  moreover	  showed	  a	  keen	  interest	  in	  my	  potential	  media	  publications,	  asked	  me	  how	  long	  it	  would	   take	  me	   to	  publish	  and	  what	   type	  of	  media	  contacts	   I	  had	   (‘Do	  you	  have	  contacts	  with…	   what’s	   the	   name…	   the	   BBC?’).	   At	   least	   implicitly,	   I	   was	   offered	   access	   for	  propaganda	   –	   or,	   phrased	   differently,	   the	   role	   of	   an	   ‘active	   participant’	   beyond	   that	  acceptable	  for	  a	  researcher.24	  This	  was	  most	  clearly	  so	  when	  Gómez	  offered	  to	  take	  me	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  There	   are	   a	   number	   of	   scholars	   who	   have	   become	   involved	  more	   directly	   with	   the	   respective	   criminal	  groups	   they	   were	   conducting	   fieldwork	   on.	   Notably,	   Dennis	   Rodgers	   was	   initiated	   as	   a	   member	   of	   the	  Nicaraguan	  youth	  gang	  he	  was	  researching.	  Philippe	  Bourgois	  (1995)	  became	  so	  deeply	  embedded	  into	  the	  lives	  New	  York	  drug	  dealers	  he	  was	  researching	  that	  he	  walked	  a	  thin	  line	  not	  to	  become	  a	  direct	  asset	  in	  the	  commission	  of	  drug	  crimes.	  Nancy	  Scheper-­‐Hughes	  (2004)	  conducted	  undercover	  research	   in	  human	  and	   organ	   trafficking	   rings.	  While	   in	   those	   cases,	   such	   proximity	  might	   have	   been	   appropriate	   and	   even	  necessary,	  becoming	  an	  asset	  to	  a	  drug	  cartel	  appears	  as	  obviously	  off-­‐limits	  as	  well	  as	  highly	  dangerous	  to	  me.	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one	  of	  the	  group’s	  paramilitary	  style	  training	  grounds.	  I	  would	  be	  picked	  up	  by	  some	  of	  his	  men	   in	   Apatzingán,	   searched	   for	   tracking	   devices,	   provided	   with	   a	   new	   set	   of	   clothes,	  blindfolded,	  and	  taken	  up	  to	  el	  cerro	  (‘the	  hill’),	  i.e.	  LCT’s	  very	  core	  territory	  (see	  Chapters	  5	  and	  6).	  Here,	  Gómez	  said,	  I	  would	  spend	  the	  night	  and	  be	  provided	  with	  a	  show	  of	  force:	  ‘If	  you	  want,	  I’ll	  put	  a	  thousand	  in	  front	  of	  you	  so	  you	  see	  how	  fucking	  strong	  we	  are	  [sic].’	  However,	  this	  offer	  was	  a	  conditional	  one:	  ‘We	  ask	  for	  one	  thing	  only:	  if	  you	  like	  what	  you	  see,	   you	   publish;	   if	   you	   don’t	   like	   it,	   you	   don’t	   publish.’	   My	   response	   that	   I	   could	   not	  guarantee	  such	  a	  thing	  –	  I	  cite	  academic	  and	  ethical	  standards,	  but	  in	  the	  very	  instant	  I	  am	  also	  principally	  worried	  about	  getting	  caught	   in	  an	  uncontrollable	  dynamic	  –	   is	  met	  with	  comprehension	  (‘Sure,	  you	  have	  your	  own	  mind…’),	  but	  also	  means	  that	  the	  visit	  does	  not	  materialize.	  	  	  	  
	  
Triangulation	  	  
The	  true	  richness	  of	  the	  data	  thus	  (verbally)	  obtained	  lies	  in	  the	  different	  discursive	  levels	  they	   unveil	   as	   well	   as	   in	   the	   possibility	   to	   triangulate	   it.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   my	  conversational	  partners	  by	  and	  large	  try	  to	  present	  me	  with	  the	  group’s	  official	  discursive	  line.	   On	   the	   other,	   however,	   neither	   particular	   accounts	   in	   themselves	   nor	   accounts	  provided	  by	  different	  members,	  when	  cross-­‐compared,	  prove	  ‘waterproof’	  (consider	  here	  the	   related	   question	   of	   ‘whose	   meaning’	   is	   captured	   in	   interviews,	   posed	   by	   Seidman,	  2013:26-­‐30).	   Contradictions	   arise	   and	   allow	   for	   ‘data	   triangulation’	   (Denzin,	   1978).	  This	  specifically	   concerns	   the	   tension	   between	   front-­‐	   and	   backstage	   (see	   Goffman,	   1959),	  between	   ‘official’	   discourse	   and	   its	   more	   pragmatic	   translation	   into	   the	   everyday	   as	   an	  admitted	   effect	   of	   on-­‐the-­‐ground	   constraints.	   Being	   able	   to	   incorporate	   LCT’s	  perspective(s)	  supposes	  an	  important	  building	  block	  in	  my	  attempt	  to	  capture	  the	  group	  as	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a	   phenomenon/dominant	   actor	   suspended	   in	   the	   local	   ‘web	   of	   meaning’,	   as	   Geertz	  (1973:5)	   would	   have	   it.	   I	   generally	   subscribe	   to	   an	   interpretivist	   stance	   –	   a	   ‘search	   for	  meaning’	   rather	   than	   a	   positivist	   search	   for	   universal	   laws	   (ibid.)	   –	   that	   follows	   the	  ‘assumption	  of	  multiple	  constructed	  realities’	  (Lincoln/Guba,	  1985:295).	  Hence,	  I	  make	  no	  objective	   claims	   but	   focus,	   following	   the	   latter	   stance,	   on	   accessing	   the	   subjective	  experiences	  of	   those	  who	   inhabit,	   experience,	   and	   ‘make’	   the	  world.	  This	  appears	  all	   the	  more	   pertinent	   in	   light	   of	   a	   setting	   governed,	   as	   mentioned	   above,	   by	   uncertainty.	   The	  perceptions	  of	  those	  participants	  embedded	  in	  it,	   in	  this	  vein,	  do	  not	  amount	  to	  anything	  coming	  close	  to	  such	  a	  thing	  as	  a	  ‘uniform	  experience’	  that	  could	  underpin	  equally	  uniform	  constructs	   of	   sensemaking.	   In	   this	   context,	   Schutz’s	   (1964)	   observation	   that	   even	  participants	  in	  their	  own	  cultures	  do	  not	  always	  understand	  what	  they	  do	  and	  why	  they	  do	  it	  seems	  especially	  relevant.	  Even	  so,	  this	  does	  not	  exclude	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  production	  of	  a	  verisimilar	  account	  of	  the	  local	  state	  of	  affairs	  (see	  here	  also	  Hammersley,	  1992:43-­‐56	  for	  his	   concept	  of	  a	   ‘subtle	   realism’	   that	  allows	   for	   the	  notion	  of	   supra-­‐subjective	   ‘truth’,	  albeit	   in	  a	  non-­‐positivist	  sense).	  The	  absence	  of	  uniformity	  and	  the	  fragmented	  nature	  of	  experience	   and	   perception	   amount,	   in	   this	   sense,	   to	   an	   important	   and	   generalizable	  pattern	   in	   itself.	   Since	   my	   core	   exploratory	   interest	   ultimately	   lay	   on	   alternative	  governance,	  capturing	  the	  voices	  of	  those	  affected	  by	  its	  pursuit	  through	  LCT	  was	  crucial.	  This	  also	  helped	  to	  cross-­‐reference	  and	  thus	  scrutinize	  the	  statements	  given	  to	  me	  by	  LCT	  (see	  Chapters	  5	  and	  6).	  	  	  	  	  
	  
Local	  civilians	  as	  a	  source	  
My	   goal	   to	   provide	   a	   verisimilar	   account	   is	   fostered	   by	   the	   possibility	   to	   include	   LCT’s	  perspective(s)	  as	  an	  additional,	  unexpected	  layer	  of	   ‘truths’	  that	  can	  be	  triangulated	  with	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those	  held	  and	  voiced	  by	  local	  civilians.	  Along	  such	  lines,	  accounts	  of	  real-­‐life	  encounters	  and	  experiences	  provide	  an	  essential	  reflection	  on	  LCT’s	  attempt	  to	  impose	  its	  own	  ‘truth’,	  an	  exercise	  of	  positioning	  itself	  as	  an	  organic	  element	  within	  a	  reconstructed	  narrative	  of	  the	   local	   (Chapter	  5).	  The	   subjects	  of,	   and	  at	   the	   same	   time,	   evaluating	   social	   audiences,	  local	   civilians’	   accounts	   are	   part	   and	   parcel	   of	   deciphering	   the	   on-­‐the-­‐ground	  materialization	  of	  LCT’s	  project	  of	  alternative	  governance.	  Data	  gathered	  amongst	  civilian	  populations	  compose	  the	  bulk	  of	  the	  data	  collected.	  A	  rich	  source	  of	  information	  hitherto	  largely	   ignored	  –	  again,	  arguably	  an	  effect	  of	   the	  perceived	   impossibility	   to	  get	  close	  and	  the	   connected	  macro-­‐focus	   of	  most	   studies	   on	   organized	   crime,	   non-­‐state	   armed	   actors,	  and	   related	   matters	   of	   security	   –	   these	   are	   given	   considerable	   prominence	   in	   my	  elaborations.	  Reflecting	  their	  voices	  also	  contains	  a	  political	  aspect	  insofar	  as	  local	  civilian	  populations	   find	   themselves,	  many	   times	  quite	   literally	   so,	   in	   the	  crossfire	  between	  non-­‐state	  and	  state	  actors	  as	  well	  as	  the	  object	  of	  stigmatizing	  representations	  imposed	  by	  the	  outside	  world.	  My	  persona	  as	  a	  naïve,	  albeit	  empathetic	  outsider	  with	  a	  genuine	  interest	  in	  looking	   behind	   such	   much-­‐lamented	   accounts	   was,	   by	   and	   large,	   met	   with	   a	   principal	  openness	  to	  share	  their	  side	  of	  the	  story.	  Again,	  my	  out-­‐of-­‐place	  presence	  highly	  unusual	  for	  inhabitants	  of	  a	  region	  that	  sees	  little	  to	  no	  presence	  of	  foreigners	  –	  during	  the	  entire	  period	  spent	  in	  Tierra	  Caliente,	  I	  did	  not	  cross	  paths	  with	  another	  one	  –	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  an	  asset.	  Being	  German	  and	  thus	  from	  a	  country	  about	  which	  locals	  had	  little	  to	  no	  concrete	  information	  but	  which	  was	  positively	  connoted.	  This	  proved	  advantageous,	  especially	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  category	  of	  gringo,	  tainted	  not	  least	  as	  an	  effect	  of	  the	  ‘war	  on	  drugs’	  (see	  in	  this	  context	   Goldsmith’s	   elaborations	   on	   how	   what	   he	   calls	   the	   ‘gringo	   factor’	   affected	   his	  fieldwork	   in	   Colombia,	   2003:107-­‐109)	   and	   which	   I	   made	   efforts	   not	   to	   be	   put	   into.	  Moreover,	  as	  I	  had	  done	  in	  previous	  instances	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  country,	  I	  could	  play	  with	  the	   confusion	   stemming	   from	   my	   Northern-­‐European	   looks	   and	   the	   not-­‐so-­‐easily-­‐
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reconcilable	  command	  of	  Mexican	  Spanish	  and	  slang.	  Still,	  the	  usual	  stereotypes	  about	  my	  country	   of	   origin	   –	   football,	   cars,	   economic	   success,	   and	   a	   certain	  mentality	   –	   provided	  welcome	  icebreakers	  for	  conversations	  with	  civilians	  as	  well	  as	  members	  of	  LCT.	  El	  Inge,	  for	   instance,	   lamented	  Bayern	  Munich’s	   recent	  defeat	   in	   the	  Champions	  League	   final	  and	  was	  moreover	   proud	   to	   show	  off	   some	   items	   of	   ‘German	   engineering’	   in	   his	   possession.	  These	  include	  a	  9mm	  handgun,	  which	  he	  takes	  the	  bullets	  out	  of,	  hands	  to	  me,	  and	  praises	  its	   ‘reliability’:	   ‘It	  has	  served	  me	  well.’	  Engraved	  on	   the	  side	  of	   the	  barrel,	   I	   read	  Heckler	  und	  Koch	  GmbH.25	  	  
	  
Being	  around	  and	  participant	  observation	  	  	  
If	  ethnographic	  method	  boils	  down	  to	  the	  lowest	  common	  denominator	  of	  the	  researcher	  ‘participating…	   in	   people’s	   daily	   lives	   for	   an	   extended	   period	   of	   time,	   watching	   what	  happens,	  listening	  to	  what	  is	  said,	  and/or	  asking	  questions…	  collecting	  whatever	  data	  are	  available	   to	   throw	   light	   on	   the	   issues	   that	   are	   the	   emerging	   focus	   of	   the	   inquiry’	  (Hammersley/Atkinson,	  2007:3),	  it	  was	  the	  possibility	  for	  me	  to	  be	  around	  and	  partake	  in	  locals’	  daily	  lives	  that	  allowed	  my	  methodology	  to	  transcend	  the	  boundaries	  I	  had	  initially	  deemed	   realistic.	   This	   enabled	   a	   shift	   towards	   a	   more	   intense,	   embedded	   form	   of	  participant	   observation	   within	   the	   setting	   of	   core	   interest	   itself	   rather	   than	   sporadic	  encounters	  with	   informants	   outside	  of	   it.	   Being	   there	  meant,	   for	   one,	   becoming	   a	   casual	  observer	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  LCT’s	  presence	  manifested	  itself	  in	  the	  everyday.	  At	  times,	  even	  when	  I	  was	  trying	  to	  ‘take	  a	  night	  off’	  –	  as	  it	  turned	  out	  something	  utterly	  impossible	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Later	   in	   the	   conversation,	   he	  moreover	   praises	   the	  G36	   assault	   rifle,	   also	  manufactured	   by	  Heckler	   and	  Koch	  Ltd.	  The	  company,	  one	  of	  the	  world’s	  principal	  small	  arms	  manufacturers,	  has	  recently	  been	  accused	  of	   illegally	   trafficking	   arms	   to	   conflict	   areas	  officially	   embargoed	  by	   the	  German	   state,	   including	  parts	   of	  Mexico	  (see	  Knight,	  2014).	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when	  in	  the	  field	  –	  data	  seemed	  to	  miraculously	  find	  their	  way	  to	  me.	  Having	  a	  drink	  in	  a	  local	  bar,	  to	  cite	  one	  instance,	  members	  of	  LCT	  rushed	  in	  to	  hand	  out	  propaganda	  material.	  Being	   there	   moreover	   meant	   being	   able	   to	   gradually	   build	   up	   trust	   through	   normal	  everyday	   interactions	   such	   as	   shared	   dinners,	   grocery	   shopping,	   collectively	   cleaning	  houses,	   football	  matches,	   family	   celebrations,	   sharing	   a	   car	   during	   road	   trips,	   or	   simply	  hanging	   out.	   These	   interactions,	   emblematic	   for	   an	   ongoing	   methodological	   adaptation	  towards	   greater	   informality,	   paved	   the	   way	   for	   informants	   to	   open	   up,	   to	   unveil	   more	  sensitive	  details	  or	  for	  them	  to	  talk	  to	  me	  about	  items	  of	  interest	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  Much	  of	  the	  information	  was	  therefore	  not	  gathered	  during	  clearly	  delineated	  interview	  situations,	  but	   simply	   in	   the	   form	   of	   conversational	   fragments	   embedded	   in	   everyday	   interactions.	  One	  example	  is	  the	  afternoon	  I	  hung	  out	  with	  a	  group	  of	  women	  who	  were	  preparing	  Caldo	  
de	  Iguana	  (Iguana	  stew)	  for	  a	  larger	  party	  and	  our	  conversation	  shifts	  from	  food	  in	  general	  to	   meals	   handed	   out	   by	   LCT	   in	   local	   communities.	   Nevertheless,	   I	   also	   conducted	   and	  recorded	   a	   total	   of	   twenty-­‐one	   interviews.	   Some	   of	   these	   took	   the	   form	   of	   group	  discussions,	  with	  three	  to	  six	  people	  present.	  	  	  
	  	  
Representativeness	  	  
As	  I	  have	  underlined,	  the	  research	  upon	  which	  the	  present	  thesis	  is	  based	  took	  place	  in	  a	  severely	  understudied	  setting.	  Fundamentally,	  then,	  it	  is	  exploratory	  in	  nature	  and	  much	  of	  what	   I	   identify	   over	   the	   following	   pages	   are	   themes	   pointing	   to	   possibilities	   for	   future	  research.	   As	   already	   made	   clear	   in	   the	   introduction,	   by	   no	   means	   do	   I	   claim	   to	   have	  obtained	   and	   present	   such	   a	   thing	   as	   an	   ‘all-­‐encompassing’	   data	   set	   that	   could	   be	  considered	   representative	   for	   Tierra	   Caliente’s	   civilian	   population	   as	   a	   whole.	   First,	   the	  majority	   of	   my	   informants	   are	   to	   be	   considered	   ‘regular’	   dwellers	   from	   small	   rural	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communities	  and	  situated	  within	  a	  specific	  stratus	  of	  society	  where	  the	  precariousness	  of	  livelihoods	  is	  prevalent.	  This	  group	  is	  of	  special	  interest	  to	  the	  goals	  of	  this	  study	  as	  these	  communities	   coincide	   with	   the	   zones	   in	   which	   LCT’s	   control	   is	   highest,	   rendering	   their	  inhabitants	  immediate	  observers	  and/or	  direct	  recipients	  of	  the	  practices	  applied	  by	  LCT	  in	   this	   context.	   Second,	   the	   bulk	   of	   the	   communities	   in	   question	   are	   situated	   in	   the	  surroundings	  of	  Apatzingán.	  Inferences	  about	  realities	  in	  other	  parts	  of	  LCT’s	  territory	  are	  therefore	   not	   necessarily	   to	   be	   made.	   The	   more	   so	   as	   LCT	   is	   not	   to	   be	   considered	   a	  monolithic	  actor	  characterized	  by	  or	  capable	  of	  perfectly	  concerted	  action	  (see	  Chapter	  5).	  Third,	   and	   closely	   related	   to	   uncertainty	   as	   a	   factor	   underpinning	   the	   absence	   of	  uniformity	   in	   experience	   as	  mentioned	   above,	   I	   provide	   an	   interpretivist	  window	   into	   a	  particular	  and	  temporally	   limited	  arrangement	  of	  a	   fragment	  of	   local	  society	  and	  capture	  the	   subjective	   experiences	   of	   research	   informants.	   In	   this	   vein,	   my	   analysis	   ‘resists	   the	  connotation	  of	  timelessness	  commonly	  described	  as	  ‘’the	  ethnographic	  present’’…	  that	  has	  adversely	  haunted	   traditional	  ethnography…	   [and]	   in	  which	   ‘’the	  other’’	   is	   inscribed	   in	  a	  static,	   unchanging,	   and	   enduring	   imprint’	   (Madison,	   2011:11).	   Considering	   the	   constant	  state	  of	  flux	  characterizing	  social	  (dis)order	  in	  Tierra	  Caliente	  as	  well	  as	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  ‘global	  south’	  (a	  theme	  prominently	  surfacing	  throughout	  this	  thesis),	  this	  appears	  all	  the	  more	  relevant.	  Hence,	  I	  employ	  the	  terms	  ‘contemporary’	  and	  ‘state	  of	  affairs’	  to	  carry	  the	  notion	   of	   an	   ephemerality	   limited	   to	   the	   time	   of	   fieldwork.	   Arguably,	   then,	   ‘theoretical	  saturation’	   (Glaser/Strauss,	   1967)	   supposes	   a	   possibility	   only	   insofar	   as	   it	   is	  comprehended	  as	  constrained	  by	  such	  a	  temporal	  frame.	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Generalizability	  	  
The	   inevitably	   small	   sample	   sizes	   of	   ethnographic	   case	   studies	   such	   as	   the	   present	   one	  obviously	   renders	   generalizability	   in	   a	   statistical	   sense	   unfeasible	   (and	   perhaps	  undesirable;	   see	   LeCompte/Goetz,	   1982	   and	   Small,	   2009	   for	   syntheses	   of	   depth	   v	  width	  debate).	  What	  appears,	  in	  contrast,	  feasible	  and	  moreover	  gives	  value	  to	  ethnographic	  case	  studies	   beyond	   the	   description	   of	   particular	   empirical	   realities	   is	   the	   possibility	   for	  ‘theoretical	  generalization’	   (Mitchell,	  1983),	  or	  simply	   ‘theorizing’.	  Some	  subscribe	   to	   the	  view	   that	   ethnography’s	   raison	   d’être	   and	   the	   basis	   upon	   which	   to	   judge	   the	   merit	   of	  particular	   enterprises	   is	   the	   generation	   of	   formal	   theory	   (e.g.	   Athens,	   1984).	   I	  make	   no	  such	   ambitious	   claim.	   Yet,	   in	   a	   milder	   formulation,	   ethnography	   can	   be	   neither	   strictly	  ‘particularizing’	   nor	   strictly	   ‘generalizing’,	   neither	   solely	   ‘ideographic’	   nor	   solely	  ‘nomothetic’	   (see	   Brewer,	   2000:149).	   That	   is,	   even	   though	   each	   case	   is	   recognized	   as	  particular	  and	  unique,	  overarching	  dynamics	  and	  structures	  can	  and	  indeed	  must	  still	  be	  factored	  in	  so	  as	  to	  capture	  it	  as	  an	  ‘idiosyncratic	  combination	  of	  elements’	  (Mitchell,	  1983:	  188).	   Beyond	  merely	   ‘[examining]	   how	   the	   social	   situation	   is	   shaped	   by	   external	   forces’	  (Burawoy	  et	  al.,	  1991:	  6),	  the	  success	  of	  such	  an	  approach	  rests	  on	  the	  examination	  of	  how	  social	  situation	  and	  external	  forces	  interact	  to	  create	  something	  sui	  generis.	  Corresponding	  analyses,	   then,	   can	   speak	   to,	   help	   to	   refine,	   and	   stress-­‐test	   existing	   theory	   and	  conceptualizations.	   The	   present	   case	   therefore	   identifies	   deviations	   from	   default	  sensemaking	   on	   organized	   crime,	   questioning	   its	   pertinence.	   It	   moreover	   relates	   to	   an	  emerging	   literature	   on	   the	   reconfiguration	   of	   social	   (dis)order	   in	   the	   global	   south’s	  liquefied	  landscape	  of	  governance	  and	  sovereignty	  and	  the	  role	  of	  non-­‐state	  armed	  actors	  herein,	  adding	  nuance,	  new	  aspects,	  and	  above	  all	  depth	  to	  questions	  thus	  far	  insufficiently	  explored.	  Crucially,	  as	  I	  show,	  while	  the	  structures	  and	  dynamics	  identified	  in	  such	  a	  body	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of	  thought	  surface	  prominently	  in	  LCT’s	  conduct	  within	  the	  local,	  they	  do	  so	  in	  unexpected	  and	   seemingly	   paradoxical	   ways	   that	   question	   an	   array	   of	   largely	   taken-­‐for-­‐granted	  assumptions	  concerning	   law,	  order,	  and	  not	   least	  state-­‐organized	  crime-­‐interactions	  (see	  Chapter	  6	  for	  a	  more	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  this	  thesis’	  contribution).	  	  	  
	  
Gatekeeper	  centrality	  	  
Gaining	  access	  (to	  data)	  in	  the	  fashion	  outlined	  above	  would	  have	  been	  impossible	  without	  the	  prominent	  role	  my	  gatekeeper	  occupied	  and	  moreover	  proactively	  assumed	  during	  my	  fieldwork	   in	   Tierra	   Caliente.	   Here,	   just	   as	   in	   criminological	   fieldwork	   in	   general,	   the	  gatekeeper	  occupies	   the	  position	  of	  sine-­‐qua-­‐non	  hero	  of	  access	  (see	   Jacobs,	  2006:163).	   I	  consider	  the	  excellent	  personal	  ‘chemistry’	  between	  us	  key	  in	  this	  context.	  He	  provided	  me	  with	  an	  array	  of	  initial	  contacts,	  introduced	  me	  to	  basic	  behavioral	  rules,	  and	  supported	  me	  in	   assessing	   risks	   and	   the	   trustworthiness	   of	   potential	   informants.	   Furthermore,	   he	  provided	  direct	  logistical	  support,	  driving	  me	  to	  rural	  communities	  as	  well	  as	  other	  places	  and	   thereby	   rendering	   my	   movements	   possible	   in	   the	   first	   place.	   Fundamental	   to	   this	  exceptional	  support	  was,	  as	  already	  pointed	  out,	  that	  he	  principally	  welcomed	  my	  interest	  in	  building	  up	  a	  first-­‐hand	  understanding	  of	  the	  conditions	  governing	  local	  civilians’	  lives,	  the	   improvement	  of	  which	   supposed	  both	  a	   life-­‐long	  passion	  of	  his	   as	  well	   as	   the	   stated	  
raison	  d’être	  of	  the	  organization	  headed	  by	  him.	  The	  work	  of	  this	  organization,	  left-­‐leaning	  to	   revolutionary	   in	   political	   orientation,	   consisted	   in	   channeling	   financial	   support	   into	  micro-­‐development	   projects	   and	   in	   representing	   the	   interests	   of	   dwellers	   of	   rural	  communities	  towards	  the	  outside	  world,	  foremost	  state	  bureaucracies.	  Diego	  in	  particular,	  as	  civilians	  I	  interacted	  with	  stressed	  time	  and	  again,	  enjoyed	  significant	  popularity	  due	  to	  his	   and	   his	   organization’s	   positively	   connoted	   role.	   This	   standing,	   in	   turn,	   rendered	   his	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vouching	  for	  my	  integrity	  effective	  and	  my	  accounting	  for	  my	  presence	  credible	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  locals.	  	  	  His	  capacity	  to	  confer	  trust	  on	  to	  me	  opened	  doors.	  During	  the	  initial	  phase	  of	  my	  stay	  in	  Tierra	  Caliente,	  he	  moreover	  provided	  me	  with	  a	  blueprint	  of	  sorts	  for	  how	  to	  pertinently	  introduce	  my	   own	   persona	   and	   research	   goals.	  Many	   informants	   that	   ultimately	   shared	  their	   experience	  with	  me	  would,	   I	   am	   certain,	   not	   have	   done	   so	  without	   his	  mediation.	  Reflecting	  potential	  consequences	  imposed	  by	  LCT	  upon	  for	  ‘those	  who	  talk’	  (see	  Chapter	  4),	  an	  array	  of	  informants	  stated	  that	  they	  ‘talked	  about	  such	  things	  with	  nobody’,	  making	  our	  conversation	  the	  first	   time	  they	  did.	  A	  testimony	  to	  his	  centrality	   in	  vouching	  for	  me	  and	   thus	   enabling	   access	   to	   locals’	   accounts	   came	   as	   I	   abandoned	   the	   incipient	  conversation	  he	  and	  I	  had	  with	  an	  informant	  out	  on	  his	  porch	  to	  go	  inside	  to	  fetch	  drinks.	  Unintentionally,	  I	  had	  left	  the	  voice	  recorder	  running.26	  Listening	  to	  it	  later,	  I	  heard	  how	  as	  soon	  as	  I	  was	  out	  of	  range,	  the	  informant	  asked	  in	  a	  hush	  and	  preoccupied	  voice:	  ‘But	  my	  name	  is	  not	  going	  to	  get	  out,	  right?’	  My	  gatekeeper	  soothed	  her:	  	  
‘No,	  of	  course	  not…	  this	   is	  not	   for	  a	  newspaper	  or	  anything	   like	   that…	   it’s	  just	   for	   documenting…	   and	   he	   comes	   from	   Germany,	   from	   Europe…	   the	  people	  there	  have	  erroneous	  ideas	  about	  what’s	  happening…	  even	  in	  el	  DF	  [The	   Federal	   District,	   i.e.	   Mexico	   City]	   when	   you	   say	   that	   you’re	   from	  Michoacán	  or	  even	  that	  you’re	  from	  Apatzingán	  they	  look	  at	  you	  like…	  bad	  bad...	   that	   we	   all	   are	   Templars,	   that	   we’re	   all	   assassins,	   that	   we	   all	   cut	  heads…’	  	  	  	  As	  I	  rejoined	  the	  conversation,	  Diego	  filled	  me	  in	  on	  what	  he	  had	  told	  the	  informant	  and	  I	  added	   to	   the	  concert.	  The	   informant,	  apparently	  gaining	  confidence	   in	  my	  presence,	   told	  me	  ‘yes,	  and	  how	  good	  that	  you	  came	  here	  with	  him…	  the	  people	  here	  appreciate	  him	  a	  lot,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that,	  apart	  from	  this	  methodological	  vignette,	  other	  data	  was	  neither	  obtained	  nor	  used	  in	  
this	  way.	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he	  helps	  them	  so	  much…’	  The	  same	  function	  became	  apparent	  in	  interactions	  with	  ellos.	  He	  countered,	  for	  instance,	  Tito’s	  doubt	  that	  I	  might	  be	  an	  informant	  of	  some	  sort:	  ‘Nooo,	  but	  why	  do	  you	   think	   that,	  Tito?	  He’s	  not	  an	  oreja…	  otherwise	  we	  wouldn’t	  have	  him	   in	  our	  house…’	  	  	  My	  being	  granted	  tolerance	  by	  LCT	  seems	  to	  have	  moreover	  been	  rooted	  in	  an	  interest	  on	  the	   group’s	   part	   to	   coopt	   or,	   at	   least,	   not	   to	   antagonize	   Diego	   and	   his	   organization,	  equipped	  with	  a	  considerable	  social	  base	  and	  influence	  on	  locals’	  opinions,	  against	  it	  (see	  also	   Chapter	   5).	   During	   our	   encounters,	   LCT’s	   leaders	   not	   only	   invoked	   an	   ideological	  congruence	  between	  both	  organizations,	  but	  moreover	  expressed	  that	  they	  ‘normally	  don’t	  do	  this	  [meeting	  outsiders	  such	  as	  myself]’.	  His	  standing	  seemed	  to	  have	  provided	  him,	  and	  in	  extension	  me,	  with	  a	  degree	  of	  protection	  from	  LCT.	  Diego	  himself	  speculated	  ‘if	  they	  kill	  me,	  my	  people	  will	  turn	  on	  them’.	  This	  bluntness	  moreover	  played	  out	  in	  interesting,	  albeit	  not	   entirely	   unproblematic	   ways	   for	   bearing	   potential	   risks,	   in	   conversations	   with	  members	  of	  LCT,	  during	  some	  of	  which	  Diego	  was	  present.	  At	  times,	  this	  resembled	  a	  ‘good	  cop	  bad	  cop’	  dynamic:	  whilst	  I	  stuck	  to	  my	  role	  as	  a	  respectful	  outsider	  interested	  in	  their	  side	  of	  the	  story	  and	  only	  subtly	  referring	  to	  contradictions,	  Diego	  was	  straightforward	  in	  his	  critique	  and	  even	  outright	  aggressive	  in	  calling	  LCT	  on	  its	  hypocrisy	  (see	  Chapter	  6	  for	  a	  corresponding	  interaction	  with	  Moreno).	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Dealing	  with	  risks	  known	  and	  unknown	  	  
Risk	   necessarily	   forms	   part	   of	   research	   in	   settings	   such	   as	   the	   one	   I	   conducted	   my	  fieldwork	   in.27	  Most	  pressing	  –	  and	  treated	  as	  such	   in	   the	  still	   relatively	  scarce	   literature	  explicitly	   addressing	   corresponding	   matters	   –	   appear	   ‘human	   hazards’.	   Howell	   (1990)	  hereby	  connotes	  physical	  risks.	  Though	  a	  factor	  in	  on-­‐the-­‐ground	  criminological	  research	  in	   general	   (see	   Jacobs,	   2006),	   they	   appear	   especially	   acute	   in	   what	   Belousov	   et	   al.	  (2007:159,	   drawing	   on	   Giddens,	   1985)	   refer	   to	   as	   ‘frontier	   zones’,	   i.e.	   ‘geographical	  [locations]	  within	  a	  strife-­‐ridden	  setting	  typical	  of	  a	  post-­‐colonial,	  transitional	  or	  otherwise	  criminalized	  state...	  [with	  a]	  prevalence of violence and the relative weakness of police and 
other state institutions’ (see also Goldsmith,	  2002). So as to minimize them, the challenge 
becomes to anticipate risks and identify their sources as best possible. As already mentioned, 
my own ‘impression management’ was key to my own integrity as well as that of those who 
might have, had I overstepped, become subjects of acts of repression by LCT. Moreover, and 
also part of securing	   their	   trust,	   in	   interacting	   with	   informants	   I	   stuck	   to	   a	   ‘security	  protocol’	   which	   I	   had	   detailed	   as	   part	   of	   the	   process	   of	   obtaining	   informed	   consent	   by	  informants.	   Initially,	   I	   presented	   interview	   partners	   with	   sheets	   on	   which	   I	   had	   listed	  corresponding	   measures	   (based	   on	   recommendations	   by	   the	   UK	   Data	   Archive28).	   Even	  though	  I	  ceased	  to	  use	  the	  latter	  as	  my	  methodology	  shifted	  towards	  greater	  informality	  –	  informants	  moreover	   showed	   little	   to	   no	   interest	   in	   the	   prints	   but	   rather	   on	  my	   verbal	  explications	  –	  I	  strictly	  adhered	  to	  these	  measures.	  Most	  important	  amongst	  the	  latter,	  the	  non-­‐disclosure	  of	  informants’	  identities	  through	  anonymization	  or	  omission	  of	  real	  names,	  geographical	   locations,	  as	  well	  as	  other	  relational	  data	  such	  as	   the	  names	  of	  members	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Notwithstanding,	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  cases	  where	  potential	  risks	  actually	  materialized	  into	  bodily	  harm	  or	  even	  death	  are	  extremely	  rare	  (see	  Jacobs,	  2006:157-­‐158;	  Rawlinson,	  2008).	  A	  notable	  exception	  is	  the	  research	  conducted	  by	  Belousov	  et	  al.	  (2007)	  in	  Russia,	  during	  which	  a	  gatekeeper	  was	  killed.	  	  28	  Available	   under:	   http://www.data-­‐archive.ac.uk/create-­‐manage/consent-­‐ethics/anonymisation?index=2	   ,	  last	  accessed	  3	  January	  2015.	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LCT	  with	  whom	  informants	  had	  interacted	  or	  certain	  compromising	  details	  of	  the	  settings	  these	   interactions	   had	   taken	   place	   in	   or	   the	   interactions	   themselves.	   These	   steps	   were	  applied	   to	   both	   written	   material	   generated	   in	   the	   field	   (fieldwork	   diary,	   e.g.)	   and	   texts	  generated	  later	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  data	  obtained	  (i.e.	  this	  thesis).	  	  	  A	   further	   risk	   stemmed	   from	   getting	   caught	   in	   crossfire	   during	   a	   possible	   confrontation	  between	  LCT	  and	  one	  of	  its	  enemy	  groups,	  including	  federal	  agencies	  present	  in	  the	  region.	  Though	   I	   never	   witnessed	   violent	   encounters,	   they	   would	   sporadically	   break	   out	  unannounced	  in	  parts	  of	  Tierra	  Caliente.	  In	  a	  few	  instances,	  rumors	  of	  imminent	  attacks	  by	  state	  actors	  grew	  strong	  enough	   to	  prompt	  my	   ‘withdrawal’	   to	   safer	   locations	  outside	  of	  the	  region	  (to	  Morelia	  and	  Mexico-­‐City,	  for	  instance).	  This	  also	  followed	  the	  advice	  of	  one	  of	  the	  academics	  involved	  in	  overseeing	  my	  project	  at	  my	  home	  institution	  to	  sporadically	  introduce	   physical	   distance	   to	   the	   field	   so	   as	   not	   to	   become	   overly	   complacent	   and	  inattentive	   to	   risk.	   Furthermore,	   albeit	   ultimately	   of	   limited	   effectiveness,	   when	  undertaking	  excursions	   into	  Apatzingán’s	   rural	   surroundings	   to	  meet	  members	  of	  LCT,	   I	  would	  ask	  a	  close	  friend	  to	  place	  a	  call	  to	  local	  contacts	  in	  case	  I	  failed	  to	  report	  back	  by	  a	  specific	  deadline.	   In	   spite	  of	   these	  measures	   to	  deal	  with	   identifiable	   sources	  of	   risk,	   the	  main	   issue	   stems	   from	   the	   fact	   that	   in	   such	   settings,	   as	   Campbell	   (2009:13)	   writes	   in	  reference	  to	  the	  Ciudad	  Juárez-­‐El	  Paso	  border	  region,	  ‘no	  one	  has	  all	  the	  information’.	  Nor	  is	  there	  anybody,	  for	  that	  matter,	  with	  de	  facto	  control	  over	  all	  processes	  and	  events.	  That	  entering	  territories	  such	  as	  Tierra	  Caliente	  exposes	  researchers	  to	  a	  certain	  isolation	  and	  powerlessness	  (see	  Sampson/Thomas,	  2003)	  then	  it	  becomes	  more	  than	  just	  a	  function	  of	  the	   effective	   dysfunctionality	   of	   official	   law.	  As	   stated	   above,	   its	   non-­‐state	   alternative	   as	  represented	   and	   claimed	   by	   LCT’s	   leaders	   had	   promised	   me	   protection.	   Yet,	   even	   they	  admittedly	   exercised	   limited	   control	   over	   their	   own	   members	   and	   moreover	   headed	   a	  
	  	   103	  
group	   characterized	   by	   internal	   diversity	   (in	   action).	   Hence,	   I	   could	   neither	   necessarily	  take	   for	   granted	   that	   the	   decision	   to	   tolerate	   my	   presence	   had	   effectively	   been	  communicated	  throughout	  all	  the	  organization's	  layers	  nor	  that	  it	  would	  be	  welcomed	  by	  all	  segments	  and	  members.	  To	  a	  certain	  extent,	  my	  integrity	  depended	  on	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  LCT’s	  (internal)	  criminal	  governance.	  The	  volatility	  and	  principal	  uncertainty	  of	  Tierra	  Caliente	  as	  the	  research	  setting	  moreover	  meant	  that	  I	  chose	  not	  to	  follow	  up	  certain	  leads.	  I	   declined,	   for	   instance,	   an	   offer	   to	   visit	   a	   methamphetamine	   laboratory	   and	   thus	   a	  different	  and	   literal	  kind	  of	  volatile	  environment.	  None	  of	  my	  trusted	  contacts	  possessed	  information	  sufficient	  to	  at	  least	  partly	  evaluate	  the	  risk	  involved.	  	  
Apart	   from	   physical	   risks,	   another	   source	   to	   be	   factored	   in	   consisted	   in	   potential	   legal	  repercussions.	   After	   all,	   I	   became	   privy	   to	   data	   officially	   of	   high	   relevance	   for	   ‘national	  security’	  such	  as	  ways	  to	  locate	  designated	  ‘enemies	  of	  the	  state’.	  Leading	  members	  of	  LCT	  I	   interacted	   with	   were	   included	   in	   both	   the	   Mexican	   and	   the	   US-­‐American	   states’	   most	  wanted/	   kingpin	   lists,	  with	   hefty	   sums	  written	   out	   as	   rewards.	  Moreover,	   as	  Hobbs	   has	  argued	   (1988:Chapter	   1),	   anyone	   conducting	   on-­‐the-­‐ground	   criminological	   research	   and	  who	  establishes	  a	  certain	  proximity	  with	  active	  criminal	  necessarily	  becomes	  an	  accessory	  to	   the	  commission	  of	   crimes	  and	  could	  very	  well	   face	   legal	   consequences.	  Hence,	   I	   could	  not	  exclude	  the	  possibility	  of	  attracting	  unwanted	  attention	  by	  state	  actors.	  No	  such	  thing	  happened,	   and	   perhaps	   the	   responsible	   authorities	   simply	   did	   not	   notice	   my	   presence.	  Furthermore,	   I	   was	   by	   no	   means	   the	   only	   person	   in	   possession	   of	   such	   information.	  Arguably,	  a	  lack	  in	  intelligence	  did	  not	  suppose,	  as	  of	  the	  time	  of	  fieldwork,	  the	  major	  and	  perhaps	   not	   even	   a	   factor	   for	   LCT’s	   leaders’	   continued	   liberty	   (see	   in	   this	   context	   my	  discussion	   of	   state-­‐organized	   crime-­‐interactions	   beyond	   the	   licit-­‐illicit-­‐divide	   in	   Chapter	  6).	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Chapter	  4:	  Revisiting	  the	  history	  of	  Michoacán	  organized	  crime	  	  
What	  rises	  falls	  from	  its	  own	  weight	  
Paranoia	  is	  part	  and	  parcel	  of	  everyday	  life	  in	  Michoacán.	  A	  meeting	  I	  had	  arranged	  with	  a	  journalist	  from	  a	  national	  news	  magazine	  who	  has	  promised	  a	  chat	  was	  a	  casualty	  of	  this	  ever-­‐present	   feeling	  of	  suspicion.	  Postponed	  and	  ultimately	  to	  be	  cancelled	  three	  times,	   I	  made	   my	   way	   out	   of	   Morelia’s	   center	   and	   into	   the	   anonymous,	   concrete-­‐dominated	  outskirts.	  With	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  shops	  abandoned,	  the	  Starbucks	  clone	  I	  took	  a	  seat	  in	  front	  of	  is	  all	  that	  is	  left	  to	  remind	  one	  of	  the	  largely	  futile	  attempts	  to	  attract	  the	  affluent	  and	  have	  them	   abandon	   their	   SUVs	   and	   dig	   into	   fast	   food	   and	   American	   apparel.	   The	   choice	   of	  location,	  in	  its	  desolation	  predestined	  to	  be	  a	  postmodern	  urban	  Westerner	  to	  be	  shot	  at,	  was	  no	  coincidence.	  Fashionably	   late,	   the	   journalist	   first	  asked	  me	  to	  switch	  places	  as	  he	  preferred	  not	  to	  turn	  his	  back	  to	  the	  street.	  As	  he	  made	  clear	  in	  a	  low	  voice,	  ‘in	  this	  city	  you	  never	   know	  who’s	  watching’.	   Just	   as	   paranoia	   –	   a	   perhaps	   impertinent	   and	   even	   unfair	  assessment	   that	   nevertheless	   was	   all	   I	   got	   to	   grasp	   as	   the	   fear	   ellos	   inspire	   in	   locals	  remains	  largely	  impalpable,	  abstract	  to	  me,	  at	  least	  outside	  of	  Tierra	  Caliente	  –	  shaped	  the	  conditions	  of	  our	  first	  encounter,	  it	  had	  left	  marks	  on	  his	  face.	  I	  caught	  myself	  reading	  the	  sweat	   that	   pours	   out	   of	   the	   oversized	   pores	   bedecking	   his	   red-­‐swollen	   nose	   as	  confirmation	   of	   what	   it	   means	   to	   be	   a	   journalist	   in	   Michoacán	   and	   having	   to	   juggle	  pressures	   even	   greater	   than	   those	   of	   a	   profession	   notoriously	   precarious	   at	   the	   best	   of	  times.	   Confirmation	   too	   for	   the	   rumors	   I	   harvested	   as	   I	   carefully	   dropped	   his	   name	   in	  conversations	  with	  trusted	  informants.	  These	  depicted	  him	  as	  a	  somewhat	  shady	  character	  I	  should	  be	  wary	  of	  as	  he	  was	  said	  to	  reconcile	  the	  stress	  of	  serving	  two	  masters	  –	  his	  own	  editorial	  office	  was	  said	  to	  ‘watch’	  him	  due	  to	  suspected	  ties	  to	  ellos	  –	  through	  alcohol	  and	  cocaine.	   Anything	   embedded	   in	   a	   comparable	   setting,	   it	   seemed,	   cannot	   be	   free	   of	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permeation	   and	   adaption.	   As	   (Western)	   ideals	   hit	   (or	   are	   hit	   by)	   the	   everyday	   –	   or	   the	  street-­‐level,	  as	  Lipsky	  (1980)	  phrased	  it	  to	  underline	  the	  incongruence	  between	  projected	  and	  de	  facto	  performances	  of	  bureaucrats	  –	  deviation	  inevitably	  follows	  and	  is	  arguably	  the	  price	  of	  functionality,	  however	  distorted,	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  What	  remains	  stubbornly	  rigid	  incurs	  the	  risk	  of	  fracturing	  or	  even	  ceasing	  to	  exist	  altogether.	  This	  concerns	  professions	  as	  much	   as	   (nominally	   democratic)	   institutions,	   a	   theme	   that	   becomes	  prominent	   in	  my	  discussion	  of	  state-­‐organized	  crime-­‐interactions	  in	  Chapter	  6.	  For	  the	  time	  being,	  suffice	  it	  to	   note	   that	   blundering	   into	   the	   reality	   –	   or	   what	   the	   powers	   that	   be,	   hidden	   behind	   a	  façade	  of	  administrative	  respectability	  and	  those	  complying	  with	  the	  stereotypical	  label	  of	  illegality	  alike,	  might	  perceive	  as	   such	  –	   in	   inquiry	  and	  reporting	  has	  been	  known	   to	  cut	  careers	  and	  lives	  short.	  	  
Propelled	   in	   whichever	   way,	   his	   success	   in	   frequently	   being	   the	   first	   to	   arrive	   at	   fresh	  crime	   scenes	   and	   thus	   being	   able	   to	   feed	   nota	   roja	   (‘red	   item’)	   newspapers	   with	   those	  images	   that	   lend	   them	   their	   designation	   and	   popularity	   informs	   the	   101	   of	  Michoacán’s	  recent	  narcohistory	  I	  receive	  on	  the	  exhaustion	  of	  small	  talk.	  As	  he	  hastily	  filled	  me	  in	  on	  actors	   and	   events,	   he	   rushed	   through	   an	   extensive	   photographic	   collection	   of	   disfigured	  torsos	  and	  body	  parts,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  typical	  messages	  perpetrators	  adorn	  them	  with.	  It	  was	  not	   only	   these	  narcomensajes,	   or	   narco-­‐messages,	   that	   provided	   a	   text	   beyond	   the	   deed	  itself,	  contextualize	  it,	  and	  frequently	  seek	  to	  explain	  –	  if	  not	  justify.	  (More	  on	  the	  spectacle	  of	   violence	   and	   its	   specificities	   in	   the	   present	   case	   below).	   Competition	   amongst	  participants	   is,	  so	  much	  is	  clear,	  by	  no	  means	  limited	  to	  physical	  encounters.	  The	  field	  of	  contention	   is	   in	   many	   ways	   also	   a	   symbolic	   one.	   The	   degree	   to	   which	   its	   semantics	  transcend	  the	  confines	  of	  such	  a	  thing	  as	  an	  illegal	  market	  to	  interact	  with	  and	  indeed	  push	  into	   all	   spheres	   of	   society	   testifies	   to	   the	   career	   of	   el	   narco	   as	   a	   phenomenon	   ever-­‐
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mutating.	   To	   the	   outside	  world,	  most	   of	   this	  meaning	   is	   lost	   as	   selected	   images	   become	  channeled	   into	   and	   blurred	   to	   indistinction	   in	   the	   sea	   of	   violent	   imagery	   that	   provides	  reporting	  on	  (and	  imaginations	  of)	  Mexico’s	  ‘drug-­‐fueled	  conflict’	  with	  its	  visual	  backdrop.	  	  	  
	  Image	  4.1:	  Murder	  as	  text	  in	  El	  Aguaje,	  Tierra	  Caliente,	  Michoacán,	  2009.	  	  Courtesy	  of	  anonymized	  source.	  	  	  	  The	  2009	  scene	  depicted	  in	  Image	  4.1	  and	  photographed	  by	  the	  above	  journalist	  contains	  the	   staging	   elements	   typical	   of	   Mexico’s	   recent	   hyperviolence.	   The	   severed	   head,	   a	  symptom	  of	  an	  escalation	  that	  has	  seen	  the	  practice	  of	  decapitation	  and	  the	  display	  of	  its	  results	  becoming	  standardized	  since	  2006;	  not	  least	  so	  in	  Michoacán	  (see	  Arteaga	  Botello,	  2009).	  The	  message	  is	  a	  warning	  to	  competitors	  and	  those	  daring	  to	  collaborate	  with	  them,	  roughly	  translatable	  as	  ‘To	  the	  informants	  and	  snitches	  that	  betray	  La	  Familia.	  Bye	  dude’.	  The	   scene’s	   composition,	   with	   the	   head	   suspended	   by	   a	   pierced	   ear,	   designating	   the	  victim’s	  culpability	  as	  an	  oreja,	  i.e.	  the	  same	  function	  as	  an	  ‘ear’	  for	  the	  hostile	  entities	  Tito	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had	  indicated	  I	  could	  have	  been	  mistaken	  for	  (see	  Chapter	  3).	  It	  was	  no	  coincidence,	  either,	  that	   the	   head	   was	   hung	   from	   a	   cross,	   originally	   erected	   by	   family	   members	   to	  commemorate	  the	  abduction	  and	  killing	  of	  an	  individual	  in	  2006	  who	  had,	   just	   like	  those	  dumped	  here	  after	  him,	  chosen	  the	  wrong	  side.	  	  	  However,	  to	  the	  group	  of	  five	  apatzingenses	  I	  shared	  this	  image	  with	  one	  afternoon	  in	  April	  2012,	  it	  speaks	  of	  far	  more	  than	  just	  an	  assertion	  of	  power	  of	  one	  faction	  of	  participants	  in	  the	   field	  of	  organized	   crime	  over	  another.	   So	  do	   their	   remarks	  which	  unveil	   a	   contrast	   I	  struggled	  to	  reconcile.	  This	  and	  similar	  scenes,	  that	  is,	  appeared	  far	  more	  personal	  to	  them	  than	   to	   an	   outside	   observer.	   Events	   are	   rendered	   palpable	   as	   protagonists,	   victims	   and	  perpetrators	  alike	  are	  referred	  to	  by	  their	  first	  names	  and	  past	  interactions	  with	  them	  or	  their	  family	  members	  resuscitated.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  however,	  they	  seemed	  detached	  and	  even	  bereft	  of	  the	  terror	  that	  coated	  me	  as	  I	  gazed	  at	  such	  scenes	  this	  time	  and	  many	  more	  in	   the	   future.	  Casually	  expressed	  with	  a	   sarcastic-­‐humoristic	  undertone,	  being	  murdered	  becomes	  morir	  de	  causas	  naturales	  (‘dying	  by	  natural	  causes’)	  and	  disappearing	  to	  be	  later	  found	   assassinated	   amanecer	   muerto	   (‘waking	   up	   dead’).	   As	   one	   of	   my	   informants,	   a	  woman	  of	  about	  fifty	  years	  of	  age,	  summarized:	  
‘Recently,	  we	  were	   talking	  about	   this	  and	  we	  were	  saying…	  how	  sad	   it	  was	  that	  we	  were	  now	  seeing	  these	  things	  as	  part	  of	  everyday	  life…	  that	  we	  were	  seeing	  them	  as	  normal	  to	  a	  certain	  degree…	  ten	  heads…	  and	  we	  would	  look	  at	  the	  newspapers	  and	  ‘’ah,	  so	  many	  dead	  then’’	  [she	  shrugged	  to	  demonstrate	  a	  reaction	   of	   indifference]…	   so	   we	   have	   simply	   gotten	   used	   to	   these	   things	  happening.’	  	  	  The	   constitution	   of	   these	   extreme	   expressions	   of	   violence	   as	   a	   normalized	   and	   even	  banalized	   fixture	   of	   the	   everyday	   life	   she	   lamented	   is	   perhaps	   inevitable.	   Yet,	   she	   also	  suggested	  that	  this	  represented	  a	  relatively	  recent	  adaption.	  Nowhere	  perhaps	  –	  albeit	  far	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from	  here	  –	  does	  this	  find	  a	  more	  palpable	  expression	  than	  in	  El	  Aguaje,	  situated	  half	  way	  between	   Apatzingán	   and	   Aguililla	   and	   thus	   between	   two	   of	   Tierra	   Caliente’s	   localities	  traditionally	   associated	  with	   narcotrafficking.	   It	  moreover	   lies	   in	   direct	   proximity	   to	   the	  equally	  infamous	  black	  cross	  depicted	  in	  the	  photograph	  above.	  Locals	  depict	  El	  Aguaje	  as	  something	   akin	   to	   ground	   zero.	   And	   indeed,	   the	   narrations	   underpinning	   this	   label	   felt	  palpable	   as,	   a	   few	   days	   after	   the	   abovementioned	   conversation,	   my	   gatekeeper	   and	   I	  entered	   the	   locality	   at	   dusk.	   Its	   streets	   were	   endowed	   with	   a	   mysterious	   aura	   from	   a	  golden	  light	  further	  intensified	  as	  its	  rays	  catch	  the	  dust	  swirled	  up	  by	  a	  light	  breeze	  that	  did	  little	  to	  alleviate	  the	  relentless	  heat.	  The	  buildings	  that	  flank	  the	  main	  street	  appeared	  oddly	  out	  of	  place.	  The	  more	  so	  as	  all	  we	  observed	  from	  the	  overland	  road	  leading	  into	  El	  Aguaje	  were	  precarious	  shacks.	  Here,	  in	  contrast,	  we	  came	  across	  estates.	  Their	  nine-­‐feet-­‐high	  walls,	  painted	  in	  yellow	  and	  green,	  occupy	  long	  stretches	  of	  the	  street	  and	  hide	  lush	  gardens	   and	   swimming	   pools.	   Judging,	   moreover,	   from	   the	   security	   cameras	   observing	  events	  on	  both	   sides	  of	   the	   entrance	  doors,	   they	   aspire	   to	  be	   fortresses	   rather	   than	   just	  luxurious	  habitations.	  Ultimately,	   though,	   these	  measures	   could	  not	  prevent	   some	  of	   the	  original	   inhabitants	   being	   taken,	   attached	   to	   pick-­‐up	   trucks	  with	   chains,	   and	   dragged	   to	  their	   deaths.	   ‘All	   that	   rises	   falls	   from	   its	   own	   weight.’	   The	   latter	   (cited	   in	   Grayson,	  2011:200)	   is	   one	   of	   the	  more	   cynical	   comments	   provided	   in	   2006	   via	   narcomensaje	   by	  those	  doing	   the	  dragging.	  Literally	  here	  and	  elsewhere	   in	  Tierra	  Caliente.	  As	  a	   result,	   its	  authors	  –	  members	  of	  the	  then	  up-­‐	  and	  coming	  Familia	  Michoacana	  –	  successfully	  ousted	  from	  both	  power	  and	  villas	  what	  had	  been	  until	  then	  counted	  amongst	  Mexico’s	  principal	  drug	   trafficking	   organizations,	   the	   so-­‐called	   Cartel	   del	  Milenio	   (‘Millennium	   Cartel’,	   also	  known	  as	  Cartel	  de	  los	  Valencia,	  see	  Nájar,	  2005).	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El	  Aguaje,	   its	   streets	  now	  visibly	  deserted	  and	  emitting	   the	  atmosphere	  of	  a	  ghost	   town,	  serves	  as	  a	  marker	  of	  before	  and	  an	  after	  and	  as	  a	  reminder	  of	  the	  latest	  phase	  of	  el	  narco’s	  career	  in	  the	  region.	  A	  career,	  that	  is,	  of	  a	  phenomenon	  that	  has	  formed	  part	  of	  the	  local	  as	  long	  as	  anyone	  can	  remember.	  One	  that	  began	  as	  a	  side	  product	  of	  and	  yet	  an	  intrinsic	  part	  of	  modernity	   and	   that	  would	   nevertheless	   remain	   largely	  marginal	   in	   impact	   relative	   to	  other	   social	   and	   political	   forces	   until	   after	   the	   turn	   of	   the	   millennium.	   The	   career	   of	   a	  phenomenon	  that	  has,	  as	  of	   late,	  become	  effectively	  political	   in	  that	   its	  protagonists	  have	  come	  to	  claim	  supremacy	  over	  as	  well	  as	  the	  right	  to	  shape	  and	  to	  even	  remake	  all	  spheres	  of	   local	   society.	  What	   is	   telling	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   this	   latest	   phase’s	   prime	   characteristic	   of	  deep	  and	  pro-­‐active	  societal	  penetration	  is	  that	  El	  Aguaje	  by	  no	  stands	  means	  alone	  in	  its	  symbolism.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  as	   I	  conducted	  my	  fieldwork	  in	  Tierra	  Caliente	   it	  was	  as	   if	  everything	  was	  dusted	  by	  the	  superstrate	  of	  semantic	  redefinition	  that	  this	  last	  phase	  has	  swirled	   up	   and	   coated	   the	   local	   with.	   Whisky,	   avocados,	   butterflies.	   Community	  organization,	  ‘democratic’	  elections,	  cockfights,	  marriage,	  morals,	  honor,	  work,	  church	  and	  worship.	   Taxis,	   street	   corners,	   house	   façades,	   localities.	   The	   hills,	   the	   countryside,	   the	  forest.	   But	   for	   a	   few	   items	   of	   everyday	   life,	   touched	   upon	   in	   the	   following	   pages,	   the	  meaning	  of	  which	  have	  become	  modified,	  in	  the	  center	  of	  it	  all,	  the	  very	  phenomenon	  of	  el	  
narco.	  	  
	  
The	  career	  of	  Michoacán	  organized	  crime	  in	  four	  phases:	  Overview	  
This	   all-­‐pervasiveness,	   embodied	   by	   the	   rise	   of	   LFM,	   represents	   the	   culmination	   of	   a	  decades-­‐long	  process.	  Granting	  center	  stage	  to	  the	  voices	  and	  experiences	  of	  local	  civilians	  –	  current	  civilians,	   to	  be	  precise,	   for	   former	  narcotraffickers	  provide	  their	  viewpoints	  –	   I	  reconstruct	   the	  mutation	   of	   Michoacán	   organized	   crime	   throughout	   this	   chapter.	   In	   the	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spirit	   of	   the	   core	   interest	   of	   the	   present	   thesis,	   market-­‐internal	   dynamics	   provide	   a	  backdrop.	  Rather,	  I	  highlight	  how	  the	  ‘grand	  changes’	  brought	  about	  by	  this	  mutation	  are	  reflected	  upon	  and	  evaluated	  by	   locals,	   especially	   as	   concerns	   their	   social	   and	   economic	  impact.	   I	   identify	   four	   phases.29	  The	   first	   phase	   appears	   in	   the	   narrations	   provided	   as	  something	  akin	  to	  a	  ‘golden	  age’	  of	  Michoacán	  narcotrafficking,	  characterized	  by	  broad	  and	  sporadic	  participation	  as	  well	  as	  a	  positively	  connoted	  effect	  of	  economic	  empowerment.	  During	   the	   second	   phase,	  which	  materialized	   during	   the	   1980s,	   the	   first	   phase’s	   diffuse	  structure	   of	   participation	   and	   participants	   revealed	   the	   first	   indications	   of	   greater	  concentration	   and	   centralization.	   The	   presence	   of	   criminal	   organizations,	   both	   local	   and	  non-­‐local,	   became	   notable:	   This	   was,	   in	   essence,	   a	   phase	   of	   transition.	   The	   third	   phase	  initially	   saw	   the	   accentuation	   of	   the	   second	   phase’s	   features	   into	   exclusive	   and	   highly	  stratified	   forms	   of	   participation	   in	   narcotrafficking,	   a	   condition	   for	   which	   subsequently	  became	  membership	  in	  or	  at	  least	  servile	  affiliation	  to	  organized	  groups.	  This	  striving	  for	  exclusivity	   translates	   into	   the	   above	   touched	   upon	   expressions	   of	   violent	   competition	  amongst	   participants.	   It	  moreover	   led	   to	   el	   narco’s	   spillover	   into	   societal	   spheres	   other	  than	  criminal	  markets.	  In	  the	  fourth	  phase,	  marked	  by	  the	  rise	  of	  LFM	  and	  later	  embodied	  by	  LCT,	  this	  spillover	  became	  amplified	  to	  a	  degree	  of	  galvanization	  of	  organized	  crime	  and	  alternative	   governance	   into	   a	   fundamentally	   eclectic	   phenomenon.	   The	   phenomenon’s	  mutation	   into	   its	   contemporary	   shape,	   as	   I	   demonstrate	   below,	   would	   have	   been	  unthinkable	   without	   parallel	   and	   enabling	   developments	   in	   the	   role	   the	   state	   occupies	  within	  society	  and	  economy.	  LCT’s	  project	  of	  alternative	  governance	  can,	  in	  this	  vein,	  not	  be	  adequately	  comprehended	  without	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  it	  arose	  out	  of,	  related	  to,	  and	  built	  on	  the	  ruins	  of	  the	  Mexican	  state’s	  representation	  of	  social	  order	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  These	   phases	   should	   be	   thought	   of	   as	   ideal-­‐typical.	   Traits	   prevalent	   during	   one	   phase	   can	   still	   be	   well	  present	  during	  another,	  albeit	   less	  strongly	  so.	  Given	  the	  scarcity	  of	  reliable	  (historical)	  data	  and	  the	   fact	  that	  this	  thesis	  does	  not	  seek	  to	  produce	  a	  comprehensive	  historical	  account,	  my	  aim	  can	  only	  be	  thus.	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progress.	  Important	  clues	  are	  present	  here	  to	  the	  underlying	  question	  of	  what	  empowers	  LCT	  as	  project	  and	  organization.	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
Phase	   I:	   ‘And	   everybody	   went	   up	   to	   the	   hill’:	   The	   golden	   age	   of	   Michoacán	  
narcotrafficking	  	  	  
‘Where	   do	   think	   all	   of	   this	   came	   from?’	   My	   informant	   and	   I	   made	   the	   best	   of	   a	   shared	  insomnia,	  only	  further	  accentuated	  by	  a	  heat	  that	  was	  still	  merciless	  at	  three	  o’clock	  in	  the	  morning.	  This	  time	  we	  chose	  not	  to	  combat	  it	  with	  cigarettes,	  iced-­‐cooled	  Sangre	  de	  Cristo	  (red	  wine	  best/only	  enjoyed	  cold),	  and	  long	  chats	  on	  the	  porch.	  We	  took	  an	  excursion	  into	  nighttime	  Apatzingán	  which	  took	  on	  the	  shape	  of	  an	  archeological	  exploration.	  We	  toured	  monuments	   to	   past	   episodes	   of	   the	   trade,	   erected	   in	   seemingly	   quixotic	   attempts	   to	  counteract	  the	  nearly	  always	  inevitable	  truth	  that	  a	  gained	  place	  in	  the	  sun	  is	  an	  ephemeral	  one.	   The	   one	   we	   eventually	   stopped	   in	   front	   of	   had	   four	   stories	   and	   towered	   over	   its	  surroundings.	   Its	   pseudo-­‐roman	   pillars	   complied	   with	   the	   stereotypical	   nouveau	   narco	  riche	  kitsch.	  They	  also	  brought	  back	  memories	  of	  better	  times,	  from	  back	  when	  she	  lived	  in	  the	  mansion	  with	  a	  former	  husband.	  Where	  did	  all	  this	  come	  from?	  In	  this	  case,	  from	  acting	  as	  a	  local	  distributor	  of	  precursor	  drugs,	  brought	  in	  from	  Mexico	  City	  and	  needed	  for	  the	  highly	   profitable	   production	   of	  methamphetamines	   that	   started	   to	   pick	   up	   speed	   in	   and	  around	   Michoacán	   from	   the	   late	   1980s	   on	   (see	   Fernández,	   1999;	   Aguilar,	   2011).	   She	  smiled	   as	   she	   told	   me	   how	   this	   had	   also	   led	   to	   her	   receiving	   a	   significantly	   greater	  allowance,	  just	  for	  her	  personal	  use.	  ‘He	  [the	  ex-­‐husband]	  would	  call	  me	  up	  and	  ask:	  ‘’How	  would	  you	  like	  to	  make	  10,000	  pesos	  on	  the	  side?	  I	  need	  you	  to	  go	  pick	  something	  up	  for	  me	   and	   bring	   it	   back	   to	   town.’’’	   After	   he	   fled	   to	   Canada	   in	   1998	   –	   the	   wiser	   choice,	   as	  compared	  to	  the	  risk	  of	   ‘getting	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  things’	  when	  pressure	  was	  being	  put	  on	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him	  to	  ‘coordinate’	  his	  business	  activities	  –	  the	  contact	  broke	  off	  and	  she	  remarried,	  just	  to	  see	  her	  husband	  die	  of	  cancer	  a	  couple	  of	  years	  later.	  The	  latter	  reason	  was	  enough	  for	  her	  to	  state	  that	  it	  was	  around	  that	  time	  that	  things	  started	  getting	  más	  malo	  (sic,	  ‘more	  bad’).	  	  
In	   contrast,	  what	  enables	   the	  golden	  age	  of	  Michoacán	  narcotrafficking	  appear	  golden	   in	  locals’	  memories	  is	  a	  combination	  of	  three	  principal	  and	  interdependent	  attributes:	  	  
i) the	  absence	  of	  levels	  in	  violence	  considered	  extraordinary30	  and	  the	  equation	  of	  involved	   activities	   to	   honorable	   and	   respectable	   work	   (note	   how	   in	   the	  interview	   fragments	   cited	   below	   narcotrafficking	   is	   simply	   referred	   to	   as	  
trabajar,	  or	  to	  work);	  	  
ii) the	   possibility	   for	   independent	   actors	   to	   sporadically	   and	   (relatively)	   freely	  participate,	   without	   entry	   and	   exit	   being	   dependent	   upon	   membership	   in	   or	  lasting	  affiliation	  with	  more	  organized	  entities;	  	  
iii) and	   thus	   the	   possibility	   for	   a	   relatively	   wide	   population	   to	   directly	   access	   or	  indirectly	  benefit	  from	  narcotrafficking	  	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  economic	  empowerment.	  	  
These	  attributes	  moreover	  aggregate	  into	  items	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  which	  the	  phenomenon’s	  shape	   in	   its	   subsequent	   phases	   is	   evaluated:	   the	   role	   of	   violence;	   the	   moral	   status	   of	  activity	   and	   participants;	   the	   field’s	   structure	   and	   conditions	   of	   participation;	   and	   the	  distribution	  of	  proceeds.	  	  	  A	   comprehensive	   historical	   account	   of	   the	   emergence	   of	   narcotrafficking	   in	   Michoacán	  remains	  to	  be	  written	  and	  presumes	  an	  enterprise	  that	  lies	  well	  outside	  of	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  thesis.	   The	   few	  writings	   that	   do	   touch	   upon	   the	  matter,	   however,	   coincide	   in	   that	   such	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  This	  does,	  as	  I	  discuss	  below,	  not	  imply	  the	  absence	  of	  violence	  altogether.	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activities	   have	   formed	   part	   of	   the	   local	   economy	   at	   least	   since	   the	   1950s	   (see	   Astorga,	  1996:184;	  Maldonado	  2012:11).	  In	  some	  parts	  of	  Tierra	  Caliente,	  they	  appear	  to	  have	  been	  generalized	  as	  early	  as	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  1960s.	  So	  much	  so	  that	  even	  the	  military	  –	  sent	  into	   the	   region	   a	   few	   years	   earlier	   to,	   amongst	   other	   reasons,	   lead	   an	   early	   anti-­‐narco	  campaign	   –	   found	   itself	   surprised	   to	   find	   that	   poppy	   growers	   and	  opium	   traffickers	   had	  ‘inexplicably	  converted	  such	  activities	  into	  the	  normal	  work	  of	  some	  regions	  in	  the	  south	  of	  Michoacán’	   (Military	   bulletin	   of	   1962,	   cited	   in:	   Maldonado,	   2010:345;	   note	   the	  representation	  of	  narcos	  as	  infiltrating,	  perverting	  agents).	  	  
	  
Narcotrafficking	  as	  a	  widespread	  means	  of	  economic	  empowerment	  
Amelia,	   an	   informant	   of	   mine	   who	   grew	   up	   during	   the	   ‘golden’	   period,	   upholds	   this	  observation.	  We	  had	  been	   introduced	  at	  an	  event	  at	  Diego’s	  organization’s	  offices	  and	  as	  we	   chatted	  over	   lunch,	   she	   let	   it	   emerge	   that	  her	   family	   also	  had	  a	   certain	   tradition.	  My	  follow-­‐up	   questions	   and	   obvious	   interest	   landed	  me	   an	   invitation	   to	   the	   house	   she	  was	  brought	  up	  in	  in	  Arteaga.	  It	  was	  situated	  a	  two	  hour	  drive	  south	  of	  Apatzingán	  in	  the	  hills	  that	   mark	   the	   lower	   reaches	   of	   the	   mountains	   separating	   Tierra	   Caliente’s	   geological	  depression	   from	   the	   Pacific	   coast.	   Long	   before	  Arteaga	   became	   known	   as	   the	   home	   turf	  and	   stronghold	   of	   Servando	   Gómez	   Martínez,	   LCT’s	   second	   in	   command	   at	   time	   of	  fieldwork	   and	   one	   of	   my	   interviewees,	   locals	   became	   involved	   in	   the	   production	   and	  trafficking	  of	  marihuana:	  	  
‘Back	   then,	   when	   I	   was	   a	   child,	   my	   uncles	   were	   cultivating	   enervante	   [a	  term	   commonly	   used	   by	   locals	   to	   refer	   to	   drogas	   enervantes,	   or	  psychoactive	  drugs],	  marihuana…	  we	  kids	  knew	  what	  they	  were	  doing,	  that	  they	  were	  planting,	  and	  harvesting,	  and	  then	  packaging…	  we	  wouldn’t	  help	  since	  they	  were	  growing	  it	  in	  the	  cerros	  [hills],	  in	  the	  ravines…	  and	  as	  kids	  we	  would	  stay	  in	  the	  villages…	  but	  we	  did	  observe	  at	  home	  when	  they	  were	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using	  a	  hydraulic	  press31	  to	  make	  very	  compact	  packs…	  so	  they	  would	  bring	  it	   home…	   and	   under	   your	   bed	   there	   would	   be	   packs	   of	   enervante…	   my	  uncles	  weren’t	  major	  producers	  either,	   it	  was	  more	   like	  everybody	   in	   the	  
ranchos	  [small	  rural	  settlements]	  was	  growing…	  because	  it	  was	  the	  way	  to	  survive…	  one	  would	  always	  grow	  corn	   for	   consumption,	   and	  beans,	   some	  pigs	  and	  maybe	  some	  cattle…	  But	  if	  you	  wanted	  to	  have	  a	  little	  something	  extra,	   you	   had	   to	   grow	   enervante	   since	   that	  would	   give	   you	   a	   little	  more	  money	   annually…	   to	   buy	   clothing,	   shoes,	   and	   maybe	   it	   would	   even	   be	  enough	   for	   a	   vehicle…	   and	   what’s	   more	   is	   that	   growing	   marihuana	   isn’t	  difficult,	  this	  plant	  is	  so	  noble	  that	  you	  can	  just	  put	  it	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  a	  corn	  plantation,	  there	  it	  grows	  strong,	  big	  and	  beautiful	  plants…	  and	  you	  didn’t	  even	  have	  to	  invest	  a	  lot,	  no	  fertilizer	  or	  anything	  like	  that…	  So	  everybody	  went	  up	  to	  el	  cerro32.’	  	  	  	  
	  Image	  4.2:	  Peasant	  on	  Marihuana	  plantation	  in	  Tierra	  Caliente,	  Michoacán,	  2011.	  	  Courtesy	  of	  Eduardo	  Loza.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  These	  hydraulic	  presses	  are	  still	  used	  to	  form	  packs	  of	  one	  kilogram.	  See	  Image	  4.3.	  	  32	  The	   term	   el	   cerro	   is	   generically	   used	   to	   refer	   to	   the	   region’s	   rugged	   hills,	   places	   that	   lie	   outside	   of	   the	  ‘regular’	  insofar	  as	  they	  connote	  spaces	  of	  wilderness,	  both	  in	  natural	  and	  civilizational	  terms.	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  Image	  4.3:	  Marihuana	  harvested	  and	  pressed	  into	  kilo	  bricks	  for	  shipment,	  Tierra	  Caliente,	  Michoacán,	  2011.	  	  Courtesy	  of	  Eduardo	  Loza.	  	  	  	  
Narcotrafficking	  as	  a	  diffusely	  arranged	  field	  of	  economic	  activity	  
Well	   into	  his	  eighties,	  one	  of	   the	  uncles	   in	  question	   is	  now	  the	  sole	  occupant	  of	  Amelia’s	  parental	  home.	  Measured	  by	  his	  own	  standards	  –	  ‘the	  most	  important	  thing	  is	  to	  keep	  them	  strong	  and	  aggressive’	  –	  he	  masters	  his	  current	  business.	  The	  very	  second	  I	  naively	  placed	  my	  finger	  into	  one	  of	  the	  cages	  that	  made	  up	  two	  long	  rows	  on	  the	  back	  patio,	  one	  of	  the	  majestic	  fighting	  cocks	  he	  breeds	  pecks	  away	  at	  my	  finger.	  He	  was	  less	  keen	  to	  talk	  about	  previous	  business	  activities	  which	  he	  considered	  to	  be	  nothing	  but	   ‘things	  of	  the	  past’.	   In	  contrast,	  his	  brother	  had	  no	  problem	  with	  digging	  up	  old	  stories.	  We	  visited	  him	  a	  few	  days	  later	   in	  a	  small	  coastal	  setting	  on	  the	  border	  between	  Michoacán	  and	   its	  neighbor	   to	   the	  east,	   Guerrero.	   He,	   Amelia	   had	   told	  me,	   used	   to	   ‘do	   narco	   to	   take	   it’	   (‘hacía	   narco	   para	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llevarsela’).	   That	   is,	   as	   he	   filled	  me	   in,	   he	   and	   a	   partner	  would	   approach	   local	   peasants,	  negotiate	   a	   price	   to	   buy	  up	   their	   harvest	   to	   then	  make	   three	   or	   four	   runs	   a	   year	   to	   and	  across	  the	  US	  border:	  	  ‘I	   started	   doing	   that	   about	   forty	   years	   ago	   and	   I	   lasted	   for	   ten	   or	   fifteen	  years	  or	  so…	  and	  I	  did	  make	  un	  dinerito	  [diminutive	  for	  money]…	  we	  would	  buy	  here	  and	   sell	   in	  Tijuana…	  or	   sometimes	  we	  would	   cross	   [the	  border]	  and	  sell	  in	  el	  gabacho	  to	  the	  gabachos33…	  back	  then	  you	  would	  load	  up	  here	  and	  go	  up	  north…	  you	  wouldn’t	  take	  much	  either:	  120,	  130,	  140	  kilos	  in	  a	  
camionetita,	  in	  a	  pick-­‐up	  [sic]…	  since	  the	  camionetita	  was	  then	  empty,	  we’d	  take	  back	  like	  sixty	  rifles	  and	  sell	  them	  here…’	  	  Intrigued	  by	  the	  early	  indication	  of	  what	  until	  today	  remains	  one	  of	  the	  flows	  characteristic	  for	   the	   bi-­‐national	   interweaving	   central	   to	   the	   contemporary	   landscape	   of	   Mexican	  organized	   crime	   –	   guns	   one	   way,	   drugs	   the	   other	   (see	   e.g.	   Mercille,	   2011)	   –	   I	   inquired	  whether	  it	  was	  hard	  to	  get	  his	  hands	  on	  guns:	  	  
‘Well	  no,	   just	   like	   that…	  the	   thing	   is	   that	  over	   there,	   there	  were	  so	  many	  gunsmith’s	  shops…	  it	  was	  a	  good	  way	  of	  making	  a	  living…	  we	  didn’t	  need	  some	  contact,	  nor	  were	  there	  problems	  with	  the	  police	  [in	  Mexico]…	  once	  we	  got	  stopped	  by	  the	  judicial	  [judicial	  police]	  but	  they	  let	  us	  go	  for	  some	  money…	  when	  I	  finally	  quit	  the	  business,	  it	  was	  when	  we	  got	  caught	  at	  the	  border	  because	  the	  one	  in	  charge	  of	  packing	  [i.e.	  renting	  out	  a	  camioneta	  with	  hidden	  compartments	  to	  cross	  the	  border	  in	  Tijuana]	  wasn’t	  much	  of	  a	  specialist	  at	  that,	  he	  was	  rather	  for	  killing	  people…’	  	  	  	  How	  widespread	   participation	   in	   narcotrafficking	   had	   become	   by	   the	   1980s	   at	   the	   very	  latest	  becomes	  expressed	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  many	  locals	  I	  interacted	  with	  considered	  their	  or	  their	   family	  members’	   trajectories	   not	   even	  worth	  mentioning.	   One	   example	   here	   is	  my	  gatekeeper’s	   brother.	   He	   had	   shown	   himself	   willing	   to	   unveil	   an	   array	   of	   potentially	  compromising	  details.	  Prior	  to	  LFM’s	  schism	  that	  rendered	  such	  interactions	  unthinkable,	  for	   instance,	   he	  would	   spend	   nights	   drinking	   and	   playing	   cards	  with	   sicarios	   from	   both	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  Gabacho	   is	   used	   to	   either	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  USA	  or	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   Both	   can	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  do	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  necessarily	  carry	  pejorative	  meaning.	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factions.	  However,	  that	  he	  too	  had	  a	  story	  to	  tell	  he	  had	  failed	  to	  mention.	  My	  gatekeeper’s	  remark	  –	  ‘You	  see?	  I	  told	  you	  everybody	  here	  has	  a	  history!’	  –	  was	  followed	  by	  the	  request	  to	  his	  brother	  to	  ‘tell	  us	  already!’	  ‘So	  how	  did	  you	  get	  into	  it	  then?’,	  I	  asked.	  	  
‘Well,	  a	   friend	  from	  back	  at	  the	  rancho	   invited	  me,	  he	  tells	  me	   ‘’c’mon,	  get	  your	  ass	  up,	  come	  work	  with	  me	  al	  gabacho	  [to	   the	  USA]…’	  and	  so	   I	  went	  with	   him…	   and	   he	   showed	   me	   how	   to	   work…’	   The	   work,	   in	   his	   case,	  consisted	   in	   retailing	   chiva	   [goat,	   colloquial	   for	   heroin]	   in	   a	   suburb	   of	  Portland,	  Oregon.	   ‘[In	   total],	  we	  were	   four,	  me	  and	  my	  friend	  and	  the	  two	  who	  brought	  the	  drug…	  about	  half	  a	  kilo	  every	  two	  weeks…	  we	  would	  buy	  it	   directly	   from	   the	   producers	   in	   Guerrero34…	   and	   double	   it	   [the	  money]	  here…	  there	  was	  good	  money	  in	  it	  back	  then.’	  	  He	  lasted	  two	  years.	  until	  one	  of	  his	  customers	  was	  caught	  and,	  as	  he	  speculated,	  cut	  a	  deal:	  	  ‘At	  six	  in	  the	  morning	  they	  come	  knocking	  on	  my	  door…	  boom	  boom	  boom,	  very	  loudly…	  First	  I	  didn’t	  want	  to	  get	  up,	  it	  was	  super	  early	  after	  all,	  but	  I	  looked	  from	  behind	  the	  curtain	  and	  saw	  that	  it	  was	  the	  narcs	  [sic,	  short	  for	  narcotics	   agents	   in	   American	   English,	   here	   for	   the	   Drug	   Enforcement	  Administration	  or	  DEA].’	  	  ‘Did	  you	  have	  a	  lot	  of	  stuff	  there?’	  	  
‘Well	   I	   thought	  well	  hidden,	  but	   there	  was	  drugs	  and…	  money…	  and	   they	  were	  searching	  and	  searching	  and	  I	  already	  thought	  they	  weren’t	  going	  to	  find	  anything	  and	  that	  they	  were	  going	  to	  leave	  but	  then	  all	  the	  sudden	   la	  
vieja	  [pejorative	  for	  woman,	  here	  one	  of	  the	  agents]	  shouts	  ‘’Bingo!’’…	  fuck	  [imitates	  his	  reaction	  and	  laughs].’	  	  	  ‘Doing	  time,	  did	  you	  meet	  a	  lot	  of	  michoacanos?’	  ‘Uyyyyy	  the	  prison	  was	  full	  [stretches	  the	  word,	   emphasizing	  with	   typical	   terracalentana	   intonation]	  with	   them	   [laughs]!’	   ‘A	   lot	   of	  them	  working	  for	  the	  same	  jefe?’	   ‘No…	  it	  was	  like	  everybody	  was	  working	  on	  their	  own…	  back	   then	  who	  wanted	   to	  work	   could	  work…	   and	   nobody	   told	   you	   ‘’here	   you	   don’t	   sell,	  here	  is	  my	  territory’’…	  nothing	  of	  that.’	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Abovementioned	   federated	   state	   bordering	   with	   Michoacán	   and	   traditionally	   associated	   with	   poppy	  cultivation.	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(Narco)	  trickle-­‐down	  economics	  
The	  above-­‐cited	  experiences	  are	  emblematic	  for	  the	  overall	  positive	  place	  the	  ‘golden	  age’	  occupies	   in	   locals’	   reflections	  of	   the	  past.	  35	  Narcotrafficking	  here	  appears	  as	  a	   taken-­‐for-­‐granted,	  diffusely	   composed	   field	  of	  economic	  activity	   in	  which	  small-­‐scale	  enterprises	  –	  nowhere	  close	  to	  the	  degree	  of	  organization	  as	  expressed	  in	  larger,	  lasting	  structures	  and	  binding,	  exclusive	  membership	  associated	  with	  contemporary	  Mexican	  organized	  crime	  –	  could	  sporadically	  participate	  in,	  i.e.	  enter	  and	  exit	  freely.	  Frequently,	  participation	  in	  such	  enterprises	   seems	   to	   have	   followed	   the	   logic	   of	   generating	   start-­‐up	   capital	   for	   licit	  economic	   activities.	   As	  Diego	   summarizes:	   ‘a	   lot	   of	   people	  were	   doing	   it	   to	   buy	   a	   casita	  [diminutive	  for	  house],	  a	  tiendita	  [diminutive	  for	  shop],	  a	  parcel	  [of	   land]…	  and	  once	  you	  had	   that,	   [you	  would]	   not	   [do	   it]	   anymore’.	   Apart	   from	   flushing	  money	   into	   individuals’	  pockets,	   the	   local	   economy	   seems	   to	   have	   been	   stimulated	   by	   such	   activity.	   Reflecting	  similar	  experiences	  in	  other	  regions	  of	  the	  Americas	  (see	  e.g.	  Thoumi,	  2003),	  this	  became	  most	  apparent	   in	   the	  construction	  sector.	  As	  houses	  such	  as	   those	  described	  above	  were	  being	  erected,	  demand	  for	  manual	  labor	  was	  created.	  I	  discussed	  the	  pros	  and	  cons	  of	  past	  and	  present	  with	  one	   informant	  at	  his	  son’s	  school	  one	  afternoon.	  To	  him,	  the	   influx	  and	  distribution	   of	  narcodinero	   (‘narcomoney’)	   ‘was	   like	   a	   chain.	   If	   they	  work	   them	   you	   get	  something	  as	  well…	  and	  if	  I	  tell	  you	  ‘’listen,	  you’re	  from	  the	  organized	  crime	  [sic]	  and	  you	  got	  money	   and	   I’m	   a	  worker	   and	   you	   give	  me	  work	   and	   I	   give	  work	   to	   somebody	   else	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  While	  this	  is	  true	  for	  my	  civilian	  informants	  from	  Tierra	  Caliente	  across	  the	  board,	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  these	  experiences	  are	  not	  to	  be	  taken	  as	  representative	  for	  the	  entire	   local	  population,	  a	  claim	  this	  thesis	  does	  not	  and	  cannot	  make.	  The	  bulk	  of	  my	  informants	  are,	  as	  already	  mentioned	  in	  Chapter	  2,	  from	  the	  very	  stratus	  that	  originally	  benefitted	  most	  from	  the	  rise	  of	  narcotrafficking	  as	  a	  tool	  of	  economic	  empowerment	  and	   social	   mobility	   previously	   largely	   unavailable	   to	   them,	   i.e.	   mostly	   Tierra	   Caliente’s	   dependent	  (agricultural)	  laborers	  or	  small	  farmers	  struggling	  to	  stay	  afloat.	  It	  might	  thus	  be	  assumed	  that,	  given	  that	  said	  mutation	  affected	  them	  and	  their	   livelihoods	  most	   immediately,	   the	   ‘golden	  age’	   is	  reflected	  by	  them	  more	   favorably	   than	  by	  other	  strata	  with	  divergence	  economic	  opportunities	  and,	  at	   times,	  detrimentally	  affected	  by	  the	  original	  rise	  as	  the	  nouveau	  narco	  riche	  pushed	  up	  the	  social	  ladder	  to	  contend	  their	  status	  and	  standing.	  Yet,	  there	  is	  little	  doubt	  that	  to	  (most	  of)	  them,	  too,	  what	  was	  before	  was	  better	  than	  what	  is.	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[subcontracting]…’’	  then,	  yeah,	  it’s	  like	  a	  cadenita	  [diminutive	  for	  chain]	  and	  a	  lot	  of	  people	  benefit…’	  This,	   then,	   is	   the	  basis	  of	   trickle	  down	  (narco-­‐)economics.	   In	   the	  same	  vein,	  all	  three	   abovementioned	   studies	   that	   discuss	   Michoacán	   narcotrafficking	   in	   some	   depth	  (Malkin,	  2001;	  McDonald,	  2005;	  Maldonado,	  2010	  and	  2012)	  emphasize	  that	  ‘much	  of	  the	  economy	  was	  kept	  afloat	  by	  drug	  money’	  (Malkin,	  2001:109).	  This	  dependence	  is	  further	  increased	  as	  the	  1980s’	  economic	  crisis	  adversely	  affected	  already	  scarce	  licit	  alternatives	  (see	  below).	  	  	  
	  
‘Simply	  working’:	  Narcotrafficking	  as	  an	  honorable	  activity	  	  
Though	  they	  are	  voiced	  with	  a	  degree	  of	  conviction	  that	  evokes	  an	  inherent	  and	  absolute	  quality,	  these	  positive	  reflections	  arise	  as	  the	  present	  is	  evaluated	  through	  the	  contrasting	  recurrence	  of	  past	  experiences.	  Violence,	  for	  one,	  was	  an	  undeniable	  and,	  again,	  taken-­‐for-­‐granted	   factor	   well	   before	   El	   Aguaje.	   Tales	   of	   local	   gangs	   stealing	   the	   harvest	   were	   as	  frequent	  as	  small-­‐time	  traffickers	  being	  stopped	  or	  hauled	  off	  overland	  buses	  and	  ‘relieved’	  of	  their	  merchandise	  at	  gunpoint.	  This	  was	  all	  part	  of	  the	  game,	  as	  Amelia’s	  uncle	  relates:	  ‘I’ll	  tell	  you	  something…	  you	  know	  well	  that	  here	  in	  Mexico,	  if	  you’re	  a	  smuggler	  and	  I’m	  a	  smuggler…	  as	  much	  as	  I	  want	  to	  kill	  you	  sometimes	  you	  want	  to	  kill	  me	  sometimes	  to	  get	  something	   extra…’	  At	   the	   same	   time,	   however,	   the	   quantity	   and	   quality	   of	   violence	   thus	  produced	   appears	   not	   to	   have	   been	   significant	   enough	   for	   narcotrafficking	   to	   shine	  through	   as	   an	   extraordinary	   source	   against	   the	   backdrop	   of	   persistently	   high	   regional	  levels	  of	  violence	  (for	  an	  in-­‐depth	  discussion	  of	  its	  roots	  and	  manifestations	  in	  Michoacán	  see	  Maldonado,	   2010	   and	  Montes,	   2011:317-­‐322;	   Arias/Goldstein,	   2010	   provide	   a	   fresh	  look	   at	   the	  matter	   in	   the	   broader	   context	   of	   Latin	   America	   as	   the	   world’s	   most	   violent	  region).	   As	   Malkin	   (2001:119)	   observes	   with	   regards	   to	   the	   rising	   prominence	   and	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visibility	   of	   the	   social	   group	   of	   los	  narcos:	   ‘This	   is	   not	   the	   arrival	   of	   a	   group	   that	   brings	  violence	  to	  an	  otherwise	  peaceful	  community.’	  	  
Even	   so,	   narcotrafficking	   supposes	   not	  merely	   a	   tool	   for	   economic	   empowerment,	   but	   a	  more	  honorable	  one	  at	  that.	  Don	  José	  used	  to	  be	  metido	  (‘in	  it’)	  as	  well,	  as	  my	  gatekeeper	  points	  out	  after	  we	  had	  finished	  dinner	  at	  my	  first	  day’s	  baptism	  party	  (see	  Chapter	  3).	   I	  approached	   him	  with	   two	   glasses	   of	   Buchannan’s	   twelve-­‐year-­‐old	   Scotch,	  narcocultura’s	  liquid	  status	  symbol	  (see	  Campbell,	  2009:25	  for	  a	  list	  of	  some	  of	  its	  insignia,	  material	  and	  else;	  see	  Ovalle,	  2005	  and	  Rincón,	  2009	  for	  general	  depictions).	  I	  was	  feeling	  unsure	  of	  how	  to	   start	   the	   conversation.	   Don	   José	  was,	   after	   all,	   the	   first	   ‘real-­‐life	   narco’	   I	   had	   interact	  with.	  He,	  however,	  brusquely	  dismissed	  my	  doubts,	  barely	  hidden	  as	  I	  touch	  upon	  his	  past:	  	  
‘Tranquilo	  boy,	  I	  have	  nothing	  to	  hide.	  I’ve	  paid	  for	  it	  [gone	  to	  jail]	  and	  that’s	  that…	  Back	   then,	   I	  was	  young	  and	   I	  wanted	   to	  get	   into	  something	   to	  have	  something,	  to	  have	  some	  money…	  so	  I	  was	  thinking	  about	  becoming	  part	  of	  the	  judicial	  [state	  police]…	  but	  then	  I	  realized	  that	  another	  path	  was	  better,	  you	  understand?	  In	  the	   judicial	  you	  had	  to	  kill	  people	  and	  so	  on,	  and	  no,	   I	  am	  a	  different	  class	  of	  people.’	  	  	  However,	  he	  underlined	  that	  he	  was	  ‘not	  a	  coward	  either.’	  ‘You	  always	  feel	  death…	  because	  you	  know	  you’re	  moving	  outside	  of	   the	   law,	  está	  cabrón	   [‘it’s	   really	   tough’]…	  so	   I	  always	  carried	  a	  pistol	  y	  la	  chingada	   [‘and	  shit’].’	  Yet,	   first	   smuggling	  mota	   (‘the	   fucking	  car	  was	  doing	  rounds	  and	  rounds’)	  and	   later	  chiva	  to	  California	   to	  ultimately	   ‘drop’	   three	   to	   four	  kilograms	  of	  cocaine	  a	  week	  to	  retailers	  in	  and	  around	  Los	  Angeles	  seemed	  to	  be	  the	  better	  solution:	  	  
‘You	  were	  watching	  out	  for	  la	  pura	  ley	  [‘nothing	  but	  the	  law’,	  i.e.	  the	  police],	  you	  understand?	  I	  never	  killed	  anybody.	  The	  whole	  thing	  appeared	  clean	  to	  me.	  When	  the	  whole	  drug	  thing	  started,	  I	  started	  to	  make	  money…	  but	  not,	  say,	  by	  killing…	   it	  was	  a	   cleaner	  way	  of	  making	  a	   living.	  You	  were	   simply	  working	  [trabajando].’	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Dreams	  of	  modernity:	  Official	  and	  alternative	  pathways	  	  
Tierra	  Caliente’s	  stigma	  
By	   the	   early	   1980s	   (at	   the	   latest),	   narcotrafficking	   had	   become	   so	   generalized	   as	   to	  constitute	  an	  ‘integral	  part	  of	  everyday	  life’	  (Malkin,	  2001:103;	  see	  also	  Montes,	  2011:315-­‐317)	  in	  Tierra	  Caliente.	  The	  same	  holds	  true	  for	  other	  parts	  of	  Mexico,	  primarily	  the	  north	  (see	  Campbell,	  2009:17).	  While	  largely	  painted	  in	  a	  positive	  light	  in	  locals’	  memory,	  to	  the	  outside	  world	  its	  rise	  seconded	  the	  historically	  deeply	  engrained	  image	  of	  Tierra	  Caliente	  as	  standing	  outside	  of	  law,	  morality,	  and	  progress.	  Already	  by	  the	  Spanish,	  the	  region	  was	  perceived	  as	  backward,	  uncivilized,	  barbarian,	  and	  rebellious.	  Tucked	  away	  in	  a	  depression	  in	  the	  south	  of	  Michoacán	  and	  surrounded	  by	  rugged	  mountains	  and	  hills	  that	  would	  make	  transport	   into	   and	   out	   of	   the	   region	   challenging	   and	   led	   to	   a	   certain	   isolation	   until	   the	  latter	   half	   of	   the	   twentieth	   century,	   it	   earned	   the	   designation	   of	   el	   fondillo	   del	   mundo	  (diminutive	   for	   ‘bottom	   of	   the	   earth’,	   see	   González	   y	   González,	   2001:17).	   Its	   untamed	  nature,	   desert-­‐like	   climatic	   conditions,	   and	   inhabitants	   alike	   were	   portrayed	   as	   hostile	  enough	  to	  ‘[make]	  even	  devils	  flee’	  (ibid.:19).	  This	  motivated	  a	  variety	  of	  projects	  to	  civilize	  the	   region	   (Maldonado,	   2010	   provides	   the	  most	   comprehensive	   portrayal	   of	   the	   latter).	  The	   Roman	   Catholic	   Church,	   alongside	   other	   religious	   organizations,	   tried	   to	   break	   the	  
terraclenteños’	   ‘indolent	   life	   style’	   (González	   y	   González,	   2001:28)	   –	   supposedly	  characterized	   by	   the	   five	   vices	   of	   ‘alcoholism,	   lechery,	   spleen,	   idleness,	   and	   gambling’	  (ibid.:38-­‐39)	  –	  through	  missionary	  work	  and	  evangelization	  campaigns.	   In	  a	  similar	  vein,	  the	  region	  became	  inserted	  into	  the	  dynamics	  of	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  Mexican	  state,	  which	  sought	   to	   integrate	   this	   and	   further	   ‘marginal’	   territories	   into	   a	   homogenous	   national	  political,	  economic,	  and	  cultural	  project	  (see	  e.g.	  Pansters/Ouweneel,	  1989).	  This	  took	  the	  shape,	  above	  all	  during	  Mexico’s	  liberalist	  regime	  in	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  and	  early	  twentieth	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centuries,	   of	   attracting	   and	   colonizing	   the	   region	   with	   ‘European	   minds’	   (González	   y	  González,	  2001:33)	  and	  by	  relying	  on	  the	  socializing	  machinery	  of	  educational	  institutions.	  	  	  
	  
‘Civilizing’	  Tierra	  Caliente	  through	  large-­‐scale	  modernization	  programs	  
At	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  20th	  century,	  Tierra	  Caliente	  becomes	  the	  stage	  for	   what	   Malkin	   (2001:104)	   calls	   ‘one	   of	   the	   largest	   experiments	   in	   agrarian	   and	  agricultural	   reform’	   in	   Mexican	   history	   (Maldonado,	   2010/2012;	   Montes,	   2011;	   Ortiz,	  2011;	   and	   Thiebaut,	   2011	   provide	   overviews).	   From	   1947,	   substantial	   investments	   in	  infrastructure	  were	  made	  and	  bridges,	  streets,	  train	  lines,	  and	  irrigation	  systems	  built.	  This	  also	   enabled	   the	   mining	   industry	   to	   thrive.	   In	   the	   center,	   however,	   stood	   the	   region’s	  agriculture	   the	   potential	   of	  which	  was	   finally	   realized.	   By	   becoming	   a	   site	   of	   industrial-­‐scale	   production,	   Tierra	   Caliente	  was	  meant	   to	  make	   a	   key	   contribution	   in	   bringing	   the	  epoch’s	  attempt	  at	  making	  Mexico	  economically	  (and	  thereby	  politically)	  independent36	  to	  fruition.	   Yet,	   incorporating	   Tierra	   Caliente	   ‘as	   an	   integral	   part	   of	   the	   national	   project’	  (Malkin,	  2001:15)	  included	  more	  than	  just	  economic	  modernization	  and	  the	  conquest	  of	  a	  nation-­‐state’s	   remaining	   internal	   geographical	   frontiers.	   The	   moral-­‐interventionist	  approach	   remained	  part	   and	  parcel	   of	  bringing	  modernity	   to	   the	   region.	   Seeking	   to	   root	  out	   that	   considered	   ‘unmodern’,	   an	  expression	  of	  backwardness,	   and	   thus	  an	  obstacle	   to	  linear	   progress	   towards	   the	   envisioned	   society	   so-­‐called	   ‘sanitizing	   campaigns’	   were	  conducted.	  To	   this	  end,	   the	  Mexican	  military	  was	  deployed	  and	  established	  a	  permanent	  presence	   in	   the	  region	   for	   the	   first	   time.	  These	  campaigns	   included	   ‘regular’	  police	  work	  and	  were	  intended	  to	  establish	  ‘law	  and	  order’,	  for	  instance	  by	  trying	  to	  curb	  petty	  crime	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  This	   policy	   of	   ‘important	   substitution	   industrialization’	  was	   dominant	   in	   Latin	   America	   for	  much	   of	   the	  1950s	  and	  1960s	  (for	  overviews	  see	  Baer,	  1972;	  De	  Janvry,	  1981).	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and	   prostitution.	   In	   the	   foreground,	   however,	   stood	   actions	   against	   narcotraffickers,	   for	  instance	   in	   form	  of	   eradication	   campaigns.	   The	   ‘war	   on	   drugs’,	   in	   its	  Michoacán	   variant,	  found	  an	  early	  precedent	  in	  these	  campaigns.	  In	  differing	  intensities,	  they	  would	  remain	  a	  fixture	   of	   the	   local	   until	   today	   (see	   Maldonado,	   2010:	   283	   ff.	   for	   an	   overview	   and	   an	  examination	  of	  official	  motivation	  and	  meddling	  in	  counterinsurgency	  objectives	  and,	  more	  generally,	  the	  suppression	  of	  political	  opposition	  and	  social	  movements).	  	  	  	  	  In	   these	   images	   and	   the	   policies	   construed	   around	   them,	   narcotrafficking	   appeared	   as	   a	  formidable	   other.	   As	   an	   antithesis	   to	   modernity	   that	   has,	   unsurprisingly,	   found	   fertile	  ground	   in	   this	   exotic,	   backward,	   and	   depraved	   land	   whose	   ‘indolent	   spirit,	   scarcity	   of	  [human]	  energies,	   [and]	  pleasure	  of	   the	  easy	  and	   the	  delectable’	   ‘neither	   the	   factory,	   the	  school,	  nor	  the	  temple	  achieved	  to	  dismantle’	  (González	  y	  González,	  2001:52).37	  What	  this	  overlooked	   was	   how	   intrinsically	   interwoven	   the	   very	   phenomenon	   of	   narcotrafficking	  was	  with	  the	  outlined	  project	  of	  modernization.	  The	  latter	  has	  been	  widely	  depicted	  as	  a	  failure.	  When	  measured	  by	  its	  own	  promises,	  this	  indubitably	  holds	  true.	  Meant	  to	  finally	  materialize	  the	  ideals	  of	  Mexico’s	  1910-­‐1917	  revolution,	   it	  entered	  decay	  and	  underwent	  distortion	  almost	  as	  soon	  as	  the	  initial	  infrastructural	  mega-­‐projects	  were	  completed	  (see	  Malkin	  2001:115ff.).	  Broad-­‐scale	  empowerment	  of	  the	  rural	  poor	  remained	  an	  illusion.	  In	  spite	   of	   the	   partial	   expropriation	   and	   redistribution	   of	   large	   estates,	   land	   concentration	  remained	  high	  through	  mechanisms	  that	  were	  legal,	  illegal,	  or	  lay	  somewhere	  in	  the	  murky	  grey	   between.	   Coercively	   backed	   land	   grabbing	   was	   but	   one	   common	   practice.	   Those	  fortunate	   enough	   to	   get	   their	   hands	  on	   a	   small	   parcel	   –	   conflict	   over	   rightful	   ownership	  was	  and	  remains	  rife	  –	  suffered	  from	  a	  credit	  structure	  playing	  out	  to	  their	  disadvantage.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  As	   I	   discuss	   in	   greater	   depth	   in	   Chapter	   5,	   such	   exoticizing	   binaries	   are	   key	   building	   blocks	   of	   the	   licit-­‐illicit-­‐divide	   mentioned	   in	   the	   introduction	   and	   of	   great	   importance	   for	   shaping	   state-­‐organized	   crime-­‐interactions	  (in	  Tierra	  Caliente).	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Competition	  with	  larger	  producers	  –	  or	  the	  refusal	  to	  rent	  out	  their	  parcels	  at	  low	  prices,	  for	  that	  matter	  –	  was	  thereby	  rendered	  additionally	  complicated.	  First	  gradually	  and	  more	  blatantly	  as	  the	  1980s	  were	  approaching,	  economic	  policy	  moreover	  became	  characterized	  by	   a	   shift	   towards	   neoliberalism.	   This	   entailed,	   in	   ways	  more	   overt	   and	   amplified	   than	  before,	   the	   re-­‐concentration	   of	   land	   as	   conditions	   favorable	   to	   domestic	   and	   foreign	  private	  capital	  were	  created	  (see	  Calderón,	  2001;	  Maldonado,	  2010;	  for	  general	  overviews	  of	   this	   problematic	   of	   great	   relevance	   across	   Latin	   America	   see	   Stavenhagen,	   1970;	  Thiesenhusen,	  1989;	  Stanford,	  1994;	  Sanderson,	  2013).	  	  
	  
Narcotrafficking	  as	  an	  alternative	  pathway	  to	  modernity	  
While	   failing	   to	   deliver	   on	   the	   originally	   envisioned	   outcomes	   of	   economic	   and	   social	  engineering,	   the	   attempt	   to	   make	   Tierra	   Caliente	   a	   poster	   region	   for	   progress	   set	   the	  fundaments	  for	  its	  transformation	  into	  a	  laboratory	  for	  what	  McDonald	  (2005:117)	  calls	  a	  ‘locally	   reconstituted’	   form	  of	  modernity.	   Corresponding	   dreams	   of	   social	   ascension	   and	  material(ist)	   achievement	   had	   been	   churned	   up	   not	   least	   through	   the	   mantra-­‐like	  promises	   of	   politicians	   that	   entry	   into	   the	   ‘first	  world’	  was	   just	   around	   the	   corner.	   Licit	  ways	  to	  materialize	  them	  were,	  in	  contrast	  and	  as	  pointed	  out	  above,	  blocked	  for	  the	  many.	  A	   textbook-­‐like	   constellation	   of	   anomie	   resulted	   (see	   Merton,	   1938	   for	   the	   original	  formulation	   and	  Passas,	   2000	   for	   a	   recent	   application	   to	   globalization	   and	   crime).	  Apart	  from	  migration	  to	  the	  USA	  –	  Michoacán	  has	  become	  one	  of	  Mexico’s	  main	  sending	  regions	  (see	   Rendón	   et	   al.,	   2013)	   –	   narcotrafficking	   has	   emerged	   as	   a	   widespread	   alternative	  means.	  Its	  proliferation	  into	  a	  generalized	  phenomenon	  in	  Tierra	  Caliente	  began	  to	  become	  apparent,	  as	  mentioned	  above,	  around	  the	  same	  as	  the	  outlined	  project	  of	  modernization	  kicked	  off.	  The	   latter	   is	  no	  coincidence	  and	   is	   fostered,	  as	  Malkin	  (2001)	  and	  Maldonado	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(2010,	   2012)	   both	   highlight,	   as	   much	   by	   the	   region’s	   unprecedented	   cultural	  connectedness	   as	   by	   its	   now	   excellent	   infrastructural	   communication	   with	   the	   outside	  world.	  New	  train	  lines	  and	  paved	  roads	  facilitate	  illicit	  drugs	  exportation.	  The	  construction	  of	  Mexico’s	  largest	  container	  port	  on	  the	  state’s	  coast	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1960s	  in	  the	  city	  of	  Lázaro	   Cárdenas	   moreover	   made	   it	   an	   attractive	   transshipment	   corridor.	   In	   this	   light,	  narcotrafficking	  (in	  Tierra	  Caliente)	  supposes	  by	  no	  means	  an	  antidote	  to	  modernity.	  Much	  to	   the	  contrary38	  it	  arose	  out	  of	   the	  propagation	  of	  modernity	   in	  discourse	  and	  deed	  and	  became	   firmly	   sedimented	   as	   an	   alternative	   pathway	   to	   access	   its	   promised	   fruits.	   As	   ‘a	  colonizing	   phenomenon’	   (McDonald,	   2005:118),	   it	   effectively	   developed	   into	   a	   self-­‐perpetuating	   carrier	   of	   (a	   reductionist	   version	   of)	   modernity	   in	   its	   own	   right	   in	   that	   it	  sustained	  and	  further	  deepened	  the	  region’s	  connectedness	  to	  the	  outside	  world.	  	  
	  
Phase	  II:	  Transitions	  	  
From	   the	   1980s,	   far-­‐reaching	   transformations	  were	   produced	   in	   the	   political,	   economic,	  and	  social	  arenas	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  field	  of	  narcotrafficking	  in	  the	  Americas.	  This	  exceptional	  confluence	   of	   factors	   produced	   profound	   changes	   in	  Michoacán	   narcotrafficking	   and,	   by	  extension,	  in	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  locals	  experience	  and	  evaluate	  it.	  Across	  Latin	  America,	  the	  previous	   assistantialist	   paradigm,	   based	   on	   the	   state’s	   leading	   and	   pro-­‐active	   role	   in	  shaping	  and	   fostering	  national	  economies,	  gave	  way	  to	  a	  neoliberal	  one	  (see	  above).	  The	  implementation	  of	   the	   latter	  –	   in	  essence	   the	  state’s	  negation	  to	  be	  a	  state	   insofar	  as	   the	  dismantling	   of	   its	   governing	   capacity	   was	   driven	   from	   within	   –	   provoked	   important	  repercussions	  that	  were	  felt	  most	  intensely	  in	  rural	  areas.	  Programs	  heavily	  criticized	  for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  Consider,	   in	   this	   context,	   Arlacchi’s	   (1986)	   argument	   that	   organized	   crime	   is	   but	   an	   unvarnished,	  more	  consequent	  manifestation	  of	  the	  capitalist	  spirit.	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their	   inefficiency	   and	   ineffectiveness	   and	   yet	   supposing	   a	   source	   of	   financial	   support	   to	  small	  farmers	  were	  abandoned	  or	  replaced	  with	  programs	  of	  lesser	  scope.	  Amplified	  by	  a	  crisis	  in	  the	  Mexican	  economy	  from	  1982	  (see	  Ramírez,	  1989)	  and	  the	  dependence	  of	  local	  agriculture	   on	   particular	   produce,	   rural	   poverty	   levels	   reached	   new	   heights	   (Stanford,	  1994;	  Gledhill,	  1995;	  Snyder,	  1999;	  Malkin,	  2001:102).	  Narcotrafficking	  as	  an	  alternative	  pathway	   to	   modernity,	   as	   my	   informants	   and	   writings	   addressing	   the	   matter	   (Malkin,	  2001;	  McDonald,	  2005;	  Montes,	  2011)	  stress,	  became	  more	  prevalent	  than	  ever.	  	  	  Simultaneously,	  changes	  in	  the	  composition	  of	  the	  field	  of	  narcotrafficking	  in	  the	  Americas	  brought	  Mexican	  actors	  to	  the	  forefront.	  Until	  the	  start	  of	  the	  1990s,	  Colombian	  actors	  had	  been	   considered	   as	   occupying	   the	   dominant	   position,	   benefitting	   most	   from	   serving	   a	  booming	   US	   cocaine	   market	   (see	   Krauthausen/Sarmiento,	   1991;	   Thoumi,	   1995;	  Gootenberg,	   2009).	   This	   changed	   with	   increased	   enforcement	   efforts	   and	   larger	   scale	  Colombian	   organizations39	  such	   as	   the	   so-­‐called	   Medellin	   Cartel	   were	   dismantled.	   The	  hitherto	  most	   frequented	  Caribbean	  shipment	   route	   (bypassing	  Mexico	   to	   reach	  Florida)	  was	   interrupted	   as	   US	   agencies	   increased	   levels	   of	   surveillance	   and	   interdiction.	   As	   a	  result,	  more	  and	  more	  cocaine	  was	  now	  being	  channeled	  onto	  Mexican	  soil	  via	  the	  Pacific	  and	   then	   into	   the	  USA.	   In	  1989,	   thirty	  percent	  of	   the	   substance	  passed	   through	  Mexican	  territory	  and	  by	  1998	  amounted	  to	  fifty	  percent.	  At	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  millennium	  it	  had	  reached	  between	   seventy	   to	   eighty	  percent40	  (see	  Serrano,	  2012).	   ‘This	   shift’,	   as	   Serrano	  (2012:139)	   remarks,	   ‘radically	   altered	   the	   nature,	   size,	   and	   organization	   of	   the	  Mexican	  drug	   market.’	   As	   actors	   diversified	   their	   traditional	   portfolio	   (marihuana,	   heroin)	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  The	  term	  organization	  should,	  as	  mentioned	  above,	  not	  be	  equated	  to	  perfectly	  coherent	  and	  hierarchically	  structured,	  monolithic	  entities.	  Paoli	   (2002:68-­‐69)	  makes	  a	   convincing	   case	   for	   the	   impertinence	  of	   such	  imagery	  to	  describe	  Colombian	  ‘cartels’).	  	  	  	  40	  As,	  amongst	  others,	  Thoumi	  (2005)	  has	  argued,	  estimations	  of	  any	  numbers	  relating	  to	  illicit	  markets	  need	  to	  be	  treated	  with	  utmost	  care	  and	  resemble	  a	  veritable	  “numbers	  game”.	  Here,	  they	  serve	  to	  underline	  a	  tendency.	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include	   Cocaine	   and	   moreover	   methamphetamines,	   financial	   resources	   flushed	   into	   the	  field	  and	  available	  to	  Mexican	  actors	  reached	  a	  new	  dimension.	  They	  thereby	  did	  not	  only	  gain	   power	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   their	   Colombian	   counterparts	   but	   moreover	   the	   Mexican	   state	   as	  higher	   sums	   became	   available	   for	   corruption	   and	   bribery	   (see	   Andreas,	   1998;	  Serrano/Toro,	  2002).	  	  
	  
The	  rise	  of	  Michoacán’s	  first	  ‘homegrown’	  criminal	  organization	  
Michoacán,	  with	  its	  long	  stretch	  of	  Pacific	  cast,	  came	  to	  gain	  unprecedented	  prominence	  as	  a	   transshipment	   territory.	   In	   this	  context,	  narcotrafficking	   in	  Tierra	  Caliente	  experienced	  its	   first	   important	  moment	   of	   organizational	   aggregation	   in	   the	   shape	   of	   the	   previously	  mentioned	  Cartel	  del	  Milenio,	  which	  enjoyed	  privileged	  contacts	  with	  one	  of	  the	  principal	  actors	  on	  the	  national	  scene,	  the	  so-­‐called	  Tijuana	  Cartel	  (Proceso,	  2003;	  Guerrero,	  2014).	  As	   opposed	   to	   those	   that	   asserted	   Michoacán’s	   first	   ‘homegrown’	   drugs	   trafficking	  organization’s	   general	   ‘[control]	   of	   illicit	   crops	   in	  Michoacán’	   (Guerrero,	   2014),	   the	  way	  local	   informants	   reflected	   upon	   it	   speaks	   a	   different	   language.	   Accordingly,	   its	   existence	  did	   not	   translate	   into	   strict	   exclusivity,	   with	   one	   actor	   aiming	   to	   level	   competition	   and	  strive	  for	  monopolization.	  Don	  José,	  who	  bought	  his	  first	  significant	  quantities	  of	  Cocaine	  in	  El	  Aguaje,	  remembers	  that	  it	  was	  common	  knowledge	  that	  the	  community	  ‘was	  theirs’.	  Yet,	   ‘there	  were	   various	   [actors].	  El	   chaparro,	  El	  Roby,	  El	  Bonbon...	   all	   of	   them	   did	   their	  business	  in	  El	  Aguaje…	  so	  maybe	  what	  I	  got	  there	  was	  sometimes	  from	  the	  Valencias,	  and	  other	  times	  from	  others…’	  Here	  and	  elsewhere	   in	  the	  region,	   the	  coexistence	  of	  actors	  of	  various	   sizes	   seems	   to	   have	   been	   prevalent.	   The	   participation	   of	   smaller,	   independent	  actors	   also	   appears	   to	   still	   have	   been	   possible.	   To	   my	   gatekeeper’s	   brother,	   too,	   the	  existence	   of	   more	   organized	   actors	   was	   no	   secret.	   However,	   as	   he	   puts	   it,	   ‘they	   didn’t	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bother	  you	   that	  much	   then.’	  Most	   importantly,	  as	   judged	   from	  the	  perspective	  of	   civilian	  populations	   living	   in	   proximity	   to	   the	   Valencias’	   strongholds,	   narcotrafficking	   was	   still	  narcotrafficking.	  Phrased	  differently	  by	  one	  informant:	  ‘they	  didn’t	  mess	  with	  the	  people…	  [since]	  they	  were	  purely	  dedicated	  to	  narcotrafficking.’	  	  	  Over	   the	  course	  of	   the	  1990s,	  signs	  that	   things	  were	  taking	  a	   turn	   for	   the	  worse	  become	  apparent.	   Traffickers	   ran	   into	   problems	   in	   Tijuana,	   gateway	   to	   San	   Diego	   and	   the	   US	  American	   South-­‐Western	  markets	   and	  michoacanos’	   prime	   drop-­‐off	   and	   border	   crossing	  point.	   According	   to	   Diego’s	   brother,	   ‘those	   cabrones	   [colloquial	   Latin	   American	   Spanish,	  oscillitaing	  between	  disgust	  and	  admiration,	  between	  ‘asshole’	  and	  ‘badass’]	  from	  Sinaloa	  and	  the	  Arrelano	  Felix’	  start	  charging	  cuota,	  i.e.	  dues	  to	  be	  paid	  for	  using	  a	  plaza,	  a	  specific	  territory	  or	  corridor	   (see	   in	   this	   context	  Knight’s	  2012	  overview	  of	  key	  developments	   in	  the	   field	   of	  Mexican	   drug	   trafficking).	   In	   introducing	   and	   leveraging	   on	   tighter	   forms	   of	  territorial	   control,	   actors	   hitherto	   primarily	   dedicated	   to	   narcotrafficking	   effectively	  expanded	   their	  portfolio	  of	   sources	  of	   income	  and	   thus	  organizational	   activities	   towards	  the	  provision	  of	   protection	   to	   already	   subordinated	   actors	   or	   actors	   to	  be	   subordinated.	  Simultaneously,	  competition	  over	  the	  control	  of	  plazas	  and	  thus	  the	  possibility	  to	  tax	  grew	  stronger	  amongst	  larger	  actors	  in	  the	  Mexican	  north.	  It	  was	  then,	  in	  the	  late	  1990s,	  that	  ‘all	  this	   shit	   really	   starts…	   that	   they	   start	   killing	   each	   other’	   (Don	   José)	   and	   when	   the	  participant	  populations	  began	  to	  thin	  out.	  This	  first	  spike	  in	  violence	  might	  be	  considered	  merely	   as	   a	   foretaste	   of	   what	   was	   yet	   to	   come.	   The	   same	   basic	   structural	   features	  nevertheless	  drove	  it	  and	  the	  role	  of	  the	  state	  occupied,	  again,	  prime	  importance.	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Break-­‐down	  of	  state	  regulation	  over	  the	  illicit	  	  
Amongst	   others,	   Astorga	   (1996)	   has	   argued	   that	   Mexican	   drug	   trafficking’s	   violent	  potential	  was	  historically	  held	   at	   bay	  due	   to	   the	   state’s	   capacity	   to	   (informally)	   regulate	  illicit	  markets	  and	  mitigate	  conflicts	  amongst	  participants.	  Mexican	  drug	  trafficking	  –	   the	  field	   out	   of	   which	   more	   diversified	   criminal	   organizations	   would	   emerge	   –	   was	   thus	  shaped	   under	  what	   Snyder	   and	  Duran	   (2009)	   call	   a	   ‘state-­‐sponsored	   protection	   racket’.	  The	  considerable	  power	  of	  a	  decades-­‐long	  stable	  one-­‐party-­‐system	  headed	  by	  the	  Partido	  
Revolucionario	   Institucionalizado	   (PRI)	   was,	   in	   other	   words,	   not	   employed	   to	  (indiscriminately)	   enforce	   the	   law	  and	   the	   state	  permitted	  drug	   trafficking	  with	  highest-­‐ranking	   functionaries	   directly	   involved	   in	  many	   instances.	   In	   exchange,	   traffickers	  were	  expected	  to	  provide	  shares	  and,	  crucially,	  to	  respect	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  game	  keeping	  levels	  of	  violence	   to	   a	   minimum.	   As	   indicated	   above,	   the	   PRI’s	   grip	   over	   the	   Mexican	   state	   and	  society	   gradually	   dissolved	   from	   the	   late	   1960s	   on.	   Reforms	   were	   introduced	   and	   the	  country’s	   political	   system	  underwent	   an	   evolution	   from	   authoritarian	   rule	   to	  multiparty	  electoral	  democracy.	  In	  2000,	  the	  first	  non-­‐PRI	  president	  was	  elected	  (see	  Magaloni,	  2006).	  This	  diversification	  in	  political	  parties’	  access	  to	  power	  and	  positions	  was	  internationally	  and	   domestically	   lauded,	   prompting	   optimism	   with	   regards	   to	   the	   country’s	   future.	  However,	   these	   changes	   are	   also	   blamed	   for	   triggering	   a	   fragmentation	   of	   a	   hitherto	  relatively	   coherent	   protection	   racket	   (see	   Flores	   Pérez,	   2009).	   The	   resulting	   parallel	  existence	   of	   multiple	   patron-­‐client-­‐protection-­‐networks	   is	   said	   to	   have	   undermined	   the	  latter’s	   effectiveness	   and	   ability	   to	   create	   certainty,	   thus	   increasing	   the	   potential	   for	  friction	  and	  violent	  competition	  (see	  Snyder	  and	  Duran,	  2009;	  Ríos,	  2013).	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  regulatory	  superstructure,	  illicit	  actors	  henceforth	  had	  to	  rely	  on	  coercion	  as	  the	  sole	  available	   mechanism	   for	   dispute	   settlement	   and	   contract	   enforcement	   (see	   Gambetta,	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1993	  for	  some	  basic	  arguments	  about	  the	  relationship	  between	  illegality	  and	  violence).	  In	  synthesis,	   these	   developments	   are	   to	   take	   into	   account	   as	   a	   basis	   to	   the	   deciphering	   of	  state-­‐organized	   crime-­‐interactions	   in	   contemporary	   Mexico	   and,	   for	   that	   matter,	  Michoacán	  (see	  Chapter	  6).	  	  	  
	  
Phase	  III:	  The	  Influx	  of	  external	  criminal	  organizations	  and	  incipient	  spill-­‐over	  	  
Fundamentally,	  then,	  the	  mutation	  of	  el	  narco	  in	  the	  late	  1990s	  towards	  its	  contemporary	  shape	  was	  driven	  by	  the	  confluence	  of	  two	  interlocking	  developments:	  the	  self-­‐dismantling	  of	  the	  state’s	  governing	  capacity	  and	  the	  (hereby	  enabled)	  increased	  capacity	  of	  financially	  better	  equipped	  criminal	  organizations	  who	  would,	  at	   least	  attempt	  to,	   impose	  their	  own	  rules	   of	   the	   game	   and	   expand	   their	   geographical	   reach. 41 	  Around	   the	   turn	   of	   the	  millennium,	  Michoacán	  and	  Tierra	  Caliente	  in	  particular	  become	  fully	  integrated	  into	  these	  dynamics	   transforming	   the	   field	   of	   Mexican	   organized	   crime.	   This	   had	   important	  repercussions	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  production	  of	  the	  third	  phase	  of	  the	  mutation	  of	  Michoacán	  organized	  crime.	  Aiming	  to	  establish	  control	  over	  the	  region	  and	  its	  flows	  of	   illicit	  goods,	  two	  of	  Mexico’s	  most	  powerful	  criminal	  organizations	  increased	  their	  physical	  presence	  in	  the	   region.	   Thus	   inserted	   into	   the	   accompanying	   logic	   of	   exclusivity	   in	   organizational	  membership	   and	   affiliation,	   Tierra	   Caliente	   became	   one	   of	   the	   main	   stages	   for	   violent	  contention	   between	   both	   groups	   (see	   Astorga,	   2007:184-­‐210;	   Ravelo,	   2008:	   202-­‐203;	  Guerrero,	   2014).	   Moreover,	   Alliances	   spun	   between	   local	   actors	   constituted	   channels	  through	  which	  new	  operational	  features	  and	  organizational	  practices	  could	  find	  an	  influx	  into	  the	  local.	  The	  2003	  dispatching	  of	  the	  Gulf	  Cartel’s	  armed	  wing,	  Los	  Zetas,	  was	  crucial	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  As	  I	  discuss	  in	  greater	  detail	   in	  Chapter	  5,	  while	  this	  constellation	  supposes	  greater	  opportunities,	   it	  also	  entails	   an	   increased	  existential	   challenge.	  The	   shortlivedness	  of	  many	  criminal	  organizations	   involved	  as	  well	   as	   the	   field’s	   eminent	   trend	   towards	   organizational	   atomization	   speaks	   to	   this	   effect	   (see	   Reuter,	  2009).	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in	   this	   context.	   These	   former	   Mexican	   military	   special	   forces	   (see	   Osorno,	   2012;	  Grayson/Logan,	   2012)	   were	   sent	   to	   help	   an	   allied	   faction	   of	   the	   now	   divided	   Valencia	  Cartel	   to	  gain	   the	  upper	  hand.	  Both	  Nazario	  Moreno	  González	  and	   José	  de	   Jesús	  Méndez	  Vargas	   –	   the	   leaders-­‐to-­‐be-­‐of	   LFM’s	   two	   dominant	   factions	   –	   formed	   part	   of	   the	   latter.	  Sinaloa’s	   proxy,	   the	   remainder	   of	   the	  Valencia	  Cartel,	  mirrored	   this	   strategy.	   It	   began	   to	  recruit	   former	   kaibiles	   (see	   Maldonado,	   2012:	   23-­‐30;	   Guerrero,	   2014),	   members	   of	   a	  Guatemalan	   elite	   unit	   created	   under	   the	   tutelage	   and	   with	   the	   support	   of	   the	   USA	   as	  spearheads	   for	   counterinsurgency	   campaigns	  during	   the	  Cold	  War	  period	   and	  notorious	  for	   a	   variety	   of	   crimes	   against	   humanity	   (see	  Arteaga	  Botello,	   2009;	   see	  Gill,	   2004	   for	   a	  vivid	   overview	   of	   US	   involvement	   in	   counterinsurgency	   training	   programs	   in	   the	  Americas).	  It	  was	  against	  the	  backdrop	  of	  these	  groups’	  arrival	  in	  Michoacán	  that	  violence	  reached	  the	  above	  outlined	  new	  quantity	  as	  well	  as	  quality.42	  	  	  
	  
Los	  Zetas	  
The	   arrival	   of	   Los	   Zetas	   to	   Michoacán	   and	   their	   success	   in	   swiftly	   gaining	   territorial	  supremacy	  through	  a	  coalition	  with	  La	  Empresa	  marked	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  third	  phase	  of	  the	  mutation	   of	   Michoacán	   organized	   crime.	   A	   defining	   feature	   of	   the	   latter	   here	   became	  apparent	   for	   the	   first	   time:	   the	   phenomenon’s	   spillover	   into	   societal	   spheres	   other	   than	  those	  of	  illicit	  narcotic	  markets.	  That	  is,	  Los	  Zetas’	  modus	  operandi	  differed	  from	  previous	  organizational	  models	   in	   that	   it	  was	  no	   longer	   limited	   to	  direct	  participation	   in	   criminal	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  Establishing	   a	   direct	   correlation	   between	   these	   groups’	   participation	   and	   transformations	   in	   violence	  should	  be	  treated	  with	  care.	  It	  remains	  doubtful	  whether	  the	  experienced	  escalation	  in	  fact	  dependent	  upon	  the	   influx	   of	   ‘expert	   violence’	   or	   could	   have	   simply	   been	   produced	   through	   other,	   less	  mystified	  means.	  Attempts	  to	  pinpoint	  a	  specific	  origin	  and	  point	  of	  entry	  of	  specific	  practices	  –	  Arteaga	  Botello,	  2009	  ties	  the	  decapitation	   of	   victims	   to	   the	   recruitment	   of	   kaibiles,	   for	   instance	   –	   remain	   challenged	   by	   data	   scarcity.	  Official	  documents	  I	  obtained	  and	  which	  describe	  the	  recruitment	  of	  kaibiles	  by	  LFM	  suggest,	   in	  this	  vein,	  that	   symbolic	   considerations	   (signaling	   strength	  and	  violent	   capacity)	  weighed	   just	   as	  heavy	  as	  practical	  ones.	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markets	   or	   the	   imposition	   of	   protection	   rackets	   onto	   other	   participants.	   It	   moreover	  comprehended	  the	  extraction	  of	  cuota	  (‘protection	  tax’)	  from	  a	  wide	  array	  of	  licit	  business	  activities	   (see	   Ríos/Dudley,	   2013;	   Guerrero,	   2014).	   The	   group’s	   designation	   as	   a	   ‘drug	  trafficking	  organization’	   or	   even	   a	   ‘drug	   cartel’,	   still	   predominantly	   employed	   to	   refer	   to	  Mexican	   criminal	   organizations	   across	   the	   board,	   appeared	   outdated	   in	   light	   of	   this	  expanded	  set	  of	  organizational	  activities.	  More	  importantly,	  the	  local	  subsequently	  became	  more	  than	  just	  a	  territory,	  the	  control	  of	  which	  enabled	  transshipment	  corridors	  as	  well	  as	  the	  possibility	  to	  tax	  subordinate	  participants	  in	  narcotrafficking	  to	  be	  kept	  open.	  Rather,	  it	  became,	  in	  itself,	  a	  pool	  of	  economically	  exploitable	  resources	  that	  could	  be	  tapped	  into	  so	  as	   to	   obtain	   income	  qua	   extortion.	  As	   an	   effect	   of	   this	   operational	   turn	   to	   the	   local,	   as	   I	  phrase	  it,	  civilian	  populations	  became	  subject	  to	  a	  different	  set	  of	  practices	  that	  were	  now	  directed	  at	  them	  immediately.	  	  	  The	   depth	   of	   societal	   penetration	   achieved	   by	   Los	   Zetas	   does	   not	   compare	   to	   LCT’s	  subsequent	   territorial	   supremacy	   over	   Tierra	   Caliente.	   Across	   the	   board,	   informants	  presented	  as	  a	  taken	  for	  granted	  fact	  that	  ‘all	  this	  [Tierra	  Caliente]	  was	  Los	  Zetas’’.	  Yet,	  they	  had	   little	  concrete	   information	   to	  offer.	  Excluding	  LCT’s	   leaders,	  direct	   interactions	  were	  only	  remarked	  upon	  by	  Tito	  (see	  Chapters	  3	  and	  5)	  who	  had	  admittedly	  formed	  part	  of	  Los	  
Zetas	   before	   joining	  LCT’s	   ranks.	  Nevertheless,	  displays	  of	   extreme	  violence	  authored	  by	  
Los	   Zetas,	   second-­‐hand	   stories	   of	   encounters,	   and	   general	   rumors	   sufficed	   to	   allow	   the	  label	  ‘Zeta’	  appear	  as	  the	  sum	  of	  all	  fears,	  a	  concentrated	  and	  palpable	  embodiment	  of	  the	  most	   violent	   and	   gruesome	   features	   of	   contemporary	   Mexican	   organized	   crime.	   Thus	  evoked	   in	   local	   informants’	   statements,	   this	   corresponds	   to	   the	   wider	   discursive	  representation	  of	  the	   ‘brand	  Zeta’	   (Ríos/Dudley,	  2013).	  An	  asset	  strategically	   fostered	  by	  the	   group	   and	   crucial	   to	   its	   rapid	   territorial	   expansion	   upon	   breaking	   with	   its	   mother	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structure	  of	  the	  Gulf	  Cartel	  (ibid.),	  Los	  Zetas’	  sanguine	  image	  was	  further	  amplified	  through	  corresponding	   reflections	   by	   media,	   policy	   makers,	   and	   some	   scholars	   alike	   (e.g.	  Grayson/Logan,	  2012).	  	  
	  
Phase	  IV:	  The	  rise	  of	  La	  Familia	  Michoacana	  and	  alternative	  governance	  	  
One	   individual	   in	  particular,	  Carlos	  Rosales,	   seems	   to	  have	  served	  as	  a	   cohesive	  element	  between	   Empresa,	   Gulf	   Cartel,	   and	   Los	   Zetas.	   Upon	   his	   arrest	   in	   2004,	   the	   coalition	  fractured	   leading	   to	   a	   confrontation	   between	   Los	   Zetas	   and	   Empresa,	   now	   under	   the	  leadership	   of	   Nazario	   Moreno.	   The	   execution	   of	   this	   schism	   subsequently	   surfaced	   in	  displays	  of	  violence	   that	  were,	  after	  El	  Aguaje,	  not	  necessarily	  new.	  Yet,	  as	  Los	  Zetas	  had	  made	  Apatzingán	  their	  regional	  hub,	  it	  was	  more	  palpable.	  As	  we	  passed	  an	  intersection	  on	  our	  way	  to	  a	  meeting	  outside	  of	  the	  city,	  Diego	  underlined	  how	  locals’	  memory	  of	  a	  number	  of	   places	   had	   become	   transformed	   as	   a	   result:	   ‘Pretty	   much	   overnight,	   bodies	   started	  appearing	  all	  over	  the	  place…	  they	  dumped	  five	  bodies	  on	  this	  intersection…	  and	  then	  six	  bodies	  on	  some	  other	  street	  corner	  the	  next	  day.’	  Equally,	  for	  another	  informant:	  	  	  
‘this	  separation	  was	  very	  harsh.	  When	  the	  wave	  of	  dead	  bodies	  [sic,	  ola	  de	  muertos]	  begins…	  such	  ugly	  things…	  with	  heads	  hung	  from	  bridges…	  heads	  placed	   on	   our	   monuments…	   there	   were	   so	   many	   dead…	   many	   many…	  because	  there	  were	  people	  who	  said	  they	  wanted	  to	  keep	  being	  Zetas	  (sic)	  and	   didn’t	   want	   to	   be	   disidencia	   (sic,	   ‘dissidence’)…	   and	   they	   were	   also	  killing	  people	  that	  didn’t	  want	  to	  be	  with	  them	  [LFM].’	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A	  brief	  characterization	  of	  LCT’s	  project	  of	  alternative	  governance	  	  
From	  the	  rise	  of	  LFM	  onwards	  –	  publicly	  so	  in	  2006,	  yet	  already	  well	  visible	  to	  locals	  over	  the	   course	   of	   the	   year	   2005	   through	   the	   above	   referred	   to	   publicly	   staged	   displays	   of	  violence	  –	  the	  latest	  phase	  of	  the	  mutation	  of	  Michoacán	  organized	  crime	  was	  to	  develop	  its	   defining	   features	   in	   full.	   Reaching	   from	   ‘simple’	   narcotrafficking	   (Phase	   I)	   to	   reveal	  higher	  degrees	  of	  greater	  coagulation,	  organization,	  as	  well	  as	  violence	  (Phase	  II),	  in	  Phase	  III	  it	  morphed	  into	  a	  more	  complex	  form	  of	  organized	  crime.	  Here,	  it	  became	  characterized	  by	  a	  strong	  momentum	  of	  exclusivity	  and	  violently	  enforced	  protection	  rackets	  within	  the	  criminal	  sphere	  whilst	  simultaneously	  spilling	  over	  into	  the	  non-­‐criminal.	  In	  Phase	  IV,	  the	  latter	   features	  were	   further	   amplified	   and	   the	  mentioned	   ‘operational	   turn	   to	   the	   local’	  became	   both	   more	   expansive	   and	   pervasive.	   It	   was	   here	   that	   the	   career	   of	   Michoacán	  organized	   crime	   culminated.	   It	   completed	   its	   mutation	   from	   a	   by-­‐product	   of	   modernity	  from	   which	   an	   indirect,	   albeit	   important,	   effect	   on	   the	   local	   societal	   setting	   was	  transformed	  into	  an	  organizationally	  concentrated	  force	  that	  proactively	  intervened	  in	  and	  effectively	  shaped	  societal	  processes	  far	  beyond	  the	  confines	  of	  illicit	  (and	  licit)	  markets.	  In	  this	  vein,	   the	  claim	  that	   ‘Here,	  we	  are	   the	  government’	  –	  repeatedly	  voiced	   in	   interviews	  with	   LCT’s	   leaders	   –	   can	   be	   understood	   as	   emblematic	   of	   LCT’s	   behavior	   towards	   local	  society.	  The	  attempt	  to	  secure	  a	  duality	  of	  control	  over	  locally	  rooted	  (social)	  capital,	  LCT	  followed	   the	   ‘governance	  mixture’	   of	   terror	   and	  generosity	   identified	  by	  Hansen	   (2005).	  Reckoning	   that	   a	   minimum	   degree	   of	   social	   legitimacy	   was	   crucial	   to	   organizational	  survival,	   its	   leaders	   forged	   a	   narrative	   of	   LCT	   as	   a	   benevolent	   actor	  with	   local	   society’s	  interests	   at	   heart.	   Far	  more	   than	   just	   an	   undisputed	   dominion	   over	   criminal	  markets,	   it	  claimed	  nothing	  less	  than	  ownership	  of	  social	  order	  per	  se.	  This	  ultimately	  translated	  into	  a	  project	  of	   alternative	  governance,	  driven	  by	  a	   form	  of	   criminal	  agency	  of	  unprecedented	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hybridity.	  The	  repercussions	  of	  this	  novel	  mode	  of	  territorial	  control	  for	  both	  LCT	  as	  well	  as	   affected	   civilian	   populations	   remain	   underexplored	   or	   even	   entirely	   ignored	   in	   the	  existing	  literature.	  In	  essence,	  then,	  Phase	  IV	  of	  the	  mutation	  of	  Michoacán	  organized	  crime	  was	  characterized	  by	  the	  mutually	  empowering	  galvanization	  of	  ‘criminal’	  governance	  and	  organized	   crime	   in	   sensu	   stricto	   into	   an	   eclectic	   phenomenon	   that	   escapes	   default	  approaches.	  Before	  I	  go	  on	  to	  discuss	  LCT’s	  project	  of	  governance	  in	  depth	  (Chapter	  5),	   I	  portray	   below	   locals’	   accounts	   of	   the	   shape	  Michoacán	   organized	   crime	   had	   attained	   in	  Phase	  IV.	  I	  do	  so	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  items	  specified	  above	  (the	  role	  of	  violence;	  moral	  status	   of	   activity	   and	   participants;	   the	   field’s	   structure	   and	   conditions	   of	   participation;	  distribution	  of	  proceeds).	  	  	  
	  
Vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  ‘golden	  age’:	  Organized	  Crime	  under	  Los	  Caballeros	  Templarios	  	  
In	  a	  field	  now	  structured	  in	  accordance	  to	  exclusivity	  in	  membership	  and	  affiliation,	  fault	  lines	  between	  enemy	  groups	  increasingly	  appear	  as	  profound	  and	  absolute.	  In	  spite	  of	  the	  latter,	   they	   also	   appeared	   more	   ephemeral	   than	   ever.	   Shifts	   are,	   in	   this	   vein,	   not	   only	  produced	  in	  the	  shape	  of	  changing	  intergroup	  alliances.	  Reflecting	  the	  field’s	  trend	  towards	  organizational	   pluralization,	   they	   frequently	   opened	   up	   as	   groups	   underwent	   schisms	  through	  which	   they	   resurfaced	   as	   smaller	   factions.	   Doña	  Mari,	   too,	   found	   herself	   on	   the	  losing	  side	  of	  the	  separation	  that	  split	  LFM	  in	  two	  during	  late	  2010	  and	  out	  of	  which	  the	  winning	  faction	  finally	  emerged	  under	  the	  new	  label	  of	  LCT.	  She	  is	  one	  of	  the	  informants	  in	  whose	   presence	   trauma	   becomes,	   to	  me,	   most	   intense.	   She	   was	   frail	   and	   seemed	   to	   be	  broken.	  Her	  voice	  was	  constantly	  on	  the	  verge	  of	  dropping	  to	  unintelligibility.	  For	  a	  brief	  moment,	   though,	  her	  eyes	   flared	  up	  with	  a	  glimpse	  of	   joy.	  She	  remembered	  how	   José	  de	  Jesús	  Méndez	  alias	  El	  Chango,	  co-­‐founder	  of	  LFM	  and	  close	  to	  her,	  would	  come	  to	  hang	  out	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in	  front	  of	  her	  ‘grocery	  store’	  (which	  only	  sells	  beer)	  where	  we	  had	  picked	  her	  up	  from	  half	  an	  hour	  before.	  Then,	  she	  recalled,	  Moreno	  and	  Gómez	  teamed	  up	  against	  El	  Chango	   in	  a	  case	  of	   treason	  motivated	  by	  pure	  greed,	   according	   to	  her.	  This	  was	  a	  necessary	   step	   to	  keep	  his	  faction	  from	  further	  tarnishing	  LFM’s	  good	  name	  through	  kidnapping-­‐for-­‐ransom	  and	  extortion,	  as	  amongst	  other	  LCT	  leaders	  as	  Gómez	  would	  later	  tell	  me.	  Whichever	  the	  reason,	  her	  proximity	  to	  Méndez	  (by	  no	  means	  limited	  to	  the	  occasionally	  shared	  beer,	  as	  other	   informants	   relate)	  qualifies	  her	  as	  disidencia	   by	  default	  –	  and	   thus	  as	  up	   for	  being	  killed.	  The	  cleansing	  lasted	  for	  about	  a	  week.	  ‘Even	  right	  here	  on	  this	  corner’,	  an	  informant	  whose	   house	   is	   situated	   a	   block	   down	   from	   one	  whose	   bullet-­‐riddled	   façade	   provides	   a	  lasting	   testimony,	   ‘they	   were	   confronting	   each	   other	   in	   shoot-­‐outs.’	   ‘Right	   here?’	   ‘Right	  here!	   And	   then	   they	   would	   come	   down	   on	   the	   houses	   where	   they	   knew	   Chango	   had	  people…	   they	  went	   there	   to	  kill.’	   ‘Obviously’,	  Diego	  stated	  an	  obvious	   fact,	   ‘the	  Templars	  were	  finishing	  them	  all	  off’.	  Doña	  Mari	  being	  spared,	  in	  turn,	  was	  dependent	  upon	  certain	  conditions.	   ‘We	  [herself	  and	  some	  family	  members]	  were	  able	  to	  arrange	  to	  stay…	  not	  to	  have	  to	  flee…	  [hastily	  adding	  ]	  but	  not	  to	  work.’	  ‘And	  they	  respected	  that	  deal?’,	  I	  asked.	  She	  responded:	  
	  ‘Yes…	   but	   just	   without	   having	   any	   communication	   with	   them	   [Méndez’	  people]…	   since…	   the	   one	   they	   found	   out	   to	   have	   communication	   with	  them…	   pickup	   trucks	  would	   come	   there	   [in	   front	   of	   her	   house]	   and	   they	  would	  wait…	  first	  I	  thought	  they	  were	  just	  there	  to	  buy	  beer	  but	  they	  were	  just	   sitting	   there	   and	   waiting…	   for	   somebody	   to	   come…	   and,	   I	   think,	   if	  anyone	  would	  come…	  they	  would	  take	  them	  and	  [her	  voice	  breaks]…um…	  kill	  them…’	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Others	   were,	   as	   a	   dweller	   of	   one	   of	   ‘Moreno’s’	   communities43	  told	   me,	   confronted	   with	  either	  switching	  sides	  or	  bearing	  the	  consequences:	  	  
‘My	  brother,	  they	  have	  him	  by	  the	  short	  hairs	  [bien	  agarrado]	  out	  there…	  he	  was	   with	   La	   Familia	   first,	   renting	   a	   parcel	   for	   El	   Chango	   as	   a	   nominal	  holder…	  and	  then,	  when	  the	  change	  came	  and	  they	  [LCT]	   took	  the	  rancho	  [sic]	  they	  told	  him	  that	  La	  Familia	  was	  a	  thing	  of	  the	  past	  already	  and	  that	  he	   should	   forget	   all	   about	   them…	   they	   took	   him	   down	   to	   the	   river	   and	  forced	   him	   to	   throw	   away	   his	   cell	   phone	   with	   all	   the	   old	   numbers…	   the	  
mero	  jefe	  [‘the	  boss	  himself’]	  came	  and	  threatened	  him	  real	  ugly…’	  	  	  ‘Who?	  La	  Tuta44?’,	   I	  asked,	  not	  convinced	  that	  Moreno	  was	  still	  alive.	  Her	  voice	   lowers	  to	  near	  unintelligibility:	  ’No…	  El	  Chayo45.’	  	  	  	  Just	  as	  heavy	  as	  the	  extended	  intergroup	  violence	  locals	  are	  confronted	  with	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  integration	  of	  Tierra	  Caliente	  into	  the	  new	  modalities	  of	  organization,	  competition,	  and	  territorial	   control	   within	   the	   field	   of	   Mexican	   organized	   crime,	   weighs	   the	   loss	   in	  ownership	   of	   the	   very	   phenomenon	   of	   narcotrafficking.	   The	   above	   listed	   attributes	   –	  participation	   as	   honorable	  work	   (trabajar),	   the	   possibility	   for	   independent	   participation	  without	   the	   necessity	   of	   membership	   or	   lasting	   affiliation,	   and	   the	   availability	   of	  narcotrafficking	  as	  a	  tool	   for	  economic	  empowerment	  –	  that	  underpinned	  the	  golden	  age	  now	   seem	   to	   have	   withered	   away	   and	   to	   have	   been	   altogether	   transformed	   into	   their	  extreme	   opposites.	   To	   Don	   José,	   to	   whom	   violence	   and	   the	   presence	   of	   ‘death’	   had	  supposed	   inevitable	   components	   of	   being	  metido,	   today’s	   narcos	   do	   not	   deserve	   to	   be	  designated	  as	  such.	  Nor	  does	  what	  they	  do	  qualify	  as	  trabajar:	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  As	   discussed	   in	   Chapter	   4,	   the	   label	   LCT	   veiled	   a	   fragmented	   organizational	   structure	   composed	   by	   an	  array	   of	   local	   strongmen	   with	   a	   considerable	   amount	   of	   discretion	   over	   their	   respective	   chunks	   of	   the	  territory.	  	  44	  One	  of	  Gómez’	  nicknames.	  	  
45	  One	  of	  Moreno’s	  nicknames.	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‘there	   are	   just	   no	   honest	   people	   anymore…	   for	   about	   the	   last	   five	   or	   six	  years	   [i.e.	   since	   2006,	   2007]	   it’s	   gotten	   really	   bad…	   these	   narquillos	  [diminutive	  for	  narcos,	  here	  used	  pejoratvely	  to	  underline	  his	  disgust]	  don’t	  even	   work	   anymore…	   it’s	   a	   risky	   work	   anyhow,	   but	   now…	   there	   is	  something	  wrong	  with	  those	  people…	  just	  for	  killing	  you,	  they	  kill	  you…	  ’	  	  	  As	  much	  as	  with	  a	   loss	   in	  values	  and	  rules	  of	  honor	  (similarly	  observed	  in	  other	  parts	  of	  Mexico,	   see	   Campbell,	   2009:12;	   Serrano,	   2012:147),	   the	   rise	   of	   LFM	   as	   a	   violently	  propelled	   agent	   of	   aggregation	   and	   centralization	  over	   illicit	   activities	   is	   associated	  with	  the	  cancelation	  of	  narcotrafficking	  as	  a	  viable	  vehicle	  for	  economic	  empowerment	  for	  the	  many.	  As	   of	   the	   time	  of	   fieldwork,	   LCT	  had	   come	   to	   impose	   a	   central	   regulatory	   regime	  over	   the	   formerly	   loosely	  coupled	  market	   for	  Marihuana.	   If	  not	   taken	  over	  altogether	  by	  members	   of	   the	   group,	   licenses	   were	   given	   out	   for	   a	   limited	   number	   of	   growers	   and	  exporters	   in	   exchange	   for	   quantity-­‐dependent	   taxation.	   Compliance	   with	   rules	   such	   as	  obligatory	  tax	  marks	  to	  be	  placed	  on	  packages	  destined	  for	  shipment	  out	  of	  the	  region	  was	  enforced,	   for	   instance,	   at	   checkpoints	   set	   up	   at	   exit	   points	   (and	   manned,	   according	   to	  informants,	  by	  LCT	  but	  also	  by	  state	  police).	  Transgressions	  entailed,	  in	  a	  first	  instance,	  a	  penalty	  fee	  and,	  in	  a	  second	  instance,	  corporal	  punishment	  reaching	  up	  to	  execution.	  Prices	  paid	  to	  producers	  were	  moreover	  being	  established	  in	  a	  monopolistic	  fashion	  and	  had	  hit	  historic	  lows.	  A	  former	  grower	  lamented	  the	  result:	   ‘A	  lot	  of	  peasants,	   local	  people,	  gente	  
bien	   jodida	   pues	   [‘fucked	   people	   thus’,	   indicating	   poverty]…	   they	   prefer	   not	   to	   cultivate	  anymore.’	  	  	  As	   of	   the	   time	  of	   fieldwork,	   the	   field	   of	  Michoacán	  organized	   crime	  had	   effectively	   been	  cleared	  of	   independent	  participants.	  Access	  to	  narcotrafficking	  as	  an	  alternative	  pathway	  to	   modernity	   and	   economic	   empowerment	   for	   the	   many	   had	   effectively	   become	  monopolized	   by	   the	   few.	   Narcos	   do	   not	   only	   not	   ‘work’	   anymore	   but,	   as	   an	   array	   of	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informants	   would	   state,	   do	   not	   let	   others	   ‘work’	   either.	   Against	   this	   backdrop,	   it	   might	  seem	  paradoxical	   that	   the	   allure	   to	  become	  parte	  de	   is	   perhaps	  now	  stronger	   than	  ever.	  Yet,	   the	   interplay	  between	  a	  persistent	   lack	  of	   licit	  alternatives	   (see	  e.g.	  Universal,	  2014;	  for	  a	  general	  take	  at	  the	  correlation	  between	  a	  lack	  in	  opportunities	  and	  non-­‐state	  armed	  actor	  recruitment	  see	  Humphreys/Weinstein,	  2007;	  Weinstein,	  2007:97ff.)	  and	  the	  out-­‐in-­‐the-­‐openness	  with	  which	   it	  manifests	   itself	  acts	  as	  a	  key	  reproductional	  force	  of	  the	  very	  phenomenon	  of	  organized	  crime.	  In	  the	  same	  vein,	  it	  constituted	  a	  formidable	  recruitment	  tool	   for	   LCT.	   In	   contrast	   to	   the	   past	   when	   income	   generated	   through	   narcotrafficking	  surfaced	  more	   subtly	   through	   investments	   into	   land,	   businesses,	   and	  housing,	   organized	  crime	  was	  now	  on	  display	  as	  an	  unmissable	  fixture	  of	  everyday	  life.	  As	  an	  informant	  from	  one	  of	  the	  communities	  surrounding	  Apatzingán	  reflected,	  	  
‘there	  have	  always	  been	  narcos	  but	  less	  directly	  [sic]…	  they	  wouldn’t	  pass	  on	   the	   street	  with	   their	   barrels	   of	   liquids	   for	   the	   kitchens	   they	   have	   [i.e.	  barrels	  of	  precursor	  substances	  used	   in	  methamphetamine	   laboratories]…	  before,	   as	   I	   told	   you,	   yes,	   they	  were	   narcos	   but	   calladitos	   [diminutive	   for	  silent],	  just	  packing	  up	  their	  mota	  and	  so	  on…’	  	  	  As	  LFM	  pushed	   for	   territorial	   colonization,	   the	  presence	  of	  at	   least	   some	  of	   its	  members	  became	  permanent	  in	  all	  local	  communities	  (see	  Chapter	  5).	  This	  did	  not	  fail	  to	  produce	  an	  effect,	   especially	   on	   youngsters.	   These	  muchachos	   (‘boys’),	   as	   leading	   members	   such	   as	  Gómez	  and	  El	  Inge	  paternally	  (or	  paternalistically?)	  referred	  to	  them	  in	  interviews,	  made	  up	  the	  bulk	  of	  LCT’s	  members,	  thus	  underlining	  the	  changed	  profile	  of	  those	  integrating	  el	  
narco	   in	  Michoacán.	   An	   array	   of	   informants	   reported	   that	   children	   as	   young	   as	   thirteen	  were	  being	  integrated	  through	  an	  escalating	  recruitment	  process.	  Younger	  members	  were	  first	   given	   the	   task	   of	   running	   simple	   errands:	   ‘go	   and	   buy	  me	   some	   beer	   and	   keep	   the	  change’,	  as	  one	  mother	  preoccupied	  for	  her	  fourteen-­‐year-­‐old	  son’s	  incipient	  involvement	  illustrated.	  After	  some	  time,	  greater	  responsibility	  frequently	  came	  by	  being	  equipped	  with	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a	  two-­‐way-­‐radio.	   In	  some	  cases,	  the	  halcón’s	  paraphernalia	  finally	  gave	  way	  to	  those	  of	  a	  
sicario:	   Child	   soldiers	   in	   Tierra	   Caliente,	   a	  much-­‐lamented	   occurrence	   throughout	   these	  times.	  	  	  Whatever	   the	   channel,	   at	   the	   beginning	   stands	   an	   approximation	   to	   group	   and	  phenomenon	   enabled	   through	   the	   physical	   presence	   of	   LCT	   and	   thus	   the	   immediate	  display	  of	   insignia	  that	  attract	  and	  fascinate.	  Julio,	   in	  his	  mid-­‐twenties	  and	  from	  a	  rancho	  close	   to	   Apatzingán,	   comes	   from	   what	   he	   describes	   as	   a	   ‘divided	   family’.	   His	   parents	  divorced	  as	  his	  father	   ‘andaba	  muy	  mal	   [was	  on	  the	  wrong	  path]’,	  which	  is	  to	  say	  that	  he	  was	  not	  only	  ‘bien	  mujerito	  [sleeping	  around]’	  but	  moreover	  involved	  with	  ellos.	  ‘And	  still,	  he	   just	  wouldn’t	   leave	  us	   in	  peace…’	  His	  brother,	  still	  close	  to	   the	   father,	   told	  his	  mother	  that	  if	  she	  would	  not	  reunite	  with	  him,	  he	  would	  join	  LCT:	  	  
‘So	  he	  starts	  to	  hang	  out	  with	  those	  people…	  to	  see	  what	  they	  were	  doing…	  the	  guns,	  and	  the	  money,	  and	  the	  women…	  so	  he	  went	  into	  hiding…	  and	  we	  realized	  what	  was	  going	  on,	  they	  already	  had	  him	  well	  azotado	  [‘whipped’,	  as	   in	  under	  control],	   all	   armed	  and	  all	   that…	  he	  was	  sixteen…	  a	  very	  ugly	  feeling,	  I	  feel	  like	  my	  brother	  is	  already	  sangre	  mala	  [‘bad	  blood’,	  as	  in	  evil]	  because	  this	  is	  how	  they	  taught	  him	  to	  be…	  and	  after	  that	  he	  tells	  me	  that	  he	  has	  already	  killed	  people…	  it	  was	  the	  first	  thing	  they	  had	  to	  do	  out	  there,	  kill	  somebody,	  that	  is…’	  	  	  	  Julio	  himself	  was	  also	  approached,	  albeit	  with	  a	  direct	  offer	  to	  occupy	  a	  more	  prestigious	  (and	  thus	  better	  paid)	  position:	  	  
‘One	  they	  call	  El	  Barrito	  comes	  to	  my	  place	  one	  day	  and	  tells	  me	  ‘’take	  your	  stuff	  and	  come	  to	  Morelia	  with	  me	  as	  an	  accountant’’…	  and	  he	  tosses	  some	  packs	  of	  money	  over	  to	  me,	  nothing	  but	  bills	  of	  500	  [pesos],	  the	  first	  pay,	  it	  was	   like	   15,000…	   and	   I	   was	   already	   contemplating	   how	   I’d	   have	   all	   the	  finest	   clothes	   and	   so	   on…	   but	   no,	   I	   told	   them	   to	   go	   fuck	   themselves	   [he	  rectifies	   that	   he	   expressed	   it	   differently]…	   it’s	   like	   they	   get	   you	  with	   the	  money	  but	  once	  you’re	  in…’	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Una	   vez	   que	   entras,	   ya	   no	   sales.	   Once	   you’re	   in,	   you	   don’t	   get	   out	   anymore.	   Common	  knowledge	   amongst	   locals	   and	   a	   harsh	   contrast	   to	   the	   golden	   age’s	   free	   entry	   and	   exit,	  being	  a	  Templar	  implies	  not	  only	  an	  exclusive	  commitment	  but	  furthermore	  one	  for	  life.	  As	  LCT’s	  official	  wording	  –	  contained	  in	  its	  fifty-­‐three-­‐item-­‐strong	  booklet	  of	  behavioral	  codes	  that	  was	  handed	  out	  in	  vast	  numbers	  to	  local	  civilians	  and	  to	  me	  personally	  by	  Alejandro,	  the	  twenty-­‐something-­‐year-­‐old	  sicario	  who	  had	  driven	  me	  to	  my	  first	  meeting	  with	  Gómez	  (‘grab	  as	  many	  as	   you	  want’)	   –	  had	   it:	   ‘Any	  element	   that	   is	   accepted	   to	   form	  part	  of	   the	  group	  of	  the	  Knights	  Templar	  of	  Michoacán	  does	  so	  for	  their	  entire	  life,	  he	  will	  not	  be	  able	  to	   abandon	   the	   cause’	   (Code	  #4).	   The	  Código	  de	  Los	  Caballeros	  Templarios	  de	  Michoacán	  (‘Code	  of	  The	  Knights	  Templar	  of	  Michoacán’,	  see	  Image	  4.1)	  moreover	  leaves	  no	  doubt	  as	  to	   the	   consequences	   violations	   entail.	   New	   recruits	   swear,	   as	   the	   fifth	   code	   specifies,	   an	  oath:	   ‘Juramento	  Templario	  
Juro	  delante	  de	  todos,	  vivir	  y	  morir	  con	  
honor.	  
Juro	  combatir	  la	  injusticia	  y	  socorrer	  a	  mi	  
prójimo.	  Juro,	  igual	  en	  el	  combate	  como	  en	  
la	  paz,	  que	  ningún	  caballero	  será	  
considerado	  por	  mi	  como	  enemigo.	  
Juro	  fidelidad	  al	  temple	  y	  esforzarme	  por	  
perpetuarlo.	  
Juro	  respeto	  a	  las	  damas,	  veneración	  a	  las	  
madres,	  protección	  a	  los	  niños	  y	  a	  los	  
ancianos,	  asistencia	  a	  los	  necesitados.	  
Juro	  respetar	  la	  fe	  de	  otros	  y	  buscar	  más	  la	  
verdad	  que	  la	  gloria,	  el	  honor	  que	  los	  
honores.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Si,	  por	  desgracia	  yo	  traicionara	  mi	  
juramento,	  ruego	  ser	  ejecutado	  por	  la	  
orden	  como	  un	  traidor.’
‘Templar	  Oath	  I	  swear	  in	  front	  of	  everybody,	  to	  live	  and	  die	  with	  honor.	  I	  swear	  to	  combat	  injustice	  and	  to	  come	  to	  the	  aid	  of	  my	  neighbor.	  I	  swear,	  in	  battle	  and	  in	  peace	  alike,	  that	  no	  knight	  will	  be	  considered	  an	  enemy.	  I	  swear	  fidelity	  to	  the	  temple	  and	  to	  make	  efforts	  to	  perpetuate	  it.	  I	  swear	  respect	  for	  women,	  veneration	  of	  mothers,	  protection	  of	  children	  and	  the	  elderly,	  assistance	  to	  the	  needy.	  I	  swear	  to	  respect	  the	  faith	  of	  others	  and	  to	  seek	  truth	  over	  glory,	  honor	  over	  honors.	  If	  in	  disgrace	  I	  come	  to	  betray	  my	  oath,	  I	  beg	  to	  be	  executed	  by	  the	  order	  as	  a	  traitor.’
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In	  real-­‐life,	  ‘desertion’	  –	  the	  term	  used	  by	  LCT	  and,	  again,	  sedimented	  in	  locals’	  parlance	  –	  plays	   out	   in	   ways	   well	   detached	   from	   the	   evoked	   world	   of	   honor	   and	   absolute	   loyalty.	  Moreover,	   both	   individuals’	   decisions	   to	   leave	   the	   group	   as	   well	   as	   the	   subsequent	  application	  of	  the	  label	  ‘traitor’	  stands	  by	  no	  means	  always	  in	  direct	  relation	  to	  the	  ‘cause’	  or,	   more	   broadly	   speaking,	   the	   organization’s	   functioning	   and	   goals.	   Frequently	   –	   and	  reflecting	   the	   mobilization	   of	   the	   label	   LCT	   for	   particular	   interests	   (see	   Chapter	   5)	   –	  interpersonal	  and	  seemingly	  banal	  conflicts	  occupy	  prime	  importance	  in	  this	  context.	  For	  Julio’s	  brother,	  neither	  being	  overly	  ‘mujerito’	  nor	  wanting	  to	  leave	  his	  wife	  for	  another	  girl	  might	  have	  constituted	  major	  issues.	  Wanting	  to	  leave	  the	  daughter	  of	  EL	  Negro	  and	  thus	  of	  a	  mid-­‐ranking	  member	   of	   LCT,	   in	   turn,	  was	   one.	  When	  he	   ‘preemptively’	   abandoned	   the	  group,	  El	  Negro	  and	  his	  men	  chased	  him	  down.	  As	  Julio	  narrates	  it,	  	  
‘they	   had	   already	   taken	   him…	   had	   him	   tied	   up	   on	   the	   back	   of	   one	   of	   the	  pick-­‐up	   trucks	   they	   use…	   he	   later	   told	  me	   how	   they	   said	   to	   him	   ‘’tu	  puta	  
madre	  [roughly	  and	  mildly:	  you	  son	  of	  a	  bitch],	  you’ll	  end	  exactly	  like	  your	  cousin’’,	  because	  we	  also	  have	  a	  cousin	  desaparecido46…	  and	  we	  had	  heard	  that	  he	  was	  buried	  alive…	  so	  they	  are	  taking	  my	  brother	  tied	  up	  but	  out	  of	  pure	   luck	   they	   run	   into	   some	   soldiers	   and	   they	   take	   him…	   when	   that	  happened	   we	   had	   him	   hidden	   in	   our	   house	   but	   he	   couldn’t	   be	   there	  anymore	  because	  one	  of	  El	  Negro’s	  sisters	  would	  come	  and	  investigate	  (sic)	  where	  we	  were	  living…	  so	  they	  wanted	  to	  chingarselo	  [‘fuck	  him’,	  as	  in	  kill	  him]	  and	  he	  had	  to	  go	  away…	  we	  then	  had	  him	  for	  a	  while	  [in	  a	  city	  close	  by]	  and	  we	  never	  said	  anything,	  but	  what	  if…	  the	  life	  of	  all	  the	  others,	  of	  my	  cousins,	  of	  my	  uncles,	  was	  at	  risk’	  	  	  	  ‘Did	  the	  rest	  of	  your	  family	  receive	  threats	  then?’,	  I	  enquired.	  	  
‘They	   [the	  military]	   took	  my	  mom	  to	  Morelia	   for	   two	  days…	  because	   they	  had	   detained	   three	   guys	   that	  were	   going	   to	   kill	   him	   [the	   brother]…	  what	  they	  wanted	  was	  for	  my	  brother	  to	  come	  forward	  to	  make	  a	  statement…	  he	  stayed	  hidden…	  and	  my	  mom	  went	  and	  they	  threatened	  my	  mom	  too…	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  Desaparecido	   translates	   as	   ‘disappeared’.	   In	   Latin	   America,	   it	   originally	   evokes	   those	   taken	   and	   killed	  during	  the	  region’s	  military	  dictatorships	  but	  whose	  deaths	  were	  never	  officially	  (or	  only	  later)	  confirmed.	  In	   contemporary	  Mexico,	   the	  meaning	   has	   shifted	   to	   indicate	   those	   vanished	   during	   the	   country’s	   ‘drug-­‐fuelled	  conflict’.	  Estimations	  speak	  of	  20,000	  disappearances	  over	  the	  past	  decade	  (see	  Newsweek	  Noticias,	  2015).	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well,	  until	  now	  they	  haven’t	  bothered	  us	  anymore…	  My	  mom	  had	  to	   leave	  because…	   they	  wouldn’t	   let	   her	   in	  peace	   anymore…	  a	   cousin	  of	  mine	   that	  was	  also	  in	  prison…	  I	  supported	  him	  and	  sent	  him	  clothing	  and	  so	  on…	  he	  gets	  out	  and	   joins	   them	  [LCT]	  again,	  and	  this	   is	  what	  he	  said	   to	  my	   face.	   I	  told	   him:	   ‘’Hey	  how	  are	   you?’’	   ‘’Well,	   here	   I	   am,	  working,	   looking	   for,	   you	  know	  who…	  we	  want	  to	  know	  where	  those	  who	  desert	  are	  because	  we	  want	  to	  kill	   them’’…	  he	   told	  me	   that	  because	  of	  my	  brother,	   and	   I	   tell	   him	  how	  messed	   up	   I	   thought	   that	   was	   and	   now	   we	   don’t	   even	   greet	   each	   other	  anymore…	  and	  now	  my	  family	  is	  more	  destroyed	  than	  ever,	  it’s	  such	  an	  ugly	  feeling…	   I	   don’t	   feel	   well	   at	   all	   anymore,	   I’m	   practically	   all	   alone	   now	  because	  my	  mom	  had	  to	  leave	  as	  well…	  I’m	  still	  in	  touch	  with	  her	  but	  it’s	  not	  the	  same…	  on	  the	  weekends	  I	  stay	  alone	  and	  I	  cry.’	  	  The	  tight	  regime	  of	  control	  over	  the	  lives	  of	  those	  who	  join	  its	  ranks	  (and,	  by	  extension,	  of	  those	  close	  to	  them)	  goes	  hand	  in	  hand	  with	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  stratification	  within	  LCT.	  The	  way	  the	  group’s	  proceeds	  are	  distributed	  stands	  in	  stark	  contrast	  to	  both	  the	  golden	  age’s	  effect	  of	  broad	  economic	  empowerment	  as	  well	  as	   its	  promise	  as	  a	  central	  motivation	   to	  become	  a	  member.	  Access	  to	  the	  material	  fruits	  of	  the	  profession	  is	  limited	  to	  what	  I	  refer	  to	  as	  the	  narcoelite.	  To	  those,	  that	  is,	  occupying	  mid-­‐	  and	  top-­‐level	  positions	  within	  LCT	  as	  a	   centralized	   accumulating	   body.	   Half	   way	   into	   our	   first	   conversation,	   a	   chatty	   and	  seemingly	  hyperactive	  Gómez	  once	  again	  deviated	  from	  the	  official	  line	  (Moreno	  would,	  as	  I	  make	   reference	   to	   some	   of	   Gómez’	   statements	   in	   a	   later	   conversation	   complained	   that	  ‘that	   one	   talks	   too	   much’).	   In	   contradiction	   to	   the	   código’s	   prohibition	   of	   members	  consuming	   illicit	   drugs	   (Code	   #	   38	   states	   that	   ‘anti-­‐doping	   tests’	   will	   periodically	   be	  conducted),	  this	  self-­‐designated	  narco	  de	  corazón	  (“narco	  by	  heart”)	  promised	  to	  be	  frank	  with	  me:	  	  
‘What	  am	  I	  going	  to	  tell	  you…	  I’m	  not	  going	  to	  lie:	  I	  do	  like	  la	  coca	  [cocaine]	  and	  I	  do	  like	  women…	  sometimes	  they	  bring	  me	  twenty	  or	  thirty	  women	  for	  me	  to	  have	  fun…	  and	  some	  of	   them	  charge	  15,000	  pesos!	  Way	  too	  much…	  but	   then	   again,	   I	   have	   suitcases	   of	  money	   laying	   around	   and	   I	   can’t	   even	  spend	  it…’	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Conditions	  for	  the	  bulk	  of	  lower	  ranking	  members	  is,	  in	  contrast,	  precarious	  in	  every	  way	  possible.	  Their	  monthly	   saldo	  (‘wage’,	   sic),	   as	  Tito	   told	  me,	   lies	   somewhere	  around	  5000	  pesos	  (ca.	  215	  GBP	  as	  of	  March	  13th	  2015)	  –	  hardly	  enough	  to	  live	  a	  narco’s	  stereotypical	  ‘lush	   life’	   (a	   term	   borrowed	   from	   Hobbs,	   2013).	   Rather,	   scarcity	   seems	   to	   govern	   the	  everyday	  life	  of	  regular	  Caballeros,	  perceived	  by	  informants	  to	  be	  ‘just	  as	  miserable	  as	  us’	  and	  even	  to	  look	  ‘starved’.	  As	  a	  mother	  of	  an	  underage	  sicario	  reflected	  on	  the	  conditions	  of	  the	  cell	  LCT	  has	  installed	  in	  her	  community,	  	  
‘el	  que	  manda	  [the	  one	  who	  commands,	  another	  term	  frequently	  used	  in	  lieu	  of	  jefe	  de	  plaza],	  only	  he	  sleeps,	  the	  boys	  don’t…	  it’s	  a	  real	  shame…	  they	  are	  always	  up	  and	  on	  guard,	  they	  barely	  give	  them	  enough	  water	  to	  drink…	  and	  if	  one	  falls	  asleep,	  they	  tie	  him	  up47,	  they	  punish	  him…	  they	  don’t	  eat	  until	  the	  jefe	  has	  eaten…	  they	  treat	  them	  real	  ugly	  thus…’	  	  	  	  But	  then	  again,	  a	  Caballero	  is	  in	  it	  for	  reasons	  nobler	  than	  material	  gains	  and	  is	  expected	  to	  neither	  question	  hierarchy	  nor	  privileges.	  As	   the	  Código	   specifies:	   ‘A	  Knight	  ought	  not	   to	  seek	  positions	  of	  enrichment	  within	  the	  Order.	  He	  will	  be	  satisfied	  with	  those	  posts	  that	  he	  shall	  be	  entrusted	  with	   to	   serve	   it	  best’	   (Code	  #25);	   ‘A	  Templar	   shall	  not	   judge	  anybody	  inside	  or	  outside	  the	  Order	  for	  his	  possessions	  or	  his	  social	  position’	  (Code	  #26);	  ‘For	  the	  Knights	  Templar	  of	  Michoacán,	  discipline	  is	  constant	  and	  obedience	  is	  always	  respected:	  he	  [the	   member]	   comes	   and	   goes	   according	   to	   the	   signals	   given	   by	   whomever	   possesses	  authority’	  (#28).	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  Amarrar	   is	   a	   standard	   practice	   of	   punishment	   applied	   by	   LCT	   both	   to	   its	   own	   members	   as	   well	   as	   to	  civilians	  as	  part	  of	  its	  production	  as	  a	  guardian	  of	  social	  order	  (see	  Chapter	  4).	  It	  usually	  implies	  designated	  perpetrators	   being	   tied	   to	   objects	   such	   as	   trees	   for	   hours	   or	   days,	   thus	   exposing	   them	   to	   the	   regard	   of	  others.	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Conclusion	  
Over	   the	   previous	   pages,	   I	   have	   laid	   the	   necessary	   groundwork	   for	   the	   line	   of	  argumentation	  I	  present	  in	  the	  following	  chapters.	  In	  particular,	  I	  have	  provided	  a	  critical	  reexamination	   of	   the	   history	   of	  Michoacán	   drug	   trafficking	   and	   organized	   crime.	   Rather	  than	   a	   more	   comprehensive,	   all-­‐encompassing	   history	   than	   currently	   available,	   which	  would	   have	   gone	   beyond	   the	   scope	   of	   this	   thesis,	   I	   have	   revisited	   the	   emergence	   and	  trajectory	  of	  the	  phenomenon	  from	  an	  angle	  congruent	  with	  the	  core	  interest	  of	  this	  thesis:	  approaching	   the	   interaction	  between	  criminal	  organizations	  and	  civilian	  populations	  and	  deciphering	   the	   ensuing	   effects.	   True	   to	  my	   general	  methodological	   approach	   to	   rely	   as	  little	   as	   possible	   on	   categories	   and	   containers	   prefabricated	   from	   afar	   and	   through	   a	  normatively	   biased	   officialist	   perspective,	   I	   have	   done	   so	   by	   relying	   as	   extensively	   as	  possible	   on	   insights,	   memories,	   and	   experiences	   of	   actual	   protagonists	   in	   the	   trade:	  traffickers	  themselves	  as	  well	  as	  members	  of	  civilian	  populations	  with	  which	  the	  latter	  are	  intrinsically	   interwoven	  with	  and	  without	  of	  which	   they	  have	  emerged.	  These	  depictions	  describe	   the	  mutation	  of	  a	  phenomenon	   that	  has	  become	  ever	  more	  deeply	  engrained	   in	  the	  local	  culture	  and	  society	  and	  that	  has	  begun	  its	  trajectory	  as	  an	  illegal,	  yet	  considered	  to	  be	  largely	  harm-­‐free	  way	  of	  gaining	  extra	  income	  in	  a	  region	  historically	  characterized	  by	  high	   rates	   of	   socio-­‐economic	  marginalization.	   The	   proliferation	   of	   locals’	   involvement	   in	  narcotrafficking	  and	  the	  ‘normality’	  it	  thereby	  attained	  is,	  as	  I	  have	  shown,	  set	  against	  the	  backdrop	   of	  macrostructural	   political	   as	  well	   as	   economic	   changes	   both	  within	   the	   legal	  arena	  (e.g.	   the	  neo-­‐liberalization	  of	   the	  Mexican	  economy	  and	  agriculture)	  and	  the	   illegal	  arena	   (e.g.	   the	   growth	   and	   increasing	   financial	   and	   political	   power	   of	   international	   drug	  markets).	  From	  this	  stage	  of	  growth	  onwards,	  and	  at	  least	  partly	  enabled	  by	  simultaneous	  changes	  in	  the	  Mexican	  political	  regime	  which	  brought	  about	  a	  pluralization	  of	  the	  power	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structure	  and	  thereby	  difficulties	  for	  the	  state	  to	  keep	  drug	  traffickers	  at	  bay	  and	  regulate	  disputes	   amongst	   them,	   the	   phenomenon	  moreover	   experienced	   an	   accentuation	   of	   the	  quality	   and	   quantity	   of	   the	   violence	   involved.	   This	   came	   accompanied	   by	   an	   imminent	  trend	   towards	  more	   rigid	   forms	  of	   organization,	  which	  pushed	   independent	  participants	  out	  and	  led	  to	  a	  greater	  stratification	  of	  power	  and	  material	  gains.	  My	  historical	  overview	  reaches	   up	   to	   the	   emergence	   of	   La	   Familia	   Michoacana	   and	   thus	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	  contemporary	  (as	  defined	  by	  the	  time	  of	  fieldwork	  in	  2012)	  apogee	  of	  this	  mutation	  in	  the	  sense	   that	   it	   had	   come	   to	   transcend	   its	   original	   sphere	   of	   action,	   taken	   up	   a	   more	  prominent	  and	   interventionist	  role	  within	  society	   that,	  as	  of	   late,	  has	  undeniably	  become	  political.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Reflecting	  the	  history	  of	  Michoacán	  organized	  crime	  through	  the	  eyes	  of	  local	  actors	  can	  by	  itself	  be	  considered	  fruitful	  insofar	  as	  it	  adds	  a	  new	  dimension	  as	  well	  as	  new	  aspects	  and,	  through	   the	   personal	   proximity	   that	   characterizes	   informants’	   accounts,	   greater	   texture.	  However,	  the	  importance	  of	  understanding	  how	  evaluations	  are	  formed	  and	  through	  which	  type	   of	   encounters,	   past	   and	   current,	   and	   perhaps	   even	   involvement	   with	   the	   changing	  phenomenon	  and	  the	  respective	  actors	  that	  populate,	  make,	  and	  are	  associated	  with	  it	  goes	  far	   beyond	   this	   aspect.	   For,	   as	   I	   demonstrate	   in	   the	   following	   chapter,	   local	   civilians’	  opinions,	  evaluations,	  and	  reflections	  –	  both	  of	  organized	  crime	  as	  well	  as	  the	  wider	  socio-­‐economic	   and	   political	   environment	   and,	   in	   this	   context,	   the	   state	   –	   constitute	   a	   force	  without	   which	   the	   direction	   the	   phenomenon	   was	   given	   under	   LFM’s	   and	   later	   LCT’s	  agency	   cannot	  be	  properly	  understood.	  LCT	  demonstrated	  an	  awareness	  of	   these	   critical	  evaluations	   by	   civilians	   –	   stemming	   not	   least	   from	   the	   all-­‐permeating	   shape	   organized	  crime	   had	   attained	   as	   a	   result	   of	   its	   spillover	   –	   as	   well	   as	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   these	   could	  ultimately	  lead	  to	  a	  proactive	  resistance	  against	  its	  claim	  of	  territorial	  supremacy	  and	  the	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group	   itself.	   This	   recognition,	   I	   argue,	   pushed	   LCT	   to	   pursue	   its	   project	   of	   alternative	  governance	  in	  the	  first	  place	  and	  established	  the	  obtention	  of	   legitimacy	  –	  or,	  simply	  put,	  favorable	  evaluations	  –	  as	  a	  prime	  organizational	  goal.	  It	  furthermore	  constituted	  the	  basis	  in	  reflection	  of	  which	  this	  goal	  was	  translated	   into	  correspondingly	  designed	  practices	  to	  obtain	  legitimacy,	  key	  examples	  of	  which	  I	  analyze	  below	  by	  drawing	  on	  the	  voices	  of	  both	  civilians	  and	  contemporary	  members	  of	  LCT.	  Before	  I	  do	  so,	  I	  recall	  some	  key	  concepts	  in	  the	   contemporary	   landscape	   of	   social	   order	   and	   sovereignty	   and	   provide	   some	   basic	  reflections	  on	  legitimacy.	  This	  serves	  to	  situate	  LCT’s	  agency	  within	  a	  broader	  context	  and	  a	  wider	  population	  of	  non-­‐state	  actors	   involved	   in	  the	  provision	  of	  governance	   in	  Mexico	  and	  Latin	  America	  today.	  I	  then	  provide	  in-­‐depth	  insights	  into	  LCT’s	  project	  of	  alternative	  governance,	   which	   I	   understand	   as	   an	   enacted	   narrative	   geared	   at	   the	   generation	   of	  legitimacy.	  Finally,	  I	  bring	  in	  the	  experiences	  and	  voices	  of	  local	  civilians	  as	  the	  immediate	  recipients	  as	  well	   as	   social	  audiences	  evaluating	  LCT’s	  performance	  and	  adherence	   to	   its	  own	  proclaimed	  identity.	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Chapter	  5:	  LCT’s	  project	  of	  alternative	  governance	  	  
Oh	  all	  mighty	  Lord	   	   	   	   	  	  
Liberate	  us	  of	  all	  sins	  
Give	  me	  blessed	  protection	  
Through	  San	  Nazario	  
	  
Protector	  of	  the	  poorest	  
Knight	  of	  the	  People	  
San	  Nazario,	  give	  us	  life	  
Oh	  sacred	  eternal	  senor	  
	  
Sacred	  light	  of	  the	  night	  	  
Defender	  of	  the	  sick	  
San	  Nazario,	  our	  saint	  
Forever	  I	  turn	  myself	  over	  to	  you	  
	  
Glory	  to	  God	  the	  father	  	  
I	  dedicate	  you	  my	  rosary	  
Give	  us	  health	  and	  more	  work	  	  
Abundance	  in	  our	  hands	  
That	  our	  people	  shall	  be	  blessed	  
I	  ask	  you,	  San	  Nazario	  
	   Rosary	  to	  San	  Nazario	  	  	  A	   few	   days	   into	   my	   fieldwork	   in	   Tierra	   Caliente,	   I	   learned	   that	   participants	   in	   self-­‐empowerment	   seminars	   roam	   Apatzingán’s	   streets	   in	   butterfly	   costumes	   and	   hand	   out	  ‘free	  hugs’	   to	  passing	  pedestrians.	  What	  would	  certainly	  have	  seemed	  curious	   to	  me	   in	  a	  city	   such	   as	   London,	   here	   seemed	   outright	   bizarre.	   For	   one,	   it	   further	   added	   to	   my	  confusion	   with	   regards	   to	   an	   everyday	   banality	   that	   overtly	   contradicts	   the	   state	   of	  emergency	  I	  had	  expected	  to	  find.	  More	  striking	  though	  was	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  sponsors	  of	  these	  seminars	  were	  the	  very	  same	  as	   those	  that	  would,	   to	  paraphrase	  Don	  José,	  kill	  you	  just	   for	   the	   heck	   of	   it.	   The	   same	   ones,	   that	   is,	   that	   burst	   into	   domestic	   as	  well	   as	  world	  media	   attention	   and	   thus	   collective	   imaginations	   in	   2006	   when	   twenty	   of	   its	   sicarios	  entered	  a	  brothel	  and	  strip	  club	  in	  another	  Michoacán	  city	  and	  tossed	  five	  severed	  heads	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onto	  the	  floor	  (see	  Roque	  Madríz,	  2006).	  The	  same	  ones,	  not	  least,	  whose	  monopolization	  of	   and	   imposition	   of	   a	   violent	   and	   excluding	  modus	   operandi	   onto	   narcotrafficking-­‐as-­‐pathway-­‐to-­‐modernity	   had	   entailed	   condemning	   evaluations	   and	   comments	   by	   local	  civilians	   (see	   Chapter	   4).	   As	   perplexing	   as	   this	   may	   seem,	   against	   this	   backdrop,	   the	  assertion	   of	   voluntary	   participation	   in	   and	   indeed	   positive	   experiences	   exist	   and	   are	  derived	  from	  such	  seminars	  organized	  and	  financed	  by	  LCT.	  One	  woman,	  in	  her	  mid-­‐forties,	  stated	  how	  El	  Profe	  –	  she	  used	  another	  of	  Gómez’s	  nicknames	  stemming	  from	  his	  past	  as	  a	  teacher	  –	  paid	  a	  Catholic	  priest	  originally	  from	  Tierra	  Caliente	  to	  come	  down	  from	  Chicago	  to	  act	  as	  one	  amongst	  various	  individuals	  giving	  her	  and	  others	  orientaciones:	  The	  latter,	  as	  she	  specified,	  included	  	  
‘a	   lot	  of	   testimonies…	  very	  beautiful	   things	  actually…	  of	  what	  happened	  in	  his	   family,	   that	   his	   brother	   had	   a	   serious	   heart	   problem	   because	   he	   was	  drinking	  a	  lot…	  and	  the	  doctors	  only	  gave	  him	  only	  two	  months	  to	  live…	  and	  Delfino	  [the	  priest’s	  name]	  took	  him	  to	  church	  and	  tells	  him:	   ‘’there,	  you’ll	  talk	   to	  God	  and	  offer	  him	  something	  so	  he	  cures	  you’’…	  and	  him:	   ‘’Lord,	   if	  you	   cure	  me,	   I	  will	   always	   talk	   about	   your	  word	   and	   I	  will	   go	   to	   a	   lot	   of	  places	  to	  predicate	  your	  word	  and	  I’ll	  last	  as	  long	  as	  you	  want	  me	  to’’…	  and	  he	  [Delfino]	  says	  that	  this	  was	  ten	  years	  ago	  and	  he’s	  still	  predicating…’	  ‘So	  he	  comes	  every	  year?’	  ‘Yes,	  and	  it’s	  really	  beautiful	  because	  he	  teaches	  you	  to	  get	  close	  to	  God,	  which	  is	  good	  because	  God	  is	  good	  and	  God	  helps	  one	  to	  
sanarse	  [to	  heal	  or	  to	  cure,	  as	  in:	  to	  live	  an	  improved,	  moral	  life]…’	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  material	  handed	  to	  me	  by	  LCT	  a	  few	  weeks	  later	  added	  further	  elements	  to	  what	  was	  beginning	  to	  present	  itself	  as	  a	  magic	  (narco-­‐)realism	  terracalentano.	  We	  had	  already	  been	  sent	  back	  the	  same	  morning,	  a	  hoped-­‐for	  encounter	  with	  the	  person	  Gómez	  had	  referred	  to	  as	   his	  patrón	   postponed.	   Back	   again	   in	   the	   community	   later	   the	   same	  day,	  we	  waited	   in	  front	   of	   the	   local	   jefe	   de	   plaza’s	   house.	   He	   seemed	   grim	   signaling	   little	   interest	   in	   our	  presence,	  let	  alone	  a	  readiness	  to	  interact.	  Perhaps	  this	  was,	  I	  speculated,	  due	  to	  our	  arrival	  earlier	   that	  day.	   It	   had	  prompted	  his	  wife	   to	   chase	  him	  out	  of	   bed	   after	  what	   seemed	   to	  have	  been	  a	  rough	  night,	  at	  least	  judging	  from	  the	  way	  he	  looked	  as	  he	  stumbled	  out	  of	  the	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front	  door:	  shirtless,	  proudly	  bellied,	  the	  loose	  camouflage	  pants	  so	  low	  as	  to	  barely	  veil	  the	  missing	   underwear,	   and	   the	   9mm	  handgun	  provisionally	   tugged	   away	   in	   the	   back	   of	   his	  pants.	  Even	  so,	  we	  were	  being	  entertained	  by	  the	  group	  of	  young	  sicarios	  who	  had,	  as	  the	  sun	  had	  started	  to	  set,	  gotten	  out	  a	  guitar	  and	  begun	  to	  sing	  love	  songs.	  The	  ice-­‐cooled	  beer	  I	  was	  offered,	  in	  contrast,	  I	  turned	  down,	  wanting	  to	  keep	  my	  senses	  as	  sharp	  as	  possible.	  The	  envoy,	  who	  arrived	  after	  about	   two	  hours,	  bore	  polite	  excuses.	  The	  patrón	  had	  been	  called	  away	  to	  attend	  an	  urgent	  matter	  and	  would	  consequently	  not	  be	  available	  to	  receive	  us.	   He	   had,	   however,	   sent	   his	   greetings	   as	   well	   as	   an	   USB-­‐stick,	   a	   booklet,	   and	   a	   book.	  Material	  that,	  as	  he	  stated,	  ‘shows	  how	  he	  thinks’	  and	  that	  was	  to	  help	  me	  ‘better	  prepare	  myself’	  for	  a	  future	  meeting.	  	  	  We	  hid	  the	  items	  amongst	  two	  high	  stashes	  of	  documents	  in	  our	  car’s	  trunk.	  	  Successfully,	  albeit	   tensely48,	   we	   made	   it	   through	   a	   navy-­‐checkpoint49	  (‘What	   are	   doing	   you	   here?’	  ‘Paseando	  na’	  más	  [just	  visiting]…’)	  and	  back	  home,	  we	  eagerly	  explored	  the	  stuff	  we	  had	  been	   given,	   finding	   a	   preview	   of	   the	   latest	   round	   of	   propaganda	  material,	   released	   soon	  after	  and	  of	  the	  sort	  central	  to	  LCT’s	  striving	  for	  legitimacy	  ever	  since	  its	  rise.	  It	  included	  a	  copy	   of	   Moreno’s	   autobiography,	   portrayed	   as	   a	   post	  mortem	  publication	   and	   titled	   ‘Me	  
dicen:	  ‘’El	  Más	  Loco’’	  –	  Diario	  de	  un	  idealista’	   (‘They	  call	  me:	   ‘’The	  Craziest	  One’’	  –	  Diary	  of	  an	  idealist’,	  henceforth	  Moreno,	  2012)	  after	  one	  of	  his	  nicknames.	  The	  supposedly	  defunct	  author	  here	  laid	  out	  his	  version	  of	  Michoacán’s	  recent	  history	  as	  well	  as	  his	  and	  his	  group’s	  (desired)	   place	   in	   it.	   It	   offered	   by	   far	   the	   best	   and	   densest	   crystallization	   of	   the	   group‘s	  discursive	  self-­‐portrayal	  and	   illuminated	   the	   ideological	  building	  blocks	   it	  was	  construed	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  Given	   the	   efforts	   undertaken	   and	   arrests	   made	   in	   this	   context	   by	   federal	   state	   actors	   to	   get	   Moreno’s	  autobiography	  off	  the	  street	  as	  soon	  as	  it	  had	  been	  handed	  out,	  our	  nervousness	  seems	  all	  the	  more	  justified	  in	  retrospect.	  	  	  49	  Here	  and	  in	  other	  stages	  of	  Calderón’s	  ‘war	  on	  drugs’,	  the	  Mexican	  navy	  has	  been	  deployed	  in	  the	  country’s	  interior.	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of.	  Below,	  due	  to	  its	  outstanding	  importance,	  I	  dedicate	  significant	  space	  to	  portraying	  the	  core	  narrative	  it	  reproduced.	  Doing	  so	  establishes	  the	  basis	  for	  my	  discussion	  of	  the	  ways	  this	  narrative	  played	  out	  on	  the	  ground	  as	  well	  as	  of	  its	  reception	  and	  evaluation	  by	  local	  civilians.	  	  	  As	  a	  ‘social	  movement’,	  Moreno	  writes	  in	  ‘El	  Más	  Loco’,	  the	  group’s	  raison	  d’être	  consists	  in	  uniting	  ‘all	  the	  isolated	  social	  struggles	  developing	  in	  Mexico	  and	  other	  countries…	  to	  make	  one	  sole,	  powerful,	  and	  inexorable	  social	  earthquake	  which	  would	  once	  and	  for	  all	  liberate	  all	  the	  peoples	  of	  the	  world’	  (Moreno,	  2012:	  68).	  Ambitious	  claims	  such	  as	  these	  –	  or,	   for	  that	  matter,	  the	  placement	  of	  Moreno’s	  picture	  right	  next	  to	  that	  of	  Jesus	  Christ	  (see	  Image	  5.1)	   –	   have	   underpinned	   the	   swift	   and	   general	   dismissal	   of	   LCT’s	   self-­‐production	   as	   a	  benevolent	   actor	   inspired	   by	   the	   highest	   moral	   standards	   as	   a	   poor	   and	   transparent	  attempt	   to	   veil	   a	   purebred	   predator:	   ‘one	   of	   the	  most	   bizarre	   and	   deadly	   cartels	   in	   the	  world’	   (Grayson,	  2010:vii)	  or,	  according	   to	   the	  Drug	  Enforcement	  Administration,	   ‘one	  of	  the	  world's	  most	  vicious	  and	  violent	  drug	  and	  criminal	  networks’	  (DEA,	  2015).	  And	  again,	  when	  measured	   against	   local	   civilians’	   evaluations	   as	   reflected	   in	   Chapter	   4,	   little	   doubt	  seems	  to	  remain	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  narcotrafficking	  as	  embodied	  by	  LCT	  has	  lost	  what	   Malkin	   diagnosed,	   a	   decade	   earlier,	   as	   a	   ‘cultural	   struggle	   over	   [its]	   meaning’.	  Narcotraffickers	   would,	   she	   argued,	   ultimately	   only	   subsist	   within	   local	   society	   if	   they	  successfully:	  
‘[generated]	   a	   status	   for	   themselves	   that	   can	   counteract	   the	  messages	   by	  the	   government	   and	   other	   media…	   that	   stress	   the	   illegality	   of	   narcotics	  production	   and	   attempt	   to	   construct	   narcotraffickers	   as	   a	   group	   that	   can	  endanger	  national	  development	  and	  progress’	  (2001:101)	  	  	  In	   the	   same	   vein,	   the	   treatment	   of	   legitimacy	   generation	   of	   criminal	   organizations	   as	  counterintuitive	   and	   therefore	   as	   a	   non-­‐subject	  within	   the	   corresponding	   literature	   (see	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Chapter	   1)	   might	   seem	   justified	   at	   first	   sight.	   The	   more	   so	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   Mexican	  organized	  crime	  and	  not	   least	   its	  Michoacán	  variant.	  After	  all,	   those	   leading	  a	  group	  now	  claiming	   to	   constitute	   a	   force	   of	   good	   were	   amongst	   the	   protagonists	   that	   pushed	   the	  phenomenon	   into	   its	   oppressive,	   hyperviolent	   form	   emblematizing	   a	   new	   dimension	   of	  social	  disorder	  in	  the	  region.	  	  	  
	  Image	  5.1:	  Cover	  page	  ‘Code	  of	  The	  Knights	  Templar	  of	  Michoacán’,	  own	  scan.	  	  The	  quote	  reads:	  ‘This	  fight	  is	  for	  your	  people	  for	  my	  people,	  for	  ourselves	  and	  for	  our	  future	  generations’	  	  	  	  
	  	  	   153	  
The	  erosion	  of	  state	  governance	  and	  the	  demand	  for	  social	  order	  	  
What	  the	  above	  outlined	  characterizations	  fail	  to	  accurately	  grasp	  is	  that	  it	  is	  precisely	  this	  escalation	  that	  entails	  an	  ever	  greater	  demand	  for	  some	  solution	  to	  social	  order	  –	  or	  at	  least	  the	  promise	  of	   a	   solution.	  This	   is	   by	  no	  means	   limited	   to	  Tierra	  Caliente	  but	   supposes	   a	  dynamic	   central	   to	   contemporary	   Mexico,	   Latin	   America,	   and	   the	   ‘global	   south’	   more	  generally.	   As	   noted	   in	   Chapter	   4,	   anti-­‐statist	   (neoliberal)	   reforms	   advanced	   in	   great	  intensity	   from	   the	   1980s	   have	   fundamentally	   put	   in	   question	   ‘traditional’	   nation-­‐states’	  role	  as	  guarantors	  of	  order	  and,	  for	  that	  matter,	  the	  embodiment	  of	  (dreams	  of)	  progress.	  Furthermore	   confronted	   with	   too-­‐virulent-­‐to-­‐control	   forces	   and	   flows	   of	   globalization	   –	  including	   but	   not	   limited	   to	   organized	   crime	   as	   a	   phenomenon	   propelled	   to	   greater	  prominence	  in	  this	  context	  (see	  e.g.	  Berdal/Serrano,	  2002)	  –	  their	  governmental	  capacity	  has	  become	  eroded	  (see	  Gledhill,	  1995;	  Snyder,	  1999).	  The	  failure	  of	  Latin	  America’s	  late-­‐twentieth	  century	  wave	  of	  democratization	  to	  deliver	  on	  its	  own	  promises	  (e.g.	  Huntington,	  1993)	   and	   to	   materialize	   as	   more	   than	   just	   nominal	   versions	   of	   it	   has	   been	   a	   widely	  lamented	   outcome,	   not	   least	   in	   light	   of	   region-­‐wide	   increases	   in	   social	   inequality	   and	  violence	   (see	   Agüero/Stark,	   1998;	   Méndez	   et	   al.,	   1999;	   Hagopian/Mainwaring,	   2005;	  Arias/Goldstein,	  2010).	  	  
This	  ‘deregulation	  of	  monopolies	  over	  the	  legitimate	  means	  of	  force,	  of	  moral	  orders,	  of	  the	  protection	   of	   persons	   and	   property…	   [and	   the]	   unraveling	   of	   law	   and	   order’	  (Comaroff/Comaroff,	  2006:1)	  cannot,	  however,	  be	  equated	  to	  the	  absence	  of	  order	  per	  se.	  As	   ‘the	   means	   and	   ends	   of	   the	   liberal	   democratic	   state	   are	   refracted,	   deflected,	   and	  dispersed	   into	   the	  murkier	   reaches	  of	   the	  private	   sector’	   (ibid.:16),	   they	   resurface	   in	   the	  hands	  of	  lynch	  mobs,	  vigilantes,	  private	  security	  firms,	  paramilitaries,	  youth	  gangs,	  as	  well	  as	  ‘classical’	  criminal	  organizations	  (see	  Koonings/Kruijt,	  2004;	  Comaroff/Comaroff,	  2006;	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Arias/Goldstein,	   2010;	   Clunan/Trinkunas,	   2010).	   As	   an	   aggregate	   outcome	   and	   self-­‐perpetuating	   driving	   force	   stands	   the	   ‘pluralization	   of	   regulatory	   authority’	   (Roitman,	  2005)	   in	   that	   the	   designated	   core	   functions	   of	   the	   nation-­‐state	   such	   as	   the	   provision	   of	  security	  and	  welfare	  are	   increasingly	  assumed	  by	  non-­‐state	  entities	   (see	  e.g.	  Reno,	  1995,	  2000;	   Comaroff/Comaroff,	   2006;	   Litzinger,	   2006;	   Baylouny,	   2010).	   Contemporary	   Latin	  America	  is	  no	  exception.	  Here,	  too,	  a	  true	  kaleidoscope	  of	  actors	  –	  situated	  everywhere	  and	  anywhere	   on	   a	   blurry	   licit-­‐illicit-­‐continuum	   and	   differing	   greatly	   in	   spatial	   extension,	  organizational	   structure,	   and	   duration	   –	   is	   involved	   in	   the	   reshuffling	   of	   rule	   and	  governance.	  The	  contours	  of	  the	  ‘great’	  structural	  changes	  reshaping	  Latin	  America	  have,	  in	  synthesis,	  been	  principally	  outlined.	  Davis	  (2009,	  2010)	  pertinently	  captures	  the	  resulting	  state	   of	   affairs	   as	   one	   of	   ‘fragmented	   sovereignty’.	   However,	   and	   leading	   back	   to	   the	  (perceived)	  methodological	  dilemma	  of	  getting	  close	  enough	  to	  armed	  non-­‐state	  actors	  to	  produce	   much	   needed	   first-­‐hand	   empirical	   data,	   questions	   relating	   to	   ‘the	   origins	   and	  nature	   of	   alternative	   authority	   and	   governance	   structures	   in	   contested	   spaces’	   (Clunan,	  2010:	   3)	   remain	   severely	   underexplored.	   The	   same	   is	   true	   for	   the	   formation	   of	   new	  ‘imagined	   communities’	   on	   the	   sub-­‐national	   level,	   which	   goes	   hand	   in	   hand	   with	   this	  development	  (see	  Davis,	  2010).	  	  
	  
Remarks	  on	  alternative	  governance	  and	  legitimacy	  	  
In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  provide	  insights	  into	  LCT	  as	  one	  particular	  non-­‐state	  actor-­‐driven	  project	  of	  alternative	  governance.	  Before	  I	  do	  so,	  a	  few	  basic	  remarks	  with	  regards	  to	  my	  use	  of	  the	  term	   ‘alternative	   governance’	   are	   in	   order.	   Its	   main	   attribute	   –	   ‘alternative’	   –	   must	   be	  treated	  with	   caution	   so	   as	  not	   to	  prove	   analytically	  distorting.	  Most	   importantly,	   on-­‐the-­‐ground	  realities	  do	  not	  support	  the	  popular	  notion	  that	  the	  constitution	  of	  spaces	  in	  which	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armed	   non-­‐state	   actors	   come	   to	   assume	   functions	   stereotypically	   associated	   with	   ‘the‘	  state50	  follows	   a	   recipe	   of	   supplantation,	   exclusivity,	   and	   opposition.	   While	   ‘the’	   state’s	  governing	  capacity	  has	  indeed	  been	  reduced,	  this	  does	  not	  simply	  leave	  a	  ‘vacuum’	  (Davis,	  2010:10).	  Nothing	   is	   further	   from	   the	   truth.	   ‘The’	   state	   is	   latently	  present	  and	   remains	  a	  force,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   to	   be	   reckoned	   with.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   however,	   ‘it’	   can	   also	  constitute	   a	   rich	   source	   of	   unexpected	   opportunities	   and	   resources	   for	   non-­‐state	   armed	  actors	  such	  as	  LCT.	  Already	  due	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  convergence	  between	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  elements	  supposed	  a	  sine	  qua	  non	  feature	  of	  LCT’s	  project	  of	  survival	  qua	  governance	  (in	   Chapter	   6,	   I	   provide	   a	   detailed	   examination	   of	   state-­‐organized	   crime-­‐interactions),	  ‘alternative’	  cannot	  be	  read	  as	   following	  Paoli’s	  recipe	  of	  organized	  crime’s	  existence	  and	  actions	   ‘against’	   and	   ‘without	   the	   state’	   (2002:	  64,	  65).	  The	  assertion,	   then,	   of	   territories	  simply	   ‘abandoned	   by	   the	   State’	   (Maldonado,	   2012:8)	   and	   correspondingly	   up	   for	   easy	  non-­‐state	   colonization	   falls	   short.	   Moreover,	   the	   malperformance	   of	   state	   actors	   in	  providing	  governance	  or	  in	  merely	  ‘impersonating’	  themselves	  by	  simulating	  adherence	  to,	  as	   well	   as	   the	   mere	   possibility	   to,	   fulfill	   their	   legally	   stipulated	   roles	   (see	  Comaroff/Comaroff,	   2006:16)	   supposes	   a	  historical	   constant	   to	   local	   civilian	  populations	  only	   further	   accentuated	   as	   of	   late.	   The	   same	   is	   true	   for	   dubious	   engagements	   between	  those	   situated	   on	   either	   extreme	   of	   ‘the	   law’,	   which	   undermines	   the	   pertinence	   of	   the	  frequently	  employed	  term	  ‘parallel	  states’	  (see	  Arias,	  2006).	  ‘Alternative’,	  then,	  indicates	  a	  deviation	  from	  a	  far-­‐from-­‐materialized	  ideal	  in	  which	  ‘the’	  state	  acts	  and	  is	  perceived	  as	  the	  champion	  of	  social	  order	  and	  legality.	  By	  these	  standards,	  the	  empirical	  state	  itself	  becomes	  an	  alternative	  project	  of	  governance.	  There	  are,	  as	  Comaroff	  and	  Comaroff	  would	  have	   it	  (2006),	  nothing	  but	  counterfeits.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  So	  as	  to	  avoid	  the	  tacit	  reproduction	  of	  the	  impertinent	  assumption	  of	  state	  as	  monolith	  capable	  of	  ‘doing	  or	  intending	  things’	  	  (Smart,	  1999:105)	  qua	  the	  use	  language,	  when	  referring	  to	  ‘it’	  in	  the	  singular	  form,	  I	  do	  so	  in	  parenthesis.	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The	  latter	  points	  provide	  important	  clues	  as	  to	  the	  possibility	  for	  an	  actor	  such	  as	  LCT	  to	  portray	  itself	  as	  a	  guardian	  of	  social	  order.	  Still,	   they	  only	  partly	  help	  to	  clarify	  the	  above	  stated	  paradox	  that	  the	  representatives	  of	  the	  contemporary	  shape	  of	  Michoacán	  organized	  crime,	  on	  which	  those	  statements	  reproduced	  in	  Chapter	  4	  shed	  an	  unfavorable	  light,	  could	  claim	   legitimacy.	   The	   underlying	   confusion	   stems,	   as	   I	   argue,	   from	   a	   misconception	   of	  legitimacy	  that	  is	  both	  state-­‐centric	  and	  absolute.	  The	  former	  insofar	  as	  legitimacy	  tends	  to	  be	   depicted	   as	   a	   binary	   quality,	   one	   that	   an	   actor	   either	   has	   or	   has	   not:	   The	   latter	   in	  accordance	  with	  the	  view	  that	  ownership	  and	  representation	  of	  social	  order	  can	  ultimately	  only	  rest	   in	  the	  hands	  of	  no	  actor	  other	  than	  its	  stereotypical	  champion,	   the	  nation-­‐state.	  Both	   assumptions	   prove	   overly	   rigid	   for	   approaching	   a	   setting	   such	   as	   the	   one	   in	   focus	  here.	  Apart	  from	  the	  fact	  that,	  as	  I	  have	  outlined,	  governance	  and	  claims	  of	  legitimacy	  have	  become	   dispersed	   to	   rest	   within	   an	   actor	   population	   highly	   varied	   and	   prominently	  including	   non-­‐state	   actors,	   this	   overlooks	   the	   fact	   that	   legitimacy	   is	   a	   state	   never	   fully	  realized.	   Reflections	   here	   on	   Wallerstein’s	   case	   (1974:142)	   that,	   throughout	   history,	  governments	   and	  other	   regimes	  of	   social	   control	  have	  been	  endured	   rather	   than	   coming	  anywhere	  close	  to	  being	  supported	  by	  heart.	  From	  this	  perspective,	  the	  aim	  for	  those	  that	  (claim	  the	  right	  to)	  govern	  consists	  in	  obtaining	  a	  minimum	  degree	  of	  legitimacy.	  One	  that	  is	   conducive	   to,	   if	   not	   fostering	   outright	   support,	   preserving	   power	   by	   evading	   adverse	  mobilization	  or	  even	  overt	  opposition.	  	  	  	  	  	  As	  a	  ‘sine	  qua	  non	  for	  easy	  access	  to	  resources…	  and	  long	  term	  survival’	  (Brown,	  1998:	  35;	  for	   an	   overview	   of	   the	   relevant	   literature	   in	   organizational	   sociology	   see	  Deephouse/Suchman,	  2008),	  such	  a	  minimum	  degree	  of	   legitimacy	  is	  dependent	  upon	  an	  organization’s	   ‘cultural	   support’	   (see	   Meyer	   and	   Rowan,	   1977;	   Meyer	   and	   Scott,	   1983).	  Phrased	  differently:	  An	  organization’s	  existence	  must	  make	  sense	  in	  a	  given	  period	  of	  time	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and	  within	  a	  given	  socio-­‐cultural	  setting.	  It	  must	  appear	  aligned	  with	  or	  at	  the	  very	  least	  as	  not	   overtly	   contradicting	   prevalent	   norms,	   values,	   and	  worldviews.	   A	   contravention	   can	  undermine	  an	  organization’s	  prospects	  of	  permanence.	  For	  whether	  or	  not	  it	  is	  perceived	  as	  conforming	  to	  a	  given	  setting’s	  expectations	  determines	  whether	  support	  is	  granted	  or	  denied	  by	  the	  sources	  of	  legitimacy,	  i.e.	  relevant	  social	  audiences.	  Consensus	  prevails	  that	  legitimacy	   cancels	   interference	   with	   the	   organization	   and	   its	   activities	   (see	  Deephouse/Suchman,	  2008:	  57).	  The	  contrary	  entails	  ‘comments	  and	  attacks’,	  i.e.	  a	  hostile	  mobilization	   (Pfeffer/Salancik,	   1978).	   What	   is	   essential	   to	   keep	   in	   mind	   here	   is	   that	  legitimacy	  cannot	  be	  misread	  as	  an	  objective	  quality	  that	  could	  be	  externally	  established	  by	  applying	  criteria	  such	  as	  Western	  ideals	  of	  democracy.	  As	  Pansters	  (2012:23)	  observes,	  in	  absence	   of	   such	   a	   thing	   as	   an	   ‘absolute	   source	   of	   legitimacy…	   the	   actual	   ascription	   of	  (il)legitimacy	  [is	  done]	  by	  specific	  members	  of	  a	  community.’	  The	  power	  to	  grant	  or	  deny	  legitimacy	   rests,	   then,	   entirely	  with	   specific	   social	   audiences	   and	   their	   subjective,	   time-­‐,	  space-­‐,	  and	  case-­‐bound	  evaluations.	  The	  latter	  depend,	  in	  turn,	  on	  more	  than	  just	  the	  ways	  in	   which	   an	   organization’s	   existence	   adds	   to	   their	   material	   benefit.	   Ceremonial	  commitment	  –	  through	  discourse	  and	  the	  symbolic	  enactment	  of	  discursive	  claims	  alike	  –	  can	   be	   just	   as	   effective.	   Phrased	   differently:	  what	  matters	   is	   perceptions,	   and	   not	   solely	  performance.	  This,	   in	   turn,	   enables	  organizations	   to	   strategically	   relate	   to	  norms,	   values,	  and	   worldviews	   prevalent	   within	   a	   given	   environment	   and	   to	   thereby	   increase	   their	  legitimacy	  (relative	  to	  that	  of	  other	  entities).	  One	  way	  of	  doing	  so	  –	  and	  to	  keep	  in	  mind	  in	  light	   of	   the	   following	   elaborations	   –	   is	   to	   become	   ‘identified	   with	   symbols,	   values,	   or	  institutions	  which	  have	  a	  strong	  base	  of	  social	  legitimacy’	  (Dowling/Pfeffer,	  1975:	  127).	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Approaching	  LCT	  as	  narrative	  	  
Against	   this	   backdrop,	   the	  question	  of	  whether	  LCT	   is	   one	   thing	  or	   another	   –	   good/bad;	  legitimate/illegitimate;	  moral/immoral	  –	  appears	  both	  misformulated	  and	  misleading.	  As	  laid	  out	  above,	   legitimacy	   is	  not	  a	  matter	  of	  an	  absolute	  quality	  but	  of	  degrees,	  which,	   in	  turn,	   arise	   out	   of	   perceptions.	   The	   latter	   decide	   how	   available	   resources	   are	   mobilized	  and/or	  demobilized	  for	  or	  against	  the	  group.	  The	  duality	  of	  control	  over	  extant	  resources	  as	  a	  task	  crucial	  to	  survival	  arises,	  against	  this	  backdrop,	  as	  a	  communicational	  challenge.	  Moreover,	   the	  binary	   approach	   inherently	   carries	   the	   image	  of	   criminal	   organizations	   as	  monolithic	  entities	  (an	  ascription	  of	  identity	  akin	  to	  that	  applied	  to	  ‘the’	  state,	  see	  above),	  characterized	  by	  a	  coherent	  identity,	  harmonic	  interests	  and	  capable	  of	  unified,	  concerted	  action	   towards	   the	   outside	   through	   frictionless	   hierarchy.	   There	   is	   little	   doubt	   that	   LCT	  does	  qualify	  as	  an	  organization	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  does	  show	  membership,	  training,	  codes	  of	   conduct,	   more	   or	   less	   standardized	   remuneration,	   division	   of	   labor	   (accountants	   v	  
sicarios,	  e.g.),	  and	  coordination	  of	  activities	  (e.g.	  in	  the	  context	  of	  establishing	  relations	  with	  state	  officials),	  amongst	  other	  features.	  The	  existence	  of	  an	  organizational	  construct	  as	  such	  does,	   however,	   not	   sustain	   the	   existence	   of	   an	   actor	   in	   itself	   capable	   of	   actions	   or	  intentions.	   Any	   organization	   is	   necessarily	   characterized	   by	   complexity,	   contradiction,	  divergence,	   and	   friction.	   Phrased	   differently:	   behind	   the	   façade	   of	   an	   officially	   conveyed	  organizational	   culture	   –	   the	   core	   narrative	   via	  which	   legitimacy	   and	   the	   right	   to	   exist	   is	  sought	  (see	  Meyer/Rowan,	  1977)	  –	  there	  are	  always	  sub-­‐cultures	  (see	  Jermier	  et	  al.,	  1991).	  This	  is	  no	  different	  for	  LCT.	  It,	  too,	  is	  composed	  of	  an	  array	  of	  factions,	  cells,	  and	  individuals	  that	   act	   under,	   are	   empowered,	   and	   kept	   together	   by	   the	   same	   label.	   Simultaneously,	  however,	  they	  show	  significant	  differences	  in	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  they	  employ	  and	  represent	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it	   in	  concrete	  practice,	  not	   least	  so	   in	  the	  shape	  of	  divergent	  behavioral	  patterns	  towards	  specific	  local	  civilian	  populations.	  	  A	  more	  fruitful	  take	  than	  one	  that	  attempts	  to	  ascribe	  to	  LCT	  the	  quality	  of	  a	  unitary	  actor	  with	  a	  clearly	  delineated	  identity	  consists,	  I	  argue,	  in	  approaching	  LCT	  as	  narrative.	  Geared	  at	   fostering	   a	   minimum	   degree	   of	   legitimacy,	   I	   understand	   the	   latter	   as	   composed	   of	   a	  discursive	  component	  that	  interacts	  with	  a	  component	  of	  palpable	  practice.	  To	  begin	  with,	  this	  allows	  me	  to	  circumnavigate	  the	  never-­‐ending	  and	  unfruitful	  discussion	  about	  the	  ‘true	  nature’	   of	   organized	   crime	   (organization	   or	   not?)	   without	   compromising	   on	   analytical	  accuracy.	   Simply	  phrased:	   I	   ask	  what	   the	  narrative	   claims,	  what	   it	   is	  meant	   to	  do,	  which	  actors,	   acts,	   and	   interactions	   it	   effectively	   empowers	  on	   the	   ground,	   and	  what	   effects	   on	  both	  ends	  of	  corresponding	   interactions	  result.	   I	  hereby	  hope	  to	  capture	  as	  best	  possible	  the	  complexity	  of	  LCT	  as	  organizational	  construct	  held	   together	  by	  said	  narrative	  and	   its	  interactions	   with	   local	   civilian	   populations	   from	   the	   perspectives	   of	   the	   protagonists	  situated	   on	   both	   sides	   –	   and	   thus	  without	   recurrence	   to	   the	   common	   normative	   bias	   in	  shape	   of	   a	   value	   judgment	   about	   the	   ‘genuineness’	   of	   LCT.	   I	   unpack	   LCT	   as	   narrative	   by	  addressing	   three	   distinct	   analytical	   levels.	   First,	   I	   introduce	   LCT’s	   ‘official	   narrative’	   by	  portraying	   its	   stated	  aims	  and	  claims,	  building	  blocks,	   as	  well	  as	  underlying	  motivations.	  Second,	   I	   address	   the	  palpable,	   understood	   as	   the	   set	   of	  material	   practices	   derived	   from	  said	   official	   account,	   and	   examine	   how	   the	   translation	   of	   the	   discursive	   into	   practice	  oscillated,	   on	   the	   ground,	   between	   congruence	   and	   contradiction.	   Third,	   I	   portray	   how	  locals’	  experiences	  underpin	  their	  evaluations	  of	  the	  group,	  thus	  unveiling	  the	  narrative’s	  effectiveness	  and	  perceived	  shortcomings.	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LCT’s	  self-­‐narrative:	  Criminal	  distinction	  and	  (narco-­‐)social	  engineering	  	  
Considered	  from	  LCT’s	  perspective,	  the	  achievement	  of	  a	  minimum	  degree	  of	  legitimacy	  is	  conditional	  upon	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  narrative	  conducive	  to	  its	  perception	  as	  meriting,	  if	  not	  outright	  support	  for,	  then	  tolerance	  of	  its	  existence	  and	  actions.	  Both	  need	  (to	  appear)	  to	  make	  sense	  within	  the	  setting	  in	  question.	  The	  name	  of	  the	  game	  here	  is	  distinction	  and	  communion.	  Distinction	  from	  threatening	  and	  amoral	  others,	  construed	  as	  enemies	  of	  local	  society	  and	  LCT	  alike.	  Distinction,	  too,	  from	  itself	  insofar	  as	  it	  seeks	  to	  position	  itself	  within	  a	   class	   of	   actors	   entirely	   different	   from	   the	   one	   it	   is	   normally	   placed	   in	   by	   default.	   The	  pursuit	  of	  said	  project	  of	  alternative	  governance	  follows,	  as	  I	  argue,	  this	  logic.	  In	  assuming	  and	   claiming	   functions	   other	   than	   those	   stereotypically	   associated	   with	   criminal	   actors,	  LCT	   sought	   to	   change	   the	   parameters	   as	   well	   as	   the	   very	   subject	   of	   evaluation.	  Correspondingly,	  Moreno	  rejects	  the	  group’s	  labeling	  as	  a	  ‘drug	  cartel	  or	  any	  other	  type	  of	  delinquent	  group’	  as	  unfounded	  propaganda:	  
‘Without	  remembering	  the	  exact	  moment,	  date,	  or	  reasons,	  the	  yellow	  press	  at	  the	  service	  of	  the	  government	  started	  the	  smear	  campaign	  saying	  that	  the	  group	  I	  was	  leading	  was	  a	  bunch	  of	  narcotraffickers	  and	  they	  start	  to	  attack	  us	  in	  forms	  and	  to	  burn	  us	  before	  the	  eyes	  of	  society.	  They	  implicate	  us	  in	  narcotrafficking	  activities	  and	  soon	  we	  were	  already	  being	  persecuted	  as	  if	  we	  were	   rabid	   dogs.	   The	   news…	  were	   so	   venomous	   that	   it	  would	   appear	  that	   in	  my	  person	  all	   the	  riders	  of	   the	  apocalypse	  were	  coming	   together…	  We,	  faced	  with	  the	  brutal	  and	  ruinous	  official	  infamy,	  had	  to	  go	  into	  hiding,	  obligated	  by	  the	  circumstance,	  not	  because	  we	  were	  guilty…	  What	  I	  wanted	  to	   do	   was	   realize	   a	   humanitarian	   and	   generous	   work,	   and	   in	   return,	   the	  government	  and	  some	  media	  exhibit	  me…	  as	  a	  dangerous	  narco,	  initiating	  a	  cruel	   and	   relentless	   persecution	   against	   me	   in	   the	   entire	   country,	   but	  fundamentally	  in	  my	  beloved	  state	  of	  Michoacán.’	  (Moreno,	  2012:65-­‐66)	  	  	  	  	  	  Communion	   in	   the	  sense	  that	   the	   introduction	  of	   the	  category	  of	   the	  threatening	  other	   is	  mirrored	  by	   the	  suggestion	  of	  a	   shared	  socio-­‐cultural	   identity,	  history,	   lived	  experiences,	  and	  worldview	  –	  all	  of	  which	  unite	  LCT	  and	  the	  local	  in	  quasi-­‐natural	  symbiosis.	  Telling,	  in	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this	  vein,	  is	  the	  use	  of	  the	  first-­‐person	  plural	  throughout	  Moreno’s	  autobiography.	  Contents	  are	  introduced	  through	  assertions	  such	  as	  ‘As	  we	  all	  know…’	  and	  ‘We,	  the	  ones	  that...	  were	  born	   poor,	   suffered…’	   (ibid.:7).	   To	   the	   same	   effect,	   the	   label	   La	   Familia	   Michoacana:	   ‘I	  decided	  to	  give	  it	  this	  name	  since	  already	  by	  definition	  family	  is	  a	  concept	  that	  refers	  to	  a	  homogenous	  group,	  to	  a	  same	  social	  class,	  to	  a	  culture,	  tradition,	  same	  blood,	  same	  lineage,	  same	  interests,	  and	  equal	  objectives	  and	  goals’	  (ibid.:65).	  Though	  published	  at	  a	  relatively	  late	  stage	  of	  the	  group’s	  lifespan,	  ‘They	  call	  me:	  The	  craziest	  one’	  reads	  like	  a	  blueprint	  of	  LCT’s	   discursive	   positioning.	   Herein,	  Moreno	   stylizes	   himself	   as	   a	   self-­‐made	  man	   having	  overcome	  great	  hardship,	  morally	  empowered,	  destined	  for	  greater	  things,	  and	  thus	  fit	  to	  lead	   the	   reformation	   of	   local	   society.	   Below,	   I	   present	   excerpts	   representative	   of	   the	  discursive	   techniques	   and	   building	   blocks	   applied	   by	   LCT.	   Collected	   and/or	   observed	  during	   fieldwork,	   these	  were	   furthermore	  widely	  diffused	   through	  an	  array	  of	  additional	  carriers	  such	  as	  flyers,	  banners	  hung	  in	  public	  places,	  booklets,	  and	  newspaper	  ads.	  	  
	  
Moreno’s	  passion	  as	  metaphor	  for	  the	  rightful	  existence	  of	  LCT	  	  	  
Moreno	   describes	   the	   conditions	   in	   which	   he	   was	   brought	   up	   in	   one	   of	   the	   ranchos	  surrounding	  Apatzingán	  as	  just	  like	  those	  facing	  anybody	  else	  that	  falls	  into	  the	  category	  of	  ‘us’,	  the	  rural	  poor:	  ‘My	  family	  and	  I	  lived	  a	  poverty	  so	  cruel	  and	  humiliating	  that	  we	  were	  all	  dressed	  in	  rags…	  when	  we	  ate	   fried	  beans	   it	  was	  a	   luxury…	  just	  hunger	  and	  excessive	  work.	   On	   top	   of	   everything,	   my	  mother…	  would	   beat	   us’.	   Even	   so,	   ‘with	   hope,	   I	   naively	  thought	   to	  myself	   that	  when	   I	  would	  be	   big	   and	   earn	  money…	   I	  would	   eat	   like	   the	   rich:	  bread	  rolls,	  cocas	  [Coca	  Cola]	  and	  carnitas	  de	  puerco	  [specialty	  dish	  made	  of	  pork]’	  (ibid.:8).	  Finally,	  and	  following	  one	  alternative	  pathway	  to	  economic	  empowerment,	   ‘like	  any	  poor	  without	  hope’	  he	  decided	  to	  go	  ‘p’al	  norte	  [to	  the	  North,	  i.e.	  the	  USA]’	  (ibid.:30).	  Despite	  the	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extreme	  hardship,	  he	  remained	  strong-­‐willed	  and	  relentless	   in	   the	  pursuit	  of	  his	  dreams.	  For	   a	   limited	   period,	   he	   unwittingly	   and	   innocently	   slipped	   into	   illicit	   activities	   (‘A	   kid	  growing	  up	   in	  a	  situation	  so	  adverse…	  only	  he	   is	   to	  blame	  for	  having	  temporarily	  chosen	  the	  path	  of	   illegality?’,	   ibid.:8-­‐9).	   Instead	  of	   in	  cash,	  a	   job	   is	  remunerated	   in	  the	   form	  of	  a	  pound	  of	  marihuana:	  ‘Since	  I	  was	  not	  made	  to	  be	  afraid,	  as	  I	  had	  not	  come	  so	  far	  to	  behave	  like	   a	   coward,	   I	   immediately	  went	   to	   the	   park	   to	   sell	  my	  marihuana’	   (ibid.:38).	   His	   true	  entrepreneurial	   skills,	   however,	   were	   to	   be	   developed	   through	   licit,	   honest	   businesses	  activities.	  	  	  These	   successes	   notwithstanding,	   fate	   haunted	   him.	   With	   an	   array	   of	   family	   members	  losing	  their	  lives,	  ‘it	  seemed	  like	  my	  family	  was	  marked	  by	  destiny	  to	  die	  young	  and	  under	  tragic	  and	  unexpected	  circumstances.	  Like	  the	  Kennedy	  family	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  with	  all	  due	   respect	   and	   distance’ 51 	  (ibid.:55).	   Troubled,	   he	   developed,	   as	   he	   considers	   in	  retrospect,	  dangerous	  vices:	   ‘these	  were	  the	  most	  critical	  epochs	  that	  dragged	  me	  into	  an	  almost	   suicidal	   alcoholism’	   (ibid.:52).	   ‘Even	   worse:	   I	   picked	   fights	   with	   whomever	   and	  whenever	  I	  could.	  I	  was	  fighting	  for	  diversion	  and	  out	  of	  desmadre	   [here,	  roughly,	   for	  the	  joy	  of	  creating	  chaos].	  Over	  time,	  I	  changed	  fists	   for	  pistols…’	  Following	  an	  array	  of	  near-­‐death	  experiences	  such	  as	  an	  almost	  fatal	  beating,	  he	  vowed	  to	  change	  his	  life	  but	  failed	  to	  do	  so	  by	  himself:	  ‘In	  spite	  of	  my	  good	  will	  and	  effort	  to	  overcome	  myself	  and	  an	  orderly	  life,	  the	  vice	  of	  alcohol…	  I	  became	  aware	  that	  I	  had	  fallen	  into	  the	  dark	  and	  sinister	  labyrinth	  of	  worlds	   of	   fantasy	   and	   easy	   pleasures’	   (idid.:45).	   He	   sought	   help	   from	   a	   wise,	   elder,	  respected	   man	   who	   invited	   him	   to	   an	   Alcoholics	   Anonymous	   group.	   This	   led	   to	  participation	  in	  a	  number	  of	  further	  self-­‐empowerment	  seminars	  of	  Christian-­‐charismatic	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  Similarly	   ambitious	   analogies	   to	   prominent	   historical	   figures,	   including	   Latin	   American	   revolutionary	  heroes	   such	   as	   Ernesto	   Guevara	   are	   introduced	   in	   a	   similar	  way	   throughout	   the	   book.	   Though	   explicitly	  distancing	  himself	   from	  any	   intention	  of	   claiming	   an	   equal	   place	   in	  history,	   they	  nevertheless	   leave	   little	  doubt	  with	  regards	  to	  a	  claimed	  higher	  calling.	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orientation	   and,	   generally	   speaking,	   a	   spiritual	   calling	   that	   he	   satisfied	   through	   intense	  lecture.	  ‘Cured’,	  he	  ‘[realized]	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  human	  being	  and	  life	  itself’	  (ibid.:54).	  Acting	   on	   ‘the	   call	   of	   God’	   and	   the	   ‘vocation	   for	   serving	   the	   prójimo	   [biblical	   neighbor]	  (ibid.:47)’,	   he	   started	   to	  provide	   financial	   support	   to	   churches,	   did	   good	  by	   giving	   to	   the	  poor,	   constructed	   churches	   and	   clinics,	   distributed	   ‘thousands	   and	   thousands	   of	   bibles’	  since	  ‘they	  brought	  to	  their	  readers	  a	  message	  of	  love	  and	  an	  oasis	  of	  peace’,	  and	  contracted	  inspirational	   speakers	   ‘at	   a	   high	   cost’	   (ibid.:47-­‐48).	   ‘Across	   the	   country’,	   he	   moreover	  sponsored	   seminars	   such	   as	   those	   that	   had	   ‘saved	   him’	   (and	   whose	   participants	   were	  giving	   out	   free	   hugs	   as	   of	   the	   time	   of	   fieldwork)	   as	   well	   as	   rehabilitation	   programs	   for	  addicts:	  ‘Not	  for	  my	  own	  benefit,	  but	  for	  the	  good	  of	  the	  fatherland’	  (ibid.).	  Here,	  the	  same	  altruistic	  pathos	  that	  underpins	  LCT’s	  discourse	  is	  also	  clearly	  apparent.	  	  	  His	   striving	   to	   ‘combat	   the	   true	   scourges	   of	   humanity:	   ignorance,	   injustice	   and	   lying’	  culminated	   in	   the	   creation	   of	   LFM	   as	   a	   body	   to	   ‘make	   society	   egalitarian	   [sic]	   and	   end	  injustices	   and…	   renovate	   the	   legal	   structures	  maintaining	   the	  poor…	   [in]	  misery	   and	   the	  rich	  well	  defended	  in	  their	  immense	  wealth.’	  The	  envisioned	  endgame	  consisted	  in	  ‘uniting	  all	   the	   isolated	   social	   struggles	   developing	   in	  Mexico	   and	   other	   countries…	   to	  make	   one	  sole,	  powerful,	  and	  inexorable	  social	  earthquake	  that	  would	  once	  and	  for	  all	  liberate	  all	  the	  peoples	  of	   the	  world’	   (ibid.:	  68-­‐69).	  Reflecting	   the	   latent	   revolutionary	  and,	  here,	  overtly	  Marxist	   undertone,	   he	   introduced	   the	   voice	   of	   a	   high-­‐ranking	   politician	  who	   offered	   his	  support	  after	  stating	  that	  ‘’‘the	  objective	  and	  subjective	  conditions	  were	  given	  and	  that	  was	  the	  reason	  of	  so	  much	  violent	  uproar	  of	  inconformity	  in	  the	  southeast	  of	  the	  country52…’’’	  and	  realizing	  that	  ‘[Moreno]	  appeared…	  in	  charge	  of	  realizing	  a	  profound	  change	  in	  Mexico’	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  A	   clear	   reference	   to	   the	   southeastern	   state	   of	   Chiapas	   that	   saw,	   in	   1994,	   the	   emergence	   of	   the	   so-­‐called	  
Ejército	   Zapatista	   de	   Liberación	  Nacional	   (‘Zapatista	   Army	   of	   National	   Liberation’).	   Its	   actions,	   claims	   of	  indigenous	   liberation,	   and	   skillfully	   communicated	   anti-­‐neoliberal	   discourse	   earned	   it	   wide	   popularity	  nationally	  as	  well	  as	  internationally	  (see	  de	  Vos,	  2002).	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(ibid.:68).	  However,	  as	  a	  condition	  to	  dedicate	  the	  needed	  energy	  to	  the	  pursuit	  of	  ‘ideals	  of	  progress,	  liberty,	  and	  security’	  ‘[his]	  people	  [michoacanos]’	  were	  ‘so	  longing	  for’	  (ibid.:71),	  a	  more	  immediate	  matter	  had	  to	  be	  attended	  to:	   ‘My	  state	  was	  being	  subjugated,	  robbed,	  and	   humiliated	   by	   a	   dangerous	   group	   of	   professional	   delinquents…	   whose	   cruelty	   was	  incomparable	   in	   the	   annals	   of	   narcoviolence…	   [and	  whose]	   savagery…	  was	   so	   that	   they	  devastated	  and	  imposed	  terror’	  (ibid.:71).	  What	  follows	  was	  a	  ‘bloody	  battle’	  in	  which	  good	  triumphed	  over	  evil	  and	  moral	  superiority	  as	  well	  as	  the	  suitability	  of	  LFM	  as	  a	  protector	  of	  the	  local	  is	  put	  to	  the	  test:	  	  
‘We	  achieved	  a	   rapid	  victory,	   for	   the	  difference	  between	   the	   two	  groups…	  was	   clear…	   While	   they	   were	   a	   bunch	   of	   drunks	   and	   drug	   addicts…	   our	  elements	  neither	  drank	  nor	  took	  drugs	  and	  rarely	  was	  there	  anybody	  who	  smoked…	  In	  synthesis,	  while	  our	  muchachos	  were	  healthy	  and	  idealist	  and	  were	  plainly	  prepared	  and	  disciplined,	  all	  that	  the	  enemies	  knew	  how	  to	  do	  was	  stealing	  from	  peaceful	  people,	  rape	  women…	  kill	  at	  close	  range,	  drink	  like	  pigs.’	  (ibid.:	  75)	  	  	  	  Although	   Los	   Zetas	   surfaced	   as	   the	   prime	   embodiment	   of	   the	   dark	   ‘other’	   that	   renders	  LFM’s	  existence	  necessary,	   it	   shared	   the	  category	  with	  an	  ultraconservative,	  corrupt,	  and	  abusive	   elite	   represented	   by	   Calderón’s	  Partido	  Acción	  Nacional	   (‘National	   Action	   Party’,	  PAN).	   The	   latter	   was	   accused	   of	   employing	   a	   captured	   state53	  to	   victimize	   and	   abuse	  innocent	  civilians	  under	  the	  pretext	  of	   ‘national	  security’	  [sic],	  of	  refusing	  to	  create	  order	  (despite	  offers	  to	  collaborate	  to	  this	  end	  by	  LFM),	  and	  of	  actively	  colluding	  with	  Los	  Zetas.54	  In	  light	  of	  this	  ‘inquisition-­‐like’	  campaign	  against	  LFM	  and	  Moreno	  personally,	  he	  retreated	  to	  Tierra	  Caliente’s	  cerros	   to	   lead	  a	  guerilla-­‐like	  resistance	  from	  here	  (see	   ibid.:77-­‐82).	   In	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53	  The	  possibility	  for	  a	  criminal	  organization	  to	  accuse	  a	  presidential	  administration	  of	  state	  capture	  (see	  Hellman	  
et	  al.,	  2000	  for	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  concept)	  alone	  speaks	  loudly	  of	  realities	  that	  drastically	  depart	  from	  Western	  
ideals.	  In	  many	  ways,	  they	  leave	  a	  field	  in	  which	  taken-­‐for-­‐granted	  relations	  between	  good/evil,	  legal/illegal,	  and	  
state/non-­‐state	  are	  many	  times	  turned	  upside	  down	  and	  can	  moreover	  be	  turned	  upside	  down	  to	  underpin	  and	  
empower	  forms	  of	  criminal	  agency	  that	  defy	  and	  yet	  leverage	  on	  such	  binary	  representations	  (I	  provide	  an	  in-­‐
depth	  discussion	  of	  the	  matter	  in	  Chapter	  6).	  	  54	  Public	  accusations	  by	  criminal	  organizations	  that	  the	  federal	  government	  was	  favoring	  certain	  actors	  over	  others	  were	  common	  during	  Calderón’s	  presidency.	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the	   book’s	   epilogue,	   he	   introduces	   voices	   of	   family	   members	   and	   comrades-­‐in-­‐arms,	  mourning	   their	   loss	   and	   praising	   his	   deeds.	   They	   furthermore	   act	   as	   witnesses	   of	   the	  ‘cowardly	  and	  despicable’	  attack	  by	  the	  Federal	  Police	  that	  led	  to	  his	  ‘death’55:	  
‘when	  I	  turned	  around…	  I	  saw	  him	  [Moreno]	  rapidly	  firing	  crashing	  bursts	  towards	   the	   fearsome	   apparatuses	   [helicopters	   of	   the	   Federal	   Police]…	  when	  we	  counted	  our	   losses,	  we	  discovered	  with	  unprecedented	  pain	  and	  anguish	   that	  Chayo	   had	   been	   killed	   by	   the	   shellfire	   ripping	   him	   to	   pieces’	  (ibid.:90)	  	  His	  ‘death’,	  a	  final	  heroic	  act	  of	  self-­‐sacrifice	  for	  a	  cause	  worth	  dying	  for	  ‘since	  we	  would	  die	  with	   the	   honor	   with	   which	   Emiliano	   Zapata,	   Pancho	   Villa56,	   Che	   Guevara	   died...	   like	   so	  many	   others	  who	  understood	   that	   it	  was	   preferable	   to	   die	   fighting	   than	   to	   live	   on	   one’s	  knees57’	  (ibid.:70).	  The	  latter,	  too,	  being	  the	  basis	  for	  his	  auto-­‐sanctification	  as	  San	  Nazario.	  Reinvented	  as	  a	  patron	  saint58	  –	  consider	  the	  rosary	  cited	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  chapter,	  handed	   out	   in	   brochures	   to	   encourage	   locals	   to	   ask	   for	   his	   protection	   at	   shrines	   set	   up	  throughout	  Tierra	  Caliente	   and	  equipped	  with	   statues	  modeled	   after	  Moreno	   (see	   Image	  5.2)	  –	  he	  provides	  the	  densest	  expression	  of	  LCT’s	  discourse	  as	  well	  as	  its	  translation	  into	  artifacts	  as	  carriers.	  ‘People	  need’,	  as	  the	  living	  saint	  told	  me	  during	  our	  encounter,	  ‘a	  place	  to	  believe.’	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  I	  here	  refer	  to	  his	  ‘first	  death’	  in	  late	  2010,	  the	  staging	  of	  which	  I	  discuss	  in	  Chapter	  6.	  	  56	  The	  two	  most	  heroized	  figures	  of	  the	  Mexican	  revolution.	  	  57	  Prefiero	  morir	   de	   pie	   que	   vivir	   de	   rodillas	   (‘I	   would	   rather	   to	   die	   on	   my	   feet	   than	   live	   on	   my	   knees’)	   is	  attributed	   to	   Zapata	   and	   is	   one	   of	   the	   phrases	  most	   common	   amongst	   left-­‐wing/revolutionary	   groups	   in	  Latin	  America	  (see	  Anderson/Stransky,	  1979:281).	  	  58	  As	  opposed	  to	  my	  prior	  characterization	  of	  San	  Nazario	  as	  a	  ‘narcosaint’	  (see	  Ernst,	  2014)	  similar	  to	  those	  venerated	  by	  narcotraffickers	  In	  Latin	  America	  (see	  Edberg,	  2001),	  it	  would	  be	  more	  pertinent	  to	  speak	  of	  a	  patron	  saint.	  For,	  while	  a	  narcosaint	  is	  a	  patron	  saint	  for	  narcotraffickers,	  San	  Nazario	  is	  a	  narcotrafficker	  come	  saint	  for	  a	  wider	  population.	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  Image	  5.2:	  Cover	  page	  of	  propaganda	  booklet	  released	  	  by	  LCT	  in	  2012	  and	  authored	  by	  a	  local	  journalist	  (name	  blacked	  	  out).	  	  	  	  	  
The	  claiming	  of	  a	  more	  perfect	  ownership	  of	  social	  order	  	  
Dramatized	  as	  passion,	  Moreno’s	  narrative	  of	  his	  own	  life	  and	  ‘death’	  serves	  as	  a	  metaphor	  for	  the	  necessity	  of	  LCT’s	  existence.	  It	  unveils,	  in	  a	  compressed	  fashion,	  the	  same	  reflexive	  exercise	   that	   provides	   LCT’s	   legitimizing	   discourse	   in	   general	   with	   its	   argumentative	  backbone.59	  Its	  core	  message	  is,	  albeit	  embellished,	  straightforward:	  LCT	  organically	  arises	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	  As	   I	   discuss	   in	   Chapter	   6,	   this	   principle	   of	   environmental	   responsiveness	   –	   in	   essence:	   that	   capacity	   to	  ‘read’	   and	   relate	   to	   the	  extant	   in	  ways	   conducive	   to	   the	  group’s	  performance	  and	   survival	   –	   furthermore	  becomes	  clear	   in	  LCT’s	   interactions	  with	  state	  actors	  as	  well	  as	   in	   its	  relating	  to	  structures	  of	  community	  organization.	  A	  similar	  observation,	   in	   the	  case	  of	  Rio	  de	   Janeiro,	   is	  provided	  by	  Arias	  (2009:	  196):	   ‘More	  than	   just	   filling	   in	   space	   left	   by	   the	   government,	   illegal	   networks	   appropriate	   existing	   state	   and	   societal	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out	  of	  the	  local	  experience	  as	  the	  only	  available	  and	  moreover	  only	  pertinent	  solution	  for	  social	  order.	  It	  signals,	  to	  this	  end,	  that	  it	  is	  equipped	  with	  a	  comprehension	  of	  locals’	  needs	  and	   problems	   more	   profound	   than	   any	   outside	   actor	   could	   ever	   achieve.	   Crucially,	   the	  hardship	  facing	  locals	  is	  nothing	  abstract	  to	  LCT’s	  leaders	  and	  members.	  It	  is	  a	  lived	  reality,	  and,	  as	  such,	  underpins	  the	  assertion	  of	  a	  shared	  identity	  qua	  communion	  in	  suffering.	  On	  one	  hand,	   this	   is	   to	   lend	   legitimacy	   to	   the	  group’s	  analysis	  of	  Michoacán’s	  problem-­‐laden	  state	   of	   affairs	   (insecurity,	   violence,	   poverty).	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   it	   introduces	   the	   basis	  from	   which	   the	   mandate	   for	   its	   interventionist	   and	   regulatory	   agenda	   is	   derived.	   For,	  rather	   than	   remaining	   inert	   in	   the	   face	   of	   adversity,	   it	   takes	   action	   –	   and	   moreover	  possesses	   the	   necessary	   knowledge,	   experience,	   dedication,	   and	   moral	   integrity.	   Thus	  elevated	  to	  a	  position	  of	  exceptionality	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  ‘regular’	  locals,	  this	  justifies	  the	  exercise	  of	  power	  towards	  its	  own	  communities.	  The	  improvement	  of	  local	  society	  is	  as	  much	  a	  matter	  of	  setting	  up	  a	  bulwark	  against	  forces	  of	  destruction	  pushing	  in	  from	  the	  outside	  as	  one	  of	  internal	  reform.	  A	  matter	  of,	  to	  recite	  the	  term	  employed	  by	  members	  of	  LCT	  in	  interviews	  I	  conducted	  with	  them,	  ‘curing’	  individuals	  whose	  deviant	  and	  amoral	  behavior	  negatively	  affects	  local	  society	  as	  a	  whole.	  Moreno’s	  self-­‐empowerment,	  achieved	  by	  overcoming	  great	  obstacles,	  here	  serves	  to	  project	  a	  promise	  of	  replication	  on	  the	  collective	  level	  qua	  LCT	  as	  a	  carrier	  construed	  for	  this	  purpose	  alone.	  	  	  In	   forging	   a	   common	   identity	   as	   the	   basis	   for	   its	  motivation	   to	   act	   as	   a	   bulwark	   against	  outside	  threats	  as	  well	  as	  a	  spearhead	  for	  societal	  change,	  LCT	  provides	  a	  prime	  example	  for	   the	   construction	   of	   new	   forms	   of	   allegiance	   and	   political	   communities	   in	   the	   Global	  South’s	   liquefied	  landscape	  of	  social	  order	  and	  sovereignty	  (see	  Davis,	  2009).	  The	  latter’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  resources	  and	  power	  and	  use	   them	   to	  establish	  protected	  areas	   in	  which	   traffickers	   can	  engage	   in	   illegal	  activities.	   More	   than	   parallel	   ‘states’	   or	   ‘polities,’	   drug	   trafficking	   in	   Rio	   represents	   an	   expression	   of	  transformed	  state	  and	  social	  power	  at	  the	  local	  level.’	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characteristic	   flux	   encompasses,	   in	   this	   vein,	   far	   more	   than	   merely	   the	   erosion	   of	   the	  classical	   nation-­‐state’s	   territorial	   dimensions.	   It	   concerns	   the	   pillars	   of	   the	   ‘old	   order’	  altogether.	  Likewise,	   ‘[m]oral	  and	  legal	  spaces’	  (Pansters,	  2012:19)	  open	  up	  for	  non-­‐state	  armed	   actors	   to	   pursue	   and	   strategically	   leverage	   alternative	   forms	   of	   moral	  entrepreneurship.	   Just	   like	   the	   state	   itself,	   the	   ‘big	   ideas’	   that	   underpinned	   modernist	  dreams	   of	   societal	   progress	   and	   that,	   not	   least,	   provided	   the	   myth	   of	   the	   state	   as	   the	  stereotypical	  champion	  of	  law,	  order,	  morality,	  and	  progress	  do	  not	  simply	  vanish.	  Much	  to	  the	  contrary,	  as	  Comaroff	  and	  Comaroff	  underline,	   ‘[the	  global	  south’s]	  polities	  are	  by	  no	  means	   ‘’lawless’’’	   (2006:	   19).	   As	   is	   expressed	   not	   least	   in	   the	   cropping	   up	   of	   the	  abovementioned	  kaleidoscope	  of	  non-­‐state	  actors	  (claiming	  to	  be)	  pursuing	  corresponding	  projects,	   there	   is	   a	   veritable	   fetish	   for	   law	   and	   order.	   So	  much	   so,	   it	  would	   appear,	   that	  ‘even	   their	   outlaw	   cultures	   are	   infused	   with	   the	   spirit	   of	   the	   law’	   (2006:20).	   Under	  liquefaction,	  then,	  ‘big	  ideas’	  –	  democracy,	  justice,	  law,	  legality,	  human	  rights,	  to	  name	  but	  a	  few	  –	  do	  not	  go	  away.	  They	  remain	  tools	  to	  mobilize	  that	  are	  arguably	  more	  powerful	  than	  ever	  before.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  however,	  they	  are	  imperfectly	  occupied	  and	  represented	  by	  ‘the’	   state.	   Thus	   decoupled	   from	   ‘it’,	   ‘big	   ideas’	   become	   susceptible	   to	   trans-­‐legal	  circulation,	   residementation,	   and	   appropriation.	   That	   such	   big	   ideas’	   ‘instrumental	  discursive	  use’	  (Arias/Goldstein,	  2010:17ff.)	  has	  increasingly	  become	  a	  possibility	  for	  non-­‐state	   actors	   shines	   through	   prominently	   in	   Paley’s	   examination	   of	   the	   use	   of	   the	   term	  ‘democracy’	   (2002).	   So	   as	   to	   pertinently	   capture	   big	   ideas	   as	   ‘contemporary…	   forms	   of	  enacting	   power’,	   she	   calls	   for	   an	   analytical	   turn	   towards	   ‘local	   meanings,	   circulating	  discourses,	  multiple	   contestations,	   and	   changing	   forms	   of	   power…	   [which]	   is	   rare	   in	   the	  scholarly	  literature’	  (ibid.:469).	  While	  her	  analysis	  remains	  within	  the	  confines	  of	  the	  licit,	  the	   argument	   that	   actors	   ‘differently	   situated	   in	   relations	   of	   power’	   (ibid.:471)	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‘strategically	   and	   selectively	   appropriate	   and	   transform	   transnationally	   circulating	  discourses’	  (ibid.:485)	  is	  of	  even	  greater	  explanatory	  value	  when	  extended	  to	  the	  illicit.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  LCT’s	  narrative	  of	  itself	  (within	  the	  local)	  speaks	  loudly	  of	  the	  above	  outlined	  dynamic	  and,	  in	   this	   vein,	   of	   the	   career	   of	   Michoacán	   organized	   crime	   from	   side-­‐phenomenon	   of	  modernity	  to	  one	  whose	  protagonist	  claims	  not	  only	  centrality	  but	  moreover	  ownership	  of	  progress	  per	  se.	   Rather	   than	   just	   ‘crime	   as	   a	   factor	   in	   the	   reorganization	   of	   social	   space’	  (Bobea,	   2010:164),	   what	   becomes	   apparent	   here	   is	   a	   concentrated	   social	   force	   that	  emerges	   out	   of	   the	   field	   of	   criminal	   organizing	   to	   proactively	   seek	   to	   intervene	   in	   and	  restructure	   key	   processes	  within	   societal	   spheres	   far	   beyond	   its	   original	   confines.	   Given	  this	   spillover,	   the	   division	   between	   the	   licit	   and	   the	   illicit,	   the	   criminal	   and	   the	   legal,	  respectively,	   seem	   more	   porous	   than	   ever	   (see	   in	   this	   context	   my	   elaborations	   on	   the	  performativity	   of	   the	   licit-­‐illicit-­‐divide).	   Providing	   testimony	   to	   the	   same	   effect,	   LCT’s	  construct	   of	   legitimacy	   creation	   and	   identity	   construction	   transcends	   the	   confines	   of	  ‘classical’	  criminal	  mores.	  Such	  ‘fictive	  kinship	  ties’	  are	  seen	  as	  construed	  in	  direct	  negative	  reflection	   of	   official	   law	   and	   as	   geared	   towards	   providing	   illegal	   groups	  with	   ‘islands	   of	  cohesion	   and	   solidarity’	   (Paoli,	   2002:85)	   in	   an	   environment	   rendered	   hostile	   by	   the	  constant	   threat	  of	   law	  enforcement	   (see	  e.g.	  Paoli,	  2002:67ff.	  on	  Sicilian	  organized	  crime	  and	  Humphrey,	  1999	  on	  Russian	  organized	  crime).	  Or,	  to	  invoke	  Sykes	  and	  Matza	  (1957),	  as	   underworld-­‐specific	   techniques	   of	   neutralization.	   As	   I	   have	   made	   clear,	   like	   any	  organization	  LCT	  strives	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  conditions	  favoring	  its	  survival.	  Yet,	  rather	  than	  relying	  on	  such	  a	  thing	  as	  an	  ‘outlaw	  identity’,	  it	  effectively	  claims	  more	  perfect	  ownership	  of	   the	   very	   same	   ideas,	   norms,	   and	   values	   embodied	   in	   Mexican	   legal	   code	   and	   to	   be	  materialized	  by	  the	  state.	  These	  elements,	  recycled	  rather	  than	  outright	  rejected,	  become	  eclectically	   arranged	   alongside	   additional	   discursive	   building	   blocks	   taken	   from	   further	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ideological	   currents	   such	   as	   the	   Latin	   American	   revolutionary	   left	   and	   Charismatic/	  Evangelical	   Christianity,	   from	   whose	   language	   and	   imagery	   the	   prominently	   employed	  discursive	  element	  of	  ‘curing’	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  borrowed.	  Positively	  connoted	  on	  a	  wide	  basis,	   they	  promise	   the	   conferral	  of	   legitimacy	  as	  much	  as	  a	  visible	  proximity	   to	  or	  even	  endorsement	  by	  actors	  already	  seen	  to	  embody	  such	  ideas	  can.60	  The	  result	  stands	  nothing	  short	   of	   a	   proclaimed	   project	   of	   (narco-­‐)social	   engineering.	   The	   latter	   is,	   as	   I	   argue,	  ultimately	  geared	  at	  creating	  an	   island	  of	  security	   for	   the	  group	  qua	   (the	  promise	  of)	   the	  creation	  of	  a	  wider	  island	  of	  security	  and	  certainty	  for	  local	  civilian	  populations.	  	  	  	  
	  
The	  least	  bad	  solution:	  On	  the	  ground	  pragmatism	  	  
‘That	  kind	  of	  stuff	  you	  have	  to	  ask	  our	  patrón,	  he	  knows	  more	  about	  that.’	  El	  Inge	  referred	  my	  questions	  concerning	  ideology	  to	  Moreno:	  ‘You’ll	  have	  the	  chance	  to	  ask	  him	  all	  that.’	  I	  felt,	   initially,	   frustrated	  as	   I	  seemed	  unable	  to	  harvest	  statements	  as	  deep	  as	   I	  had	  hoped	  for.	  In	  retrospect,	  however,	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  agency	  behind	  the	  highly	  ambitious	  claims	  as	  laid	  out	  in	  ‘They	  call	  me	  the	  craziest	  one’	  effectively	  resided	  with	  its	  author,	  Moreno.	  This	  earns	  him	  Gómez’s	  respect	  (‘Está	  bien	  cabrón	  [He’s	  a	  badass]’)	  but	  also	  the	  mockery	  of	  this	  former	   school	   teacher:	   ‘He	   never	   went	   to	   school	   and	   he	   hardly	   knows	   how	   to	   write…	  sometimes	  he	  thinks	  he	  employs	  all	  his	  words	  and	  terms	  right	  but	  I	  have	  to	  correct	  him	  [he	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  During	  my	   fieldwork	   in	  Tierra	  Caliente,	   I	  became	  witness	   to	  various	  attempts	  of	  LCT	   to	  coopt	  Diego	  and	  thereby	   his	   organization,	   left-­‐leaning	   to	   revolutionary	   in	   orientation	   and,	   as	   pointed	   out	   in	   Chapter	   3,	  immensely	  popular	  amongst	  dwellers	  of	  local	  communities.	  During	  back	  alley	  meetings	  I	  assisted	  in	  as	  well	  as	  during	   the	  meetings	  with	  Gómez	  and	  El	  Inge,	   large	   sums	  of	  money	  were	  offered	   ‘in	   order	   for	   them	   to	  work	   well’.	   Intriguingly,	   the	   above	   described	   discursive	   building	   blocks	   here	   surface	   again.	   LCT’s	  representatives	  stress	  not	  only	  Moreno’s	  admiration	   for	  Diego	  and	  his	   ‘valuable	  work’	  but	  moreover	   that	  both	   leaders	   ‘have	   so	  much	   in	   common’,	   share	   the	   same	   ideals,	   and	   ‘should	  have	  met	   a	   long	   time	  ago.’	  A	  textbook	  like	  attempt	  to	  confer	  legitimacy	  (consider,	  again,	  the	  above	  included	  quote	  from	  Dowling/Pfeffer,	  1975)	  qua	  association	  with	  or	  endorsement	  by	  an	  actor	  already	  considered	  legitimate	  by	  many.	  Moreover,	  said	  duality	   in	   control	   over	   locally	   rooted	   resources	  here	  becomes	  expressed	  again	   in	   that	  Diego	  and	  his	  organization	  exercise	  sway	  over	  locals’	  opinions	  and	  hold	  significant	  power	  to	  (de-­‐)	  mobilize	  them	  (Diego:	  ‘We	  move	  a	  lot	  of	  people’).	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leans	   forward	   to	  me	   to	   reenact	   a	   corresponding	   situation]:	   ‘’ya	   la	   cagaste	   [you	   screwed	  up]’’	   [breaks	   out	   in	   laughter].’	   Also	   telling	   in	   terms	  of	   a	   degree	   of	   intragroup	   ideological	  conviction	   and	   indoctrination	   lower	   than	   claimed	   by	   LCT’s	   leaders	   themselves,	   was	   El	  
Inge’s	   vague	   response	   to	  my	  question	  about	  which	  precise	   religious	   current	  Moreno	  and	  the	  group	  adhere	  to:	  ‘He	  was	  first	  catholic	  and	  then	  he	  became…	  how	  do	  you	  say…	  cristiano	  [evangelical]	  when	  he	  had	  drug	  problems…	  and	  then	  he	  became	  interested	  in	  all	  kinds	  of	  spiritual	  things,	  like	  Buddhism	  and	  masonry	  and	  so	  on…’	  To	  El	  Inge,	  fostering	  the	  support	  of	   local	   civilian	   populations	   boils	   down	   to	   the	   more	   pragmatic	   motivation	   of	   being	  perceived	  as	  ‘de	  lo	  peor	  lo	  menos	  malo’	  (‘Of	  the	  worse,	  the	  least	  bad’).	  Similarly,	  in	  Gómez’s	  statements,	   the	   goal	   of	   a	   duality	   of	   control	   over	   local	   social	   capital	   comes	   through	  prominently	  and	  pragmatically;	  as	  does	  the	  means	  to	  achieve	  it.	   ‘So	  why	  do	  you	  put	  such	  emphasis	  on	  constructing	  good	  relations	  with	  civil	   society	  and	  the	  civilian	  population?’,	   I	  asked.	  ‘If	  I	  treated	  them	  badly,	  they	  would	  put	  a	  bullet	  in	  me,	  they	  would	  betray/report	  me	  [me	   delatarían]…	   ’	   Judging	   from	   the	   ease	   with	   which	   he	   scanned	   and	   reciprocates	   the	  greetings	  of	   the	  drivers	  of	   the	   ten	  or	   so	   cars	   that	  passed	   the	   intersection	  of	   a	  dirt	   and	  a	  paved	  road	  at	  which	  we	  stood	  in	  plain	  sight	  during	  our	  second	  meeting,	  the	  recipe	  seemed,	  here	  at	   least,	   to	  work.	   ‘It’s	   like	   if	  you	  have	  a	  family,	  a	  wife…	  you	  treat	  her	  badly	  and	  they	  [sic]	  won’t	  respect	  you,	  she’ll	  leave	  you	  or,	  just	  the	  same,	  put	  a	  bullet	  in	  you…	  without	  the	  support	  of	  the	  people,	  without	  them	  protecting	  us,	  we	  would	  have	  never	  lasted	  this	  long.’	  Summing	  up,	  he	  once	  again	  deviated	  from	  Moreno’s	  official	  account:	  	  
‘we	   are	   a	   necessary	   evil…	   like	   the	   prostitutes:	   if	   there	   weren’t	   any	  prostitutes,	   how	   much	   rape	   would	   there	   be?	   Just	   the	   same,	   we	   are	  delinquents,	  but	  not	  just	  common	  delinquents…	  for	  example:	  I	  do	  sell	  coca	  but	  the	  kind	  that	  is	  good	  quality…	  and	  if	  I	  didn’t	  do	  it,	  somebody	  else	  would,	  and	  at	  a	  far	  worse	  quality	  like	  the	  one	  they	  sell	  in	  other	  places.’	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Rather	  than	  an	  epic	  battle	  between	  good	  and	  evil,	  as	  Moreno	  described	  it,	  the	  argument	  as	  to	  why	  LCT	  is	  preferable	  to	  Los	  Zetas	  is	  voiced	  pragmatically	  (and	  under	  the	  admission	  that	  business	  did	  play	   a	   role	   in	   their	   constitution	   as	   LCT’s	   archenemy	  and	   thus	   an	   important	  point	   of	   reflection	   for	   its	   identity	   construction):	   ‘The	   problem	  with	   them	   starts	   in	   2005	  when	  they	  wouldn’t	  turn	  back	  over	  the	  port	  [Lázaro	  Cárdenas,	  see	  Chapter	  4]	  that	  we	  had	  lent	  to	  them	  [sic]	  for	  two	  years…	  and	  the	  port	  is	  very	  important	  because	  allá	  llega	  la	  droga	  [this	  is	  where	  the	  drugs	  get	  in].’	  But	  apart	  from	  that,	  El	  Inge	  continued,	  	  
‘do	  you	  know	  how	  Los	  Zetas	   operate?	  They	  go	   to	  a	   community,	  get	  all	   the	  drug	  addicts,	  the	  rateros	  [from	  rata,	  or	  rat:	  low	  life	  criminals]	  together,	  and	  when	  they	  got	   like	   ten	  cabrónes	   they	   tell	   them:	   ’Okay,	   let’s	  see	  gentlemen,	  we’ll	   give	   you	   a	   gun,	   a	   rifle,	   do	   what	   you	   will	   with	   it,	   just	   give	   us	   fifty	  percent.’	  	  	  Or,	  as	  Gómez	  summarized	  after	  providing	  a	  similar	  depiction:	  ‘Who	  can	  seriously	  want	  Los	  
Zetas	  to	  get	  in	  here?’	  	  	  	  ‘I	  sent	  him	  to	  the	  front	  for	  two	  months	  since	  he	  screwed	  up…	  ’	  As	  our	  conversation	  began	  to	  unfold	  during	  our	  second	  encounter,	  Gómez	  called	  over	  one	  of	   the	  young	  sicarios	  who	  had	  kept	  a	  respectful	  distance	  from	  their	  boss	  and	  myself.	  He	  walked	  over,	  shook	  my	  hand,	  and	   silently	   stood	   by,	   visibly	   uncomfortable	   with	   his	   head	   lowered,	   as	   his	   fate	   was	  discussed:	   ‘I	  sent	  him	  and	  another	  one	  to	  buy	  chemicals	  for	  a	  kitchen	  [methamphetamine	  laboratory]	  I	  have	  over	  there,	  and	  I	   told	  them	  to	  go	  buy	  with	  a	  certain	  contact…	  but	  they	  went	  and	  bought	  it	  from	  somebody	  else.’	  All	  the	  way	  back,	  as	  Gómez	  elaborated,	  the	  traffic	  police	   followed	   them.	   They	   finally	   decided	   to	   stop,	   get	   out	   of	   their	   car,	   and	   kill	   the	  policeman.	   As	   ‘there	   was	   no	   necessity	   for	   that,	   to	   assassinate	   [sic]	   him’,	   a	   punishment	  becomes	  necessary.	  Its	  form:	  two	  months	  duty	  on	  the	  ‘front’	  (sic),	  i.e.	  where	  confrontations	  with	   illicit	   competitors	  were	   the	   strongest	   at	   the	   time.	  Had	   they	  been	  killed	  during	   their	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detachment	   then	   ‘justice	  would	   have	   been	   done.’	   If	   not,	   they	  would	   be	   allowed	   to	  work	  ‘normally’	  again.	  The	  one	  standing	  right	  next	  to	  us	  made	  it,	  supposedly	  having	  finished	  his	  sentence	  the	  very	  day	  of	  the	  meeting.	  The	  other	  one,	  I	  was	  told,	  was	  less	  fortunate.	  Perhaps	  he	   became	  one	   of	   the	   thousands	  who	  have	  perished	   in	  Michoacán	   and	   elsewhere	   across	  Mexico	   over	   the	   past	   decade	   but	   whose	   deaths	   were	   not	   and	  most	   likely	   never	   will	   be	  officially	  recorded.	  Grounds	  for	  Gómez	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  body	  count	  the	  country’s	  ‘war	  on	  drugs’	  has	  officially	   racked	  up	  –	  60,000,	  as	  of	   the	   time	  of	  our	  conversation	  –	  was	   far	   too	  low.	  For,	  as	  he	  stated,	  ‘me	  alone,	  I	  kill	  like	  three	  or	  four	  a	  week,	  and	  they	  don’t	  appear	  in	  the	  statistics.’	   ‘And	   then	   their	  mothers	   ask	   themselves	  where	   their	   sons	   are’,	  my	   gatekeeper	  swiftly	  remarked,	  once	  again	  providing	  me	  with	  an	  unwanted	  adrenaline	  rush.	  He	  ignored	  the	   statement	   as	   such.	   Yet,	   he	   calmly	   took	   up	   the	   lead	   and	   shifted	   the	   conversation	   to	  matters	  of	  good	  vs.	  evil:	  	  
‘There	   are	   so	  many	   perspectives	   on	   this	   fundamental	   question…	   I	   like	   to	  keep	   it	   simple,	   if	   not,	   you	   go	   crazy…	   But	   one	   thing	   is	   clear	   to	   me:	   if	   the	  question	  is	  killing	  forty-­‐nine	  for	  fifty	  to	  survive,	  I	  kill	  the	  forty-­‐nine.	  But	  I	  am	  not	  like	  El	  Señor	  de	  los	  Cielos61	  either.	  He	  would	  have	  a	  dedo	  [informant]	  in	  a	  group	  of	  a	  hundred	  and	  he	  would	  lock	  them	  up	  for	  a	  day	  for	  them	  to	  identify	  the	  dedo.	  So	  after	  the	  day	  they	  asked	  him	  if	  he	  had	  already	  found	  the	  dedo.	  ‘’Yes’’,	  he	  said.	  Because	  he	  had	  killed	  all	  of	  them.’	  	  	  Gómez,	   in	   contrast,	   stressed	   that	   he	   kills	   only	   ‘those	   who	   deserve	   it.’	   The	   same	   is	   true,	  when	  judged	  from	  the	  content	  of	  messages	  released	  for	  public	  attention,	  for	  LCT	  in	  general.	  Emblematic,	   in	   this	   vein,	   is	   that	   one	   some	   of	   its	   sicarios	   left	   at	   the	   above	   described	   the	  scene	  besides	  five	  severed	  heads	  which	  stated	  that	  the	  group	  ‘does	  not	  kill	  for	  money,	  does	  not	   kill	   women,	   does	   not	   kill	   innocents,	   only	   those	   that	   deserve	   to	   die,	   die’	   (see	   Roque	  Madríz,	  2006).	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  ‘Lord	  of	  the	  skies’,	  nickname	  of	  Amado	  Carrillo	  Fuentes,	  one	  of	  Mexico’s	  mythical	  drug	  traffickers	  and	  head	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  Juárez	  Cartel	  in	  the	  1990s.	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On	  the	  ground	  practices	  	  
Territorial	  penetration	  and	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  new	  order	  
The	  right	  to	  establish	  categories	  of	  the	  justifiably	  killable	  –	  and	  accordingly,	  who	  becomes	  killable	  under	  which	  circumstances	  –	  sits	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  LCT’s	  proclaimed	  sovereignty	  over	  its	  terracalentana	  subjects.	  A	  clear	  reflection	  here,	  thus,	  of	  Mbembé’s	  observation	  that	  ‘the	  ultimate	  expression	  of	  sovereignty	  resides...	   in	  the	  power	  and	  the	  capacity	  to	  dictate	  who	  may	  live	  and	  who	  must	  die’	  (2003:11).	  That	  LCT’s	  elevation	  over	  the	  local	  as	  a	  master	  over	  life	  and	  death,	  just	  as	  an	  accompanying	  set	  of	  drastic	  measures	  of	  social	  control,	  supposes	  a	  necessity	  for	  it	  to	  fulfill	  its	  mandate	  to	  protect	  and	  reform	  local	  society	  was,	  in	  this	  vein,	  left	  blatantly	  clear	  to	  civilians	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  group’s	  colonization	  of	  the	  local	  from	  2006	  onwards.	   As	   El	   Inge	   explains:	   ‘We	   invite	   them	   [local	   civilians]	   to	   reuniones	   (‘reunions,	  meetings’),	   to	  explain	  our	  goals,	   so	   they	  understand	  and	  don’t	   fear	  us.’	  These	  reuniones62	  suppose	   the	   first	   and	   unmistakable	   indication	   of	   a	   new	   form	   of	   order,	   convened	  shortly	  after	  a	  physical	  presence	  is	  established	  in	  communities:	  ‘when	  they	  took	  the	  rancho…	  from	  one	   day	   to	   the	   other,	   they	   came	   and	   installed	   themselves	   under	   those	   trees	   over	   there	  [points	  to	  the	  spot]	  and	  they	  told	  all	  the	  people	  to	  gather…’	  In	  local	  informants’	  accounts	  of	  their	  assistance	  herein,	   too,	   the	  wording	  employed	  by	  LCT’s	   jefes	  de	  plaza	   is	   reproduced:	  ‘They	  said	  that	  they	  had	  to	  be	  here	  to	  establish	  order	  [poner	  orden],	  to	  protect	  us	  because	  the	  contras	  want	  to	  meterse	  [‘get	  in’,	  as	  in	  infiltrate]’	  Yet,	  already	  during	  this	  ‘first	  contact’,	  the	  uneasy	  combination	  of	   ‘terror	  and	  generosity’	   (though	   in	   the	  present	  case,	   it	  appears	  more	   pertinent	   to	   speak	   of	   ‘terror	   and	   (the	   ceremonial	   enactment	   of)	   benevolence’),	   as	  Hansen	   (2005:112)	   captures	   the	   ‘inherent	   ambivalence	   of	   any	   form	   of	   authority’,	   that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  62	  According	   to	   local	   civilian	   informants,	   members	   of	   the	   private	   sectors	   such	   as	   avocado	   growers	   I	  interviewed,	   and	   members	   of	   LCT,	   reuniones	   were	   moreover	   held	   with	   a	   wide	   array	   of	   local	   actors,	  including	  but	  not	  limited	  to	  local	  businesses.	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would	   characterize	   LCT’s	   pattern	  of	   control	   over	   the	   local	   in	   general,	   shines	   through.	  As	  another	   informant	   stated:	   ‘You	   go	   because	   you	   [have	   to]	   go…	   they	   invite	   you	   once,	   they	  invite	  you	  twice…	  and	  the	  third	  time…’	  –	  her	  daughter	  completed	  the	  sentence	  –	  ‘they	  take	  you	  by	  force.’	  Her	  mother	  nodded	  and	  continued:	  	  
‘there	  in	  [name	  of	  community	  omitted]	  they	  convened	  a	  reunión…	  and	  they	  told	  us	  to	  go,	  but	  we	  finally	  didn’t,	  so	  el	  que	  cuida	  allá63	  came	  and	  told	  us	  to	  come…	   and	   then	   at	   the	   reunión,	   you	   can’t	   leave	   until	   they	   tell	   you	   to…	  because	   they	   had	   us	   well	   surrounded…	   as	   long	   as	   you	   don’t	   open	   your	  mouth,	   you’re	   safe…	   but	   speaking	   out,	   hay	   chicharrón	   [‘there	   are	   pork	  cracklings’,	  as	  in	  “there	  will	  a	  mess,	  you	  will	  be	  killed”].’	  	  	  
Chicharrón	  moreover,	  as	  was	  made	  explicit,	  awaits	  those	  that	  dare	  to	  collaborate	  with	  the	  
contras,	   thus	   losing	   their	   status	   of	   locals’	   protectedness	   via	   association	  with	   the	   outside	  enemy.	  	  	  	  
	  
Beyond	  the	  material:	  ‘Curing’	  local	  society	  and	  minds	  
During	   this	   initial	   phase	   of	   colonization,	   LCT	   underlined	   its	   benevolent	   character	   by	  displaying	   generosity.	   As	   has	   been	   documented	   in	   further	   cases	   across	   Mexico	   and	   the	  Americas	   (see	  Felbab-­‐Brown,	  2010:13ff.;	   see	  Weinstein,	  2007	   for	  an	  overview	  of	  a	  wider	  population	  of	  non-­‐state	  armed	  actors),	  punctual	  material	   contributions	  are	  made	   to	   local	  civilians.	  As	  one	  informant	  remembers,	  	  
‘El	  Tío	   [‘The	  Uncle’,	   the	   local	   jefe	  de	  plaza	  and	  one	  of	  LCT’s	   leaders]	  would	  have	  a	  big	  pan	  of	  food	  [prepared]	  every	  Sunday…	  and	  send	  his	  people	  to	  get	  all	  the	  elderly	  persons	  and	  give	  them	  to	  eat,	  a	  real	  meal	  with	  meat…	  and	  the	  10th	  of	  May	  [Mother’s	  Day]	  a	  feast	  and	  a	  party	  was	  made	  for	  all	  the	  moms…	  and	  then	  El	  Tío	  shows	  up	  and	  boom…	  a	  thousand	  [pesos]	  for	  each	  one…	  for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  ‘The	   one	   who	   looks	   after/takes	   care	   there’,	   an	   alternative	   term	   for	   jefe	   de	   plaza	   employed	   by	   LCT	   and	  sedimented	  in	  locals’	  parlance.	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Children’s	  Day,	  he	  brings	  them	  lots	  of	  toys	  and	  he	  organizes	  a	  party	  with	  a	  clown	  and	  everything…’	  	  	  Similarly,	   locals’	   statements	   were	   laden	   with	   references	   to	   measures	   such	   as	   the	  construction	  of	  schools	  and	  clinics,	  the	  provision	  of	  subsidized	  groceries	  (Gómez	  was	  said	  to	  have	  set	  up	  a	   supermarket	   in	  Morelia	   in	  which	  products	  were	  offered	  at	  prices	  below	  market	  value),	   the	  co-­‐financing	  of	  popular	  housing	  projects,	   the	  covering	  of	  medical	  bills	  and	   the	   organization	   of	   ambulance	   services,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   handing	   over	   of	   agricultural	  machinery.	  Yet,	  as	  mentioned	  above,	  LCT’s	  ambition	  –	  and	  corresponding	  degree	  of	  societal	  penetration	   –	   goes	   well	   beyond	   materially	   manipulating	   populations	   into	   loyalty	   and	  recruitment	  (see	  Davis,	  2010:8-­‐9).	  	  	  ‘I	  gave	  that	  to	  them.’	  Moreno	  directed	  my	  attention	  to	  the	  small,	  one-­‐storied	  school	  building	  in	  the	  proximity	  of	  which	  we	  had	  sat	  down	  and	  engaged	  in	  a	  conversation:	  
‘We	  used	  to	  give	  away	  things	  all	  the	  time.	  But	  we	  don’t	  do	  that	  kind	  of	  thing	  anymore.	  It	  just	  spoiled	  them.	  They	  would	  just	  get	  drunk	  off	  the	  money	  we	  gave	   them.	  We	  want	   them	   to	   realize	  what’s	   important.	  We	  want	   them	   to	  learn	  to	  help	  themselves.	  We	  want	  to	  educate	  them…	  it’s	  like	  they	  say:	  Give	  a	  man	  a	  fish,	  and	  you	  feed	  him	  for	  a	  day;	  show	  him	  how	  to	  catch	  fish,	  and	  you	  feed	  him	  for	  a	  lifetime.’	  	  	  	  Gómez,	  on	  another	  occasion,	  specified	  that	  in	  order	  to	  ‘curar	  and	  create	  conscience…	  we	  go	  to	   communities	   and	  we	   assemble	   all	   the	   rateros	   and	   the	   drug	   addicts	   and	  we	   give	   them	  
pláticas	   [chats],	   we	   even	   use	   psychologists	   to	   give	   them	   pláticas…	   we	   put	   them	   in	  seminars…’	  Seminars,	  thus,	  of	  the	  sort	  one	  informant’s	  sixteen-­‐year-­‐old	  son	  participated	  in:	  
‘He	  was	  spending	  all	  of	  his	  time	  on	  the	  street…	  he	  was	  drinking	  all	  the	  time,	  he	   was	   on	   the	   wrong	   path,	   that	   is…	   and	   they	   locked	   him	   up	   a	   couple	   of	  times64	  for	   longer	   times	   and	   then	   they	   put	   him	   to	   work…	   they	   gave	   him	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  64	  According	   to	   local	   informants	   as	   well	   as	   official	   documents	   I	   obtained	   during	   fieldwork	   (SSPF/Grupo	  Primas/0007632),	  LFM	  ran	  drug	  and	  alcohol	  rehabilitation	  centers	   in	  various	  locations	  in	  Michoacán	  that	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courses	   with	   psychologists	   and	   everything…	   they	   do	   exercises	   of	   self-­‐reflection,	   they	  make	   them	  open	  up	   and	   tell	   their	   life	   stories…	   they	  make	  them	   see	   that	   they	   have	   to	   convivir	   [coexist	   in	   harmony]	   with	   their	  families…	   that	   they	   must	   behave	   well	   at	   home…	   and	   when	   they	   get	  vacations	  [sic]	  they	  have	  to	  go	  home	  to	  their	  families	  and	  they	  punish	  them	  if	  they	  do	  something	  else,	  if	  they	  drink	  and	  hang	  out	  with	  the	  girls…	  el	  señor	  [‘the	  gentleman’,	  here:	  the	  jefe	  de	  plaza]	  really	  cares	  about	  them…’	  	  In	   a	   number	   of	   communities	   and,	   again,	   during	   the	   initial	   push	   of	   LCT’s	   territorial	  penetration,	   such	   ‘seminars’	  did	  not	  merely	  serve	   to	   ‘cure’	   those	  having	  gone	  astray	  and,	  for	   that	  matter,	   their	   subsequent	   integration	   into	   the	   group’s	   ranks.	   In	   these	   large-­‐scale	  events,	   the	   ambition	   of	   (narco-­‐)social	   engineering	   as	  well	   as	   the	   application	   of	   practices	  borrowed	   from	   the	   type	   of	   evangelical-­‐charismatic	   self-­‐empowerment	   seminars	  Moreno	  had	   himself	   participated	   in	   here	   find	   their	   clearest	   and	   densest	   expression.	   The	   same	   is	  true	   for	   the	   latent	   oscillation	   between	   terror	   and	   generosity	   characteristic	   of	   LCT’s	  behavior	   towards	   local	   civilian	   populations.	   They	   moreover	   point	   to	   a	   confidence	   and	  freedom	  of	  spatial	  presence	  by	  the	  group	  that	  would	  be	  rendered	  impossible	  in	  later	  stages	  of	   its	   lifespan	  due	  to	  the	  changed	  dynamics	  of	  territorial	  cohabitation	  with	  state	  actors	  (I	  focus	   on	   these	   in	   Chapter	   6).	   Entire	   communities,	   as	   Benjamín,	   a	   young	   man	   of	   about	  twenty-­‐two	  years,	   tells	  me	  as	  he	  recounts	  his	  personal	  experience	   in	  participating	   in	  one	  such	   seminar,	   were	   driven	   off	   in	   busloads	   to	   a	   facility	   called	   Albergue	   Gratitud	  (‘Shelter/Refuge	   Gratitude’).	   Situated	   about	   a	   ten	  minutes’	   drive	   from	   the	   city	   center	   of	  Morelia,	  Michoacán’s	  state	  capital,	  Google	  maps	  lists	   it	  under	   ‘Treatment	  and	  Therapy	  for	  Alcoholics’	  and	  shows	  a	  large	  warehouse-­‐like	  building.	  According	  to	  Benjamín,	  the	  seminar	  lasted	  three	  days:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  were	   used	   for	   the	   purpose	   described	   here.	   In	   a	   similar	   vein,	   further	   organizational	   proxies	   serving	  straightforward	  operational	  goals	  alongside	  other	  goals	  such	  as	  legitimacy	  creation	  were	  created	  (and	  given	  legal	   status	   as	   non-­‐profit	   organizations)	   under	   names	   such	   as	   ‘Construyendo	   un	   Mejor	   Michoacán’	  (‘Constructing	   a	   better	  Michoacán’)	   and	   	   ‘Jóvenes	  Arte	   y	  Cultura	  de	  Tierra	  Caliente’	   (‘Youngsters	  Art	   and	  Culture	  of	  Tierra	  Caliente’,	  see	  Fernández,	  2014).	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‘The	  first	  day	  they	  give	  us	  really	  nasty	  food,	  as	  if	  you	  were	  a	  drug	  addict…	  and	  we	  all	  had	   to	  shave	  our	  heads	  and	  we	  all	  have	   to	   introduce	  ourselves	  and	  so	  on…	  	  the	  second	  day,	  they	  gave	  us	  exercises	  of	  self-­‐empowerment…	  actually,	   we	   read	   two	   books,	   one	   called	   Una	   Vida	   con	   Propósito	   and	   the	  other	   one	   Un	   liderazgo	   con	   Propósito65…	   and	   the	   third	   day	   they	   were	  showing	  us	  videos…	  we	  were	  in	  a	  dark	  room	  and	  there	  was	  nothing	  but	  the	  screen	  and	  you	  had	  to	  be	  there	  if	  you	  wanted	  or	  not.’	  	  	  	  ‘What	  type	  of	  videos?’,	  I	  enquired.	  	  
‘Videos	   of	   violence…	   como	  ellos	   chingan	  a	   la	  gente	   [how	   they	   fuck	   people	  up]…	  how	  they	  torture	  them	  and	  all	  that…	  until	  midnight,	  at	  midnight	  they	  showed	   us	   the	   last	   one,	   but	   an	   uglier	   one…	   even	   uglier…	   how	   they	   drag	  them	  with	  chains…	  and	  [hesitates	  and	  swallows,	  visibly	  moved]…	  how	  they	  cut	   their	  heads	  off…	  and	   the	   first	  one	  was	   confused…	  because…	  how	   they	  combined	  that	  of	  God	  and	  the	  evilness	  they	  were	  doing…	  [as	  he	  described	  his	   experience,	   his	   voice	   became	   shaky	   and	   his	   speech	   approaches	  unintelligibility]…	  so	  how	  they	  cut	  off	  the	  head,	  they	  grab	  him	  [the	  victim]	  here	   [points	   to	  his	  hair]…	   they	  had	   them	  blindfolded…	  and	   then	   the	  head	  [shows	   how	   head	  was	   held	   up]…	   that	   showed	   us	   that	   in	   order	   not	   to	   do	  anything…	  mal	  [wrong/evil]…	  if	  not	  it	  would	  happen	  to	  us…’	  	  	  ‘They	  explicitly	  said	  that?’	  
‘Yeah,	  just	  like	  that…	  It	  was	  like	  five	  videos…	  first	  how	  they	  dragged	  them,	  how	  they	  burned	  them	  in	  acid	  and	  then	  how	  they	  decapitated	  them…	  that	  is,	  it	  depends…	  what	  they	  did	  to	  them	  depended	  on	  what	  they	  had	  done…	  and	  when	  they	  burned	  them	  in	  acid	  it	  was…	  because	  they	  had	  done	  something	  ugly,	  some	  treason	  or	  so…’	  	  	  ‘And	  still,	  they	  talked	  about	  God?’	  	  
‘Yes,	   they	   turned	   it	   all	   upside	   down…	   they	  made	   us	   get	   up	   at	   five	   in	   the	  morning	  to	  pray…	  and	  then	  the	  videos	  of	  the	  massacres…	  and	  then,	  the	  last	  day,	   they	   took	   us	   all	   to	   the	   Palacio	   del	   Arte66	  to	   a	   celebration…	   all	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  65	  Both	   books	   are	   written	   by	   the	   US-­‐American	   evangelical-­‐charismatic	   pastor	   Rick	   Warren,	   founder	   of	   a	  Californian	   ‘megachurch’	  and	   ‘arguably	   the	  most	   influential	  evangelical	  pastor	   in	  America	   [the	  USA]’	   (The	  Economist,	   2005).	   The	   first	  mentioned	  book,	   titled	   ‘A	  purpose-­‐driven	   life’	   (2002)	   in	   its	   original,	   has	   sold	  over	  20m	  copies	  (Economist,	  2005).	  Including	  chapters	  on	  subjects	  such	  as	  ‘The	  making	  of	  a	  leader’,	  ‘How	  a	  leader	  organizes	  a	  project’,	  and	  ‘How	  a	  leader	  confronts	  those	  that	  oppose	  him’,	  these	  publications	  bear,	  in	  tone	  and	  content,	  a	  striking	  resemblance	  to	  Moreno’s	  autobiography	  as	  well	  as	  to	  the	  discursive	  construct	  advanced	  by	  the	  group	  in	  general,	  the	  detailed	  exploration	  of	  which	  lies	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  thesis.	  	  	  	  66	  ‘Palace	  of	  Art’,	  one	  of	  Morelia`s	  main	  event	  venues,	  located	  in	  a	  central	  area	  of	  town.	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pastores67	  were	  there…	  super	  elegant,	  they	  were	  wearing	  suits	  and	  all…	  and	  all	   of	   us	   bold,	   eating	   mole	   [Mexican	   specialty]	   that	   they	   gave	   us	   as	  farewell…’	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  
‘Those	  that	  don’t	  listen’:	  LCT’s	  quasi-­‐judicial	  system	  	  
Since	   ‘not	   everybody	   can	   be	   cured’	   (Gómez),	   castigos	   (‘punishments’)	   constitute	   an	  inevitable	  component	  of	  LCT’s	  regime	  of	  social	  control	  to	  produce	  results.	  As	  Tito	  explained	  to	   me	   during	   our	   second	   meeting,	   castigos	   are	   necessary	   as	   ‘the	   institutions	   just	   don’t	  work.	   For	   instance,	   if	   a	   rapist	   is	   apprehended	   by	   the	   police	   or	   the	   PGR68,	   he’ll	   be	   let	   go	  again	  and	  will	  be	  a	  danger	  again	  for	  society…	  and	  somebody	  needs	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  does	  not	  happen.’	  Pláticas	  such	  as	  those	  described	  above	  form	  the	  first	  of	  a	  three-­‐step,	  escalating	  punishment	   process	   in	   which	   he	   has	   admittedly	   participated.	   I	   asked	   what	   happens	   if	  
transgresores	   –	   ‘transgressors’,	   one	  of	   the	   terms	  used	  by	  LCT	   in	   this	   context	   –	   ‘insist’.	   ‘If	  they	  offend	  [sic]	  again,	  we	  punish	  them.’	  ‘How	  does	  the	  punishment	  work?’	  ‘We	  apprehend	  them	  and	  ‘paddlings’	  are	  applied	  [on	  the	  behind],	  about	  thirty…	  with	  a	  paddle	  made	  out	  of	  mango	  wood	  [about	  eighty	  centimeters	  long,	  as	  he	  indicated	  with	  his	  hands,	  and	  similar	  to	  the	  one	  shown	  in	  Image	  5.3].’	  ‘And	  what	  happens	  if	  they	  keep	  on	  transgressing?’	  ‘Well,	  they	  don’t.’	  ‘So	  you	  never	  had	  to	  apply	  a	  stronger	  punishment?’	  Tito	  is	  a	  poster	  boy	  for	  the	  ideal,	  unconditionally	   loyal	   LCT	   muchacho.	   He	   had	   previously	   stated	   that	   Moreno’s	   readings	  bring	  him	  nightly	  inspiration	  and	  stressed,	  time	  and	  again,	  his	  admiration	  for	  LCT’s	  leaders.	  After	   all,	   it	   was	   them	  who	   ‘saved	  me	   and	   gave	  me	   another	   chance…	   after	   [Los	   Zetas,	   to	  whom	  he	  was	  previously	  affiliated]	  left	  me	  to	  die	  like	  a	  dog.’	  He	  only	  wavered	  in	  his	  official	  posture	   when	   I	   asked	   him	   for	   a	   second	   time	   if	   he	   was	   not	   afraid,	   with	   his	   expressing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  67	  Note,	  again,	   the	  sedimentation	  of	   terminology	  advanced	  by	  LCT	   in	   locals’	  parlance	  (‘pastors’	  was	   initially	  used	  by	  the	  group	  to	  refer	  to	  members	  of	  its	  leadership).	  	  68	  The	  Procuraduría	  General	  de	   la	  República,	  the	  General	  Prosecutor’s	  Office,	   has	  proper	  policing	  powers	   in	  Mexico.	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concern	  that	  he	  might	  become	  perceived	  as	  a	  snitch	  if	  he	  told	  me	  too	  much,	  which	  in	  itself	  was	   telling	   as	   for	   the	   tensions	   between	   LCT’s	   discourse	   and	   on-­‐the-­‐ground	   realities.	  Correspondingly,	   he	   denied	   involvement	   in	  measures	   beyond	   ‘milder’	   forms	   of	   corporal	  punishment.	  	  	  In	  Gómez’s	  words,	  in	  contrast,	  the	  irreformable	  ratero	  as	  the	  internal	  enemy	  also	  enters	  the	  category	  of	   the	   justifiably	  killable:	   ‘sometimes	   they	  don’t	   listen	  and	  have	   to	  die.’	   In	  Tito’s	  account,	   LCT’s	   regime	   of	   social	   control	   appears	   as	   a	   quasi-­‐judicial	   system:	   governed	   by	  fairness	  (for	  providing	  the	  chance	  to	  reform)	  and	  reason	  (for	  only	  addressing	  those	  posing	  an	   imminent	   threat	   to	   society);	   based	   on	   clear	   rules,	   with	   a	   punishment	   catalogue,	  reminiscent	   of	   Benjamín’s	   comments	   on	   the	   contents	   of	   the	   videos	   shown	   to	   him	   and	  asserted	   to	   exist	   by	   an	   array	   of	   informants;	   and	   procedurally	   standardized,	   with	   three	  steps	   escalating	   up	   to	   a	   death	   sentence	   only	   pronounceable	   after	   corresponding	  deliberations	  by	  LCT’s	  highest	  organ,	  composed	  of	  its	  twelve	  highest	  leaders69.	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69	  During	  our	  conversation,	  Moreno	  proudly	  showed	  me	  an	  opaque	  silver	  ring	  adorned	  with	  LCT’s	   insignia.	  Only	   those	   integrating	   the	   group’s	   highest	   circle	   wear	   the	   ring.	   He	   moreover	   underlined	   that	   the	  contravention	  of	  this	  exclusive	  right	  carries,	  again,	  a	  death	  sentence.	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  Image	  5.3:	  Paddle	  used	  for	  corporal	  punishment.	  	  Courtesy	  of	  anonymized	  journalistic	  source.	  	  	  	  	  
On-­‐the-­‐ground	  social	  control:	  Depth,	  deviation,	  and	  the	  spectacle	  of	  punishment	  	  
On	  the	  ground,	  the	  procedural	  is	  frequently	  abandoned	  and	  castigos	  applied	  without	  prior	  
pláticas.	  As	  an	  informant	  from	  a	  rancho	  close	  to	  Apatzingán	  told	  me,	  	  
‘right	  over	  there	  by	  my	  house,	  a	  man	  who	  was	  going	  [in	  his	  car]	  with	  his	  son	  and	  his	  wife,	  they	  dragged	  him	  out	  of	  the	  car	  by	  his	  neck…	  just	  because	  he	  had	  run	  over	  a	  speed	  bump…	  she	  was	  screaming	  ‘’don’t	  take	  him,	  don’t	  take	  him’’…	  and	   that	  was	   that…	  the	  child	  was	  crying	  so	   loud,	  and	   they	  put	  him	  into	   the	  camioneta	   and	   they	   took	  him…	  the	  wife	  got	  back	   into	  her	  car	  but	  she	  couldn’t	  drive	  anymore	  because	  she	  was	  crying	  so	  much.’	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‘So	  what	  happened	  afterwards?’,	  I	  asked.	  ‘Ya	  no	  supimos’,	  she	  responds,	  indicating	  that	  the	  man’s	   fate	   remained	   unclear	   to	   her.	   A	   similar	   case	   arose	   in	   an	   interview	   with	   another	  informant:	  	  
‘A	   young	   man,	   he	   had	   come	   back	   from	   the	   USA…	   real	   messy,	   drunk	   and	  wanting	   to	   fight…	   so	   they	  went	   to	   him	   and	   told	   him:	   ‘’here,	  we	   do	   things	  differently’’,	  and	  they	  take	  off	  his	  shirt	  and	  they	  tie	  him	  [amarran]	  to	  a	  tree,	  and	   like	   that	   they	   kept	   him	   for	   the	   whole	   day	   and	   the	   night…	   his	   family	  went	  to	  say	  ‘’what’s	  up’’	  [to	  the	  jefe	  de	  plaza]	  but	  no	  chance…’	  	  	  LCT’s	   insertion	   into	   the	   local	   as	   a	   force	   of	   law	   and	   order	   departs	   significantly	   from	   the	  quasi-­‐judicial	   system	   invoked	  by	  Tito	  and	  existing	   to	  curtail	  grave	   transgresiones	   such	  as	  rape,	  burglary,	  kidnapping-­‐for-­‐ransom,	  and	  drug	  dealing	  on	  the	  local	  level.	  It	  addresses,	  as	  informants	   across	   the	   board	   recounted,	   a	   number	   of	   more	   ‘banal’	   forms	   of	   disorderly	  behavior.	  Reaching	   from	  traffic	  violations	  and	  public	  drunkenness	   to	  noisy	  behavior	   (e.g.	  informants	   reported	   a	   ban	   on	  music	   after	   certain	   hours),	   the	   perhaps	  most	   emblematic,	  albeit	   seemingly	   surreal	   example	   in	   this	   context	   was	   provided	   by	   an	   informant	   from	  Holanda,	  a	  community	  in	  the	  very	  heartland	  of	  Moreno’s	  chunk	  of	  the	  territory:	  	  
‘In	   Holanda	   they	   even	   killed	   the	   donkeys…	   all	   the	   people	   had	   donkeys…	  roaming	  the	  streets…	  so	  they	  let	  them	  know	  that	  they	  didn’t	  want	  donkeys	  in	   the	   street…	   because	   they	   would	   come	   to	   your	   house	   and	   eat	   your	  plants…’	   I	  can’t	  help	  but	  speculate	  that	  they	  gave	  a	  plática	   to	  the	  donkeys.	  ‘Well,	   no	   [laughs]…	   they	   talked	   to	   the	   owners	   and	   if	   not…	   boom	   boom	  [imitates	   shots	   being	   fired]…	   so	   there	   are	   no	   more	   donkeys…	   they	  eliminated	  them	  all.’	  	  	  Apart	  from	  the	  public	  sphere,	  LCT’s	  regime	  of	  social	  control	  reaches	  deep	  into	  the	  private.	  Intra-­‐family	   conflicts	   are	   intervened	   in	   and	   thus	   LCT’s	  moral	   agenda,	   and	   specifically	   its	  proclaimed	  role	  as	  a	  protector	  of	  women,	  enacted.	  Accounts	  of	  husbands	  being	   forced	   to	  stay	  in	  relationships	  (‘You	  will	  work	  to	  make	  this	  work…’),	  to	  pay	  alimony	  to	  or	  even	  sign	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over	  (real	  estate)	  property	  in	  cases	  of	  separation	  or	  divorce	  were,	  in	  this	  vein,	  as	  frequent	  as	  threats	  and	  physical	  punishments	  against	  alleged	  wife-­‐beaters.	  	  	  Murder-­‐as-­‐text	   (see	   Chapter	   4)	   has	   been	   staged	   by	   LCT	   not	   solely	   for	   ‘market-­‐related	  purposes’	  but	  moreover	  to	  underpin	  its	  role	  as	  a	  guardian	  of	  social	  order.70	  	  One	  example	  is	  the	  abduction	  of	  an	  alleged	  rapist	  from	  a	  police	  convoy	  who	  was,	  the	  following	  day,	  found	  crucified	  on	  a	  street	  sign,	  his	  genitals	  cut	  off	  and	  stuffed	  into	  his	  mouth	  and	  a	  warning	  to	  other	   rapists	   –	   ‘eso	   me	   pasó	   por	   violador	   [this	   happened	   to	   me	   for	   [being	   a]	   rapist]’	   –	  attached	   to	  his	   chest	  with	   ice	  picks	   (see	   Image	  5.4).	  As	   a	  prelude	   to	   these	  displays,	   as	   it	  were,	  stands	  the	  spectacle	  of	  punishment.	  As	  opposed	  to	  the	  discretion	  invoked	  by	  Tito,	  the	  latter	   is	   part	   and	   parcel	   of	   LCT’s	   presence	   in	   the	   local	   and	   supposes	   a	   core	   practice	   via	  which	   its	   mandate	   to	   ‘clean	   society’	   (thus	   the	   content	   of	   one	   message	   released	   in	   this	  context,	   see	  Rivera, 2010)	   is	  enacted.	  Amarrar,	   the	  practice	  of	   tying	   individuals	   to	  objects	  and	   thereby	   publicly	   exposing	   them,	   here	   constitutes	   a	  milder	   example.	   Frequent,	   along	  these	  lines,	  are	  practices	  such	  as	  the	  one	  described	  by	  one	  informant:	  ‘For	  instance,	  when	  a	  
muchacho	  offends	  and	  steals	  something	  or	  so…	  in	  a	  camioneta	  they	  drive	  him	  around	  in	  a	  plastic	  bag,	  they	  kick	  him…	  pour	  cold	  water	  on	  him	  and	  drive	  him	  back	  and	  forth	  through	  the	   rancho.’	   Nothing	   short	   of	   torture,	   punishments	   are	   also	   applied	   behind	   closed	   doors	  with	  designated	  perpetrators	  being	   locked	  up,	  blindfolded,	   for	  days	  or	  weeks,	   threatened	  with	   decapitation	   and	   dismemberment,	   and	   subjected	   to	   beatings	   as	   well	   as	   mock	  executions.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  70	  This	   adds,	   I	   argue,	   a	   thus	   far	   underestimated	   layer	   to	   the	   default	   reduction	   of	   the	   violence	   exercised	  by	  Mexican	  criminal	  organizations	  to	  the	  function	  of	  intimidating	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors	  as	  well	  as	  civilians	  (see	   e.g.	   Campbell,	   2009:27-­‐29;	  Reuter,	   2009).	   For,	  while	   the	   element	  of	   terror	   is	  well	   present,	   it	   is	   once	  again	  amended	  by	  the	  signaled	  protection	  of	  local	  civilians.	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 Image	  5.4:	  Murder	  as	  text	  for	  ‘non-­‐market-­‐related	  purposes’,	  Michoacán,	  2012.	  	  Source:	  Mexico	  News	  (2012).	  	  	  	  	  
LCT	  evaluated	  by	  local	  civilians	  	  
As	  cruel	  and	  incommensurable	  these	  measures	  appear,	  they	  do	  not	  fail	  to	  produce	  palpable	  results.	  Across	  the	  board,	  informants	  agreed	  that	  delinquency	  such	  as	  robbery	  and	  assault,	  previously	  a	  major	  nuisance	  and	  factor	  of	  public	  insecurity,	  was	  now	  altogether	  absent.	  As	  an	  apatzingense	  schoolteacher	  phrased	  it,	  	  
‘they	  finished	  off	  all	  the	  fucking	  rateros,	  that	  one	  can’t	  deny…	  in	  the	  part	  of	  town	   where	   I	   work	   they	   would	   steal	   your	   socks	   without	   taking	   off	   the	  shoes…	  now	  I	  can	  leave	  the	  door	  unlocked	  at	  night	  again,	  before	  that	  would	  not	   have	  been	  possible…	  my	  daughter	   had	   a	   scooter,	   and	  we	  put	   it	   down	  there	  [inside	  the	  house,	  on	  the	  ground	  floor]	  and	  they	  stole	  it…	  in	  my	  school,	  they	  broke	   in	  and	  took	  the	  electricity	  cables…	  it	  was	  really	  grave	  with	  the	  
rateros…’	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During	  the	  conversation,	  another	  woman	  who	  was	  present	  jumped	  in	  and	  added	  that	  ‘there	  used	  to	  be	  a	  lot	  of	  rape,	  but	  not	  anymore…	  because	  that’s	  even	  more	  penalized	  [sic]…‘	  ‘So	  it’s	   true	  that	  they	  protect	  women?’,	   I	   inquired.	   ‘Yes,	  because	   if	  you,	  as	  a	  man,	  hit	   the	  wife	  [sic],	   if	   she	   goes	   and	   complains	   to	   them…	   te	   levantan	   [‘they	  pick	   you	  up’,	   a	   term	  usually	  used	  to	  refer	  to	  abductions	  committed	  by	  criminal	  organizations]…’	  Apart	  from	  outcomes	  produced,	   the	   underlying	   violent	   means	   are	   condoned	   and	   even	   overtly	   welcomed	   by	  some,	  thus	  suggesting	  the	  partial	  functionality	  of	  LCT’s	  self-­‐narrative	  as	  a	  necessity:	  	  
‘A	   lot	   of	  women	  benefited…	  and	   they	   also	  won’t	   allow	   that	   other	   persons	  abuse	  you…	  you	  go	  to	  them	  and	  [tell	  them	  that]	  this	  and	  that	  guy	  treated	  me	  badly	  and	   they	  go	  and	   talk	   to	  him:	   ‘’either	  you	  behave	  or	  we’ll	   give	  you	  a	  paddling’’…	  so	  he	  calms	  down…	  they	  hit	  them	  really	  ugly…	  also	  the	  drunks,	  they	   put	   them	   into	   rehabilitation…	   they	   do	   good	   things,	   a	   lot	   of	   good	  things…	   there	  were	   a	   lot	   of	   people	   of	  whom	   [people]	   said	   that	   they	  were	  crazy	   for	   using	   drugs…	   and	   they	   are	   controlled!	  Now	   the	   rancho	   is	   really	  clean	  [sic]…’	  	  	  In	   the	   same	   vein,	   the	   ‘procedural	   fairness’	   of	   LCT’s	   punishment	   process	   as	   well	   as	   the	  underlying	   rules	   are	   not	   necessarily	   welcomed	   per	   se,	   but	   accepted	   as	   facts	   locals	   can	  reasonably	  be	  accepted	  to	  comply	  with:	  ‘Well,	  it’s	  the	  law	  that	  they	  have…	  and	  if	  you	  know	  and	  still	  keep	  on	  doing	  what	  you’re	  doing,	  well…’	  Similarly,	  a	  man	  who	  counts	   ‘reformed’	  
rateros	  amongst	  his	  friends	  (‘one	  has	  one’s	  acquaintances’),	  did	  not	  necessarily	  agree	  with	  ‘the	  form	  in	  which	  they	  eliminate	  them.’	  Yet:	  ‘they	  do	  give	  them	  their	  chance	  to	  work	  well	  [honestly]	  and	  you	  have	  to	  think	  before	  you	  steal…	  it’s	   like	  me	  with	  my	  son,	   if	  he	  doesn’t	  behave,	  I’ll	  cut	  off	  his	  Sky	  [subscription]	  for	  a	  month…	  and	  my	  acquaintances	  tell	  me	  that	  thanks	  to	  ellos	  they	  stopped	  fucking	  around.’	  	  	  	  	  Such	  positive	  reflections	  cannot,	  however,	  be	  equated	  to	  the	  uncritical	  acceptance	  of	  LCT,	  let	   alone	   its	   ambitious	   discursive	   formulations	   as	   most	   clearly	   represented	   in	   Moreno’s	  autobiography	  (see	  above).	  The	  latter,	  in	  fact,	  is	  a	  subject	  of	  ridicule	  by	  some.	  To	  give	  one	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example:	   The	   night	  my	   gatekeeper	   and	   I	   enjoyed	   a	   post-­‐fieldwork-­‐day	   scotch	   in	   a	   semi-­‐open-­‐air	   karaoke	   bar	   overlooking	   Apatzingán	   from	   one	   of	   its	   hills.	   A	   full-­‐hearted	  interpretation	   of	   a	   corrido	   (popular	   Mexican	   folk	   song)	   was	   first	   amended	   by	   the	   high-­‐pitched	   sound	   of	   a	   scooter	   being	   driven	   by	   twice.	   It	   was	   fully	   interrupted	   as	   the	   two	  youngsters	   responsible	   for	   the	  noise	   swiftly	  made	   their	  way	  up	   the	   stairs	   to	   the	  bar	  and	  began	  handing	  out	  the	  latest	  round	  of	  LCT’s	  propaganda	  material	  to	  everybody	  present.	   I	  looked	  at	   the	  CD,	   given	   to	  me	  with	  a	  mischievous	  grin	   (the	  muchachos	   seem	   to	  have	   fun	  carrying	   out	   this	   ‘operation’):	   The	   cover	   read	   ‘Hymn	   of	   Los	   Caballeros	   Templarios	   de	  Michoacán’	  and	  displayed	  the	  group’s	  insignia.	  Right	  after	  they	  had	  disappeared,	   ‘popular	  demand’	   forced	   the	   DJ	   to	   effect	   a	   change	   in	   music.	   The	   military-­‐style	   marching	   song	  praising	  LCT	  in	  the	  usual	  fashion	  is	  reason	  enough	  for	  a	  group	  of	  men	  to	  start	  marching	  in	  obvious	  mockery.	  Similarly,	  as	  we	  drove	  to	  Guanajuatillo,	  the	  rancho	  where	  my	  encounter	  with	   Moreno	   would	   take	   place	   about	   two	   hours	   later	   and	   passed	   one	   of	   the	   shrines	  dedicated	   to	   San	   Nazario,	   I	   asked	   two	   of	   my	   co-­‐passengers	   what	   they	   thought	   of	   this	  creation.	  ‘Ya	  se	  pasaron	  [They	  have	  gone	  over	  the	  top]’,	  they	  responded.	  Another	  informant	  joked,	   to	   the	   same	   effect,	   that	   she	   sometimes	   considers	   asking	   him	   for	   a	  miracle,	  which	  then	   prompted	   her	   sister	   to	   tell	   her	   not	   to	  waste	   her	   time	   and	   just	   go	   and	   ask	  Moreno	  himself	  for	  a	  better	  chance	  to	  make	  the	  miracle	  happen.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Local	   civilians	   do	   not,	   so	   much	   is	   clear,	   easily	   buy	   into	   LCT’s	   official	   narrative	   of	   a	  benevolent	  and,	   for	   that	  matter,	   revolutionarily-­‐driven	  guardian	  of	   society.	  Reflections	  of	  outright	  legitimacy	  are	  largely	  absent	  from	  locals’	  accounts	  and	  statements.	  Yet,	  even	  those	  that	   generally	  maintain	   a	   critical	   posture	   towards	   LCT	   and	   stress	   that	   it	   is	   important	   to	  them	   for	  me	   to	   understand	   the	   existence	   of	  abusos	  (‘abuses’)	   such	   as	   the	   recruitment	   of	  child	   soldiers	  and	  arbitrary	  violence	  weigh	  off	  benefits	  and	  disadvantages.	   In	   this	  vein,	   a	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typical	  answer	  to	  my	  question	  as	  to	  how	  things	  have	  changed	  since	  LCT	  took	  the	  respective	  
rancho	  reads	  as	  follows:	  ‘on	  one	  hand	  yes,	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  no.	  Because	  before	  there	  were	  a	   lot	  of	  matoncillos	   [diminutive	   for	  matón,	   ‘violent	   thug’]	  and	   they	  cleaned	   them	  all	  out…	  until	  now	  we	  are	  alright,	  that	   is:	   if	  you	  don’t	  mess	  with	  them,	  they	  don’t	  mess	  with	  you…	  the	   only	   bad	   thing	   is	   that	   you’re	   not	   as	   free	   anymore	   as	   you	   were	   before.’	   ‘Not	   as	   free	  anymore’	   refers,	   in	   these	  and	   further	   informants’	  depictions,	   to	  a	   loss	  of	  voice:	   ‘you	  can’t	  talk	   more	   than	   what	   you	   should	   talk.	   If	   you	   know	   something…	   you	   better	   shut	   up...’	   It	  moreover	  means	   loss	   in	  ownership	  of	   traditional	   institutions	  of	  community	  organization.	  As	   mentioned	   above	   and	   reflective	   of	   the	   described	   principle	   of	   reflexiveness,	   LCT’s	  occupation	  of	  the	  local	  did	  not	  translate	  into	  a	  colonization	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  eradicating	  the	  old	  and	  putting	  something	  entirely	  new	  in	  its	  place.	  Rather,	  extant	  structures	  were	  left	   in	  place	   and	   related	   to	   in	  ways	   deemed	   to	   be	   conducive	   to	   the	   achievement	   of	   the	   group’s	  goals	  and,	  ultimately,	  its	  permanence.	  	  	  Inserted	  into	  this	  dynamic	  is	  the	  fiesta	  del	  pueblo.	  This	  annual	  celebration	  commemorates	  communities’	  date	  of	  foundation.	  It	  is	  the	  main	  annual	  social	  event	  in	  their	  calendar.	  Being	  in	   charge	   of	   organizing	   this	   event	   brought	   (financial)	   burden	   to	   those	   chosen	   by	   the	  community	   assembly.	   Yet,	   it	   also	   supposed	   a	   privilege	   and	   acted,	   to	   the	   community	   as	   a	  whole,	  as	  a	  key	  reproductional	  institution	  of	  its	  identity.	  Before,	  as	  one	  informant	  puts	  it,	  	  
‘we	  would	  pay	   for	   the	  entry	  and	  all	   that,	  but	  we’d	  have	   fun…	   	  now…	   they	  make	  big	  fiestas,	  beautiful	  ones…	  with	  famous	  bands	  and	  all	  that…	  they	  tell	  you	  to	  drink	  as	  much	  as	  we	  want,	  eat	  as	  much	  as	  we	  want…	  everything	  is	  for	  free,	  but	  it’s	  theirs	  now	  and	  we	  don’t	  enjoy	  ourselves	  as	  much	  anymore.’	  	  	  Locals’	  opinions	  regarding	  this	  particular	  transformation	  are,	  again,	  split:	   ‘on	  one	  hand,	   it	  limits	   our	   liberty…	   since	   you	   don’t	   decide	   anymore…	   but	   a	   lot	   of	   people	   also	   say:	   ‘’how	  great	  is	  it	  that	  they	  give	  to	  us.’’’	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  The	   lamented	   loss	   of	   ownership	   furthermore	   acquires	   a	   territorial	   dimension.	   Beyond	   a	  general	  caution	  in	  movement	  induced	  through	  (the	  likelihood	  of)	  confrontations,	  this	  finds	  its	   clearest	   expression	   in	   the	   changed	   meaning	   of	   el	   cerro.	   Traditionally,	   as	   outlined	   in	  Chapter	  4,	  a	  place	  for	  illicit	  activities	  to	  crop	  up,	  el	  cerro	  nevertheless	  remained	  accessible	  for	  locals	  to	  hunt	  or	  to	  simply	  be	  with	  nature.	  At	  the	  time	  of	  fieldwork,	  el	  cerro	  had	  mutated	  into	  the	  mythicized	  emblem	  of	  LCT’s	  power.	  Constituting	  the	  very	  heart	  of	  its	  territory,	  it	  is	  off	  limits	  for	  locals.	  Unless	  one	  is	  ‘called	  to	  el	  cerro’	  (sic).	  What	  really	  goes	  on	  ‘up	  there’	  is	  but	   a	   matter	   of	   speculation,	   tales,	   and	   assertions:	   En	   el	   cerro	   is	   where	   they	   take	   their	  recruits	  and	  make	  them	  fight	  each	  other	  to	  death,	  with	  bare	  hands;	  en	  el	  cerro	  is	  where	  they	  have	   ‘people	  with	   a	   Central	   American	   accent’	   who	   train	   LCT’s	   soldiers	   in	  warfare;	   en	   el	  
cerro	   is	  where	   they	  perform	  rituals	  and	  eat	   their	  opponents’	  hearts.	  What	  seems	  certain,	  solely,	   is	   that	   great	   power	   resides	   here	   and	   can	   be	   activated	   from	   el	   cerro.	  What	   Tierra	  Caliente	  is	  to	  outsiders,	  el	  cerro	   is	  to	  locals:	  a	  black	  hole	  whose	  aura	  of	  myth,	  uncertainty,	  and	  danger	  provides	  LCT	  with	  a	  powerful	  signal	  of	  strength.	  	  	  	  Certainty,	  albeit	  of	  a	  different	  kind,	   is	  also	  what	   lets	   local	   informants	  hesitate	  and,	  again,	  weigh	  off	  pros	  and	  cons	  when	  asked	  whether	  they,	  if	  given	  the	  choice,	  would	  want	  LCT	  to	  go	   or	   stay:	   ‘Well,	   I	   don’t	   know,	   the	   problem	   is	   that	   one	   doesn’t	   know	   what	   comes	  afterwards…	  I’m	  afraid	  of	  what’s	  going	  on	  with	  the	  contras…	  I’ve	  heard	  that	  Los	  Zetas	  are	  really	   bad…	   them	   [LCT]	   I’ve	   already	   known	   for	   a	  while…	   a	   known	   evil	   is	   better	   than	   an	  unknown	  good…’	  In	  absence	  of	  feasible	  alternatives	  for	  social	  order	  and	  amidst	  conditions	  perceived	   as	   uncertain	   and	   threatening,	   LCT’s	   self-­‐narrative	   as	  de	   lo	  peor	   lo	  menos	  malo	  seems	   at	   least	   partly	   effective.	   This	   becomes	   expressed,	   not	   least,	   in	   the	   absence	   of	  opinions	  that	  I	  frequently	  found.	  This	  pragmatic	  tolerance	  –	  the	  posture	  I	  most	  frequently	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encountered	   amongst	   informants	   –	   thus	   supports	   the	   goal	   of	   guaranteeing	   the	   inertia	   of	  locals	  as	  well	  as	   the	  non-­‐mobilization	  of	  social	  capital	   in	   favor	  of	  hostile	  entities.	  A	  much	  greater	   threat	   to	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   LCT’s	   self-­‐narrative	   than	   violence	   per	   se	   and	   the	  general	  loss	  of	  freedom	  –	  both	  features	  emerge	  as	  tolerable	  to	  a	  surprising	  degree	  in	  locals’	  accounts	   –	   comes	   in	   the	   form	   of	   its	   own	   members’	   overly	   obvious	   departures	   from	   its	  officially	  held	  norms	  and	  codes	  of	  conduct.	  To	  what	  degree	  this	  is	  perceived	  to	  be	  the	  case	  largely	  depends	  on	  who	  is	  in	  charge	  in	  a	  given	  community.	  Some	  are	  referred	  to	  as	   ‘good	  people’,	  others	  as	  utmost	  abusive.	  As	  one	   informant	  summarized:	   ‘Todo	  depende	  de	  quien	  
manda	   [It	  all	  depends	  on	  who	  leads/	   is	   jefe	  de	  plaza].’	  Locals	  stressed,	   in	  this	  context,	  an	  increase	   in	  abusos	   over	   time	   and	  drew	  a	   correlation	   to	   changes	   in	   local	   leadership,	  with	  outsiders	   installed	   after	   original	   jefes	   de	   plaza,	   frequently	   ‘sons’	   of	   the	   respective	  communities,	  were	  arrested	  or	  killed.	  	  	  With	  kinship	  ties	  thus	  less	  of	  a	  factor,	  the	  employment	  of	  the	  label	  LCT	  as	  a	  personalistic	  tool	   of	   power	   whose	   coercive	   potential	   is	   activated	   arbitrarily	   in	   the	   interest	   of	   those	  directly	  bearing	  it,	  their	  families,	  or	  those	  fortunate	  to	  have	  some	  influyente	  (a	  contact	  with	  influence)	  becomes	  more	  overt	  and	  frequent.	  It	  enables,	  to	  cite	  but	  one	  example	  frequently	  lamented	  by	  informants,	  the	  concentration	  of	  great	  extensions	  of	  land	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  few	  local	   strongmen.	   It	  moreover,	   as	  already	  mentioned	  above,	   acts	  as	  an	  element	  modifying	  and	   aggravating	   the	   dynamics	   of	   everyday	   conflicts,	   or	   enabling	   their	   occurrence	  altogether.	  One	  example	  in	  this	  context	  is	  a	  minor	  traffic	  accident,	  in	  which	  one	  informant’s	  brother	  was	  involved	  and	  which	  turned	  sour	  as	  the	  other	  party	  involved	  had	  an	  influyente:	  	  
‘He	  was	  going	  fast	  as	  he	  wanted	  to	  get	  our	  uncle	  to	  the	  hospital…	  and	  he	  hit	  a	  camioneta	  just	  a	  little	  bit	  on	  the	  side…	  so	  one	  of	  the	  girls	  in	  the	  camioneta	  goes	  and	  calls	  the	  police…	  and	  they	  come	  but	   it’s	  [LCT’s]	  people…	  it	  was	  a	  
patrulla	  fantasma	  [ghost	  patrol,	  see	  also	  Chapter	  6]…	  so	  they	  kick	  him	  and	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push	  him	  [the	  brother]…	  they	  asked	  for	  his	  driver’s	  license:	  ‘now	  we	  know	  where	   you	   live	   and	   we’ll	   kill	   your	   whole	   family’…	   so	   he	   asked	   for	  forgiveness…’	  	  	  Inserted	   into	   this	   dynamic,	   too,	   the	   reappropriation	   of	   LCT’s	   punishment	   process	   as	  described	  by	  Julio,	  the	  informant	  introduced	  in	  Chapter	  4:	  	  
‘The	  wife	  of	  the	  one	  who’s	  [in	  charge]	  there	  now…	  she	  had	  somebody	  make	  flyers	  with	   the	   names	   of	   all	   the	   girls	   in	   the	   rancho	   that,	   according	   to	   her,	  were	   like	   whores…	   she	   was	   jealous,	   that	   is…	   on	   the	   flyers	   they	   were	   all	  listed	  and	  they	  put	  what	  they	  would	  do	  to	  them…	  In	  one	  occasion,	  there	  was	  a	   dance	   in	   [name	   of	   community]	   and	   one	   of	   those	   girls	   danced	   with	   her	  husband…	  and	  she	  was	  drunk	  already	  and	  gave	  her	  a	  real	  ugly	  kicking…	  and	  because	  she	  was	  the	  wife	  of	  that	  one	  [the	  jefe	  de	  plaza],	  she	  had	  the	  option	  to	  do	   that…	  she	   left	  her	  super	  beaten…	   in	   front	  of	  everybody,	  and	  nobody	  said	   anything…	   after	   a	  week	   they	  went	   for	   her	   again…	  beat	   her	   and	  used	  pepper	   spray	   on	   her…	   they	   cut	   her	   [in	   the	   face]	   and	   cut	   her	   hair	   and	  uploaded	  a	  picture	  on	  Facebook:	  ‘‘this	  is	  what	  happens	  to	  all	  the	  whores’’.’	  	  	  Such	   incidences,	   alongside	   the	   abandonment	   of	   most	   of	   the	   practices	   that	   initially	  suggested	   greater	   adherence	   to	   its	   proclaimed	   ambitions	   of	   (narco-­‐)	   social	   engineering,	  end	   up	   undermining	   LCT’s	   goal	   of	   (criminal)	   distinction.	   Telling,	   in	   this	   vein,	   is	   the	  comment	  I	  received	  from	  one	  of	  my	  informants.	  After	  she	  had	  described	  abusos	  observed	  in	  her	  community,	   I	  asked	  whether	  she	  thought	  that	   they	  are	  worse	  than	  the	   federal	  police,	  usually	   the	   one	   actor	   receiving	   most	   criticism	   and	   expressions	   of,	   to	   put	   it	   mildly,	  animosity.	  ‘Well,	  they’re	  almost	  the	  same	  already…’	  	  
	  
Conclusion	  	  
In	   this	   chapter,	   I	   have	   provided	   insights	   into	   Tierra	   Caliente	   under	   ‘Templar	   rule’,	  identifying	  patterns	  of	   territorial	  and	  social	   control	   that	  go	  well	  beyond	   those	  associated	  with	  ‘traditional’	  (Mexican)	  organized	  crime.	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  they	  amount	  to	  a	  veritable	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project	  of	  alternative	  governance.	  This	  situates	  LCT	  amongst	  an	  increasing	  number	  of	  non-­‐state	   armed	   actors	   that	   are	   taking	   up	   functions	   of	   governance	   across	   the	   Global	   South,	  including	   Mexico.	   My	   analysis	   of	   specific	   practices	   of	   governance	   as	   well	   as	   of	   the	  mechanisms	  underlying	  their	  design	  helps	  to	  tackle	  the	  still	   largely	  pendent	  task	  of	  going	  beyond	   the	   principal	   recognition	   of	   spaces	   in	   which	   non-­‐state	   armed	   actors	   exert	  significant	   influence	   and	   to	   empirically	   explore	   ‘the	   origins	   and	   nature	   of	   alternative	  authority	  and	  governance	  structures	  in	  contested	  spaces’	  (Clunan,	  2010:	  3).	  These	  findings	  question	   and	   contradict	   a	   number	   of	   fallacies	   built	   into	   the	   discursive-­‐theoretical	  construction	  of	  such	  spaces	  and	  of	  the	  actors	  populating	  them.	  For	  one,	  I	  have	  shown	  that	  the	  attempt	  to	  obtain	  legitimacy	  cannot,	  as	  is	  often	  done,	  easily	  be	  dismissed	  as	  a	  negligible	  and	   obvious	   attempt	   to	   launder	   violent	   imposition.	   What	   is	   and	   what	   is	   not	   bearable,	  acceptable,	  or	  even	   legitimate	  to	  specific	  social	  audiences	   is	  established	  through	  complex	  interactions	   that	   are	   not	   bound	   by	   official	   and/or	   externally	   construed	   categories	   of	  legality	  and	  morality.	  And	  while	  violence	   is,	  beyond	  doubt,	   important,	   it	   is	  by	   far	  not	   the	  only	  technique	  of	  territorial	  and	  social	  control	  LCT	  relies	  on.	  I	  have	  indeed	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  obtention	  of	  legitimacy	  is	  to	  be	  considered	  an	  organizational	  goal	  in	  its	  own	  right.	  This	   is	   because	   it	   has	   indubitably	  motivated	   and	   shaped	   LCT’s	   actions	   and	   the	   relations	  between	   the	   group	   and	   local	   civilian	   populations.	   These	   appear	   not	   as	   drastically	  unidirectional	   as	  asserted	  by	  default	  but	  as	   infused	  with	  a	  greater	  element	  of	  negotiated	  power.	  	  	  	  These	  insights	  suggest	  that	  this	  specific	  case	  of	  the	  (re)constitution	  of	  sovereignty	  through	  a	  non-­‐state	  armed	  actor	  follows	  an	  organizationally	  specific	  as	  well	  as	  local-­‐specific	   logic.	  In	  spite	  of	  arising	  out	  of	  many	  of	  the	  same	  structural	  conditions	  as	  similar	  cases	  across	  the	  Global	  South,	  the	  way	  this	  specific	  actor	  relates	  to	  and	  in	  fact	  leverages	  and	  even	  plays	  with	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them	  proves	  automatistic	  arguments	  simplistic	  and	  underlines	  the	  importance	  of	  agency	  in	  producing	   specific	   organizational	   outcomes	   and	   in	   shaping	   the	   lives	   of	   affected	  populations.	  This	  furthermore	  underlines	  that	  social	  realities	  are	  not	  only	  more	  complex	  in	  the	  region	  itself	  than	  usually	  suggested,	  but	  that	  the	  same	  is	  true	  for	  what	  goes	  on	  within	  the	   ‘bowels’	   of	   LCT.	   LCT,	   more	   than	   a	   well-­‐oiled	   hierarchical	   machine,	   appears	   as	   an	  organizational	   label	   that	   seeks	   to	   both	   produce	   and	   signal	   coherence	   and	   unity	   while	  simultaneously	   hiding	   and	   empowering	   an	   array	   of	   different	   attitudes,	   practices,	   actors,	  and	  impacts.	  This,	  alongside	  the	  outstanding	  relevance	  of	  legitimacy	  in	  bringing	  about	  real-­‐life	  outcomes,	  should	  be	  kept	  in	  mind	  as	  essential	  to	  the	  group’s	  eventual	  downfall,	  which	  I	  discuss	  in	  the	  conclusion	  to	  this	  thesis.	  	  	  	  While	  valuable	  and	  necessary	   to	  achieve	  an	  understanding	  of	  LCT’s	  project	  of	  alternative	  governance,	   the	   interactional	   and	   (organizationally	   as	   well	   as	   spatially)	   internal	  dimensions	  analyzed	  in	  this	  chapter	  alone	  do	  not	  suffice	  to	  tackle	  the	  underlying	  question	  of	  how,	  seemingly	  in	  spite	  of	  all	  odds,	  the	  group	  managed	  to	  survive.	  Nor	  does	  it	  by	  itself	  sufficiently	   speak	   to	   grander	   theoretical	   questions	   relating	   to	   dynamics	   of	   social	   (dis-­‐)order	  under	   the	  wider	   trend	  of	   liquefaction	  and	   the	  herewith	  entangled	  protagonism	  of	  non-­‐state	   armed	   actors.	   For	   no	   such	   project	   of	   governance	   and,	   for	   that	  matter,	   form	   of	  sovereignty	  can	  exist	  independently	  from	  all	  else,	  in	  a	  vacuum.	  It	  is	  thus	  necessary	  to	  take	  into	   account	   relations	   with	   other	   existing	   projects	   and	   actors.	   An	   all-­‐encompassing	  approach	  addressing	  all	  of	  LCT’s	  external	  relations	  goes	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  thesis	  and	  will	  have	  to	  form	  the	  stuff	  of	  future	  research.	  My	  elaborations	  in	  the	  following	  chapter	  are	  therefore	  limited	  to	  the	  most	  pressing	  external	  relation	  LCT	  had	  to	  contend	  with	  so	  as	  to	  stay	  afloat:	  those	  with	  the	  state.	  Empirically,	  the	  state	  surfaces	  in	  ways	  that	  far	  transcend	  its	   stereotypically	   and	   yet	   still	   dominantly	   ascribed	   role	   (within	   the	   so-­‐called	   ‘war	   on	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drugs’).	   I	  argue	  that	  LCT	  did	  not	  define	   its	  project	  of	  alternative	  governance	  and	  could	   in	  fact	  not	  have	  done	   so	   in	   fundamental	  opposition	   to	   ‘the’	   state.	  Much	   to	   the	   contrary,	   the	  Mexican	  state	  proved	  empirically	  rogue	  and	  more	  of	  an	  asset	  than	  a	  threat	  to	  LCT	  in	  many	  ways.	  After	  reflecting	  upon	  some	  of	   the	  main	   fallacies	  built	   into	  default	  accounts	  on	  non-­‐state	   armed	   actors	   and	   organized	   crime,	   I	   go	   on	   to	   provide	   a	   nuanced	   account	   of	   how	  correspondingly	  more	  complex	  and	  varied	  state-­‐organized	  crime-­‐interactions	  played	  out	  in	  the	  present	  case.	  	  These	  contradict	  prevalent	  binaries,	  which	  I	  summarize	  under	  the	  term	  licit-­‐illicit-­‐divide.	  These	  depictions,	  in	  turn,	  provide	  theoretical	  feedback	  for	  discussions	  on	  issues	   such	   as	   failed	   as	   well	   as	   parallel	   states	   and	   on	   how	   to	   conceptualize	   the	   new	  topography	   of	   sovereignties	   (see	   above	   and	  my	   literature	   review	   in	   chapter	   2).	   I	   recall	  main	   items	  of	   the	   respective	  debates	   throughout	   the	   chapter	   as	  well	   as	   in	   its	   conclusion	  and	  return	  to	  situating	  my	  own	  findings	  against	  them	  in	  the	  conclusion	  to	  this	  thesis.	  	   	  
	  	  	   194	  
Chapter	   6:	   Shared	   sovereignty,	   trans-­‐legal	   order,	   and	   state-­‐organized	   crime-­‐
interactions	  in	  Michoacán	  
The	  licit-­‐illicit-­‐divide	  	  
In	  December	  2010,	   President	   Felipe	  Calderón	  Hinojosa	   announced	  what	   at	   the	   time	  was	  the	   greatest	   victory	   in	   Mexico’s	   contemporary	   ‘war	   on	   drugs’.	   Federal	   forces	   had	   killed	  Nazario	  Moreno	  González,	  founder	  and	  head	  of	  La	  Familia	  Michoacana.	  Providing	  a	  much-­‐needed	   argument	   to	   counter	   the	   failure	   of	   his	   administration’s	   defining	   policy,	   the	  militarized	   fights	   against	   organized	   crime,	   Calderón	   emphatically	   highlighted	   that	  Moreno’s	   death	   meant	   nothing	   less	   than	   a	   ‘brutal	   strike’	   against	   LFM	   (see	   Informador,	  2010).	  ‘One	  of	  the	  most	  bizarre	  and	  deadly	  cartels	  in	  the	  world’	  (Grayson,	  2010:	  vii)	  had,	  as	  the	   DEA’s	   chief	   of	   operations	   seconded	   before	   a	   sub-­‐committee	   of	   the	   US	   House	   of	  Representatives,	   been	   virtually	   ‘liquidated’	   (cited	   in:	   Lara	   Klahr,	   2012).	   Notwithstanding	  the	  fact	  that	  his	  body	  had	  not	  been	  recovered	  and	  the	  general	  attorney’s	  office’s	  reluctance	  to	  speak	  of	  definite	  proof,	  intercepted	  radio	  communications	  by	  Gómez,	  now	  officially	  the	  group’s	   leader,	  seemed	  to	  support	  Moreno’s	  death	  as	   fact	  (Informador,	  2013).	  Two	  years	  later,	   I	   penetrated	   deep	   into	   LCT’s	   core	   operational	   territory	   of	   Tierra	   Caliente	   in	  Michoacán.	  What	  was	  to	  unfold	  before	  my	  eyes	  provided,	  time	  and	  again,	  testimony	  against	  the	  group’s	   seemingly	   inevitable	  extinction	  –	  and	   that	  of	   its	   leader.	  Locals	  would	  declare	  that	  Moreno	  was	  still	   ‘wandering	  the	  hills	  [of	  Tierra	  Caliente]’	  and	  that	  he	  had	  even	  been	  seen	   ‘floating	   above	   his	   bunk’.	   My	   initial	   suspicions	   towards	   such	   supernatural	  affirmations,	   however,	   soon	   evaporated.	   Moreno	   and	   I	   crossed	   paths	   at	   a	   rural	  community’s	  school	  graduation	  dance.	  Curious	  about	  what	   this	  güero	   (‘whitey’)	  might	  be	  up	  to	  in	  ‘his	  community’,	  he	  had	  one	  of	  his	  men	  summon	  me:	  ‘The	  patrón	  [boss]	  wants	  to	  see	   you’.	   My	   companions,	   as	   nervous	   as	   I	   was,	   wished	   me	   luck.	   I	   entered	   the	   circle	   of	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heavily	  armed	  sicarios	  surrounding	  him,	  and	  walked	  up	  to	  his	  table.	  He	  invited	  me	  to	  take	  a	  seat	  and	  stretched	  out	  his	  hand:	   ‘I	  am	  Chayo’.	   I	   responded	   that	   I	   couldn’t	  help	  but	  notice	  and	  we	  engaged	  in	  conversation.	  
	  The	  staging	  of	  Moreno’s	  ‘first’	  death	  –	  a	  co-­‐production	  of	  LCT	  and	  higher-­‐level	  state	  actors,	  as	   I	  explain	   in	  greater	  depth	  below	  –	  represents	  a	  spectacular	  contradiction	   to	  dominant	  accounts	  of	  state-­‐organized	  crime-­‐interactions	  and,	  more	  widely	  speaking,	  of	  the	  way	  the	  licit	   relates	   to	   the	   illicit.	   Yet,	   it	   is	   not	   the	  only	  one.	  Two	  monolithic	   blocks	   –	   the	  modern	  nation	  state	  as	  the	  stereotypical	  champion	  of	  law,	  legality,	  and	  (moral)	  order	  and	  nihilistic	  forces	  of	  illegality	  and	  disorder	  –	  are	  seen	  to	  confront	  each	  other	  in	  existential	  antagonism.	  This	  imagery	  surfaces,	  perhaps	  more	  clearly	  than	  anywhere	  else,	  in	  the	  debate	  on	  Mexico’s	  ‘war	   on	   drugs’.	   Serrano	   (2012:142)	   speaks	   of	   a	   ‘direct	   confrontation'	   between	   state	   and	  criminal	   organizations.	   Akin	   to	   Knight’s	   (2012:134)	   assertion	   that	   the	   latter	   are	  ‘confronting	   the	   state	   head-­‐on’,	   she	   sees	   them	   as	   ‘clearly	   on	   the	   warpath’	   (Serrano,	  2012:153).	   Sullivan	   and	   Elkus	   even	   claim	   that	   ‘an	   army	   of	   drug	   cartels	   has	   launched	   a	  vicious	  criminal	  insurgency	  against	  the	  Mexican	  state’	  (2008:1).	  Similarly	  drastic	  in	  tone	  is	  the	  U.S.	  Military’s	   Joint	  Forces	  Command	  2008	  threat	  evaluation:	   ‘[Mexico’s]	  government,	  its	   politicians,	   police,	   and	   judicial	   infrastructure	   are	   all	   under	   sustained	   assault…	   by	  criminal	   gangs	   and	   drug	   cartels’	   (cited	   in	   Rieff,	   2011).	   Sediments	   here,	   thus,	   of	   building	  blocks	   common	   to	   contemporary	   sensemaking	   on	   non-­‐state	   armed	   actors	   as	   well	   as	   on	  organized	   crime.	   The	   former	   are,	   in	   this	   vein,	   asserted	   as	   thriving	   under	   conditions	   of	  (violently	   induced)	   state	   absence	   and	   to	   subsequently	   producing	   ‘governance	   voids’,	  ‘ungoverned	   spaces’	   or	   even	   ‘failed	   states’	   (for	   critical	   accounts	   see	   Davis,	   2009/2010;	  Kenny/Serrano,	   2012;	   Morton,	   2012).	   The	   latter,	   in	   turn,	   are	   said	   to	   have	   to	   operate	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‘against	   the	  state’	  and	   furthermore	   ‘without	   the	  state’	   (Paoli,	  2002:64,	  65)	  so	  as	   to	  evade	  ‘the	  law’	  as	  a	  quasi-­‐natural	  existential	  threat	  to	  those	  standing	  outside	  of	  it.	  	  	  	  Much	  of	  what	  I	  encountered	  in	  the	  field	  provides	  circumstantial	  support	  for	  the	  licit-­‐illicit-­‐divide,	   the	   invoked	   iron	   division	   between	   upper-­‐	   and	   underworld	   as	   outlined	   above.	  Displaying	   a	   bellicose	   readiness	   corresponding	   to	  Calderón’s	   proclaimed	   fight	   conducted	  with	   neither	   ‘truce	   nor	   mercy	   for	   the	   enemies	   of	   Mexico’	   (see	   Emol,	   2007),	   military	  helicopters	   relentlessly	   hovered	   over	   Apatzingán,	   LCT’s	   stronghold	   and	   my	   temporary	  home	  in	  the	  field.	  Ranas	  –	  or	  ‘frogs’,	  as	  local	  parlance	  designates	  the	  military’s	  Humvees	  –	  roamed	   its	   streets.	   Entry	   into	   the	   city	   had	   itself	   become	   an	   obstacle	   course	   due	   to	   the	  
cordon	  sanitaire	  composed	  of	  checkpoints	  manned	  by	  Federal	  Police	  (Policía	  Federal,	  PF),	  Military	   (see	   Image	   6.1),	   and	   Navy.	   LCT’s	   leaders,	   too,	   signaled	   their	   claim	   of	   territorial	  supremacy.	  Michoacán,	  they	  had	  reiterated	  in	  countless	  communiqués,	  is	  rightfully	  theirs.	  As	   he	   received	   me	   in	   front	   of	   the	   middle-­‐of-­‐nowhere	   cemetery	   described	   in	   Chapter	   3,	  Gómez	  was	  similarly	  blatant.	  For	  our	  next	  meeting,	  I	  would	  be	  taken	  to	  the	  group’s	  training	  grounds:	  ‘I’ll	  put	  a	  thousand	  well-­‐armed	  men	  in	  front	  of	  you	  so	  you	  see	  how	  fucking	  strong	  we	  are.’	  Strength	  reflected,	  it	  would	  appear,	  in	  events	  such	  as	  the	  guerrilla-­‐style	  ambushing	  and	   killing	   of	   a	   high-­‐ranking	   naval	   officer	   (see	   Chouza,	   2013)	   and	   the	   apprehension	   of	  twelve	  members	  of	   the	  Federal	  Police	  whose	  charred	  bodies	  were	   left	   in	  a	  pile	  beside	  an	  overland	   road	   (see	   Castillo,	   2009).	   Though	  media	   reports,	   as	  El	   Inge	  emphasizes,	   clearly	  downplay	  the	  true	  number	  of	  casualties	  suffered	  above	  all	  by	  the	  PF;	  ‘Over	  there	  alone’,	  he	  told	  me	  as	  he	  points	  to	  a	  nearby	  location,	  ‘we	  killed	  fifty	  of	  them.’	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  Image	  6.1:	  Search	  at	  military	  checkpoint,	  Tierra	  Caliente,	  Michoacán,	  2015.	  	  Own	  photograph.	  	  	  	  
	  
The	  liquefaction	  of	  social	  order	  as	  a	  double-­‐edged	  sword	  for	  illicit	  actors	  	  
Prima	   facie,	   these	   vignettes	   comply	   with	   the	   licit-­‐illicit-­‐divide’s	   hypothesis	   of	   the	  exclusivity	  of	  ownership	  of	  territory,	   law,	  and	  order.	  The	  same	  is	  true	  for	  its	  extension	  of	  supplantation	  (as	  one	  block	  expands,	   the	  other	  must	  recede	  or	  dissolve).	  The	  more	  so	  as	  the	   coming-­‐into-­‐existence	   of	   projects	   of	   alternative	   governance	   invokes	   contention	  with	  ‘the’	   state	   in	   its	   very	   core	   arenas	   of	   action	   (see	   e.g.	   Koonings/Kruijt,	   2004).	   Such	   binary	  rigidity,	  however,	  obscures	  on-­‐the-­‐ground	  complexities.	  It	  is	  crucial,	  I	  contend,	  to	  recognize	  that	   the	   liquefied	   landscape	  of	   sovereignties	   as	  outlined	   in	  Chapter	  5	  presents	   itself	   as	   a	  double-­‐edged	  sword	  for	  non-­‐state	  armed	  actors.	  Condition	  for	  and	  result	  of	  their	  existence,	  it	  affords	  them	  with	  increased	  opportunities	  and	  action	  space.	  The	  mutation	  of	  Michoacán	  organized	  crime	  and	  its	  constitution	  as	  a	  phenomenon	  that	  spills	  over	   into	  spheres	  other	  than	  that	  of	  the	  criminal	  provides	  a	  prime	  example	  here,	  as	  does	  the	  particular	  shape	  LCT’s	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agency	  has	  taken	  in	  this	  context	  (see	  Chapter	  5).	  Simultaneously,	  however,	  the	  possibility	  for	   sustained	   control	   over	   a	   given	   (social)	   space	   appears	   severely	   constrained.	   Forms	   of	  social	  order	  produced	  in	  this	  ‘mare	  magnum	  of	  anomie’	  (Paoli,	  2002:85)	  are	  frequently	  as	  short-­‐lived	  as	  the	  actors	  carrying	  them.	  In	  the	  cutthroat	  world	  of	  Mexican	  organized	  crime	  and	   its	   evident	   trend	   towards	   organizational	   atomization	   (see	   e.g.	   Reuter,	   2009),	   this	  existential	  challenge	  seems	  further	  intensified.	  Counterintuitively,	  it	  is	  here	  that	  the	  limits	  of	  coercion	  are	  demonstrated	  most	  clearly.	  With	  its	  means	  dispersed	  amongst	  a	  wide	  and	  diverse	  population	  of	  state	  as	  well	  as	  non-­‐state	  actors,	  brute	  force	  appears	  as	  a	  necessary	  and	   yet	   insufficient	   tool	   to	   secure	   long-­‐term	   survival.	   Violence	   –	   just	   like	   displays	   of	  strength	  that	  suggest	  high	  violent	  potential	  –	  becomes	  less	  of	  an	  all-­‐defining	   ‘name	  of	  the	  game’	   in	   regard	   to	   state-­‐organized	   crime-­‐interactions	   and	   acquires	   a	   ‘defensive’	   quality	  (Davis,	   2009:232).	   Indeed,	   as	   Lessing	   (2012)	   argues,	   its	   overuse	   entails	   costs	   such	   as	  unwanted	   attention	   by	   law	   enforcement	   and	  makes	   it	   more	   of	   a	   bargaining	   instrument	  geared	  at	  delineating	  and	  sustaining	  zones	  of	  non-­‐interference.	  	  	  
What	   this	   calls	   for	   in	   analytical	   terms	   is	   to	   allow	   for	   the	   possibility	   of	   an	   element	   of	  negotiation,	   convergence,	   and	   accommodation	   greater	   than	   the	   emphasis	   on	   imposition,	  dissolution,	   and	   fragmentation	   would	   suggest.	   The	   challenge	   becomes	   to	   unpack	   how	  particular	  actors’	  potential	  access	   to	  vital	   resources	  and	  opportunities	   for	  permanence	   is	  anchored	   in	   interactional	   patterns	   transcending	   the	   spectacular,	   externally	   perceptible,	  and	  violent.	  Any	  such	  approach	  to	  the	  new	  topography	  of	  sovereignties	  must	  factor	  in	  the	  state.	   For	   it	   does	   not	   simply	   vanish	   and	   leave	   the	   field	   for	   easy	   non-­‐state	   colonization.	  Nothing	  is	  further	  from	  the	  truth.	  In	  the	  present	  case,	  too,	  ‘it’	  is	  latently	  present,	  both	  in	  its	  abstract-­‐ideal	   projection	   as	   ‘the	   very	   embodiment	   of	   reified	   legality’	   (Heyman/Smart,	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1999:11)	   as	   well	   as	   in	   shape	   of	   those	   real-­‐world	   actors	   claiming	   its	   representation,	  occupying	   and	   enacting	   its	   structures.	   At	   which	   point	   the	   historically	   ‘incestuous	  relationship’	  between	  Mexican	  organized	  crime	  and	  the	  Mexican	  state	  apparatus	  (Knight,	  2012:120,	   see	   also	   Watt/Zepeda,	   2012)	   serves	   to	   emphasize	   that	   ideal	   projection	   and	  empirical	   reality	   must	   not	   be	   confused	   with	   one	   another	   (see	   Heyman/Smart,	   1999).	  Though	   largely	   taken	   for	   granted,	   there	   is	   nothing	   to	   suggest	   that	   states	   are	   naturally	  ‘bound	   by	   law’	   (Spinoza,	   1951	   [1883]:	   311,	   cited	   in:	   Rodgers,	   2006:326)	   or	   that	   their	  actions	  are	  magically	  geared	  at	  championing	  legality	  (worth	  mentioning	  here	  also	  Cohen’s	  2001	  examination	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  Western	  nation	  states	  and	  state	  crime)	  –	  nor	  does	   the	   assumption	   of	   ‘the’	   state	   as	   monolithic	   hold.	   ‘States	   are’,	   as	   Smart	   highlights,	  ‘internally	   complex	   and	   composed	   of	   many	   agents’	   and	   therefore	   it	   is	   ‘inappropriate	   to	  refer	   to	   states	   doing	   or	   intending	   things’	   (1999:104).	   What	   follows	   is	   the	   necessity	   to	  disaggregate	  ‘the’	  state.	  
	  
The	  licit-­‐illicit-­‐divide	  as	  functional	  myth	  	  
The	  line	  of	  argumentation	  I	  develop	  against	  this	  backdrop	  is	  anchored	  in	  the	  observation	  that	  state	  and	  law	  did	  not	  primarily	  enter	  LCT’s	  strategic	  considerations	  as	  ‘natural’	  threats	  as	   a	   positive	   reading	   would	   have	   it	   (see	   Heyman/Smart,	   1999).	   To	   the	   contrary,	   LCT	  recognized	  and	   leveraged	  upon	   the	  plural	   and	  empirically	  deformed	  configuration	  of	   the	  Mexican	  nation	  state	  as	  a	  rich	  pool	  of	  actionable	  opportunities	  and	  resources.	  In	  particular,	  it	   differentially	   positioned	   itself	   towards	   its	   fragments	   as	   well	   as	   its	   foundational	   and	  sustaining	  myth.	  The	   translation	  of	   (potential)	   threats	   into	  assets	  presents	   itself	  as	  a	  key	  outcome,	   thus	   transcending	   the	   commonly	   asserted	   mix	   of	   evasion,	   corruption,	   and	  confrontation	  available	  to	  illicit	  actors	  in	  dealing	  with	  ‘the	  law’	  (Bailey/Taylor,	  2009).	  This	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chapter’s	   principal	   contribution	   consists,	   against	   this	   backdrop,	   of	   identifying	   dynamics	  proper	   to	   three	   distinct	   state-­‐organized	   crime-­‐interactional	   arenas,	   each	   of	   prime	  importance	   for	   shaping	   the	   present	   case.	   First,	   I	   reveal	   that	   LCT	   showed	   no	   interest	   in	  dismantling	  lower	  (municipal)	  and	  mid-­‐level	  (federated	  state)	  state	  structures.	  The	  group	  did	   not	   only	   deliberately	   leave	   these	   in	   place	   but	   even	   actively	   invested	   in	   their	  reproduction.	  These	   ‘rogue	  state	   fragments’,	   as	   I	   refer	   to	   them,	  nominally	   remain	  part	  of	  the	  state	  apparatus	  but	  become	  entirely	  decoupled	  from	  their	  legal	  mandate.	  They	  came	  to	  serve	   LCT	   as	   external,	   yet	   de	   facto	   organizational	   assets,	   valuable	   for	   an	   array	   of	   tasks	  precisely	  due	  to	  their	  sustained	  legal	  façade.	  	  	  The	   aforementioned	   highlights,	   once	   again,	   LCT’s	   basic	   strategic	   orientation	   of	  reflexiveness,	   i.e.	   to	   insert	   itself	   into	   given	   settings	   by	   relating	   to	   and	   leveraging	   extant	  structures	  and	  actors	  to	  its	  advantage.	  It	  differs,	  in	  this	  vein,	  from	  groups	  such	  as	  Los	  Zetas	  whose	   mode	   of	   territorial	   expansion	   rests	   on	   more	   unvarnished	   forms	   of	   (violent)	  imposition,	  leaving	  entire	  areas	  in	  the	  Mexican	  North-­‐East	  without	  municipal	  police	  forces	  (see	  Estrada,	  2010).	  Second,	  and	  adding	   to	   the	  argument	  developed	   in	  Chapter	  5,	   I	   show	  how	  the	  gap	  between	  imagined	  ideal	  and	  empirical	  reality	  of	  state	  and	  law	  served	  LCT	  in	  justifying	  its	  existence	  as	  the	  least	  bad	  solution	  for	  (local)	  social	  order.	  The	  highlighting	  of	  state	  actors’	  malperformance	   in	   the	  provision	  of	   governance	   constitutes	  a	  building	  block	  central	   to	  this	  discursive	  construct.	  Of	  equal	   importance	  was	  the	  declaration	  of	  solidarity	  with	  local	  society	  against	  certain	  higher-­‐level	  state	  actors.	  The	  PF,	  in	  particular,	  epitomizes	  the	  contradictory	  and	  adverse	  effects	  of	  the	  ‘war	  on	  drugs’	  that	  surface	  in	  this	  context	  and	  provide	  groups	  such	  as	  LCT	  with	  actionable	  opportunities.	  Designed	  under	  Calderón	  as	  a	  tool	   to	  wage	   the	   ‘war’,	   the	  PF	  became	  widely	  perceived	  as	   an	  abusive	  outside	  aggressor.	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Serving	  LCT	  to	  forge	  a	  shared	  ‘victim	  identity’	  and	  strengthen	  bonds	  with	  local	  society,	  the	  PF	  in	  particular	  occupies	  a	  centrality	  in	  its	  striving	  for	  distinction.	  	  	  	  	  The	  dynamics	  proper	   to	   the	   two	  outlined	   interactional	   arenas	  highlight	  LCT’s	   relating	   to	  state	   and	   law	   as	   principally	   neutral	   (sets	   of)	   resources,	  mobilizable	   to	   the	   advantage	   of	  actors	   of	   either	   legal	   status.	   Far	   from	   being	   doomed	   to	   operate	   ‘against’	   or	   ‘without	   the	  state’	   (Paoli,	   cited	   above),	   LCT	   did	   so	   qua	   state	   and	   law	   as	   an	   ‘indeterminate	   system	   of	  meanings	   manipulated	   in	   actual	   social	   practice’	   (Heyman/Smart,	   1999:	   11;	   see	   also	  Campbell,	  1993;	  Arias,	  2006/2009).	  Revealing	  anything	  but	  an	  interest	  to	  dismantle	  or	  to	  even	  overthrow,	   its	  actions	  back	  up	  Briquet	  and	  Favarel-­‐Garrigues’	   (2010:4)	  observation	  that	   criminal	   actors	   tend	   to	   be	   ‘satisfied	   with	   the	   existing	   rules	   of	   the	   political	   and	  economic	   game…	   [as]	   their	   familiarity	   with	   ‘‘the	   system’’	   allows	   them	   to	   detect	  opportunities	  that	  enable	  them	  to	  develop	  their	  activities’.	  What	  is	  more:	  Under	  conditions	  of	   liquefaction	   and	   environmental	   uncertainty	   as	   ‘the	   ‘’constitutional’’	   setting	   in	   which	  participants…	   operate’	   (Serrano,	   2012:143),	   ‘the’	   state	   remains	   the	   only	   thing	   close	   to	   a	  superstructure	   promising	   predictability.	   Those	   acting	   under	   its	   roof	   moreover	   bind	  resources	  such	  as	  financial	  assets,	  coercive	  potential,	  as	  well	  as	  appropriable	  symbols	  and	  ‘organizational	  shells’	  of	  value	  as	  rogue	  state	  fragments.	  They	  moreover	  serve	  as	  mimicable	  blueprints	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  counterfeits	  (of	  the	  counterfeits),	  for	  instance	  in	  the	  shape	  of	  
patrullas	   fantasma	   (see	   Chapter	   5).	   These,	   as	   informants	   expressed,	   allowed	   LCT	   to	  produce	   a	   veiled	   presence	   in	   areas	   with	   higher-­‐level	   state	   actor	   presence	   such	   as	  Apatzingán.	  Were	  they	  to	  cease	  to	  exist,	   the	   logic	  of	  and	  the	  mere	  possibility	   for	  creating	  counterfeits	  would	  arguably	  be	  undermined.	  Their	  continued	  existence	  translates	  into	  the	  existence	  of	  clearly	  identifiable	  structures	  that	  can	  be	  related	  to	  and,	  not	  least,	  (attempted	  to	  be)	  controlled.	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Access	  to	  the	  fruits	  of	  ‘the’	  state	  as	  a	  pool	  of	  trans-­‐legally	  activatable	  resources	  is,	  however,	  no	  free	  lunch.	  Contenders	  are	  manifold	  in	  contemporary	  Mexico.	  Here,	  as	  aforementioned,	  the	   twentieth	   century’s	   one-­‐party-­‐system’s	  mediating	   and	   regulating	   capacities	   over	   the	  illicit	  have	  become	  eroded.	  Disaggregated	  the	  ‘state-­‐sponsored	  protection	  racket’	  (Snyder/	  Duran,	  2009)	  under	  which	  Mexican	  organized	  crime	  was	  shaped	  and	  emerged	  in	  the	  first	  place,	   state-­‐criminal-­‐collaborations	   now	   appear	   as	   parallel,	   precariously	   constructed	  houses	  of	  cards	  (see	  Flores	  Pérez,	  2009:137-­‐227;	  Rios,	  2013).	  Yet,	  despite	  a	  manifest	  lack	  in	   coercive	   effectiveness	   –	   showcased	   by	   the	   ‘disaster’	   (Kenny/Serrano,	   2012:2)	   of	   the	  militarized	  fight	  against	  Mexico’s	  criminal	  organizations	  –	  higher-­‐level	  state	  actors	  are	  still	  in	   the	   position	   to	   cause	   significant	   damage	   to	   particular	   actors	   (and	   individuals)	   by	  mobilizing	   their	   coercive	   potential.	   From	   LCT’s	   perspective,	   what	   emerges	   is	   a	   dual	  challenge:	  To	   realize,	  on	  one	  hand,	   its	  vested	  interest	  in	  sustaining	  ‘the’	  state	   (in	   its	   rogue	  configuration)	  with	  the	  latter	  as	  the	  condition	  to	  keep	  on	  populating	  and	  manipulating	  the	  interstices	  between	  ideal	  and	  empirical	  law,	  to	  engage	  in	  interactions	  concealed	  by	  and	  yet	  transcending	   the	   licit-­‐illicit	   divide;	   and	   to	   prevent,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   a	   hostile	  mobilization,	  be	  it	  directly	  by	  state	  actors	  or	  by	  illicit	  competitors.	  Reflections	  here	  again	  of	  the	   duality	   of	   control	   over	   extant	   resources	   as	   organizational	   goal	   and	   condition	   for	  organizational	  permanence.	  Successfully	  addressing	  both	  presupposes,	  I	  argue,	  the	  ability	  to	   constitute	   a	   viable	   interactional	   partner	   for	   higher-­‐level	   state-­‐actors.	   Corruption	   is	  certainly	   important	   in	   this	   context,	   but	   insufficient	   if	   considered	   alone.	   More	  fundamentally,	   a	   successful	   and	  not	  merely	   ephemeral	   accommodation	  with	   capable	   (i.e.	  higher-­‐level)	  state	  actors	  hinges	  on	  the	  capacity	  to	  help	  the	  latter	  ‘impersonate’	  themselves	  (Comaroff/Comaroff,	  2006:16).	  To	  co-­‐enact,	   in	  other	  words,	   ‘the	  very	  possibility	  of	  [state]	  governance’	   (ibid.:	   21)	  when	  options	   are	   realistically	   constrained	   to	   the	   ‘management	   of	  ungoverned	   spaces’	   (Clunan/Trinkunas,	   2010:20).	   The	   reproduction	   of	   the	   state’s	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legitimate	   symbolic	   façade	   as	   ‘the	   very	   embodiment	   of	   reified	   legality’	   (Heyman/Smart,	  1999:11)	   becomes	   a	   potential	   interface	   of	   convergence	   between	   those	   labeled	   licit	   and	  illicit,	  respectively.	  For	  the	  former,	  ‘the	  righteousness	  of	  law,	  the	  claim	  to	  be	  the	  essence	  of	  order	   and	  morality’	   (ibid.:	   12)	   constitutes	   the	   very	   basis	   from	  which	   its	   right	   to	   exist	   is	  derived.	  Not	   least,	   ‘the	   livelihoods	  of	   the	  millions	  of	  bureaucrats	  who	  make	  up	   the	   state’	  (Clunan/Trinkunas,	  2010:	  27)	  depends	  on	  it.	  Simultaneously,	   it	  veils	  the	   ‘dark	  side	  of	  the	  state’	   (Gledhill,	   1995)	   and	   is	   thus	   constitutional	   to	   trans-­‐legally	   inhabitable	   ‘gray	   zones’	  (Auyero,	  2007;	  see	  also	  Reno,	  1995,	  2000).	  	  
	  Therefore,	   the	   licit-­‐illicit-­‐divide	  reemerges	  as	  a	  highly	   functional	  myth.	  A	  myth,	  however,	  that	  requires	  investments	  so	  as	  to	  maintain	  its	  accommodating	  qualities.	  What	  guides	  my	  reflections	   on	   the	   third	   interactional	   arena	   is	   the	   question	   of	   how	   and	   to	  what	   extent	   it	  performed	  as	  a	   trans-­‐legally	  binding	  and	  enabling	  substance.	  As	   I	  argue,	  LCT	  and	  higher-­‐level	   state	  actors	  such	  as	   the	  military	  engaged	   in	  a	   (tacitly)	  agreed	  upon	   live-­‐and-­‐let-­‐live	  equilibrium	  of	  non-­‐interference,	  acted	  out	  under	  conditions	  of	  territorial	  co-­‐existence.	  The	  military	  proved	  accommodating	   insofar	  as	  both	  sides	  could	  satisfy	  their	  respective	  needs	  under	   the	   conjointly	   reproduced	   umbrella	   of	   the	   licit-­‐illicit-­‐divide.	   LCT,	   for	   its	   part,	  demonstrated	  a	  manifest	  capacity	  to	  produce	  signals	  required	  by	  higher-­‐level	  state	  actors	  to	   simulate	   commitment	   to	   legally	   stipulated	   behavioral	   norms	   towards	   relevant,	   i.e.	  external	  social	  audiences.	  In	  turn	  for	  this	  ceremonial	  service	  to	  the	  (punctual)	  reproduction	  of	  the	  state’s	  symbolic	  façade,	  LCT	  was	  by	  and	  large	  left	  to	  exercise	  social	  control	  over	  local	  civilian	  populations.	  Effective	  access	  to	  lower	  and	  mid-­‐level	  state	  structures	  as	  rogue	  state	  fragments	   completed	   the	   package.	   Rather	   than	  merely	   fragmented	   and	   pluralized,	   then,	  
sovereignty	  in	  itself	  becomes	  a	  non-­‐exclusive	  and	  trans-­‐legally	  empowering	  commodity.	  As	  a	  conjointly	  carried	  and	  reproduced	  counterfeit,	   it	  remains	  part	  and	  parcel	  of	  the	  layered	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and	   interwoven	  production	  of	   sovereignties	   that	  here	   took	   the	  shape	  of	  a	   shared	  venture	  rather	  than	  that	  of	  a	  (territorial)	  zero-­‐sum	  game.	  
	  
Cohabitation	  and	  aggression	  in	  the	  counterfeit	  edifice	  of	  sovereignty	  	  
Compartmentalizing	  and	  sharing	  the	  territory	  	  
‘So,	  are	  there	  any	  of	  these	  left	  in	  your	  country?’	  El	  Inge	  showed	  me	  pictures	  of	  his	  old-­‐timer	  Mercedes	   on	   his	   cell-­‐phone.	   My	   negative	   response	   –	   ‘not	   that	   I	   know,	   it	   looks	   pretty	  exclusive’	  –	  seemed	  to	  satisfy	  him.	  Seated	  in	  front	  of	  a	  rural	  corner	  shop	  and	  surrounded	  by	  the	   group	   of	   sicarios	   he	   travels	   with,	   we	   became	   engaged	   in	   small	   talk.	   I	   occasionally	  attempted	  to	  steer	  the	  conversation	  to	  items	  of	  interest	  by	  carefully	  injecting	  allusions.	  The	  actual	  reason	   for	  our	  encounter	  was	  a	  different	  one,	   though.	  The	  result	  of	  a	  months-­‐long	  process	   outlined	   in	   Chapter	   3,	   I	   had	   finally	   succeeded	   in	   negotiating	   my	   way	   into	   the	  depths	  of	  Tierra	  Caliente.	  Almost,	  that	  is.	  For	  the	  time	  being,	  we	  remained	  in	  the	  last	  of	  the	  various	  zones	  that	  provide	  LCT’s	  leaders	  with	  a	  security	  buffer.	  Despite	  all	  claims	  of	  total	  territorial	  dominion,	  the	  possibility	  even	  for	  those	  who,	  at	  a	  given	  time,	  successfully	  create	  spaces	  of	  security,	  the	  latter	  prove	  porous.	  The	  informational	  supremacy	  LCT	  so	  jealously	  strives	  for	  appears	  constrained.	  Interrupting	  our	  conversation,	  one	  of	  El	  Inge’s	  men	  rushed	  over	   and,	   visibly	   excited,	   presented	   to	   him	   a	   copy	   of	   the	   day’s	  nota	   roja	   newspaper.	   He	  opened	   the	   third	   page,	  which	   showed	   a	   dismembered	   body,	   dumped	   on	   some	   sidewalk.	  ‘Será	  ese	   [‘Do	   you	   think	   that’s	   him]?’	   he	   asked.	   El	   Inge	   responded:	   ‘Well	  might	   be.’	   Both	  laughed	  and	  he	  walked	  off	  again.	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In	   the	  same	  vein,	  unexpected	   incursions	  and	  attacks	  by	  certain	  state	  as	  well	  as	  non-­‐state	  actors	  constantly	  take	  place.	  Correspondingly,	  an	  array	  of	  security	  measures	  accompanied	  my	  meetings	  with	  LCT’s	   leaders.	  On	   the	  way	   to	  one	  meeting,	   for	   instance,	  we	   received	  a	  final	  phone	  call	  with	  instructions	  and	  are	  moreover	  warned	  ‘not	  to	  engage	  with	  anybody…	  for	   our	   own	   protection’	   since,	   as	   I	   was	   told	   almost	   apologetically,	   ‘hay	  mucho	   gobierno’	  (‘There	   is	   a	   lot	  of	   government’).	  However,	   this	  was	  not	  a	   cause,	   as	   I	  point	  out	  below,	   for	  immediate	   worry.	   Nonetheless,	   care	   had	   to	   be	   taken	   as	   plain-­‐clothed	   members	   of	   the	  
Estado	  Mayor	   Presidencial	   (the	   ‘Presidential	   Guard’,	   an	   elite	   unit	   of	   the	   Mexican	   armed	  forces	  in	  charge	  of	  protecting	  the	  president)	  were	  rumored	  to	  have	  ‘infiltrated’	  the	  region.	  LCT’s	   leaders	   showing	   themselves	   openly	   in	   Tierra	   Caliente’s	   urban	   areas	   –	   Finnegan	  (2010)	  reproduces	  assertions	  of	  locals	  that	  Moreno	  used	  to	  ride	  his	  horse	  on	  Apatzingán’s	  central	   plaza	   –	   is	   now	  a	   thing	  of	   the	  past.	   That	  Tierra	  Caliente’s	   arterial	   roads	   and	  main	  urban	  areas	  are	  now,	  by	  and	   large,	   the	  exclusive	  stage	   for	   state	  actors	   to	   showcase	   their	  presence	  in	  the	  form	  described	  above	  (also	  see	  Image	  6.2)	  does	  not,	  however,	  translate	  into	  LCT’s	   absence.	   Rather,	   it	   is	   clearly	   present	   through	   rogue	   state	   fragments,	   patrullas	  
fantasma	  –	  or,	  as	  a	  local	  informant	  put	  it:	  ‘that	  which	  is	  government	  but	  is	  not’	  –	  as	  well	  as	  through	  members	  hiding	  behind	  civilian	  façades	  such	  as	  Tito’s	  taxi.	  The	  latter,	  though,	  only	  an	  effective	  cover	  for	  those	  ill-­‐informed	  or	  selectively	  ignorant	  for	  plain-­‐clothed	  elements	  form	  such	  a	  fixture	  of	  everyday	  life	  that	  their	  absence	  appears	  abnormal	  rather	  than	  their	  
presence.	   But	   there	   is	   one	   example	   here	   in	   the	   taxi	   serving	   to	   halconear	   (‘spy’)	   on	   the	  military	  base	  just	  two	  blocks	  down	  a	  road	  in	  Apatzingán.	  One	  afternoon,	  the	  spot	  where	  ‘it	  is	   always	   stationed’,	  without	   ever	   bothering	   to	   vary	   location	   or	   cover,	   became	   suddenly	  vacant	   leading	   to	  confusion	  amongst	  my	   informants.	   Its	  reappearance	   later	   the	  same	  day	  was	  received	  with	  near-­‐relief:	  ‘You	  see?	  I	  told	  you…’	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  Image	  6.2:	  Military	  deployment	  in	  Tierra	  Caliente,	  Michoacán,	  2006.	  Courtesy	  of	  anonymized	  source.	  	  	  	  	  	  Deviating	   from	   the	  main	   routes	   and	   pushing	   deeper	   into	   Tierra	   Caliente	   via	   its	   smaller	  capillaries,	  smaller	  overland	  and	  ultimately	  dirt	  roads,	  we	  entered	  a	  zone	  of	  transition.	  On	  the	   road	   that	   led	  us	   away	   from	  Apatzingán	  and	   towards	  our	  meeting	  with	  El	  Inge	   in	   the	  deserted,	  dusty	  countryside	  surrounding	  the	  city,	  we	  wound	  our	  way	  through	  military	  and	  navy	   checkpoints.	   Just	   five	   miles	   on,	   we	   encountered	   their	   shadowy	   reflections.	   First,	  
halcones	  appeared	  on	  the	  side	  of	  the	  road.	  The	  entrance	  to	  the	  village	  itself,	  the	  indicated	  meeting	   point,	   was	   guarded	   by	   two	   men	   who	   I	   had	   already	   spotted	   as	   our	   vehicle	  approached.	  Both	  in	  their	  early	  twenties,	  their	  kit	  consisted	  of	  baseball	  caps,	  sunglasses,	  AR	  15	  rifles,	  9mm	  handguns,	  and	   joints.	  They	   inhaled	  deeply	   from	  the	   latter	  as	   they	  verified	  that	  we	  were	  indeed	  expected.	  Before	  letting	  us	  through,	  there	  was	  time	  for	  small	  talk	  and	  I	  was	   asked	   to	   say	   something	   in	  German.	   ‘I	   see,	   so	   this	   is	  what	  German	   sounds	   like.	  Okay	  then,	   they’re	   waiting	   for	   you	   already…’	  We	   were	   told	   to	   await	   further	   instructions	   at	   a	  close-­‐by	  house.	  Here,	  a	  sicario’s	  mother	  provided	  us	  with	  the	  anecdotes	  corresponding	  to	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the	  portraits	  depicting	  the	  stages	  of	  her	  son’s	  growing-­‐up	  that	  were	  hung	  on	  the	  wall.	  	  She	  served	  us	   the	   inevitable	  dose	  of	  Nescafé,	   and	  repositioned	   the	   fan	   in	  order	   for	   the	  güero	  ‘not	  to	  die	  because	  of	  the	  heat’.	  	  	  Waiting	   forms	   an	   integral	   part	   of	   such	   territorial	   incursions.	   It	   highlights	   the	   role	   of	  territorial	  non-­‐exclusivity	  as	  an	  indispensable	  element	  of	  trans-­‐legal	  cohabitation.	  By	  and	  large	  –	  excluding,	   to	  a	  certain	  degree,	  el	  cerro	  as	   the	  very	  heart	  of	   the	  group’s	   territory	  –	  zones	  of	  control	  appear	  as	  temporary,	  flexible,	  meandering.	  Support	  here,	  thus,	  for	  Hönke	  and	  Müller’s	  call	   that	   ‘thinking	  about	  the	  postcolonial	  condition…	  implies	  moving	  beyond	  the	  static	  analytics	  of	  ‘bounded	  units’	  and	  fixed	  territorial	  spaces’	  (2012:386).	  To	  be	  taken	  into	   account,	   in	   this	   context,	   the	   flexibility	   with	   which	   defensible	   space	   is	   established	  according	   to	   needs	   and,	   as	   it	   were,	   travels	  with	   LCT’s	   leaders.	   Already	   on	   our	  way	   into	  Guanajuatillo,	  the	  rancho	  celebrating	  its	  pupils	  that	  day	  and	  the	  lieu	  of	  my	  encounter	  with	  Moreno,	   heavily	   armed	   sicarios	   had	  been	  positioned	   at	   the	   exact	   spot	  where	  paved	   road	  had	   given	  way	   to	   dirt	   road,	   about	   three	  miles	   from	   the	   rancho	   itself.	   Prior	   to	  Moreno’s	  arrival	  at	   the	  school	  dance,	   the	   largely	   female	  crowd	  was	  gradually	  augmented	  by	  armed	  men.	  I	  first	  began	  to	  notice	  handguns	  tucked	  away	  in	  the	  back	  of	  jeans.	  Around	  half	  an	  hour	  before	  Moreno’s	  convoy	  of	  seven	  black	  camionetas	  and	  SUVs	  rolled	  in,	  they	  were	  added	  to	  by	  men	  carrying	  semi-­‐automatic	  rifles	  with	  mounted	  grenade	   launchers,	  a	   telltale	  sign	  of	  the	   proximity	   of	   somebody	   higher	   up.	   An	   impressive	   display,	   too,	   the	   all-­‐encompassing	  darkness	  through	  which	  we	  made	  our	  way	  back	  after	  the	  interview	  being	  punctured	  by	  the	  lights	  of	  a	  number	  of	  LCT’s	  vehicles	  –	  I	  counted	  about	  twenty	  –	  positioned	  on	  the	  dirt	  roads	  connecting	  the	  surrounding	  ranchos.	  	  	  Indicative,	   in	   the	   same	   vein,	   was	   the	   moment	   the	   largely	   unintelligible	   traffic	   El	   Inge’s	  
	  	  	   208	  
sicarios’	  two-­‐way	  radios	  uninterruptedly	  spat	  out	  prompted	  one	  of	  them	  to	  come	  over	  and	  whisper	  something	  in	  his	  ear.	  He	  nodded	  and,	  addressing	  me	  once	  again,	  excused	  himself	  for	   the	   inconvenience.	  A	  military	   convoy	  would	   soon	  pass	   through	  and	   I	  was	   to	   stay	  put	  and	  wait	  for	  our	  conversation	  to	  continue.	  Calmly,	  they	  gathered	  their	  things	  and	  took	  off.	  Shortly	   after,	   a	   military	   Humvee	   and	   two	   troop	   carriers	   rolled	   by	   and	   to	   my	   relief	   the	  soldiers	  showed	  no	  interest	  in	  my	  out-­‐of-­‐place	  presence.	  Ten	  minutes	  had	  passed	  when	  the	  crew	  returned.	  On	  this	  occasion	  and,	  it	  seems,	  discerning	  a	  pattern	  through	  the	  accounts	  of	  informants	  inhabiting	  communities	  colonized	  by	  the	  group,	  LCT	  and	  the	  military	  take	  turns	  in	  making	  the	  conjointly	  counterfeited	  edifice	  of	  sovereignty	  work	  for	  them.	  Social	  control	  –	  the	  substantial,	  effective	  side	  of	  sovereignty,	  as	  it	  were	  –	  over	  communities	  such	  as	  Alba’si	  appear	  as	  exclusively	  exercised	  by	  LCT	  (see	  also	  Chapter	  5).	  As	  she	  told	  me:	  	  
‘There	   is	   nothing	   you	   can	   do	   without	   him	   [LCT’s	   jefe	   de	   plaza	   or	   local	  tenant]	   knowing	   or	   without	   his	   approval…	   he	   decides	   who	   enters	   the	  community	  and	  who	  doesn’t,	  which	  merchants	  get	  to	  sell	  and	  which	  don’t…	  there	   is	   now	   only	   one	   shop	   left,	   the	   one	   of	   his	   wife,	   the	   other	   two	   have	  closed	  down…	  and	  he	  has	  taken	  a	  lot	  of	  the	  good	  land…	  and	  you	  can’t	  just	  go	  and	   collect	   corn	   or	   something	   anymore…	   because	   if	   you	   do	   everybody	  knows	  that	  he	  will	  punish	  you...’	  	  I	   asked	   whether	   the	   observation	   ‘hay	   mucho	   gobierno’	   applies	   to	   her	   community,	   too:	  ‘lately,	  yes…	  pasan	  por	  allá	  [they	  drive/stop	  by],	  you	  see	  them	  more	  frequently…’	  ‘Does	  that	  provoke	  confrontations?’	   ‘No,	  no,	  no…	  they	  [LCT	  members]	   just	  go	  into	  hiding	  [outside	  of	  the	   community]	   but	   after	   fifteen	   minutes	   or	   so	   the	   soldiers	   are	   gone	   and	   they’re	   back	  again…’	  The	  military’s	  turn	  to	  enact	  sovereignty	  appears,	   in	  such	  instances,	   limited	  to	  the	  ceremonial	  commitment	  to	  materialize	  it	  in	  its	  (illusionary)	  Weberian	  sense71.	  This	  respect	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  71	  In	   his	   original	   formulation	   of	   1919	   –	   still	   dominant	   insofar	   as	   it	   underpins	   the	   previously	   criticized	  monolithic	   conception	   of	   state	   –	  Weber	   firmly	   couples	   sovereignty	   to	   the	   state,	   defining	   the	   latter	   as	   a	  ‘human	  community	   that	   successfully	   claims	   the	  monopoly	  of	   the	   legitimate	  use	  of	  physical	   force	  within	  a	  given	  territory’	  (for	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  text	  see	  ARC,	  2011).	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for	  each	  other’s	  access	  to	  the	  symbolic	  and	  effective	  fruits	  of	  sovereignty,	  respectively,	  also	  arises	  as	  a	  lesson-­‐to-­‐be-­‐learned	  in	  another	  informant’s	  account.	  The	  owner	  of	  an	  avocado	  plantation	   asked	   for	   protection	   from	   the	   local	  military	   commander	   after	   he	   heard	   shots	  being	  fired	  on	  his	  property.	  Instead	  of	  the	  desired	  support,	  he	  received	  a	  visit	  by	  LCT’s	  jefe	  
de	  plaza	  who	  warned	  him	  not	  to	  disrespect	  his	  authority	  again.	  	  
	  
Respect	  the	  green	  ones...	  and	  hit	  the	  blue	  ones	  with	  all	  you’ve	  got:	  LCT	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  higher-­‐level	  
state	  actors	  
The	  ‘Joint	  Operation	  Michoacán’	  (Operación	  Conjunta	  Michoacán),	  under	  which	  more	  than	  5000	  troops	  (mostly	  military)	  were	  deployed	  to	  the	  state	  (Crónica,	  12.12.2006),	  was	  meant	  to	  set	  a	  precedent	  for	  the	  viability	  for	  Calderón’s	  ‘war	  on	  drugs’.	  Following	  its	  initiation	  in	  2006,	   LCT’s	   relationship	   with	   the	   military	   was,	   according	   to	   Gómez	   and	   El	   Inge,	   ‘more	  problematic’.	  By	  the	  time	  I	  had	  been	  driven	  to	  the	  first	  meeting	  with	  Gómez	  aboard	  one	  of	  
El	  Inge’s	  convoy’s	  vehicles,	  however,	  things	  had	  changed.	  One	  of	  the	  first	  things	  I	  enquired	  about	   was	   whether	   the	   nearby	   military	   presence	   worried	   him,	   a	   question	   not	   least	  motivated	   by	   the	   undesirable	   scenario	   of	   being	   surprised	   in	   the	   company	   of	   a	   declared	  enemy	  of	   the	  Mexican	  and	  US-­‐American	  states.	   I	   should	  not,	   I	  was	   told,	  be	  worried	  as	  an	  agreement	  had	  been	  reached:	  ‘Ya	  hay	  convenio.’	  Insufficient	  intelligence,	  commonly	  blamed	  for	  the	  ineffectiveness	  of	  the	  military’s	  anti	  organized	  crime	  operations	  in	  Michoacán	  (see	  e.g.	   Felbab-­‐Brown,	   2009:27),	   here	   occupies	   secondary	   importance.	   Virtually	   any	   local	   I	  asked	   casually	   identified	   communities	   and	   infrastructure	   central	   to	   LCT	   such	   as	  methamphetamine	   laboratories	   and	   marihuana	   sites.	   As	   noted	   in	   the	   introduction	   and	  underlined	  in	  the	  previous	  chapters,	  organized	  crime	  had,	  in	  Michoacán,	  become	  anything	  but	  a	  discrete	  phenomenon	  to	  anybody	  with	  even	  the	  slightest	  idea	  of	  the	  local:	  ‘Pues	  sí,	  por	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allá	  andan’,	  roughly	  translatable	  as	   ‘Well	  yeah,	  that’s	  where	  they	  do	  what	  they	  do’.	  Locals	  state	  it	  as	  a	  fact	  almost	  too	  obvious	  to	  mention.	  	  	  The	   US	   government,	   too,	   had	   to	   realize	   that	   on-­‐the-­‐ground	   realities	   of	   this	   particular	  scenario	  of	  the	  ‘war	  on	  drugs’	  differed	  from	  what	  the	  provision	  of	  hundreds	  of	  millions	  of	  dollars’	   worth	   of	   ‘security	   assistance’	   had	   meant	   to	   produce	   (for	   an	   overview	   over	   the	  corresponding	  programs,	  see	  Arteaga,	  2009).	  In	  cables	  released	  by	  Wikileaks,	  high-­‐ranking	  diplomats	  complain	  about	  a	  Mexican	  military	  safeguarding	  its	  ‘traditional	  low-­‐profile	  approach’	  
and	  unwilling	   ‘to	  act	  on	  good	  intelligence’	  (US	  Embassy	  Mexico,	  2009).	  Reflecting	  Davis’	  observation	  
that,	  in	  Latin	  America,	  ‘more	  often	  than	  not…	  illicit	  activities	  persist	  with	  the	  tacit	  support	  of	  the	   police	   and	   military,	   who	   often	   prioritize	   the	   protection	   of	   their	   own	   institutional	  sovereignty…	   rather	   than	   the	   protection	   of	   citizens’	   (2010:	   37),	   it	   seemed	   unwilling	   to	  assume	  the	  costs	  of	  its	  designated	  lead	  role	  in	  Calderón’s	  all-­‐out-­‐battle.	  The	  more	  so	  after	  its	   legitimacy	  –	  historically	  derived	   from	   its	   image	  as	   a	  protector	   against	  outside	   threats	  that	   does	   not	   act	   against	   its	   own	   people	   (see	   Camp,	   1992)	   –	   came	   under	   fire	   due	   to	  reported	   human	   rights	   abuses.	   The	   military’s	   uncomfortable	   position	   between	   two	  irreconcilable	   pressures	   –	   obeying	   the	   supreme	   commander	   of	   the	   armed	   forces	   and	  protecting	   its	   image	   –	   played	   out	   in	   LCT’s	   favor.	   Telling,	   in	   this	   light,	  was	   the	  military’s	  reluctance	   to	   go	   ‘all-­‐in’	   during	   confrontations.	   According	   to	   a	   soldier	   involved,	   superiors	  had	  told	  his	  unit	   that	   ‘the	  war	  on	  drug	  trafficking	  was	  a	   fight	  amongst	  brothers’	  and	  that	  they	  should	  ‘not	  forget	  that	  [they]	  all	  are	  Mexicans’.	  Accordingly,	  units	  were	  ordered	  ‘not	  to	  intervene	  in	  matters	  that	  could	  risk	  their	  lives’	  and	  would	  hide	  until	  the	  worst	  was	  over.	  In	  turn,	  as	  intercepted	  radio	  communications	  suggest,	  members	  of	  LCT	  received	  orders	  not	  to	  ‘shoot	  at	  los	  verdes	  [the	  green	  ones,	  i.e.	  the	  military],	  they	  are	  friends.	  Los	  azules	  [‘the	  blue	  ones’,	  the	  PF],	  hit	  them	  with	  all	  you	  got’	  (cited	  in:	  Historias	  del	  Narco,	  2013).	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  Traces	  of	  LCT’s	  differential	  positioning	  towards	  particular	  fragments	  of	  the	  state	  moreover	  surface	  in	  Gómez’s	  statements:	  	  
‘Our	   issue	   is	   not	   with	   the	   military.	   It’s	   with	   los	   azules.	   They	   are	   just	   a	  political	   instrument	   of	   Calderón…	   who	   started	   all	   this	   because	   he	   has	   a	  personal	   problem	  with	   us72	  and	   not	  with	   other	   groups	  who	   receive	  much	  less	  attention…	  when	  we	  can,	  agarramos	  [we	  grab]	  federales	  and	  kill	  them.’	  	  While	   the	  military	  appears,	  generally	  speaking,	  as	  a	  counterpart	   that	  LCT	  can	  work	  with,	  the	  PF	  occupies	  the	  position	  of	  an	  archenemy	  amongst	  state	  actors	  and	  is	  thus,	  just	  like	  its	  non-­‐state	   counterparts,	   up	   for	   extermination.	   Gómez	   admits,	   however,	   that	   the	   threat	  posed	  by	   the	  PF,	  by	   force	  alone,	  could	  not	  be	  successfully	   fenced	  off	   in	   the	   long	  run:	   ‘Los	  
Zetas,	   them	  we	   can	   handle,	   but	   those	   of	   the	   PFP73	  not	   for	  much	   longer.’	   It	   is	   here	   that	   a	  complementary	  approach	  comes	  into	  play:	  the	  forging	  of	  a	  victim	  identity	  common	  to	  both	  LCT	  and	  local	  society.	  It	  forms,	  as	  already	  alluded	  to	  in	  Chapter	  5,	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  LCT’s	  wider	  discursive	  construct	  as	  a	  guardian	  of	  the	  local.	  Vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  PF,	  too,	  the	  desired	  effect	  consists	  of	  mutual	  protection:	  ‘We	  protect	  them	  and	  they	  protect	  us,	  for	  instance	  when	  they	  march	  on	  the	  street	  against	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  Federal	  Police…	  against	  the	  violence…’	  (El	  
Inge).	   Demonstrations	   against	   the	   presence	   of	   federal	   forces	   on	   the	   grounds	   of	   human	  rights	  abuses	  have	  rightfully	  been	  portrayed	  as	  organized	  by	  LCT	  (see	  e.g.	  Ferrer/Martínez,	  2010)	   –	   partly	   so,	   that	   is,	   for	   some	   seem	   to	   also	   participate	   voluntarily.	   Once	   again	  providing	   testimony	   to	   the	   principle	   of	   environmental	   reflexiveness,	   local	   society’s	  mistrust	   and	   even	   outright	   hostility	   towards	   the	   central	   state	   and	   particularly	   the	   PF	  affords	   LCT	   a	   schism	   it	   can	   leverage	   with.	   That	   ‘there	   are	   a	   lot	   of	   people	   with	   broncas	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  72	  At	  a	  different	  point	   in	  the	  interview,	  he	  claimed	  that	   in	  2006,	  they	  kidnapped	  a	  cousin	  of	  Calderón’s	  who	  had	   been	   known	   for	   his	   abusive	   business	   practices.	   This	   then	   started,	   according	   to	   Gómez,	   ‘la	   bronca	  
personal’	  (‘the	  personal	  mess/issue’).	  	  	  	  73	  The	  term	  he	  uses	  stands	  for	  Policia	  Federal	  Preventiva,	  the	  predecessor	  organization	  to	  Calderón’s	  PF.	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[issues]	  with	   the	  PFP	  and	  the	  PAN’	  –	  as	  Gómez	  synthesizes	  –	  underlies,	   in	   this	  sense,	   the	  attempt	  to	  mobilize	  social	  capital	  to	  its	  advantage.	  	  	  	  To	  provide	  one	  example	  here:	  The	  group’s	  turn	  to	  local	  civilians	  for	  support	  against	  federal	  state	  presence	  as	  well	  as	   for	   them	  to	   feed	   the	   informational	  system	  via	  which	   it	   seeks	   to	  sustain	  territorial	  supremacy.	  Via	  cell	  phone	  and	  Blackberry,	  messages	  are	  sent	  out	  to	  civil	  society	   proxies.	   These	   messages,	   which	   an	   informant	   showed	   me	   and	   of	   which	   I	   took	  photographs,	   call	   on	   them	   to	   activate	   local	   populations	   in	   light	   of	   the	   presence	   of	   plain-­‐clothed	  elements	  of	  the	  Navy	  and	  Estado	  Mayor	  Presidencial.	  Details	  of	  what	  to	  watch	  out	  for	   (types	   of	   vehicles	   and	   license	   plates)	   are	   included	   alongside	   the	   call	   to	   report	   any	  suspicious	  movement.	  Moreover,	  proxies	  are	  called	  upon	  to	  denounce	  any	  rights	  violations	  that	  might	  occur	   through	  official	  channels	  and	  to	   tell	   local	  civilians	   to	  do	  the	  same.	  Here,	  LCT’s	   recognition	   of	   the	   plural	   configuration	   shines	   through	   yet	   again,	   as	   does	   the	  activation	  of	  one	  state	  fragment	  to	  undermine	  others.	  Excerpts	  of	  these	  messages	  read	  as	  follows:	  	  
‘The	   state	   of	   Michoacán	   is	   a	   house	   that	   won’t	   allow	   that	   you	   will	   be	  mistreated,	   molested	   and	   even	   our	   families	   raped	   [sic].	   We	   have	   to	   be	  prepared	   to	   conserve	   our	   character	   and	  honor.	   The	   government	  wants	   to	  provoke	  so	  we	  react	  with	  violence…	  I	   invite	  you	   to	   transmit	  peace…	  don’t	  forget	   that	   if	   God	   is	   with	   us,	   who	   against	   [sic]…	   Pass	   this	   to	   the	   whole	  society,	  especially	  the	  civilians,	  I	  need	  them	  to	  film	  them	  [state	  elements]…	  so	   they	  have	  proof	   that	   they	  are	   robbing	  and	  beating	   society.	   In	   a	  while	   I	  give	   you	   the	   number	   of	   human	   rights	   [sic,	   the	   number	   of	   the	   Mexico’s	  National	  Human	  Rights	  Commission,	  transmitted	  in	  the	  following	  message]	  so	  you	  call	  them	  and	  tell	  them	  what	  is	  happening.’	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Caballeros	  v	  federales:	  Forging	  a	  shared	  victim	  identity	  	  	  
Nowhere,	  perhaps,	  does	  the	  depth	  of	   the	  divorced	  relationship	  between	   local	  society	  and	  federal	   government	   find	   a	   clearer	   expression	   than	   within	   the	   narrow	   confines	   of	   the	  classroom	   in	  which	   I	  meet	   local	   fifth	   graders.	   It	   resembled	   a	  warehouse	   rather	   than	   the	  space	  of	   knowledge	   transmission	   it	   is	   supposed	   to	   serve	   as.	   The	   roof,	   albeit	   high,	   barely	  provided	   shelter	   against	   the	   extreme	   heat	   so	   characteristic	   of	   the	   region.	   The	   dust,	   a	  defining	   feature	   of	   Apatzingán’s	   desert-­‐like	   environment,	   had	   relentlessly	   penetrated	  between	  doors	  and	  windows	  and	  underlined	  the	  futility	  of	  recent	  efforts	  to	  keep	  the	  room	  clean.	  Teaching	  materials	  were	  stacked	   in	  apparent	  disorder	   in	  one	  of	   the	  corners.	  Apart	  from	  math,	  geography,	  and	  Spanish,	  I	  spotted	  national	  history	  books	  and	  borrowed	  a	  copy.	  It	   praised,	   as	   expected,	   the	   continuity	   between	   Mexico’s	   struggle	   for	   independence	   and	  revolution	  and	  the	  cementation	  of	  this	  heroic	  spirit	  in	  the	  institutions	  of	  the	  Mexican	  state.	  It	  is,	  after	  all,	  no	  coincidence	  that	  the	  party	  that	  ruled	  the	  country	  uninterrupted	  for	  more	  than	  seven	  decades	  until	  the	  year	  2000	  labeled	  itself	  Partido	  Revolucionario	  Institucional	  –	  Revolutionary	  Institutional	  Party.	  The	  founding	  fathers,	  as	  it	  were,	  of	  the	  grand	  project	  of	  the	  Mexican	  nation-­‐state	  –Zapata,	  Villa,	  and	  Michoacán’s	  very	  own	  Lázaro	  Cárdenas	  –	  have	  found	  their	  deserved	  representation.	  From	  the	  walls,	  they	  stared	  down	  on	  the	  students.	  A	  tellingly	  thick	  layer	  of	  dust,	  however,	  covered	  the	  books’	  officially	  sanctioned	  accounts.	  The	  dust	   immediately	  stuck	  to	  my	  sweaty	  palms.	  The	  only	  other	  things	  that	  adorned	  the	  bare	  and	   crumbling	  walls	  were	   twenty	   or	   so	   student	   drawings.	   These,	   too,	   underlined	   that	   a	  competing	   account	   of	   contemporary	   history	   breathed	  within	   these	  walls.	   From	   afar,	  my	  outdated	  glasses	  blurrily	  suggest	  a	  colorful	  cheerfulness	  that	  caused	  me	  to	  reminisce	  about	  some	  of	  my	  first	  pieces	  of	  ‘artwork’	  of	  blooming	  cherry	  trees	  my	  classmates	  and	  I	  produced	  in	  elementary	  school.	  The	  realities	   local	  children	  grow	  up	  under,	   I	  was	  yet	  again	  brutally	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reminded	  of	  as	  I	  approached	  the	  drawings,	  are	  radically	  different.	  The	  seemingly	  gay,	  red	  coloration	   stemmed	   from	   lines	   and	   pools	   of	   blood	   running	   from	   gunned	   down	   bodies,	  observed	  by	  the	  children	  in	  reality	  and	  transformed	  into	  these	  drawings	  (one	  of	  which	  is	  shown	  in	  Image	  6.3).	  Tellingly,	  the	  role	  of	  the	  aggressor	  was	  clear	  in	  the	  drawings:	  It	  was	  the	   little	  men	  with	   the	   PF’s	   typical	   dark	   blue	   uniforms	   that	   do	   the	   shooting	   and	   killing.	  During	  the	  break,	  the	  schoolyard	  became	  the	  stage	  for	  the	  apatzingense	  version	  of	  cops	  and	  robbers.	   In	   caballeros	   v	   federales,	   the	   latter	   are	   the	   bad	   guys.	   Such	   perceptions	   are	   not	  merely	   a	   matter	   of	   play:	   Some	   hands	   shot	   up	   when	   the	   teacher	   asked	   who	   wanted	   to	  become	   parte	   de	   when	   grown	   up.	   One,	   his	   mother	   later	   told	   me,	   was	   already	   running	  errands	  for	  LCT.	  	  	  	  
	  Image	  6.3:	  Student	  drawing	  (name	  of	  student	  and	  of	  school	  blacked	  out),	  April	  2012,	  Apatzingán,	  Michoacán.	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As	   a	   historical	   constant	   (see	   Chapter	   4),	   locals’	   feeling	   of	   stigmatization	   as	   a	   ‘dangerous	  population’	  had	  been	  further	  increased	  as	  of	  the	  time	  of	  fieldwork.	  Complaints	  such	  as	  that	  ‘they	  [the	  federal	  government]	  treat	  us	  all	  like	  criminals	  while	  we	  have	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  it’	   relates	   experiences	   such	   as	   being	   stopped	   and	   harassed	   ‘just	   for	   having	   Michoacán	  license	  plates.’	  In	  the	  same	  vein,	  the	  PF	  was	  reflected	  upon	  as	  a	  foreign	  intruder	  (the	  cluster	  of	  swearwords	  adorning	  corresponding	  statements	  is	  here	  omitted):	  ‘They	  just	  showed	  up	  one	  day…	  took	  the	  whole	  street…	  and	  wouldn’t	  even	  let	  me	  leave	  for	  work	  anymore.’	  Just	  as	  frequent	  were	  accounts	  of	  outright	  human	  rights	  abuses	  committed	  under	  the	  umbrella	  of	  the	   ‘war	  on	  drugs’	   (for	  a	  general	  overview	  of	   the	   issue	  see	  Estévez,	  2012;	   for	  Michoacán	  specifically	  see	  Ballinas,	  2007).	   ‘Over	   there	   in	   [name	  of	  community]’,	  one	   local	   informant	  told	  me,	  ‘a	  lot	  of	  azules	  come	  to	  steal…	  they	  even	  stole	  a	  crowbar	  and,	  the	  houses	  that	  had	  good	  doors,	   they	  used	   it	   to	   force	  them	  open…	  and	  we	  say:	   ’’look	  at	   that,	   the	  government,	  and	   one	  would	   suppose	   that	   they	   are	   supposed	   to	   protect.’’’	   However,	   the	   situation	   has	  improved	  somewhat	  ‘ever	  since	  they	  [LCT]	  killed	  a	  bunch	  of	  them.’	  Violence	  also	  forms	  part	  of	  locals’	  experiences	  with	  higher-­‐level	  state	  actors.	  As	  one	  informant	  recalled,	  he	  was	  out	  on	   the	   street	   with	   his	   family	  when	   two	  military	   units	   appeared.	   Close	   by	  was	   a	   parked	  
camioneta,	  ‘all	  dirty	  from	  the	  Sierra’s	  soil’.	  He	  continued:	  	  
‘They	   called	   us	   over	   and	  wanted	   to	   know	  whose	   camioneta	   it	  was…	   they	  were	  very	  aggressive…	  I	   told	   them	  I	  didn’t	  know,	   that	   I	   just	  own	  a	  bicycle	  but	  he	  insisted	  it	  was	  ours…	  they	  pointed	  their	  guns	  at	  us	  and	  even	  told	  me	  they	  were	  going	  to	  come	  see	  me	  again…	  that	  I	  was	  going	  to	  die.	  My	  children	  were	  there,	  they	  were	  really	  shocked…’	  	  	  Similar,	  the	  experience	  of	  another	  informant’s	  son:	  	  
‘he	  was	  coming	  home	  from	  work…	  he	  had	  a	  cell	  phone	  and	  was	  listening	  to	  music…	   when	   he	   walked	   by	   the	   checkpoint	   they	   grabbed	   him	   and	   beat	  him…	  they	  accused	  him	  of	  working	  for	  organized	  crime	  [sic]	  and	  forced	  him	  to	  give	  them	  his	  cell	  phone:	  ‘’let’s	  see	  what	  numbers	  you	  have	  there.’’’	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Such	  encounters	  lend	  direct	  support	  to	  LCT’s	  self-­‐portrayal	  as	  de	  lo	  peor	  lo	  menos	  malo	  and	  its	  goal	  of	  distinction.	  	  	  The	  measures	   implemented	   in	   the	  name	  of	   the	   ‘war	  on	  drugs’	  produce	  adverse	  effects	   in	  further	   widening	   the	   preexisting	   schism	   between	   local	   populations	   and	   federal	  government.	   The	   real-­‐life-­‐enactment	   of	   the	   divergence	   between	   ideal	   and	   empirical	   law	  provides,	  in	  outcome,	  LCT	  with	  a	  populatable	  interstice	  and	  draws	  local	  populations	  to	  its	  side.	  Telling,	  in	  this	  sense,	  that	  an	  array	  of	  locals	  would	  identify	  the	  federal	  government	  as	  the	  main	  party	  responsible	   for	  the	  deteriorated	  security	  situation:	   ‘They	  say	  they’re	  after	  the	  criminals	  and	  they	  send	  so	  many	  [troops],	  just	  the	  other	  day	  I	  was	  watching	  TV	  and	  saw	  that	   one	   [pejorative,	   indicating	   Calderón]	   talking.	   And	   where	   does	   it	   take	   us?	   Just	   the	  same…	  where	  is	  the	  security?’	  ‘Would	  you	  say	  you	  trust	  them	  [LCT]	  more?’,	  I	  asked.	  	  
‘Well,	   let	  me	   put	   it	   like	   this…	   it’s	   not	   that	  much	   about	   trust…	   but	   before,	  when	   there	  wasn’t	   that	  much	  gobierno,	   it	  was	   better…	   there	  weren’t	   that	  many	  deaths…	  and	  there	  was	  more	  work…	  and	  we	  never	  had	  an	  aggression	  by	  ellos,	  by	  the	  persons	  they	  [the	  government]	  call	  organized	  crime,	  in	  fact	  I	  call	   them	   all	   organized	   crime,	   the	   government	   itself…	   today	   it’s	   like	   you	  watch	  out	  more	  for	  the	  federales	  than	  for	  ellos.’	  	  	  Telling,	  too,	  that	  even	  informants	  like	  Julio	  who	  had	  been,	  as	  he	  stated,	  traumatized	  due	  to	  the	  effects	  LCT’s	  insertion	  into	  the	  local	  had	  had	  on	  his	  family,	  agree	  with	  others’	  responses	  to	  my	  question	  as	  to	  which	  actor	  represents	  the	  lesser	  evil.	  Posed	  in	  a	  group	  discussion	  in	  which	   he	  was	   present,	   one	   participant	   responded	   immediately	  with:	   ‘If	   I	   had	   to	   choose,	  here	  the	  fucking	  Templars,	  and	  there	  the	  fucking	  government…	  which	  one	  do	  you	  want	  to	  haven	  taken	  out?	  I’d	  say	  a	  thousand	  times	  the	  government…’	  The	  others	  swiftly	  backed	  her	  up.	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Convergence	  between	  federal	  government	  and	  LCT	  
The	  officially	  sanctioned	  production	  of	  San	  Nazario	  	  
The	   diversely	   assembled	   moral	   landscape	   –	   on	   its	   head	   only	   if	   one	   departs	   from	   the	  normalcy	  of	  the	  licit-­‐illicit-­‐divide	  and	  its	  assumed	  exclusivity	  of	  the	  ownership	  of	  morality	  –	   occupies	   center	   stage	   in	   the	   co-­‐production	   of	   Moreno’s	   death.	   While	   Calderón’s	  administration	   hereby	   countered	   the	   notion	   that	   the	   militarized	   fight	   against	   organized	  crime	   had	   failed,	   LCT	   also	   leveraged	   on	   the	   event.	   As	   the	   group’s	   leaders	   told	   me,	   the	  apparent	  success	  put	  an	  end	  to	  an	  offensive	  carried	  out	  by	  the	  PF	  –	  and	  by	  the	  PF	  alone,	  as	  local	  military	   commanders	   felt	   compelled	   to	   stress	   (Ferrer/Martínez,	   2010b).	  Moreover,	  LCT	  took	  its	  strategy	  of	  social	  legitimacy	  creation	  to	  the	  next	  level.	  It	  elevated,	  as	  described	  in	  Chapter	  5,	  Moreno	  to	  the	  status	  of	  saint	  and	  equated	  the	  event	  to	  additional	  proof	  of	  an	  aggression	   facing	   both	   the	   group	   and	   local	   society	   as	   a	   whole.	   Moreno’s	   death	   was	  originally	  diffused	  as	   fact	  by	  LCT	   itself,	  as	  Gómez	  and	  El	  Inge	   told	  me.	  Knowing	  perfectly	  well	  that	  state	  forces	  were	  intercepting	  radio	  communications	  –	  the	  reason	  for	  a	  number	  of	  codes	  being	  normally	  employed	  in	  lieu	  of	  clear	  text	  –	  LCT	  itself	  spread	  the	  news	  amongst	  its	  members.	  The	  only	  source	  confirming	  Moreno’s	  death	  was	  thus	  LCT	  itself.	  Nevertheless,	  the	   federal	   government	   was	   quick	   to	   announce	   the	   apparent	   success	   as	   certainty,	  prompting	   viral	  media	   diffusion.	   LCT	   as	  well	   as	   the	   federal	   government	   both	   fed	  media	  reporting	  by	  each	  releasing	  a	  photograph	  that	  supposedly	  showed	  Moreno’s	  gunned-­‐down	  body.	   In	   spite	   of	   the	   PGR’s	   reluctance	   to	   confirm	  Moreno’s	   death	   –	   it	   stated	   that	   it	   was	  ‘rather	   certain	   that	   that	   person	   did	   die	   in	   the	   past	   events’	   (see	   Vanguardia,	   2010)	   –	   the	  presidency	  stuck	  to	  the	  official	  narrative	  as	  did	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  media.	  Ultimately,	  the	  staging	  of	  Moreno’s	  death	  represented	  a	  mutually	  beneficial	  –	  at	  least	  so	  in	  the	  short	  term	  –	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co-­‐production	  carried	  by	  both	  sides,	  providing	  an	   intriguing	   insight	  behind	  the	  rhetorical	  façade	  of	  the	  ‘war	  on	  drugs’.	  	  
	  
The	  co-­‐production	  of	  rogue	  state	  fragments	  	  
The	  school	  dance	  entered	   its	  most	   intense	  phase	   in	   the	  background	  and	  members	  of	   the	  community	  came	  up	  to	  the	  table	  time	  and	  again	  to	  pay	  their	  respects	  to	  Moreno,	  to	  express	  their	   joy	   of	   seeing	   him	   for	   the	   first	   time	   in	   a	  while,	   or	   to	  make	   fun	   of	   the	   living	   saint’s	  apparent	  weight	   gain.	   In	   the	  meantime,	   the	   essential	   rule	   for	  physical	   integrity	   in	  Tierra	  
Caliente	  templaria	  –	  ‘as	  long	  as	  you	  don’t	  open	  your	  mouth,	  you’re	  safe,	  [if	  not]	  there	  will	  be	  
chicharrón’	  –	  kept	  on	  popping	  up	  in	  my	  mind.	  For	  the	  better	  part	  of	  a	  quarter	  of	  an	  hour,	  Diego	  had	  been	  bombarding	  Moreno	  with	  accusations	  of	  hypocrisy,	  questioning	  his	  status	  as	   a	   ‘true	   revolutionary.’	   His	   reaction	   wavered	   between	   barely	   hidden	   impatience	   and	  annoyance.	   He	   finally	   put	   a	   stop	   to	   the	   tirade	   by	   paternalistically	   patting	   his	   cheek	   and	  pulling	  his	  ear:	  	  
‘If	   you	   have	   three	  monitos	  [diminutive	   for	   playing	   pieces]:	   You	   know	   that	  one	  will	  not	  win,	  you	  know	  about	  the	  other	  one	  that	  you	  cannot	  [support	  it],	  and	  about	  the	  other	  one	  [sic]	  you	  know	  that	  it	  will	  win.	  Which	  one	  do	  you	  bet	   on…	   if	   you	   know	   that	   one	   is	   one-­‐hundred	   percent	   with	   El	   Chapo	  [Joaquín	  Guzmán	  Loera	  aka	  El	  Chapo,	  then	  Mexico’s	  most	  wanted	  trafficker	  and	  head	  of	  the	  (then)	  allied	  Sinaloa	  Cartel]	  and	  the	  other	  is	  with	  Los	  Zetas?’	  	  	  Moreno	  unveiled	  the	  basic	  motivation	  for	  his	  group’s	  intervention	  in	  the	  ongoing	  electoral	  process	  on	  the	  federated	  state	  level.	  Favoring	  a	  specific	  political	  party	  –	  a	  monito	  –	  followed	  yet	  again	  a	  pragmatic	  reasoning.	  The	  ‘intervention	  of	  organized	  crime	  [sic]	  in	  the	  electoral	  process	  of	  unprecedented	  magnitude’	  –	  as	  a	  high-­‐ranking	  federal	  public	  servant	  involved	  in	  overseeing	  the	  2012	  elections	  would	  later	  put	  it	  to	  me	  –was	  an	  open	  secret	  in	  Michoacán.	  Concretely,	  as	  local	  informants	  described	  it,	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‘they	  called	  a	  general	  reunión,	  they	  went	  to	  all	  the	  houses	  and	  gave	  us	  flyers:	  ‘’there	  and	  there	  we	  expect	  you	  at	  that	  and	  that	  time’’…	  [at	  the	  reunión]	  they	  told	   us	   that	   we	   all	   had	   to	   vote	   for	   the	   PRI	   [in	   the	   federated	   state	   and	  municipal	   elections74],	   and	   if	   not…	   obligated,	   if	   we	   didn’t	   march	   straight	  [sic]…	  and	  well,	  we	  all	  did…’	  	  	  To	   that	   end,	   rural	   populations	   situated	   within	   Moreno’s	   chunk	   of	   the	   territory	   were	  moreover	  transported	  to	  polling	  stations.	  To	  make	  sure	  the	  ‘right’	  votes	  were	  cast,	  ‘favors’	  were	  called	  in:	  	  
‘Now	  that	  there	  are	  the	  campaigns	  for	  president	  of	  Mexico75	  [sic]…	  here	  in	  Apatzingán	  they’re	  going	  around.	  And	  it	  is	  the	  PRI.	  It	  has	  to	  the	  PRI…	  They	  don’t	  even	  give	  you	  money	  anymore76,	  it’s	  just	  an	  order.	  Because	  the	  people,	  they	   [LCT]	   have	   them	   comprometida	   [obliged/bound]	   already.	   Because	  sometimes	  there	  are	  people	  that	  don’t	  have	  money,	  somebody	  gets	  sick	  or	  something…	   so	   they	   go	   to	   them	   and	   they	   help	   them…	   but	   what	   happens	  afterwards?	  ‘’We	  want	  this	  and	  you	  better	  remember	  that	  you	  asked	  us	  for	  a	  favor	  and	  now	  it’s	  our	  turn…	  that’s	  how	  they	  do	  it…	  and	  a	  lot	  of	  people	  say:	  ‘’you	  know	  what?	  I	  better	  don’t	  vote’’,	  but	  the	  señor	  [jefe	  de	  plaza]	  says:	  ‘’it’s	  not	  what	  you	  want,	  you	  have	  to	  vote!’’’	  	  	  The	  data	  introduced	  above	  suggest	  anything	  but	  an	  interest	  on	  LCT’s	  part	  to	  dismantle	  ‘the’	  state,	  as	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  this	  group	  as	  part	  of	  a	  criminal-­‐insurgent	  actor	  population	  would	  have	  it.	  To	  the	  contrary,	  it	  proactively	  engaged	  in	  the	  reproduction	  of	  the	  lower	  reaches	  of	  the	  state	  apparatus.	  Again,	  a	  (tacit)	  convergence	  of	  interests	  between	  federal	  government	  and	  LCT	  becomes	  clear.	  The	  fact	  that	  elections	  took	  place	  –	  and	  were	  not	  cancelled	  by	  LCT	  –	  allowed,	   as	   mentioned	   above,	   ‘the’	   state	   to	   ‘impersonate’	   itself	   (Comaroff/Comaroff,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  74	  Federated	   state	   and	   municipal	   elections	   took	   place	   on	   November	   13th	   2011.	   The	   PRI	   took	   the	   state	  governorship	  from	  its	  principal	  competitor	  and	  incumbent,	  the	  Partido	  de	  la	  Revolución	  Democrática	  (Party	  of	   the	  Democratic	  Revolution,	  PRD).	  LCT	  had,	  according	   to	  Moreno	  and	  Gómez,	  supported	   the	  PRD	   in	   the	  2007	  elections.	  This	  claim	  is	  supported	  by	  the	  contents	  of	  the	  mentioned	  judicial	  documents	  (PGR	  SIEDO,	  2009),	  which	  accuse	  the	  PRD’s	  governor’s	  brother	  (still	  at	  large)	  of	  acting	  as	  liaison	  between	  Gómez	  and	  the	  governor.	   Similar	   accusations	   have	   been	   made	   against	   the	   PRI’s	   governor’s	   son	   (indicted	   in	   2015,	   see	  Informador,	  2015)	  and	  himself	  (see	  Informador,	  2013).	  His	  deputy	  has	  been	  accused	  of	  direct	  membership	  in	  LCT	  and	  remains	  under	  indictment	  (see	  Vicenteño,	  2014).	  	  75	  Presidential	  elections	  took	  place	  on	  July	  1st	  2012	  and	  saw	  the	  PRI’s	  victory	  under	  manifold	  accusations	  of	  electoral	  fraud	  (see	  Miroff/Booth,	  2012;	  Sheinbaum/Ímaz,	  2012).	  	  	  	  	  	  76	  Vote	   buying,	   through	  direct	   financial	   and/or	   some	  other	  material	   ‘compensation’	   (handing	   out	   food	   and	  kitchenware,	  e.g.),	  supposes	  a	  regular	  occurrence	  during	  elections	  in	  Mexico	  (see	  Díaz-­‐Cayeros	  et	  al.,	  2012;	  Ugalde/Rivera,	  2013).	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2006:16).	   Here,	   it	   complied	   with	   the	   federal	   government’s	   interest	   in	   signaling	   the	  existence	   of	   an	   electoral	   democracy	   (towards	   the	   international	   sphere),	   key	   to	   the	  sustention	   of	   its	   legitimate	   and	   legal	   symbolic	   façade.	   On	   other	   occasions,	   Gómez	  would	  ‘give	  them	  a	  meth	  lab	  every	  once	  in	  a	  while’	  so	  as	  to	  support	  state	  actors’	  need	  to	  signal	  the	  will	  to	  (re-­‐)establish	  territorial	  supremacy	  (read:	  sovereignty)	  and,	  inserted	  into	  this	  logic,	  the	   effectiveness	   of	   the	   ‘war	   on	   drugs’	   as	   a	   policy	   designed	   to	   this	   end.	   The	   federal	  government,	  in	  turn,	  also	  allowed	  elections	  to	  be	  held	  in	  Tierra	  Caliente,	  thereby	  allowing	  for	   the	  production	  of	   the	  very	   functionaries	   that	  would	   come	   to	  directly	   represent	  LCT’s	  interests	  and	  operate	  under	  the	  group’s	  command.	  These	  structures’	  ‘capture’	  was	  an	  open	  secret.	  Moreno’s	  claim	  that	  they	  ‘put	  [sic,	  as	  in:	  install]	  all	  the	  municipal	  presidents	  as	  well	  as	   some	   state-­‐level	   functionaries’	   coincides,	   in	   this	   vein,	   with	   locals’	   observation	   of	   the	  complete	   decoupling	   of	   a	   legally	   stipulated	   mandate	   and	   de	   facto	   conduct:	   ‘the	   police…	  whatever	  ellos	  say,	  they	  do…	  they	  simulate	  that	  they	  work	  for	  the	  state,	  but	  here	  they’re	  at	  the	   command	   of	   ellos.’	   Notwithstanding,	   the	   federal	   government	   did	   not	   dismantle	  municipal	   and	   federated	   state-­‐level	   structures,	   thereby	   effectively	   providing	   LCT	  with	   a	  rich	   pool	   of	   de	   facto	   organizational	   assets	   made	   up	   of	   rogue	   state	   fragments.	   What	  developed	  here	  was,	  then,	  much	  more	  than	  just	  the	  ‘neutralization	  of	  the	  law’	  through	  the	  usual	   mixture	   of	   evasion,	   corruption,	   or	   confrontation	   (see	   e.g.	   Andreas,	   1998:161-­‐162;	  Bailey/Taylor,	  2009;	  McDonald,	  2005:115).	  Indeed,	  and	  reflecting	  once	  again	  the	  necessity	  to	   achieve	   a	   duality	   of	   control	   over	   extant	   resources	   so	   as	   to	   guarantee	   survival,	   in	  my	  conversations	  LCT’s	  leaders,	  the	  possibility	  that	  such	  structures	  would	  actually	  be	  used	  for	  enforcing	   the	   law	  did	  not	   surface	  at	  any	  point	  as	  an	   incentive	   to	  gain	  control	  over	   them.	  Rather,	  as	  El	  Inge	  put	  it,	  doing	  so	  is	  meant	  to	  prevent	  their	  transformation	  into	  proxies	  to	  other	  illicit	  interests:	   ‘we	  install	  the	  municipal	  police	  because	  we	  don’t	  want	  others	  to	  get	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in	  there	  [sic].’	  In	  such	  references,	  the	  lowest	  layer	  of	  the	  state	  apparatus	  thus	  appears	  as	  a	  free-­‐floating	  set	  of	  assets,	  principally	  up	  for	  grabs.	  	  
	  
The	  lower	  reaches	  of	  the	  state:	  Rogue	  state	  fragments	  as	  de	  facto	  operational	  assets	  	  	  	  
Beyond	   the	   aspect	   of	   demobilization,	   the	   prosecutorial	   documents	   I	   obtained	   during	  fieldwork	  (PGR	  SIEDO,	  2009)	  detail	  that	  rogue	  state	  fragments	  were	  activated	  as	  de	  facto	  organizational	  assets	  in	  a	  number	  of	  ways.	  But	  one	  indication	  here	  is	  the	  experience	  of	  two	  Mexican	  journalists	  who	  produced	  a	  reportage	  on	  Marihuana	  production	  in	  Tierra	  Caliente.	  As	  they	  told	  me,	  they	  first	  negotiated	  the	  terms	  of	  their	  access	  with	  a	  local	  mayor.	  Once	  this	  step	  was	  successfully	  completed,	   they	  were	   taken	  to	  a	  plantation	   in	  one	  of	   the	  municipal	  police’s	  patrol	  cars	  (see	  Image	  6.4).	  To	  begin	  with,	  rogue	  state	  fragments	  were	  employed	  to	  obtain	  state-­‐internal	  information,	  most	  crucially	  on	  movements	  and	  operations	  by	  federal	  forces.	   State	   elements	   served,	   in	   this	   context,	   as	   inconspicuous	   lookouts	   to	   monitor	  security-­‐relevant	  movements	   –	   as	  halcones	   in	   pigeons’	   clothing,	   as	   it	  were.	   According	   to	  Gómez,	  a	  call	  to	  Michoacán’s	  state	  attorney	  –	  another	  playing	  piece	  –	  would	  suffice	  to	  have	  elements	   of	   the	   judicial	   state	   police	   positioned	   in	   strategic	   spots	   such	   as	   entry	  points	   to	  certain	  areas.	  He	  mimicked	  a	  corresponding	  conversation:	  ‘You,	  put	  some	  patrol	  cars	  there	  and	   some	   there	   for	   me	   [sic].’	   The	   utilization	   of	   lower	   and	   mid-­‐level	   state	   fragments	   to	  undermine	   higher-­‐level	   state	   actors’	   operations	   speaks	   of	   the	   simultaneousness	   of	  practices	   applied	   by	   LCT	   towards	   different	   state	   segments.	   The	  notion	   of	   ‘the	   state’	   as	   a	  cohesive	  entity	  characterized	  by	  (and	  for	  that	  matter,	  capable	  of)	  unified	  action	  is	  hereby	  undermined.	  Some	  fragments	  of	  the	  state	  are	  employed	  as	  assets	  to	  counter	  the	  actions	  of	  others.	   This	   also	   became	   clear	   as	   LCT	   pro-­‐actively	   utilized	   rogue	   state	   fragments	   for	   a	  further	   array	   of	   operational	   tasks.	   During	   the	   group’s	   foundational	   phase	   in	   2005,	   for	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instance,	  assassinations	  of	  those	  opposing	  its	  claim	  of	  regional	  supremacy	  were	  ordered	  by	  Moreno	  and	  carried	  out	  by	  state	  officials.	  In	  a	  similar	  vein,	  individuals	  were	  apprehended	  and	   handed	   over	   to	   LCT	   by	   ‘state	   officials’,	   including	   Michoacán’s	   specialized	   anti-­‐kidnapping	  unit.	  The	  violent	  capacity	  of	  the	  state	  turned	  to	  an	  alternative	  use.	  	  	  	  
	  Image	  6.4:	  Rogue	  state	  fragments,	  Tierra	  Caliente,	  Michoacán,	  2011.	  Courtesy	  of	  Eduardo	  Loza.	  	  	  	  	  Similarly,	  official	  vehicles	  were	  used	  for	  transporting	  merchandise	  as	  well	  as	  bulk	  cash.	  One	  reason	   for	   doing	   so,	   according	   to	   the	   protected	   witnesses	   on	   whose	   testimonies	   the	  mentioned	   document	   is	   based,	   consists	   in	   mitigating	   the	   risk	   of	   being	   stopped	   and	  searched	  –	  and	  thus	  of	  suffering	  (economic)	  losses.	  Co-­‐opting	  state	  agents	  and	  agencies	  in	  the	  mentioned	  ways	  moreover	  provided	  access	  to	  schooled	  personnel	  and	  to	  the	  weaponry	  –	  including	  semi-­‐automatic	  rifles	  and	  higher	  calibers	  weapons	  –	  (municipal)	  police	  forces	  are	  equipped	  with.	  In	  addition,	  LCT	  was	  hereby	  enabled	  to	  feed	  on	  state	  resources	  passed	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down	   from	   the	   federal	   to	   the	  municipal	   level.	   This	   took	   the	   form,	   as	  El	   Inge	   clarified,	   of	  having	  public	  contractors	  overcharge	  and	  extracting	  a	  certain	  percentage.	  State	  resources	  available	  to	  municipal	  state	  structures	  were	  therefore	  dug	  into	  so	  that	  LCT	  effectively	  taxed	  the	  state.	  In	  the	  same	  vein	  and	  as	  mentioned	  in	  Chapter	  5	  nominal	  holders	  were	  installed	  for	   agricultural	   estates	   effectively	   controlled	   by	   leading	   members	   of	   LCT,	   thus	   enabling	  access	  to	  agricultural	  subsidies.	  Furthermore,	  operations	  of	  the	  aforementioned	  sort	  were	  not	   constrained	   to	   market-­‐related	   purposes	   but	   were	   also	   used	   in	   support	   of	   the	  aforementioned	  quasi-­‐judicial	  system,	  with	  some	  of	  the	  designated	  perpetrators	  punished	  up	  to	  death	  by	  LCT	  previously	  apprehended	  and	  then	  handed	  over	  by	  state	  officials.	  	  
	  
Conclusion	  
In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  have	  demonstrated	  that,	  contrary	  to	  common	  imagery,	  organized	  criminal	  and	   non-­‐state	   armed	   actors	   do	   not	   necessarily	   thrive	   under	   state	   absence	   nor	   do	   they	  necessarily	  strive	  to	  bring	  about	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  ‘the’	  state	  is	  absent.	  I	  have	  done	  so	  by	  first	  disaggregating	  the	  state,	  drawing	  both	  on	  critical	  theoretical	  arguments	  as	  well	  as	  my	  own	   data	   to	   show	   how	   the	   notion	   of	   ‘the’	   state	   as	   a	   legally	   committed	  monolith	   proves	  simplistic.	  In	  the	  analyzed	  scenario,	  different	  actors	  act	  through	  and	  enact	  state	  in	  diverse	  ways,	  which	  are	  neither	  necessarily	  legal	  nor	  coordinated.	  As	  a	  result	  a	  principal	  pliability	  of	   law,	   state,	   and	   state	   actors	   emerges.	   This,	   in	   turn,	   signifies	   that	   for	   actors	   standing	  outside	  of	  the	  law	  such	  as	  LCT	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  state	  per	  se	  does	  not	  translate	  into	  the	  existential	  threat	  to	  be	  battled	  head-­‐on	  or	  evaded	  clandestinely	  as	  it	  is	  usually	  made	  out	  to	  be.	   To	   the	   contrary,	   the	   uncoordinated	   and	   in	  many	  ways	   outright	   rogue	   existence	   and	  presence	   of	   the	   state	   proved	   advantageous	   to	   LCT	   in	   a	   number	   of	   ways.	   This	   led	   to	   a	  seemingly	  paradox	  situation	  in	  which	  LCT	  did	  not	  only	  not	  show	  an	  interest	  in	  dismantling	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the	   state	   altogether	   but	   moreover	   acted	   on	   a	   vested	   interest	   to	   keep	   said	   structures	   in	  place.	  Doing	   so	  provided	   it,	   as	   I	  have	   laid	  out,	  with	  an	  array	  of	   actionable	   resources	  and	  moreover	  with	  the	  possibility	  to	  populate	  interstices	  opened	  and	  subsequently	  widened	  by	  its	  malfunctioning.	   In	   light	   of	   these	   findings,	   the	   notion	   of	   the	   ‘war	   on	  drugs’	   as	   a	   battle	  good	  vs.	  evil	  does	  not	  hold	  and	  recalling	   the	  necessity	   to	   transcend	  and	  puncture	  official	  and	  institutional	  surfaces	  as	  well	  as	  narratives	  as	  the	  stuff	  of	  research	  seems	  all	  the	  more	  pertinent.	  	  	  	  	  	  Apart	   from	   revealing	   the	   simplicity	   of	  many	   of	   the	   binaries	   that	   inform	   sensemaking	   on	  (Mexican)	   organized	   crime	   and	   which	   I	   have	   summarized	   under	   the	   term	   ‘licit-­‐illicit-­‐divide’,	   the	   data	   presented	   moreover	   hint	   to	   recipes	   of	   social	   order	   creation	   ‘under	  liquefaction’	  more	  complex	  than	  that	  of	  state	  sovereignty	  being	  crippled	  through	  non-­‐state-­‐carried	  counter-­‐projects.	  What	  can	  rather	  be	  observed	   is	   the	  emergence	  of	  multi-­‐layered	  forms	  of	  sovereignty	  that	  can	  neither	  be	  spatially	  nor	  temporarily	  differentiated	  and	  that	  see	   different	   actors	   simultaneously	   exercising	   control	   over	   the	   same	   populations	   and	  territories.	  In	  this	  scenario,	  the	  state	  is	  neither	  absent	  nor	  has	  it	  ‘failed’	  altogether.	  Indeed,	  it	   is	   latently	   present	   and	   performs	   in	   a	   multitude	   of	   ways,	   many	   of	   which	   might	   seem	  counterintuitive	  or	   even	  nonsensical	  when	   sticking	   to	   a	  Weberian	  perspective.	  All	   of	   the	  above	  holds	  important	  repercussions	  for	  the	  debate	  about	  how	  the	  role	  of	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  in	  the	  reshuffling	  of	  social	  order	  in	  the	  Global	  South	  is	  conceptualized	  and	  key	  items	  of	  which	   I	  have	   touched	  upon	   throughout	   this	   thesis	  and	  particularly	   this	  chapter.	   In	   the	  following	   conclusion	   to	   this	   thesis,	   I	   return	   to	   these	   leads	   and	   discuss	   how	  my	   findings	  speak	   to	   the	   respective	   concepts,	   ideas,	   and	   points	   of	   discussions.	   In	   particular,	   I	   reflect	  upon	  matters	  of	  state	  formation,	  parallel	  states,	  and	  sovereignty.	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Chapter	  7:	  Conclusion	  	  	  
LCT’s	  demise	  and	  a	  new	  alternative	  (dis)order	  	  	  
My	   fieldwork	   period	   coincided	  with	   the	   peak	   of	   LCT’s	   dominion	   over	   Tierra	   Caliente	   as	  well	   as	   its	   zenith	   as	   an	   organization.	   As	   the	   data	   related	   in	   chapters	   4	   -­‐	   6	   reveal,	   there	  seemed	   to	  be	  no	  doubt	   in	   regards	   to	   its	   standing	  as	  el	  poder	  fáctico	  (the	  de	  facto	  power)	  over	  the	  local	  domain.	  Indeed,	  civilians,	  journalists,	  actors	  of	  the	  private	  sector,	  civil	  society	  groups,	   the	   leaders,	   and	   not	   least	   government	   functionaries	   –	   virtually	   anybody	   I	  interacted	  with	   inside	   as	   well	   as	   outside	   of	   Tierra	   Caliente	   –	   presented	   this	   to	  me	   as	   a	  taken-­‐for-­‐granted	  fact.	  LCT’s	  leaders	  themselves,	  during	  my	  encounters	  and	  conversations	  with	  them,	  mirrored	  this	  assessment.	  On	  more	  than	  one	  occasion	  I	  was	  told	  that	  ‘Here,	  we	  are	   government’	   or	   ‘Here,	  we	   are	   the	   law’.	   Their	   confidence	   in	   asserting	   control	  was	   so	  great	  that	  there	  seemed	  little	  doubt	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  group’s	  prospects	  for	  survival.	  The	  challenge	  posed	  by	  enemy	  non-­‐state	  armed	  actors	  such	  as	  their	  archenemy	  Los	  Zetas	  or	  by	  the	  more	   recent	   contender	   for	   supremacy	  over	  Michoacán,	   the	   so-­‐called	  Cartel	  de	   Jalisco	  
Nueva	   Generación	   (CJNG),	   had	   been	   mastered.	   The	   internal	   struggle	   that	   had	   split	   La	  
Familia	  Michoacana	  and	  given	  birth	  to	  Los	  Caballeros	  Templarios	  had	  been	  decided	  in	  favor	  of	   the	   faction	  headed	  by	  Moreno	  and	  Gómez.	  Moreover,	  after	  six	  years	  of	  opposition	  and	  personal	   animosity	   towards	   President	   Felipe	   Calderón’s	   Partido	   Acción	   Nacional	   and	  specifically	   his	   Federal	   Police,	   the	   political	   climate	   was	   showing	   signs	   of	   improvement.	  Supporting	  the	  return	  to	  power	  of	   the	   ‘playing	  piece’	  Partido	  Revolucionario	  Institucional,	  as	  Moreno	  had	  explained	  it	  during	  our	  interview	  (see	  Chapter	  6),	  promised	  quieter	  times.	  With	   other	   state	   actors	   such	   as	   the	  military,	   arrangements	   that	   had	   been	   reached	  were	  securing,	  not	  least,	  access	  to	  the	  lower	  reaches	  of	  the	  state	  as	  a	  pool	  of	  resources	  crucial	  for	  sustaining	   territorial	   supremacy	  vis-­‐a-­‐vis	   competing	  actors	   and	   interests.	   Finally,	   civilian	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populations	  seemed	  if	  not	  necessarily	  proactively	  supportive	  of	  the	  group	  then	  sufficiently	  inert	   and	   thus	   seemed	   not	   to	   pose	   a	   threat	   to	   LCT’s	   continued	   existence.	   All	   in	   all,	   and	  returning	  to	  the	  underlying	  question	  of	  how	  non-­‐state	  armed	  actors	  perceive	  and	  manage	  challenges	  to	  their	  survival,	  LCT	  had	  managed	  to	  relate	  to,	  intervene	  in,	  and	  shape	  relevant	  environments	  successfully.	  	  	  Its	  demise,	  unfolding	  in	  increasing	  virulence	  from	  2013	  on,	  appears	  swift	  and	  unexpected	  against	   this	   backdrop	   and	   the	   situation	   could,	   as	   of	   the	   time	  of	  writing	   these	   concluding	  remarks	   in	  December	  2015,	  not	  differ	  more	  drastically	   from	  the	  one	  I	   found	  while	   in	   the	  field	  from	  2011	  to	  2012.	  Just	  as	  other	  members	  before	  and	  after	  him,	  Gómez	  was	  arrested	  in	  February	  2015	  and	  presented	  to	  the	  public	  as	  Mexico’s	  fallen	  enemy	  of	  the	  state	  number	  one.	  Moreno,	  another	  one	  of	  my	  informants	  and	  the	  group’s	  leader,	  was	  hunted	  down	  and	  killed	   in	  March	   2014.77	  Over	   the	   previous	  months,	   LCT	   had	   started	   to	   lose	   control	   over	  parts	   of	   its	   territory	   as	   so-­‐called	   grupos	   de	   autodefensa	   (self-­‐defense	   groups)	   formed	  throughout	   Michoacán	   (for	   an	   overview	   see	   Asfura-­‐Heim/Espach,	   2013).	   These	   armed	  groups	   claimed	   to	  owe	   their	   existence	   to	  abusos	   committed	  by	  LCT,	   examples	  of	  which	   I	  have	  addressed	  in	  Chapter	  5,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  government’s	  collusion	  with	  the	  group	  and	  its	  unwillingness	  and/or	  incapacity	  to	  provide	  protection	  or	  act	  against	  it.	  Initially,	  and	  adding	  another	  point	  of	  convergence	  between	  them	  to	  those	  described	  in	  Chapter	  6,	  both	  LCT	  and	  the	   federal	   government	   stressed	   the	   illegitimacy	   as	  well	   as	   the	   criminal	   background	  and	  agenda	  of	  these	  groups.	  The	  presidential	  administration	  of	  Enrique	  Peña	  Nieto,	  which	  had	  entered	   office	   in	   late	   2012,	   showed	   great	   reluctance	   to	   permit	   the	   emergence	   of	   yet	  another	   layer	  of	  non-­‐state	  armed	  actors	  and	   thus	  a	   third-­‐order	   territorial	   fragmentation.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77	  As	  opposed	  to	  his	  ‘first	  death’,	  the	  staging	  of	  which	  I	  have	  described	  in	  Chapter	  5,	  this	  time	  concrete	  evidence	  
including	  Moreno’s	  body	  and	  DNA	  analyses	  were	  presented	   (see	   Informador,	  2014).	  My	   local	   informants,	   too,	  
support	  its	  veracity.	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Peña	   Nieto’s	   presidency	   had	   been	   shaped	   by	   the	   attempt	   to	   change	   the	   narrative	   from	  Mexico	   as	   on	   the	   brink	   of	   collapse	   to	   an	   emerging	   economic	   powerhouse.	   Accordingly,	  security	   issues	   were	   being	   downplayed	   and	   preferably	   muted	   altogether	   (see	   e.g.	   Hope	  2013).	  The	  existence	  of	  these	  self-­‐defense	  groups	  and	  their	  critical	  discourse	  towards	  the	  government’s	  inertia	  and	  collusion	  supposed	  a	  threat	  to	  this	  narrative	  U-­‐turn.	  In	  addition	  to	   labeling	   these	   groups	   a	   challenge	   to	   rule	   of	   law	   and	   the	  Mexican	   state’s	  monopoly	   of	  force	   that	  would	  not	  be	   tolerated,	   high-­‐ranking	   functionaries	  were	   explicitly	   questioning	  the	  integrity	  and	  background	  of	  these	  groups,	  suggesting	  that	  they	  might	  simply	  be	  proxies	  to	   other	   criminal	   organizations,	   namely	   the	   CJNG.	   Tellingly,	   these	   claims	   coincided	  perfectly	  with	   those	   propagated	   by	   LCT	   itself	   and	   the	   stability	   of	   the	   status	  quo	   seemed	  alluring	   to	   both	   parties.	   While	   additional	   troops	   were	   deployed	   to	   Tierra	   Caliente	   to	  ‘restore	   law	   and	   order’,	   they	   were	   heavily	   criticized	   by	   locals	   for	   refusing	   to	   act	   on	  intelligence	  provided	  to	  them	  about	  strategic	   locations	  of	  LCT	  and	  the	  whereabouts	  of	   its	  leaders	  (see	  Gil	  Olmos,	  2013).	  When	  transcending	  a	  purely	  cosmetic	  or,	  again,	  ceremonial	  nature	  (see	  Chapter	  6)	  at	  all,	  members	  of	  self-­‐defense	  groups	  were	  being	  arrested	  under	  organized	  crime	  and	  illegal	  weapons	  charges.	  	  	  More	  decisive	  steps	  were,	  as	  I	  argue,	  only	  taken	  after	  the	  production	  of	  what	  Schneider	  and	  Schneider	  (1999)	  have	  called	  a	  ‘historical	  moment	  of	  transparency’,	  i.e.	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  ‘it	   becomes	   possible	   to	   see	   the	   weaving	   together	   of	   illegal	   and	   legal	   within	   states	   and	  societies	   that	   is	  usually	  obscured	  by	   the	   reification	  of	   the	   ‘law’”.	  Unprecedented	  national	  and	   international	  media	   attention	   to	  Michoacán’s	   self-­‐defense	   groups	   led	   to	   a	   rupture	   in	  the	   aura	   of	   silence	   and	   impenetrability	   surrounding	   the	   region.	   Apatzingán	   –	   the	   place	  where	  I	  had	  been	  the	  only	  güero	  for	  miles	  during	  my	  fieldwork	  –	  appeared,	  a	  researcher	  in	  the	   field	   at	   the	   time	   told	  me,	   as	   swamped	  with	   journalists	   as	   Baghdad	  was	   after	   the	  US	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invasion	   in	   2003.	   The	   voices	   now	   carried	   outside	   of	   the	   region	   and	   amplified	   by	  media	  world-­‐wide	  were	  not	  limited	  to	  the	  identification	  of	  one	  evil	  –	  LCT	  –	  but	  advanced	  a	  more	  complex	   problem	   analysis:	   that	   of	   the	   state’s	   complicity	   and	   inertia.	   This	   supposed	   a	  significant	   threat	   to	   the	   state’s	   symbolic	   façade	   and	   thus	   to	   prior	   organized	   crime-­‐state-­‐arrangements,	  which	  had	  been	  constituted	  and	  sustained	  through	  the	  veil	  hereby	  provided.	  Hence,	   for	   LCT	   the	   true	  menace	   represented	   by	   the	   self-­‐defense	   groups	  was	   not	   chiefly	  militaristic	  but	  rather	  symbolic	  in	  nature	  as	  it	  harbored	  the	  potential	  to	  activate	  the	  state	  against	   it.	   Continued	   reporting	   on	   abusos	   and	   on	   the	   authorities’	   collusion	   made	   LCT’s	  ‘brand’	  unviable	  –	  not	  only	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  local	  civilian	  populations	  but	  also	  relevant	  state	  actors,	  with	   the	  undermined	   ability	   to	  produce	   signals	   in	   support	   of	   the	   state’s	   symbolic	   façade	  questioning	   its	   place	  within	   the	   extant	   trans-­‐legal	   arrangement.	   From	   the	   perspective	   of	  higher-­‐level	   state	   actors,	   this	   ultimately	   rendered	   a	   reshuffling	   of	   the	   local	   actor	   set	  necessary.	   In	  an	  exceptionally	  blatant	  manifestation	  of	   the	   transitivity	  between	   legal	  and	  illegal	  as	  well	  as	  of	  the	  porousness	  of	  the	  state’s	  boundaries,	  the	  officially	  proclaimed	  plan	  to	  disarm	  all	  autodefensa	  groups	  was	  abandoned	  and	  replaced	  with	  their	  absorption	   into	  the	   institutional	   state	   body.	  Autodefensa	  members	  were	   now	  being	   equipped	  with	   arms,	  uniforms,	   and	   the	   label	   of	  Fuerza	  Rural,	   a	   police	  body	   synthetically	   created	   and	   inserted	  into	  the	  void	  left	  by	  the	  completely	  resolved	  municipal	  police	  (see	  Muedano,	  2014).	  	  
The	   conditions	   under	   which	   the	   transition	   from	   Templar	   to	   post-­‐Templar	   ‘era’	   was	  produced	  as	  well	  as	  the	  current	  situation	  in	  the	  region	  add	  a	  longitudinal	  element	  and	  thus	  explanatory	  potency	  to	  the	  deciphering	  of	  dynamics	  of	  social	  (dis)order	  creation	  in	  Tierra	  Caliente	  and	  beyond.	  Hence,	  while	   the	   following	  reflections	  on	  key	  concepts	  discussed	   in	  the	   literature	   review	   and	   other	   chapters	   are	   mostly	   informed	   by	   the	   data	   and	   findings	  presented	   throughout	   the	   main	   body	   of	   this	   thesis,	   whenever	   pertinent	   I	   draw	   on	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additional	   data	   collected	  during	   a	   two-­‐month	  back-­‐to-­‐back	   fieldwork	   stay	   in	   and	   around	  Apatzingán	  for	  a	  news	  magazine	  assignment	  in	  June	  and	  July	  2015.	  	  
	  
Continuity	  in	  Post-­‐Templar	  Tierra	  Caliente	  	  
Many	  initially	  showed	  outright	  enthusiasm	  for	  the	  ‘movement’	  –	  hence	  the	  self-­‐designation	  by	  autodefensa	  members	  with	  whom	  I	  spent	  time	  with	  in	  2015	  –	  as	  an	  exceptional	  citizen-­‐led	  exercise	   in	  confronting	  organized	  crime.	  This	  proved	  far	  too	  optimistic	  and	  moreover	  misinformed.	  While	  national	  and	  international	  voices	  clung	  to	  this	  romanticizing	  narrative	  for	   longer,	   local	   informants	   of	  mine	   emphasized	   from	   the	   outset	   that	   no	   such	   thing	   as	   a	  radical	  break	  with	  the	  past	  had	  occurred.	  Telling	  here	  is	  the	  emphatic	  and	  rather	  poetical	  message,	  written	   in	  March	  2014,	  by	  one	   informant	  with	  whom	   I	  had	   stayed	   in	   touch	  via	  social	   media.	   To	   my	   query	   as	   to	   degree	   to	   which	   he	   perceived	   change	   after	   a	   large	  
autodefensa	  convoy	  had	  ‘taken’	  Apatzingán,	  he	  responded:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
‘What	   sadness	   I	   felt	   today…	   crossing	   the	   avenue…	   a	   caravan	   of	   pick-­‐up	  trucks	   with	   armed	   civilians…	   I	   could	   see	   them	   well…	   young	   guys	   with	  expressions	  of	  vulgar	  fascination…	  older	  ones	  with	  a	  touch	  of	  arrogance	  and	  triumphalism…	  holding	  up	  autodefensa	  signs…	  I	  felt	  like	  crying,	  not	  because	  I’m	  very	  sentimental	  but	  because	  it	  made	  me	  mad…	  I	  thought	  that	  we	  don’t	  deserve	  this…	  they’ll	  fool	  those	  who	  live	  elsewhere	  with	  their	  show,	  but	  not	  us…	  damn	  government,	  damn	  Peña	  Nieto…	  there	  is	  no	  restitution	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law,	  no	  reparation	  of	  the	  social	  fabric,	  no	  fight	  against	  organized	  crime…	  everything	   is	   a	   lie,	   everything	   is	   a	   farce…	   the	  only	   thing	   that’s	   real	   is	   that	  they	  gave	  us	  a	  new	  master.’	  	  	  	  Much	   in	   the	   same	   vein,	   continuity	   is	   what	   I	   found	   during	  my	   return	   to	   Tierra	   Caliente.	  Rather	   than	   a	   successful	   exercise	   in	   ‘taking	   back	   the	   territory’	   from	   organized	   criminal	  actors	  and	  in	  re-­‐establishing	  ‘law	  and	  order’	  –	  each	  a	  rhetorical	  center	  pieces	  of	  the	  central	  government’s	   intervention	   –	   the	   prevailing	   constellation	   pointed	   to	   little	   more	   than	   a	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precarious	  kitting	  out	  of	  the	  state’s	  symbolic	  façade	  behind	  which	  a	  moderately	  reshuffled	  set	  of	  actors	   is	  creating	  a	  new	  arrangement	  of	  alternative	  governance.	  By	  no	  means	   is,	   in	  other	  words,	  all	  new	  under	  the	  terracalentana	  sun.	  To	  begin	  with,	  LCT	  in	  its	  previous	  shape	  might	  have	  been	  dismantled	  and	   the	  most	  visible	  parts	  of	   its	   structures	   taken	  out	  of	   the	  picture.	  As	  already	  mentioned,	  the	  handful	  of	  leaders	  that	  had	  experienced	  media	  exposure	  and	  thus	  become	  LCT’s	  public	  symbols	  has	  been	  killed	  or	  arrested.	  Yet,	  as	  I	  have	  shown	  in	  Chapters	   5	   and	   6,	   LCT	   should	   not	   be	   misrepresented	   as	   a	   top-­‐heavy,	   hierarchically	  structured	   monolith	   depending	   on	   a	   strict	   and	   universally	   respected	   leadership.	   For,	   at	  least	  as	  much	  as	  an	  organizational	  construct,	  LCT	  is	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  label	  that	  imperfectly	  (albeit	   for	   an	   extended	   period	   of	   time)	   created	   coherence	   between	   a	   number	   of	   local	  strongmen	  with	  their	  own	  ‘jurisdictions’.	  	  	  One	   of	   the	   contributions	   of	   this	   thesis	   consists,	   in	   this	   vein,	   in	   complicating	   default	  narratives	  of	  criminal	  organizations	  and	  ‘cartels’	  in	  presenting	  concrete	  evidence	  that	  these	  are,	   similarly	   to	   the	   state,	   internally	   complex	   and	   plurally	   configured.	   The	  misrepresentation	  to	  the	  contrary	  helped	  the	  central	  government	  to	  sell	  the	  weakening	  of	  an	  organizational	  label	  as	  the	  disappearance	  of	  the	  coercive	  potential	  aggregated	  under	  it.	  Yet,	  the	  realization	  of	  more	  complex	  organizational	  realities	  that	  only	  become	  conceivable	  once	   one	   establishes	   a	   certain	   proximity	   and	   gains	   privileged	   insights	   are	   crucial	   to	  decipher	  the	  current	  state	  of	  affairs	  in	  the	  region	  as	  well	  as	  its	  unfolding.	  It	  appears,	  in	  this	  light,	   little	   surprising	   that	   post-­‐Templar	   Tierra	   Caliente	   is	   built	   on	   former	   LCT’s	   former	  blocks.	   In	   their	   vast	   majority,	   these	   succeeded	   in	   different	   ways	   in	   retaining	   their	   sub-­‐regional	   dominion	   in	   full	   and	   secure	   their	   future	   as	   part	   of	   new	   arrangements	   and	  coalitions.	   Some	  switched	  sides	  and	  put	  on	  autodefensa	   t-­‐shirts,	  paying	   lip	   service	   to	   the	  ‘movement’	  whilst	  continuing	  their	  involvement	  in	  illicit	  activities.	  One	  local	  strongman	  –	  a	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former	  member	   of	   LCT’s	   second	   layer	   of	   command	   and	   now	   a	   local	   autodefensa/Fuerza	  Rural	  leader	  –	  declined	  my	  interview	  requests,	  having	  a	  messenger	  explain	  to	  me	  his	  desire	  for	  ‘tranquility’	  and	  that	  he	  ‘just	  [wanted]	  to	  cook	  [crystal	  meth]’.	  Others,	  without	  officially	  switching	  sides,	  simply	  lay	  low	  until	  the	  dust	  settles.	  To	  my	  question	  of	  which	  of	  the	  main	  
autodefensa	   leaders	  were	  narcos,	  I	  received	  a	  blatant	  and	  telling	  answer	  by	  a	  key	  advisor	  who	  was	  then	  comandante	  of	  Apatzingán’s	  autodefensas-­‐come-­‐Fuerza	  Rural:	  ‘What	  do	  you	  want	  me	   to	   tell	   you?	  They	  all	   are.’	  My	   latest	   stay	   in	   the	   city	   coincided,	  moreover,	  with	   a	  clear	  demonstration	  of	  who,	   in	  spite	  of	   the	  generally	   lower	  profile	   these	   local	  strongmen	  were	  keeping	  at	  the	  time,	  was	  calling	  the	  shots.	  The	  same	  comandante	  –	  with	  and	  around	  whom	  I	   spent	  a	  considerable	  amount	  of	   time	  and	  who	  many	   locals	   took	   to	  be	   the	   jefe	  de	  
plaza	  of	  the	  CJNG,	  a	  charge	  he	  as	  well	  as	  his	  inner	  circle	  refuted	  as	  baseless	  –	  was	  replaced	  by	  the	  decision	  of	  two	  former	  LCT	  strongmen	  controlling	  territory	  to	  the	  east	  and	  west	  of	  the	  city,	  respectively.	  Informants	  who	  assisted	  the	  gathering	  during	  which	  the	  change	  was	  announced	   told	  me	   that	  questioning	   the	   installation	  of	  a	  direct	  proxy	   to	   the	   strongmen’s	  interests	   in	  the	  comandante’s	  stead	  was	  not	  an	  option,	  already	  as	  the	  weapons	  placed	  on	  the	   table	   to	   emphasize	   the	   demand	   corresponded	   to	   a	   general	   superiority	   in	   means	   of	  violence.	  	  
	  
The	  centrality	  of	  the	  state	  	  
The	  above	  outlined	  continuity	  in	  terms	  of	  those	  non-­‐state	  armed	  actors	  that	  call	  the	  shots	  in	   the	   region	   underlines,	   yet	   again,	   how	   the	  Weberian	   ideal	   of	   state	   as	   based	   on	   the	   its	  monopoly	   of	   violence	   and	   territorial	   and	   populational	   control	   is	   perhaps	   unattainable	  generally.	  It	  certainly	  is	  far	  from	  materialized	  in	  contemporary	  Tierra	  Caliente	  where,	  apart	  from	   the	  power	  held	  by	  actors	   such	  as	   the	   abovementioned,	   those	   remnants	  of	   LCT	   that	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have	  clung	  on	  to	  the	  label	  still	  control	  significant	  patches	  of	  territory.	  Judging	  from	  these	  as	  well	   as	   findings	   by	   further	   authors,	   social	   order	   in	   Latin	   America	   and	   the	   Global	   South	  without	  non-­‐state	  armed	  actor	  involvement	  seems	  unthinkable.	  But,	  and	  this	  is	  crucial	  for	  approaching	  state	   failure	  and	   the	  hypothesis	  of	  parallel	   states	  and	   thus	   two	  key	   items	  of	  the	  contemporary	  debate	  discussed	  in	  the	  literature	  review	  in	  Chapter	  2,	  this	  is	  just	  as	  true	  the	   other	   way	   around	   (more	   on	   the	   matter	   below).	   That	   is,	   while	   I	   agree	   with	   Das’	  observation	   that	   the	   state	   as	   such	   cannot	   be	   represented	   as	   an,	   let	   alone	   the,	   ‘order-­‐generating	   mechanism’	   (2004:	   248),	   it	   still	   seems	   latently	   present	   in	   the	   creation	   of	  (dis)order.	  The	   current	   scenario	   in	  Tierra	  Caliente,	   amongst	  other	   things	  embellished	  by	  non-­‐state	  armed	  actors,	   is	   frequently	  misread	  as	  a	   sign	   for	   state	   failure	  as	  well	   as	   for	   its	  ‘absence’	   and	   the	   central	   government’s	   decision	   to	   intervene	   as	   a	   desperate	   attempt	   to	  change	   this.	   Yet,	   both	   assertions	   depart	   from	   a	   fundamental	   fallacy:	   the	   non-­‐distinction	  between	   the	   ideal	   and	   empirical	   reality	   of	   law	  and	   state.	   I	   have	   addressed	   the	  matter	   in	  Chapters	  2	  and	  6	  by	  drawing	  on	  insights	  provided	  by	  authors	  such	  as	  Heyman,	  Smart,	  the	  Comaroffs,	   Das	   and	   Pool,	   and	   Favarel-­‐Garrigues	   and	   Briquet,	   whose	   volume	   critically	  revisits	   the	   matter	   by	   reexamining	   state-­‐organized	   crime-­‐relations	   in	   particular.	  Incorporating	   the	   insight	   that	   the	   state	   never	   lives	   up	   to	   its	   ideal,	   must	   always	   remain	  incomplete,	   and	   that	   those	   carrying	   and	   employing	   its	   name	   are	   neither	   naturally	  committed	  to	  lawful	  behavior	  nor	  act	  in	  monolith-­‐like	  concert	  helps	  to	  turn	  the	  attention	  to	  the	  state’s	  real-­‐life	  performance.	  	  	  What	  I	  have,	  by	  applying	  this	  perspective	  to	  the	  case	  of	  LCT	  and	  Tierra	  Caliente,	  found	  is	  a	  state	  that	  does	  perform	  in	  many	  ways	  and	  for	  many	  –	  only	  that	  some	  if	  not	  most	  of	  these	  ways	  and	  the	   interests	  hereby	  served	  are	  non-­‐ideal	  (read:	  criminal).	  They	  are	  thus	  easily	  overlooked	  or	  read	  as	  signs	  of	  failure	  if	  one	  sticks	  to	  a	  positive	  approach.	  To	  begin	  with	  and	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as	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  6,	  the	  project	  of	  alternative	  governance	  described	  in	  Chapter	  5	  was	  not	  primarily	  construed	  in	  opposition	  to	  or	  in	  absence	  of	  the	  state	  but	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  what	  I	  have	   referred	   to	   as	   LCT’s	   differential	   positioning	   to	   the	   state,	   which	   translated	   into	   the	  activation	  of	  the	  state	  –	  its	  myth,	  its	  actionable	  resources,	  its	  shortcomings	  –	  to	  the	  group’s	  advantage.	  One	  clear	  example	   I	  have	  described	   in	   this	  context	   is	   the	  appropriation	  of	   the	  lower	   reaches	   of	   the	   state	   and	   their	   redirection	   as	   external,	   yet	   de	   facto	   organizational	  assets.	   Higher-­‐level	   state	   actors,	   including	   the	  military,	  were	   also	   far	   from	   absent	   in	   the	  region,	  but	  showed	  a	  willingness	  to	  engage	  in	  mutually	  beneficial	  forms	  of	  accommodation	  to	  a	  degree	  even	  greater	  than	  the	  presidential	  administration	  of	  Felipe	  Calderón.	  However,	  the	   state	   surfaces	   in	   ways	   more	   active	   and	   powerful	   than	   that	   of	   a	   ‘playing	   piece’,	   as	  Moreno	  referred	  to	  political	  parties	  as	  he	  explained	  the	  how	  and	  why	  of	  his	   intervention	  into	   the	   electoral	   process	   (Chapter	   6).	   There	   is,	   as	   noted	   above,	   contemporary	   forms	   of	  order	   that	   cannot	   be	   accounted	   for	   without	   examining	   the	   role	   of	   the	   state.	   LCT’s	  significant	  weakening	   and	   disintegration	   provides	   a	   clear	   example	   in	   this	   context.	   For	   it	  only	   developed	   real	   momentum	   after	   the	   central	   government	   resorted	   to	   more	   drastic	  measures	   against	   the	   group,	   which	   included	   arming	   and	   actively	   collaborating	   with	  
autodefensa	  groups.	  Local	  informants	  told	  me	  that	  this	  ensued	  joint	  ‘cleansing’	  operations	  against	  LCT	  and	  suspected	  collaborators,	  with	  convoys	  made	  up	  of	  Federal	  Police,	  military,	  and	  autodefensas	   ‘sweeping’	   through	  communities	  situated	  within	  LCT’s	  core	  operational	  territory.	  	  	  The	  state’s	  decisive	  role	  in	  bringing	  LCT	  down	  helps	  to	  critically	  revisit	  the	  narrative	  of	  the	  state’s	  decay	  and	  its	  asserted	  marginality	  and	  even	  helplessness	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  non-­‐state	  armed	  actors.	   It	  might	  not	  be	  able	   to	  bring	  about	  a	   form	  of	  order	  coming	  anywhere	  close	   to	   the	  Weberian	   ideal.	  Theoretically	  and	  empirically,	  everything	  seems	   to	  suggest	   this	   to	  be	   the	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case,	  but	  it	  is	  still	  to	  be	  reckoned	  with.	  In	  the	  present	  case,	  for	  instance,	  it	  has	  shown	  that	  its	  coercive	  capacity	  can	  be	  effectively	  activated.	  To	  elevate	  its	  capacity	  to	  the	  ‘management’	  of	  ‘ungoverned	  spaces’,	  as	  Clunan	  and	  Trinkunas	  speculate	  (2010:20),	  might	  be	  farfetched.	  	  At	  least	   when	   judging	   from	   the	   scenario	   here	   in	   question	   –	   which	  might	   differ	   from	   other	  scenarios	  and	  thus	  calls	  for	  the	  production	  of	  corresponding	  data	  through	  future	  research	  –	  (re)shaping	   specific	   scenarios	   and	   deciding	   the	   fate	   of	   specific	   individuals	   and	  organizational	   arrangements	   appears	  well	  within	   its	   reach.	   This	  moreover	   suggests	   that	  the	  state	  remains	  central	  to	  contemporary	  conflict	  dynamics	  in	  Mexico	  and	  beyond,	  chiefly	  as	   a	   field	   of	   pliable	   and	   cooptable	   processes,	   actors,	   and	   resources	   access	   to	   which	   can	  decide	   over	   participating	   entities’	   survival	   as	   well	   as	   relative	   competitiveness	   and	  contention	  over	  access	  to	  which	  is	  something	  conflict	  gravitates	  towards.	  	  	  The	  (de)activation	  of	  the	  state	  in	  the	  present	  case	  followed,	  as	  I	  have	  argued,	  a	  recipe	  more	  complex	  than	  just	  the	  usual	  mixture	  of	  violence,	  corruption,	  and	  evasion.	  In	  this	  context,	  I	  have	  provided	   important	   insights	   into	   the	  mechanisms	  at	  play.	  Specifically,	   I	  have	  shown	  that	  legitimacy	  is	  of	  prime	  importance	  in	  this	  context	  as	  a	  technique	  to	  justify	  the	  exercise	  of	  power	  and	  control	  over	  civilian	  populations	  as	  well	  as	  the	  extraction	  of	  resources.	  And	  to	  mitigate,	  in	  this	  context,	  critical	  voices	  that	  can	  lead	  to	  contrary	  and	  even	  violent	  reactions	  by	   those	   social	   audiences	   that	   evaluate	   the	   organization’s	   material	   and	   socio-­‐cultural	  performance	  (recall	  here	  my	  conceptual	  remarks	  on	  the	  place-­‐,	  time-­‐,	  and	  audience-­‐bound	  constitution	   of	   legitimacy	   in	   Chapter	   5).	   The	   recent	   developments	   outlined	   above	   and	  triggered	  by	  just	  such	  a	  lack	  in	  legitimacy	  have	  proven	  both	  my	  conceptual	  preoccupation	  as	  well	  as	  LCT’s	  leaders’	  strategic	  preoccupation	  with	  the	  matter	  to	  be	  correct.	  Legitimacy	  moreover	  affects	  access	  to	  and	  action	  by	  the	  state	  in	  two	  different	  ways.	  A	  lack	  of	  it	  ensures	  effects	  akin	  to	  those	  triggered	  by	  an	  overly	  great	  reliance	  on	  violence,	  an	  observation	  made	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by	  Lessing	   (2012)	  and	   touched	  upon	   in	  Chapter	  6.	   It	  warrants	  state	  and	  media	  attention	  and	  lets	  the	  state’s	  symbolic	  façade	  as	  the	  veil	  for	  trans-­‐legally	  inhabitable	  spaces	  crumble.	  It	   can,	   in	  case	  of	  persistent	  public	  pressure,	   force	   the	  state’s	  hand.	  Who	  attracts	  negative	  attention	   by	   the	   public	   and	   consequently	   the	   state	   appears	   all	   the	   more	   relevant	   for	  particular	  groups’	  survival	  if	  one	  accepts	  the	  premise	  of	  limited	  state	  capacity.	  As	  the	  role	  of	  legitimacy	  has	  thus	  far	  largely	  been	  overlooked,	  my	  own	  findings	  add	  important	  nuances	  to	   the	   understanding	   of	   what	   drives	   state-­‐organized	   crime-­‐interactions	   and	   herewith	  entangled	   conflict	   dynamics.	   However,	   future	   research	  would	   ideally	   contribute	   data	   on	  additional	  cases,	  thereby	  opening	  up	  opportunities	  for	  comparisons	  across	  cases,	  settings,	  and	   time.	   These	   would	   ideally	   focus	   on	   the	   question	   of	   whether	   the	   role	   of	   legitimacy	  warrants	   similar	   importance	   in	   (de)activating	   the	   state	   elsewhere	   or	   whether	   other	  mechanisms	  can	  be	  identified.	  	  
	  
Non-­‐state	  armed	  actors	  as	  state	  makers	  	  
One	  important	  finding	  of	  this	  thesis	  consists,	  as	  I	  have	  discussed	  above,	  in	  revealing	  state-­‐organized	  crime-­‐interactions	  of	  great	  complexity.	  Not	   least,	   they	  contradict	   the	  simplistic	  notion	   of	   ‘state	   failure’	   and	   the	   ‘absence’	   of	   the	   state,	   the	   induction	   of	   which	   has	   not	  surfaced	  as	  a	  goal	  of	  LCT.	  Akin	  to	  its	  insertion	  into	  local	  society,	  characterized	  not	  primarily	  by	  an	  eradication	  and	  subsequent	  replacement	  of	  the	  old	  but	  rather	  by	  a	  skillful	  relating	  to	  extant	   structures	   and	   actors	   (Chapter	   5),	   sustaining	   the	   state	   in	   its	   rogue,	   multiple	  configuration	  allowed	  LCT	  to	  relate	  to	  it	   in	  ways	  conducive	  to	  the	  obtention	  of	  resources.	  This,	   in	   turn,	   can	   be	   thought	   of	   as	   having	   enhanced	   its	   performance	   and	   chances	   for	  survival.	  This	  once	  again	  emphasizes	  that	  those	  binaries	  I	  have	  summarized	  under	  the	  term	  licit-­‐illicit-­‐divide	  do	  not	  withstand	  a	  reality	  check.	  The	  fact	  alone	  that	  an	  entire	  layer	  of	  the	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state	  apparatus	  was	  effectively	  surrendered	  to	  a	  criminal	  actor	  lets	  the	  boundaries	  of	  the	  state	  appear,	  to	  say	  the	  least,	  permeated	  and	  the	  dividing	  line	  between	  legal	  and	  illegal	  by	  no	   means	   as	   clear-­‐cut	   as	   the	   rhetoric	   underpinning	   the	   ‘war	   on	   drugs’	   would	   have	   it.	  Adding	   the	   fact	   that	  LCT	  not	  only	  had	  a	  vested	   interest	   in	   the	  sustention	  of	   the	  state	  but	  also	  acted	  on	  it	  has	  important	  repercussions	  for	  the	  debate	  on	  how,	  as	  it	  were,	  the	  state	  is	  still	  a	  thing	  in	  spite	  of	  widespread	  assertions	  of	  its	  inevitable	  decay.	  A	  key	  contribution	  of	  this	   thesis	   consists,	   against	   this	   backdrop,	   in	   the	   identification	   of	   novel	   and	   unexpected	  modes	   and	   mechanisms	   of	   state	   making	   (or	   perhaps	   better:	   state	   sustention)	   under	  conditions	   of	   liquefaction.	   This	   might	   seem	   paradoxical	   at	   first	   sight	   as	   after	   all,	   it	   is	  precisely	   the	   existence	   and	   actions	   of	   actors	   such	   as	   LCT	   that	   are	   often	   portrayed	   as	  symptomatic	  of	  and	  causal	  to	  the	  decay	  of	  the	  state.	  Yet,	  the	  data	  I	  have	  gathered	  points	  to	  just	   such	   unexpected	   sites	   and	   mechanisms	   of	   state	   making,	   thus	   reflecting	   arguments	  advanced	   by	   authors	   such	   as	   Das	   and	   Poole	   and	   the	   Comaroffs,	   whose	   works	   I	   have	  discussed	  earlier	  in	  this	  thesis	  (see	  Chapter	  2).	  	  	  As	   I	  have	   shown,	  LCT	  has	  effectively	   ‘made	   state’	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   it	  has,	   amongst	  other	  things,	  organized	  elections	  and	  left	  the	  lower	  reaches	  of	  the	  state	  in	  place.	  Not	  least,	  it	  has	  supported	   higher-­‐level	   state	   actors	   in	   theatrically	   enacting	   the	  myth	   of	   the	   state	   as	   the	  champion	   of	   legality	   and	   civilization,	   for	   instance	   by	   ‘giving	   up’	   methamphetamine	  laboratories,	  and	  thereby	  helping	  to	  keep	  from	  ripping	  all	  the	  way	  open	  the	  very	  stuff	  the	  modern	  nation-­‐state	  derives	  its	  right	  to	  exist	  from.	  All	  of	  this	  departs,	  of	  course,	  drastically	  from	   the	   Weberian	   ideal	   of	   the	   state	   and	   its	   role	   within	   social	   order.	   In	   actual	   social	  practice,	  however,	   the	   latter	  proves,	   as	  Das	   (2004)	  would	  have	   it,	   ‘metaphysical’	   and	   the	  seeming	  paradoxes	  of	  state	  making	  and	  sustention	  vanish	  once	  one	  ventures	  into	  ‘the	  dirty	  undergrowth	  of	  local	  politics’	  (Knight,	  1997:108).	  In	  identifying	  a	  criminal	  organization	  as	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a	  de	  facto	  state	  maker	  and	  sustainer,	  my	  argument	  also	  expands	  on	  Arias	  and	  Goldstein’s	  case	   that	   Latin	  America’s	   violence	   and	   (nominally)	   democratic	   systems	   are	  not	  mutually	  exclusive	  but	  symbiotic.	  	  	  In	   its	   paradoxical	   positioning	   towards	   and	   relation	   to	   the	   state	   –	   perfect	   symbolic	  antagonist	  and	  real-­‐life	  pillar	  at	  the	  same	  time	  –	  LCT	  stands	  in	  historical	  continuity	  to	  those	  private	   (and	   partly	   criminal)	   entities	  Western	   nation-­‐states	   relied	   on	   in	   cementing	   their	  dominion	  over	   the	   South’s	   colonies.	   The	   same	   is	   true	   for	  Peru’s	  gamonales	   and	  Mexico’s	  
caciques,	  the	  examples	  of	  which	  I	  have	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  2.	  The	  latter	  –	  recall	  here	  Das’	  portrayal	  of	  the	  former	  and	  Knight	  and	  Pansters’	  of	  the	  latter	  –	  embody	  the	  paradoxes	  of	  the	  state	  that	  become	  most	  visible	  in	  its	  margins	  insofar	  as	  they	  are	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  They	  stand,	   in	  other	  words,	  both	  outside	  and	  inside	  of	   the	  state	  body	  and	  their	  actions	  serve	  personal	  and	  public	  interests	  alike.	  In	  this	  understanding,	  however,	  the	  boundaries	   between	   state	   and	   non-­‐state	   remain	   prominent.	   Indeed,	   Das	   and	   Poole’s	  discussion	  of	  the	  margins	  of	  the	  state	  focuses	  strongly	  on	  processes	  and	  actors	  that	  still,	  in	  spite	   of	   all	   contradictions	   and	   porousness,	   have	   the	   label	   ‘state’	   applied	   to	   them,	   which	  would	   lead	   to	   a	   theoretical	   positioning	   of	   LCT	   in	   the	   non-­‐state	   sphere.	   However,	   this	  changes	   if	   one	   departs	   from	   a	   more	   radical	   revision	   of	   the	   very	   concept	   of	   state.	   As	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  2,	  one	  such	  approach	  has	  been	  advanced	  by	  Trouillot	  who	  abandons	  the	  widely	   taken-­‐for-­‐granted	   equation	  of	   state	   to	   government	   and	   argues	   that	   states	   are	  truly	   identifiable	   through	   specific	   processes	   and	   effects	   of	   populational	   ordering	   and	  control	   and	   not	   through	   formal	   institutions.	   Government	   can,	   from	   this	   perspective,	   be	  state,	  but	  state	  can	  never	  be	  only	  government.	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LCT’s	  practices	  of	  alternative	  governance,	  which	  I	  have	  analyzed	  in	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  5,	  fit	  well	   within	   Trouillot’s	   frame	   of	   state	   processes	   and	   effects.	   This,	   in	   turn,	   would	   mean	  nothing	   less	   than	   LCT	   being	   state	   (but	   not	   government).	   This	   finding	   is	   moreover	  consistent	  with	  one	  of	   the	  key	   features	  and	  symptoms	  of	   liquefaction,	   the	   reallocation	  of	  functions	  of	  governance,	  violence,	  and	  social	  control	  in	  the	  hand	  of	  private	  actors.	  Trouillot	  refutes	  this	  backdrop,	  the	  narrative	  of	  state	  decay,	  and	  argues	  instead	  that	  ‘[s]tate	  power	  is	  being	  redeployed’,	  and	   ‘state	  effects	  are	  appearing	   in	  new	  sites’	   (2001:132).	  This	  reflects	  the	   case	   of	   LCT	   and	   Tierra	   Caliente	   and	   I	   principally	   agree	   with	   his	   statement	   that	   ‘in	  almost	  all	  cases,	  this	  move	  is	  one	  away	  from	  national	  sites	  to	  infra-­‐,	  supra-­‐,	  or	  transnational	  ones’	   (ibid.).	   Yet,	   I	   also	   deem	   it	   crucial	   not	   to	   lose	   sight	   of	   ‘old	   sites’,	   something	   which	  becomes	  clear	  not	  least	  in	  light	  of	  the	  continued	  centrality	  of	  state	  actors	  in	  shaping	  social	  order	  and	  conflict	  dynamics	  as	  laid	  out	  above.	  Old	  sites,	  it	  would	  appear,	  are	  far	  from	  being	  abandoned,	  although	  their	  operational	  logic	  might	  undergo	  changes	  insofar	  as	  they	  become	  populated	  and	  employed	  for	  other	  actors	  and	  interests.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
LCT	  as	  a	  parallel	  state?	  	  
Depending	  on	  what	  understanding	  of	  state	  one	  works	  with,	  LCT	  can	  be	  considered	  either	  in	  complex	   relation	   to	   the	   state,	  part	  of	   it,	   an	  employer	  and/or	  benefiter	  of	   state	  power,	  or	  even	  state	  in	  its	  own	  right.	  Nothing	  suggests,	  however,	  that	  LCT	  can	  or	  should	  be	  classified	  as	  a	  ‘parallel	  state’,	  as	  a	  popular	  assessment	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  2	  would	  have	  it.	  As	  I	  have	  shown	   in	   this	   thesis	   and	   already	   reflected	   upon	   above,	   this	   does	   not	   form	   part	   of	   LCT’s	  interest	   or	   strategic	   orientation.	   Moreover,	   the	   history	   of	   Mexican	   organized	   crime	   as	   a	  phenomenon	   constituted	   not	   apart	   from	   or	   against	   the	   state	   but	   under	   its	   auspices	  contradicts	   the	   notion.	   Worth	   recalling	   is	   also	   that,	   in	   its	   empirically	   rogue	   and	   pliable	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shape,	   law	   and	   state	   provide	   criminal	   actors	   such	   as	   LCT	   with	   known	   structural	  surroundings	  that	  harbor	  rich	  opportunities,	   including	  not	  least	  a	  degree	  of	  predictability	  in	  otherwise	  highly	  volatile	  surroundings.	  This	  makes	  them,	  to	  again	  point	  out	  Briquet	  and	  Favarel-­‐Garrigues’	   contribution	   to	   the	   matter,	   ‘satisfied	   with	   the	   existing	   rules	   of	   the	  political	   and	  economic	  game’	   (2010:4).	  As	  opposed	   to	  a	  discrete	   structure	   that	  would	  be	  construed	   in	   opposition	   to	   or	   apart	   from	   the	   (existing)	   state	   construct,	   non-­‐state	   armed	  actors	   and	   state	   actors	   populate	   and	   operate	   through	   many	   of	   the	   same	   sites,	   as	   the	  interactions	  between	  LCT	   and	  different	   segments	   of	   the	  Mexican	   state	  underline.	  What	   I	  have	   depicted	   as	   trans-­‐legally	   inhabited	   zones	   resembles	   the	   networks	   of	   Brazilian	  politicians,	  drug	  traffickers,	  and	  civil	  society	  actors	  analyzed	  by	  Arias.	  Here,	  too,	  the	  theme	  is	   interwovenness	   and	   not	   separation	   or	   opposition.	   The	   argument	   brought	   forward	   by	  Arias	   that	   the	   ‘parallel	   state’	   characterization	   falls	   short	   because	   ‘illegal	   networks	  appropriate	   existing	   state	   and	   societal	   resources	   and	   power’	   (2006:322)	   is	   similarly	  reflected	  in	  the	  case	  of	  LCT.	  In	  particular,	  as	  I	  have	  shown,	  LCT	  has	  fed	  on	  the	  very	  same	  pool	   of	   resources	   as	   the	   state,	   activating	   anything	   from	  material	   state	   structures	   to	   the	  state’s	  ideological	  Unterbau	  in	  its	  interest.	  This,	  too,	  speaks	  of	  how	  ‘the	  means	  and	  ends	  of	  the	   liberal	   democratic	   state	   are	   refracted,	   deflected,	   and	   dispersed	   into	   the	   murkier	  reaches	  of	   the	  private	  sector’	   (Comaroff/Comaroff,	  2006:16)	  and	  do	  not	   just	  vanish.	  That	  they	   resurface	   in	   paradoxical	   ways	   –	   in	   the	   present	   case	   to	   empower	   a	   criminal	  organization	   –	   underlines	   that	   they,	   just	   as	   state	   structures	   and	   actors	   themselves,	   are	  susceptible	  to	  reappropriation	  and	  counterfeiting.	  	  	  The	  lack	  of	  evidence	  for	  and	  theoretical	  soundness	  of	  the	  parallel	  state	  argument	  does	  not	  mean,	  however,	  that	  a	  shift	  in	  power	  has	  not	  taken	  place.	  The	  precise	  nature	  of	  the	  Mexican	  case	   remains	   to	   be	   explored	   in	   greater	   depth	   through	   future	   research.	   Default	   accounts	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depart,	  as	  mentioned,	  from	  Astorga’s	  work	  to	  invoke	  something	  akin	  to	  total	  state	  control	  over	   organized	   crime,	  which,	   chiefly	   through	   the	   electoral	   democratization	  of	   the	   formal	  political	  regime,	  gives	  way	  to	  incoordination,	  atomization,	  chaos,	  and	  violence.	  This	  seems	  simplistic	  insofar	  as	  it	  does	  little	  to	  explore	  the	  micro-­‐dynamics	  of,	  simply	  put,	   ‘who	  used	  whom’	   and	   thus	   to	   what	   interests	   the	   state	   was	   activated	   in	   particular	   cases	   and	  constellations	  and	  how.	  Such	  a	  critical	  revision	  lies	  outside	  of	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  thesis.	  Much	  in	  the	  literature	  as	  well	  as	  the	  findings	  presented	  in	  this	  thesis	  suggests	  such	  a	  tendency.	  LCT	  provides,	   in	  this	  vein,	  a	  clear	  example	  for	  the	  more	  prominent	  role	  assumed	  by	  non-­‐state	   armed	   actors	   in	   territorial	   control	   and	   governance.	   If	   this	   still	   holds	   after	   stress-­‐testing	   the	   apparent	   novelty	   of	   the	   state	   being	   pushed	   back	   by	   contrasting	   it	   with	  historically	   continuous	   forms	   of	   alternative	   governance	   as	   for	   instance	   embodied	   by	  
caciques	   is	  a	  question	  certainly	  worth	  exploring.	  Yet,	  even	   if	   it	  does	  would	  not	  mean	  that	  the	   parallel	   state	   argument	   is	   supported.	   It	   would	   rather,	   as	   both	   state	   and	   non-­‐state	  elements	   essentially	   operate	   within	   a	   shared	   structure	   and	   share	   a	   pool	   of	   resources,	  signify	  a	  relative	  shift	   in	  power	  relations.	  This	  could	  then	  be	  read	  as	  a	  reconfiguration	  or	  even	  enlargement	  of	   ‘gray	  zones’,	   to	  again	   invoke	  Auyero’s	  designation	  of	   those	  zones	   in	  which	  legal	  and	  illegal	  as	  well	  as	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  intersect	  in	  ways	  non-­‐compliant	  with	  the	  myth	  of	  state	  and	  yet	  empirically	  manifest	  and	  normal	  (see	  Chapter	  2).	  	  
	  
Multi-­‐layered	  and	  shared	  sovereignties	  	  
While	   the	   feeding	   on	   a	   shared	   pool	   of	   resources	  might	   still	   be	   dismissed	   as	   one-­‐sidedly	  parasitical	  feeding	  and/or	  the	  perversion	  of	  the	  state	  qua	  capture	  –	  and	  from	  a	  normative	  perspective	   it	  might	  well	  be	  deemed	   just	   that	  –	   the	  parallel	   state	  argument	   truly	   folds	   in	  light	   of	   how	   different	   projects	   and	   forms	   of	   sovereignty	   co-­‐exist.	   As	   I	   have	   discussed	   at	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various	  points	  in	  this	  thesis,	  the	  Weberian	  notion	  of	  state	  has	  become	  rejected	  as	  outdated	  and	  in	  need	  of	  an	  overhaul,	  which	  appears	  all	  the	  more	  pressing	  in	  light	  of	  the	  liquefaction	  of	  social	  order	  and	  the	  different	  positioning	  and	  role	  of	  the	  ‘traditional’	  nation-­‐state	  in	  this	  context.	   Just	   as	   the	   conception	   of	   state	   itself,	   sovereignty	   as	   the	   state’s	   monopoly	   of	  coercion	  within	   its	   territorial	   confines	   has	   been	   criticized	   as	   overly	   static.	   Koonings	   and	  Kruijt’s	  work	   (2004)	   highlights	   that	   this	   is	   often	   done	   in	   reference	   to	   the	  Global	   South’s	  trend	  towards	  the	  pluralization	  of	  violence.	  Approaches	  critical	  of	  Weberian	  ‘metaphysics’	  (Das)	   reflect	   these	   realities	   by	   focusing	   on	   what	   Hansen	   and	   Steputat	   call	   ‘de	   facto	  sovereignty’,	  which	  draws	  on	  Agamben	   to	  boil	   sovereignty	  down	  to	   the	  possibility	   to	  kill	  with	   impunity	   as	   its	   essence.	   Exploring	   the	   latter	   requires	   transcending	   formal	   and	  institutional	   surfaces	   and	   looking	   for	   the	  ways	   and	   sites	   in	  which	   real-­‐life	   sovereignty	   is	  formed	  and	  exercised.	  This	  is	  an	  investigative	  agenda	  authors	  such	  as	  Mbembé	  and	  Hansen	  and	   Steputat	   (see	   Chapter	   2)	   have	   called	   for	   and	   to	   which	   I	   have	   made	   a	   contribution,	  specifically	   but	   not	   exclusively	   through	   the	   analysis	   of	   justifications	   and	   practices	   of	  alternative	   governance	   that	   include	   the	   production	   of	   killable	   individuals	   and	   groups	  (rateros).	  	  	  	  The	   idea	  of	   a	  multitude	  of	   sovereignties	   (plural)	   that	   are	  more	   limited	   spatially,	   socially,	  and	   temporally,	   that	   exist	   in	   parallel,	   and	   that	   somehow	   interact	   with	   each	   other	   has	  become	  more	  widely	  accepted	  (although	  it	  is	  still	  far	  from	  dominant	  throughout	  the	  social	  sciences).	  Yet,	   as	  noted,	  how	   these	  new	  sovereignties	  are	   formed	  and	  how	   they	   relate	   to	  one	  another	  remains	  underexplored.	  One	  of	  the	  core	  contributions	  of	  this	  thesis	  consists,	  in	  this	   vein,	   in	   demonstrating	   the	   commonly	   underestimated	   degree	   to	   which	   these	  sovereignties	  are	  entangled.	  They	  cannot,	  I	  argue,	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  discrete	  or	  in	  any	  way	  autonomous	  entities.	  The	  latter	  assumption	  still	  lingers	  on	  even	  in	  critical	  accounts,	  albeit	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perhaps	   only	   tacitly.	   But	   one	   example	  here	   is	  Arias’	  work	   (2006),	   in	  which	  he	   speaks	   of	  ‘localised	  sovereignty’.	  Similarly,	  Davis’	  concept	  of	  ‘fragmented	  sovereignty’	  (2010)	  seems	  to	  suggest	  that	  sovereignty	  itself	  has	  been	  broken	  up	  into	  parts,	  which	  in	  themselves	  once	  again	  resemble	  their	   ‘mother	  structure’	  to	  the	  degree	  that	  they	  reproduce	  it	   in	  miniature.	  While	   future	   research	   will	   have	   to	   produce	   data	   on	   additional	   cases	   to	   question	   their	  generalizability,	   my	   findings	   provide	   critical	   reflection	   of	   this	   imagery.	   As	   concerns	   the	  present	  case	  specifically,	  I	  have	  shown	  that	  parallel	  existing	  forms	  of	  sovereignty	  overlap	  in	  a	  number	  of	  ways:	   spatially	   and	   temporarily	   as	  LCT	  and	  higher-­‐level	   state	   actors	   shared	  and	   cohabit	   the	   same	   territory	   and	   during	   the	   same	   time	   and	   socially	   as	   the	   very	   same	  population	   is	   subjected	   to	   practices	   of	   control	   and	   coercion	   by	   LCT	   as	   well	   as	   its	   state	  counterparts.	  	  	  From	   this	   perspective,	   sovereignties	   appear	   as	   principally	   multi-­‐layered.	   It	   moreover	  suggests	  its	  multi-­‐dimensionality	  as	  the	  seeming	  unity	  of	  sovereignty	  is	  broken	  wide	  open	  and	  its	  different	  facets	  –	  spatiality,	  temporality,	  sociality	  –	  become	  sharable	  and,	  crucially,	  commodifiable.	  The	   latter	  provided	   the	  basis	   for	   state	  and	  non-­‐state	  armed	  actors	   to	   co-­‐inhabit	  what	  I	  have	  termed	  a	  trans-­‐legal	  order.	  Concretely,	  what	  emerged	  was	  a	  tit-­‐for-­‐tat	  constellation	   in	   which	   LCT	   invested	   in	   the	   state’s	   symbolic	   façade	   as	   the	   stereotypical	  champion	  of	   legal,	   social,	   and	  moral	   order,	   in	   exchange	   for	  which	   it	  was	   granted	   control	  over	   local	   populations.	   This	   amounts	   to	   the	   de	   facto	   and	   conscious	   surrendering	   of	  functions	   and	   fruits	   of	   sovereignty	   to	   a	   non-­‐state	   armed	   actor	   and	   could	   easily	   be	  understood	   as	   the	   central	   government’s	   (tacit)	   complicity	   in	   letting	   LCT’s	   leaders	   reign	  over	   life	   and	   death.	  Worth	  mentioning	   further	   is	   that	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   sovereignty	   is	  shared	  has	  not	  changed	  in	  any	  significant	  way	  since	  LCT’s	  downfall.	  Killing	  with	  impunity	  was,	  as	  I	  was	  told	  by	  informants	  across	  the	  board,	  part	  and	  parcel	  of	  a	  transition	  to	  a	  new	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arrangement	  of	  alternative	  governance	   in	  which,	  as	  noted	  above,	  non-­‐state	  armed	  actors	  were	  directly	  supported	  by	  the	  central	  government,	  for	  instance	  through	  weapons.	  But	  one	  example	   here	   is	   the	   commander	   of	   an	   autodefensa	   group,	   which	   by	   the	   time	   of	   the	  interview	  has	  been	  absorbed	   into	  the	  Fuerza	  Rural	  and	  thus	  the	   institutional	  body	  of	   the	  state,	  who	  stated	  that	  he	  alone	  had	  killed	  about	  forty	  people.	  These	  acts	  of	  killing	  were,	  as	  the	   above-­‐cited	   advisor	   explained,	   once	   again	   based	   on	   the	   self-­‐imposed	   criterion	   of	  whether	   individuals	   apprehended	   were	   found	   to	   themselves	   have	   killed	   as	   members	   of	  LCT.	  	  
	  
A	  new	  language	  for	  new	  forms	  of	  (dis)order?	  	  
The	  degree	  to	  which	  on-­‐the-­‐ground	  realities	  such	  as	  those	  I	  have	  analyzed	  contradict	  the	  binary	   notions	   contained	   in	   the	   licit-­‐illicit-­‐divide	   has	   raised	   suggestions	   that	   the	  corresponding	  heuristic	  labels	  –	  state	  v	  non-­‐state	  and	  licit	  v	  illicit,	  for	  instance	  –	  should	  be	  abandoned	  altogether	  or,	  at	  the	  very	  least,	  replaced	  with	  drastically	  different	  concepts	  (see	  e.g.	  Davis,	  2010	  and	  Watt/Zepeda,	  2012:6).	  These	  calls	  have	  merit.	  For	  the	  ‘language	  of	  the	  state’	  matters,	  as	  Das	  and	  Poole	  rightly	  observe	  (2004:5).	  It	  pre-­‐establishes	  the	   ‘tropes	  of	  social	  order,	  rationality,	  authority,	  and	  even	  externality	  for	  defining	  [the]	  subject’	  of	  social	  scientists.	   Dominant	   conceptualizations	   of	   the	   state	   act,	   when	   measured	   against	   the	  complexity	  of	   social	   realities	   such	  as	   those	  analyzed	   in	   this	   thesis,	   as	   an	   intellectual	   iron	  cage	  that	  does	  little	  to	  illuminate	  and	  a	  lot	  to	  obscure.	  But,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  is	  precisely	  this	   obscuring	   performance	   that	   is	   vital	   for	   the	   constitution	   and	   sustention	   of	   the	  mentioned	   ‘gray	   zones’	   (Auyero).	   Actual	   social	   practice	   that	   underpins	   the	   convergence	  between	   actors	   populating	   either	   of	   the	   licit-­‐illicit-­‐divide’s	   extremes,	   then,	   contradicts	  them	   as	   much	   as	   it	   is	   enabled	   by	   them.	   And	   as	   long	   as	   they	   retain	   this	   functionality,	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throwing	   them	   out	   altogether	   would	   mean	   going	   over	   the	   top	   and	   prove	   analytically	  counterproductive.	  Take	  the	  example	  of	  sovereignty.	  The	  shift	  away	  from	  its	  metaphysical	  understanding	  towards	  a	  search	  for	  and	  analysis	  of	  its	  de	  facto	  forms	  is	  of	  course	  needed.	  But	  as	  long	  as	  the	  former	  occurs	  as	  a	  tool,	  influence,	  and	  reference	  in	  the	  production	  of	  the	  latter,	  neither	  can	  be	  granted	  intellectual	  superiority.	  ‘Big	  ideas’,	  for	  one,	  come	  prominently	  into	  play	  here.	  Beyond	  their	  continued	  use	  by	  state	  actors,	  they	  have	  come	  to	  increasingly	  serve	  non-­‐state	  actors	  in	  general	  (see	  Paley,	  2002)	  as	  well	  as	  their	  violent	  sub-­‐species	  (see	  Arias/Goldstein,	  2010:17ff.)	  as	   tools	   for	  power	  and	   legitimation.	  LCT	   is	  perhaps	  the	  most	  blatant	  example	  in	  the	  Latin	  American	  context.	  And	  while	  Das	  (2004:248)	  criticizes	  Hansen	  (2001)	  for	  his	  focus	  on	  state	  spectacle	  and	  myth,	  stating	  that	  doing	  so	  ‘fails	  to	  address	  the	  issue	   of	   how	   the	   practice	   of	   sovereignty	   itself	   operates,	   especially	   so	   in	   relation	   to	   the	  production	   of	   ‘’killable	   bodies’’	   (Agamben	   1998)’,	   I	   believe	   that	   this	   is	   precisely	   the	  interaction	   and	  mutual	   shaping	   between	   both	   levels	   that	   should	  more	   clearly	   and	  more	  widely	   be	   adopted	   as	   an	   analytical	   priority	   (successful	   exercises	   of	   this	   type	   have	   been	  presented	  by	  Gledhill,	  1999/2001).	  	  	  This	   requires	  efforts	   to	  disentangle	  both	   levels,	  a	   task	   that	   is	   far	   from	  complete	   (and	   the	  feasibility	   of	   which	   can	   be	   questioned).	   In	   transcending	   façades	   of	   the	   formal	   and	   the	  institutional,	   the	   critical	  works	   I	   have	   discussed	   go	   a	   long	  way.	   In	   some	  ways,	   however,	  they	  remain	  –	  and	  perhaps	  must	  do	  so	  –	  derivative.	  Consider,	  for	  instance,	  Janet	  Roitman’s	  work	  on	  the	  Chad	  basin.	  She	  argues	  that,	  by	  establishing	  themselves	  within	  new	  and	  illicit	  economies	  in	  a	  parasitical	  fashion	  and	  tax	  into	  their	  own	  pockets	  while	  some	  proceeds	  flow	  into	  state	  coffers,	  corrupt	  state	  agents	  end	  up	  reconfiguring	  ‘state	  power’	  and	  that	  ‘the	  state	  thus	  benefits’	   (2004:	  215).	  Apart	   from	  reproducing	  a	  monolithic	   image	  of	   ‘the’	   state,	   this	  highlights	   how	   vast	   or	   even	   non-­‐existent	   the	   boundaries	   are	   from	   such	   a	   perspective.	   If	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such	  behavior	  qualifies	  within	  the	  conceptual	  confines	  of	  the	  state,	  when	  does	  state	  cease	  to	   be	   state?	   The	   critique	   of	   the	   state	   as	   iron	   cage	   seems	   to	   paradoxically	   reproduce	   it.	  Granted,	  in	  my	  elaborations	  on	  the	  case	  of	  LCT	  as	  well	  as	  in	  those	  theoretical	  arguments	  I	  have	  subscribed	  to,	  the	  state	  surfaces	  as	  latently	  present	  and,	  even	  in	  the	  margins,	  central.	  But	  it	  does	  raise	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  it	  is	  possible	  at	  all	  to	  step	  out	  of	  the	  ‘shadow	  of	  the	  state’	  in	  which	  ‘more	  than	  ever	  before	  men	  now	  live’	  (Trouillot,	  2001:125),	  of	  whether	  it	  is	  possible	   for	   us	   to	   conceive	   order	   beyond	   the	   analytical	   confines	   established	   through	  language	  historically	  bound	  to	  it.	  Here,	  I	  can	  only	  ask,	  not	  provide	  answers.	  	  	  What	   seems,	   in	   light	   of	   the	   above,	  most	   pressing	   it	   to	   examine	  whether	   accounts	   on	   the	  production	  of	  social	  order	  (in	  the	  Global	  South)	  sufficiently	  disentangle	  the	  mythical	  from	  the	   empirical	   and	   whether	   they	   adequately	   account	   for	   the	   effects	   produced	   by	   the	  interplay	  between	  the	  two.	  This	  task	  is	  far	  more	  than	  just	  an	  item	  of	  scholarly	  debate.	  For	  the	  licit-­‐illicit-­‐divide	  as	  functional	  myth	  empowers	  practices	  of	  great	  social	  harm	  by	  actors	  situated	  on	  either	  end	  of	  it.	  I	  have	  described	  some	  of	  these	  by	  reproducing	  the	  voices	  and	  experiences	  of	  the	  local	  civilians	  of	  Tierra	  Caliente	  and	  thus	  of	  a	  fragment	  of	  a	  vast	  world-­‐wide	  population	  most	  immediately	  confronted	  with	  the	  adverse	  effects	  of	  the	  distortion	  of	  the	  public	   interest	   through	   self-­‐interested	   trans-­‐legal	   dealings	  between	   state	   and	  violent	  non-­‐state	  actors.	  In	  this	  vein,	  I	  believe	  that	  researchers	  have	  a	  responsibility	  to	  help	  unveil	  its	   reproductive	   and	   performative	   mechanisms	   and	   critically	   reflect	   upon	   them.	  Subsequently,	   scholarship	   that	   follows	   incentives	   to	   act	   as	   ‘apologists’	   for	   state	   power	  (Tilly,	  1985)	  and	  uncritically	  reproduces	  said	  binaries	  should	  be	  scrutinized	  more	  rigidly.	  Paradigmatic	  sensemaking	  on	  organized	  crime,	  as	  dangerously	  close	  to	  state	  interests	  and	  inserted	  into	  the	  production	  of	  moral	  panics	  (see	  here	  my	  discussion	  of	  the	  corresponding	  literature	   in	  Chapter	  1)	  as	   the	  rhetoric	  of	  state	   failure	  and	  national	  security,	   is	  especially	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susceptible.	   Though	   indubitably	   pressing	   and	   spectacular	   in	   co-­‐producing	   harmful	  international	   legislation	   such	   as	   the	   prohibition	   of	   and	   the	   ‘war’	   on	   drugs,	   these	  mechanisms	  frequently	  appear	  in	  subtler	  forms.	  But	  one	  example	  here	  is	  when	  the	  Mexican	  ambassador	  to	  the	  UK	  gave	  a	  speech	  at	  a	  UK	  university	  and	  students,	  myself	  included,	  were	  explicitly	   instructed	   beforehand	   not	   to	   critically	   reflect	   upon	   the	   poorly	   veiled	   aim	   of	  marketing	   the	   exclusive	   narrative	   of	   Mexico	   as	   a	   land	   of	   economic	   progress	   and	   multi-­‐cultural	  diversity.	  This	  degrades	  the	  critical	  potential	  and	  obligation	  of	  higher	  education	  to	  an	  element	  serving	  the	  theatrics	  of	  state	  power	  and	  ultimately	  aids	  and	  abets	  the	  routine	  victimization	  of	  vulnerable	  populations	  in	  Tierra	  Caliente	  and	  beyond.	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